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Electricite & Gaz d'Algerie. Electricity & Gas of Algeria.
Fond Algerien de Developppement. Algerian Development Fund 
Food Balance Sheets
Front de Liberation Nationale. Party of national liberation 
Groupement Agraire d'lndivisaires. Agricultural Grouping of Owners in 
Joint-Possession
Groupement d’entraide paysanne. Grouping of Peasant Mutual Help
Groupement de Mise en Valeur. Grouping of Land Development
Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne. Provisional
government of the Algerian Republic
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Household Budgetary Survey
Import Substitution
Industrialising Industries
Institut Viti-Vinicole. Vine Institute
Ministere de I'Agriculture et de la Reforme Agraire. Ministry of 
agriculture and agricultural reform
Office Algerien Interprofessionel de Cereales. Interprofessional board for 
cereals
Office Algerien de Tourisme. Algerian Tourist Board
Office des Fruits et Legumes d'Algerie. Marketing board for fruits and
vegetables
Office Nationale pour I'Alimentation du Betail. National office for animal 
feed
Office Nationale de Commercialisation. National marketing board 
Office Nationale de Lait et produits laitiers. National board for milk and 
dairy products
Office Nationale Algerien du Materiel Agricole. National office for the use 
of farm machinery
Office National de Peche. National Fishery Board.
Office Nationale Algerien des Produits Oleicoles. National marketing 
board for olive products
Office Nationale de Commercialisation des produits Viti-vinicoles. 
National marketing board for wine
ONRA Office National de la Revolution Agraire. National office of agricultural 
revolution
ONT Office National de Transport. National Transport Board
PAS Private Agricultural Sector
PS The Private Sector
SAP Societe Algerienne de Prevoyance. Algerian provident society
SIP Societe Indigene de Prevoyance. Indigenous provident society
SME Self-Managed Estates
SMF Self-Managed Farms
SMS Self-Managed Sector
SNCFA Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer d’Algerie. National Railway 
Company
SN-SEMPAC Societe Nationale des Semoules, Pates et Couscous. National Enterprise 
for Semolina, Milling, Pasta and Couscous
SONATRACH Societe Nationale de Transport et de Commercialisation des 
Hydrocarbures.National Oil Company
SPC Socio-Professional Categories
UGTA Algerian Workers' Union
UMA Union de Materiel Agricole. Union for farm machinery (machinery 
section of the SIP/SAP)
UNCAC Union des Cooperatives Agricoles de Commercialisation. Union of 
marketing co-operatives (fusion of CORE and CORA)
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Achour
Azel
Bey
Bled
Chefaa
Course
DEY
Fellah
Hokor
Janissary
Khammes
Lazma
Makhzen
Odjak
Rahnia
Raya
W ilaya
Zakat
Direct Muslim tax to which any Muslim is formally bound. Under 
colonisation achour was a tax levied on privately owned land assets (the 
literal meaning of achour refers to the "tenth").
State rented land.
Turkish representative of regional power in Algeria 
Popular designation of Country.
A muslim legal rule which fulfills the function of preservation and 
protection of the community land asset. It essentially prohibits all forms 
of land alienation in favour of a non-muslim entity. The aim of chefaa 
was essentially the preservation and consolidation of the material asset 
of the community.
Maritime practice of corsairs geared towards plunder and violent 
appropriation of wealth.
Turkish representative of central power in Algeria 
Popular denomination of the Algerian peasant farmer.
Inspired muslim direct tax levied on collectively owned land or on the 
fraction of state rented land. Hokor was a form of communal direct tax. 
Turkish soldier at the service of the Ottoman Empire in Algeria 
preceding the French colonisation of Algeria.
Sharecropper to the fifth.
Inspired muslim direct tax levied on individuals.
Strictly speaking, it refers to 'treasury'. By extension, a makhzen tribe 
was a tribe which collaborated with the Turkish central power and as 
such acquitted its tax dues to the Turkish authority. A makhzen tribe 
was therefore that which financed the treasury fund of the Turkish 
power.
A Turkish military cast of officers.
Muslim legal procedure used by usurers to acquire on relatively 
easy terms the fraction of the land under indivision rule which is not 
mortgaged because one of the co-owners is not able to meet the payment 
of the borrowed capital.
Raya or s i b a  tribes rebelled against the authority of the 
central Turkish power. As such, as a result of the military weakness of 
the Turkish power, these tribes were not able to acquit their tax dues.
The expression bled siba refers to the territory upon which the 
authority of such tribes extended.
Administrative district (Wilayate is the plural of Wilaya)
Direct Muslim tax which is calculated in proportion to the size of 
livestock. It was a form of tax on wealth.
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A b strac t
The aim of this work is the study of the context under which the development of 
capitalist relations of production in Algeria affected the conditions of reproduction of 
labour power at subsistence level. More specifically it is argued that as a result of the 
specific characteristics of capitalist development in Algeria, a constant time-lag 
prevailed between the extension of wage labour and the conditions of production of the 
value of labour power.
Part I investigates the historical roots of this dichotomy by looking at the outcome of 
the penetration of capitalist relations of production accompanying the emergence of a 
colonial capitalist agriculture. More specifically this part assesses the extent of the 
contradiction existing between the generalisation of commodity relations at the level of 
the social formation and the increased proletarianisation of the indigenous population.
Part II assesses the conditions under which the post-colonial strategy of capital 
accumulation became possible, and how it tackled the inherited colonial contradiction. 
By considering the emergence of the post-colonial state and the impulse of oil rent, the 
thesis investigates the configuration of the industrial policy proper and its effects from 
the view point of the extension of capitalist relations of production on the conditions of 
reproduction of labour power.
Part III takes up the issue of the impact of the post-colonial policy of accumulation, 
particularly from the standpoint of the diffusion of wage earning relations on the 
conditions of production of wage goods. The mode of production of the food component of 
labour power is considered in both the capitalist and the non-capitalist sectors. The 
variety of capitalist forms of land ownership is taken into account. Vis-a-vis the
established capitalist public sector the thesis assesses the interwoven relation that 
exists between the state mode of control over agricultural surplus and the poor 
conditions of performance of the sector itself. Within the private sector the penetration 
of capitalist relations of production is perceived in terms of the social differentiation 
achieved. The promotion of agrarian transformations based on the suppression of 
absolute ground rent and capitalist farming is assessed in terms of its effects upon the 
elevation of agricultural output and the alleviation of rural unemployment. More 
specifically this part studies the impact that capitalist state agriculture’ and the reform 
of agrarian structures have produced in terms of the emergence of an agricultural 
surplus in the form of wage goods to meet the constraint created by the development of 
the wage-earning system accompanying industrial capital accumulation.
Part IV deals directly with the state mode of management of the food constraint. An 
appreciation of the main patterns of food consumption of the different social groups, 
particularly as they emerged in the aftermath of the policy of accumulation and wage 
earning diffusion, helps locate the terms of the contribution of domestic production and 
food imports. More specifically this part provides for the terms of access to food 
patterns in the form of a food management of labour power. The main proposition that 
runs through this final part is that the state food policy based on the supply of wage 
goods at fixed prices is essentially the manifestation of a policy whose objective 
corresponds to a mode of regulation of the value of labour power most compatible with 
the fulfilment of the realisation of the conditions of valorisation of capital itself.
INTRODUCTION
The subject matter of this thesis is concerned with the status that food crisis assumes 
in the face of capital accumulation. Capital accumulation is here understood as a social 
process of production whereby the valorisation of capital is operated via the 
productive consumption of labour and the accumulation of surplus value: capital as a 
self-perpetuating value thus refers to the process of capital as a dominating social 
relation of production. Our main proposition is that food crisis not only represents the 
archetype of agrarian contradiction proper to third world social formations, but is 
also the condition upon which the development of capitalism proceeds in such 
countries. Indeed, in the current literature devoted to the agrarian question in less 
developed countries, little consideration has been given to such a specific aspect of the 
question. The main shortcoming associated with an overemphasis on the exclusive food 
aspect of agrarian crisis is the fact that it hides the very condition upon which the 
reproduction of labour power itself actually takes place . Our main proposition is that 
the state food policy based on the supply of wage-goods at fixed prices is essentially the 
manifestation of a policy whose objective corresponds to a mode of regulation of the 
value of labour power most compatible with the fulfilment of the realisation of the 
conditions of valorisation of social capital itself. The management of the exchange value 
of labour power, essentially regulated by the value of foodstuffs, therefore indirectly 
sets the conditions under which capital is allowed to productively consume labour 
power or the objective conditions under which surplus produce is generated (for a 
given produce, the determination of the value of labour power sets that of surplus 
produce itself). Rather than food crisis leading to the control of the value of wage foods, 
it is assumed that the requirement of the regulation of the value of labour power based 
on the promotion of cheap food-cheap labour policies which, in the last analysis, 
commands the whole methodology. As such the issue raises not only the study of the 
agrarian question from the viewpoint of the impact of its capitalist development, but 
also the conditions under which the process of capital accumulation is interrelated
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with the determination of the value of labour power through the supply of wage goods 
(particularly since at subsistence level the price of labour power is that of wage 
goods). As a result of the requirement of capitalist development the conditions of 
reproduction of wage labour becomes directly dependent on the conditions under which 
the value of labour power is obtained through a policy of regulation of the value of wage 
goods, a strategy of production of such goods.
The main contention of this thesis is that, as a result of the particularisms of the 
historical development of capitalism in Algeria, a constant gap persisted between the 
diffusion of wage relations and the production of wage goods, with the development of 
the former taking an advance on the latter. Contrary to the prevalent theses on third 
world food crisis which tend to be partial and non functionalist in their methodology 
(see Appendix A), it is our main proposition that the present agro-food situation 
characterising Algeria is the result of the direct requirement imposed by capitalist 
development itself. The promotion of cheap food policies aimed at producing cheap 
labour, becomes the correlate of the promotion of capitalist relations of production. 
But if it is in the interest of capital to employ cheap labour, the promotion of cheap 
food policies in turn acts as a depressing factor upon the agricultural section producing 
wage foods. The management of such a contradiction which therefore maintains on the 
one hand the promotion of capitalist relations of production while on the other 
perpetuates the material basis of agrarian crisis, represents the substance of our 
problematic. The particularisms of the Algerian experience are also those of a social 
formation belonging to peripheral capitalism. As the historical product of a capitalism 
of colonisation, the contemporary Algerian social formation is also characterised by 
three fundamental attributes.
1. The agrarian transition along capitalist lines is an on-going process. This point, 
which is often overlooked (particularly in the Algerian economic literature), is 
however of great importance to the significance and understanding of the Algerian case.
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The main cause of neglect of such a point seems to come from a lack of appreciation of 
the particular historical forms of development of peripheral capitalism. Understood 
through a transposition of the scenario of the development of capitalism which 
characterised industrialised countries, the diffusion of wage relations and wage labour 
did indeed coincide, particularly at the early stage of the industrial revolution, with 
the conditions of production of the value of labour power as embodied in the quantum of 
wage foods necessary to its reproduction. Such a scenario illustrates the historical case 
whereby the industrial development of capitalism coincided with the capitalist 
development of agriculture resulting in the substantial elevation of agricultural 
surplus. However, the problematic of development of capitalism in its Algerian context 
does not yet conform to such a process. The historical penetration of capitalist 
relations of production in agriculture in Algeria has not, strictly speaking, resulted 
directly from within the social formation's own internal social dynamic; rather it has 
been imposed on it from outside. In comparison to the classic scenario of capitalist 
development in Europe whereby the emergence of the capitalist relations of production 
was the product of the internal unfolding of the contradictions contained within the 
feudal mode of production, the history of capitalist development in Algeria was atypical 
in ail aspects. Given such an historical particularism of the development of capitalism, 
the treatment of the agrarian question ought to be assessed in a transitional phase, i.e. 
a process whereby a progressive capitalist transformation of the social relations of 
production in peasant agriculture is still taking place under the impetus of an 
essentially urban industrial capital accumulation. The assessment of the relation 
between capital accumulation and the agrarian question is therefore an assessment 
proper to a social formation whereby the social division of labour at the level of 
agriculture is still operated on the basis of a preservation of simple commodity 
production and peasant economy, the reproduction of household farming guaranteeing 
the production of cheap labour and therefore cheap food. Indeed under the impetus of 
the penetration of capitalist relations of production the peasant economy acted de facto
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as a reservoir of cheap labour: as a producer of use values rather than exchange 
values, i.e. an exchange relation whose generalisation defines more the capitalist firm 
which aims at the realisation and accumulation of profit than the household unit cycle 
which is regulated by simple reproduction. Here the household unit integration in the 
social division of labour is operated on the basis of the exchange of use-values against 
marketed commodities in order to meet part of the direct consumption of the household 
members, and/or the acquisition of industrial inputs for productive consumption 
purposes.
The conventional classic debate about the capitalist transformation of agriculture does 
not however revolve around capital accumulation and food production per se (which is 
part of the focus of our problematic), but mainly focuses on the fate of the peasantry 
as a social category. This is not to say however that the conditions under which the 
peasantry and its components are being reproduced and/or differentiated do not bear a 
powerful relation to the conditions of formation of agricultural surplus. The polarity 
in the debate is whether the capitalist penetration of agriculture does or does not bring 
about the economic elimination of the peasantry. In such a context the whole question 
revolves around the existence or absence of a strictly peasant mode of production. 
When the existence of such a mode is asserted, the theorisation of the agrarian question 
is usually assessed in terms of articulation between the precapitalist and the capitalist 
modes of production. From an historical perspective the debate which opposed the 
Russian bolsheviks (with V. Lenin), the populist Narodniks (with V.P. Vorentstov and 
N.F. Danielson), and the neo-populist A.V. Chayanov, as well as K. Kautsky and the 
German Social Democratic Party etc., revolved around the survival of the peasantry 
(from the viewpoint of the peasant mode of production), or its disappearance (from 
the prospect of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production). According to the 
latter position, though the category of peasantry belongs a part entiere as a class to 
the precapitalist mode of production, its status in a capitalist mode of production is 
that of a fraction of class which assumes by definition only a transitional, non­
permanent form, and as such represents a fraction of class whose ultimate 
development will be regulated by the outcome of the social differentiation resulting via 
its social decomposition into a class of capitalist farmers on the one hand, and a rural 
proletariat on the other (under the capitalist mode of production peasants no longer 
assume the function of stability which was theirs in the precapitalist mode of 
production, but rather are bound to disappear as a class). Though the proponents of the 
peasant mode of production are aware of the increasing dominance of the capitalist 
mode of production, their entire analysis remains basically imprisoned by the 
theorisation of the household economy perceived within itself and not so much in terms 
of the progressive alteration of its features as a result of the increased 
commoditisation and the development of capitalism (see Bernstein on this point).
The whole Marxist debate which revolves around the theoretical assessment of the 
capitalist development of agriculture however raises some important issues for the 
characterisation of peripheral agriculture. Marx's position on the tendency of 
capitalist agriculture is clear: the capitalist transition of agriculture leads to the 
emergence of large-scale units operated by capitalist farmers. In itself such a 
movement would imply that the emergence of a capitalist agriculture was based on the 
expropriation of the peasantry and the concomitant emergence of a proletariat. In 
Marx's view the fate of the peasantry was sealed and their economic survival was not 
considered. As G. Djurfeldt put it "an expansion compatible with small scale production 
is an exception to Marx's view" (1).
Kautsky’s writings, considered by scholars as a continuation of Marx's 'Capital', 
reached the same conclusion. The concentration of land in big estates is bound to emerge 
as the main tendency of the capitalist development of agriculture under the effects of 
the economies of scale obtained through crop specialisation, the use of machines, 
labour, agronomists etc. The economic superiority of large scale estates was also 
evident in terms of access to credit and marketing facilities. As a result of the
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particularism of agriculture by opposition to industry, Kautsky was however "much 
less insistent than Marx has been that economies of scale in capitalist production 
favoured the large agriculturalists" (2). Since the extension of area under cultivation 
does not make a large estate more efficient, "a smaller holding cultivated on an 
intensive basis constitutes a larger enterprise than a bigger farm that is exploited 
extensively" (3). In other, words Kautsky's position is that the fate of the peasantry as 
a future proletariat can be delayed but not avoided.
While sharing the same view as Marx and Kautsky on the main tendency of capitalist 
development of agriculture, Lenin provided for the characterisation of agrarian 
transition proper. Under increasing commoditisation of production the formation of the 
rural class structure is operated via a process of peasant differentiation. Though 
Lenin's preference is for a farmer mode of capitalist development of agriculture, the 
outcome of the differentiation is inevitably in favour of two main classes: the rural 
bourgeoisie/capitalist farmers and a rural proletariat. This position is also held by T. 
J. Byres who even sees social differentiation upon which is based the emergence of a 
leading class of capitalist farmers as a prerequisite "before capital can begin to realise 
its full potential" (4)*
The experience of Third World countries shows that the movement of social 
differentiation is not that of a concentration of farms accompanied by a reduction of 
small scale units, but rather one accompanied by a parallel movement: a fragmentation 
of small scale units. Such a movement does not by itself contradict Marx's proposition 
since the formulation of the tendency of capitalist development ought to be 
distinguished from the concrete manifestation of its development. Moreover the forms 
under which capital manifests itself depend to a large extent on the concrete conditions 
under which it operates. What is at issue at this level is the mode of interpretation of a 
theory which initially focused mainly on the agricultural development of Europe and 
Russia. In the context of peripheral countries the terms of the problem are to be 
reformulated since neither the rapid development of agrarian capitalism nor the
survival of the peasant economy can be ignored. Here the issue does not rest on "the 
question of the future of small scale farming alone; on the contrary, we should look for 
all the changes which agriculture experiences under the domination of capitalist 
production" (5). The conditions under which the agrarian development of peripheral 
countries proceeds tend to suggest that the type of farm most identified with the 
capitalist development of agriculture is the average farm and not the large one.
Two factors determine such a characteristic: the nature of industrial development 
occurring in most peripheral countries, and the impact that the survival of small scale 
units has vis-a-vis average and large estates. As far as the mode of industrialisation 
is concerned, the conditions under which capital accumulation have been proceeding 
has not been able to generate a self-sustained industrial development capable of 
absorbing a sustained mass of pauperised peasants within the ranks of the industrial 
proletariat. This form of industrialisation in turn affects the mode of development of 
agriculture which thus loses "its former independence and becomes bound up with 
social development as a whole" (6). Under the conditions of an expanding urban cheap- 
wage food demand the diffusion of capitalist relations of production in agriculture 
necessarily acquires its own particularism. As a result of the peasant characteristic of 
agriculture it becomes possible for capitalist farming to be operated essentially on the 
basis of ’unfree' labour still bound to the small holding. In such a context the economic 
conditions under which peasants are reproduced are essentially precarious; this is 
because of their ability to sell their produce at its cost-price, incorporating an even 
lower level of personal consumption. The terms of competition between small scale and 
larger units and "the resistence that the peasant farm puts up before the large holding 
is based not on its higher productivity but on its lesser needs" (7). Being the least 
dependent on hired labour, it is the average farm which is most able to combine the 
characteristics of capitalist units (the production for the market) and peasant farming 
(the use of family labour). Given such conditions it also becomes very difficult for 
such farms to escape in turn an intense process of internal differentiation as kinship
relations are used as a surrogate for wage relations based on 'free' labour. Compared to 
average farms, large estates therefore enjoy both lower family labour facilities and 
higher wage bills even in the context of an essentially peasant economy. Here the 
industrial requirement of cheap food also acts as a deterrent vis-a-vis this type of 
farm.
In so far as our problematic bears a relation to the fate of the peasantry, the study of 
the impact of capitalism on the peasantry is significant not only from the viewpoint of 
the food aspect of the question (peasant agriculture being by definition based on simple 
commodity production, or a strictly speaking subsistence farming), but also as a 
result of the terms under which the process of differentiation itself is taking place: 
peasant production is increasingly regulated - depending in its intensity on the 
specific path of capitalist development of agriculture - by market mechanisms, and the 
preservation of the household unit as an economic activity is maintained only at the 
cost of an increasing differentiation resulting in the semi-proletarianisation of its 
members (reflected in the dual status of the existence of peasant-workers), and/or 
simple proletarianisation (assuming the status of agricultural and/or industrial 
workers).
2. The conditions of capital accumulation in post-colonial Algeria are determined by a 
form of a surplus whose realisation takes place mainly on the international market. In 
other words the generation of economic surplus acquires in the main the features of 
mining rent in the specific form of oil rent generated on the world energy market. Both 
as a form of economic surplus and as a source of investment and accumulation, oil rent 
(or the ability of oil to capture, as a result of the existence of differential rents, 
surplus profit on the international energy market), acquires an exceptional 
theoretical and economic significance. Broadly speaking three characteristics single 
out the strategic value of oil for third world oil exporting countries in general and 
Algeria in particular.
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a. As the dominant form of energy consumed by developed capitalist countries, oil 
acquires the characteristics of a commodity whose valorisation takes mainly place on 
the energy segment of the international capitalist market.
b. By its location and the diversity in the natural conditions of its production, as well 
as a result of capital's needs for energy through machines, oil production is 
increasingly giving rise to the formation of differential rents above average profit 
(including differential rent of type I, i.e. rent "caused by natural differences between 
[oil fields]", and/or differential rent of type II, i.e. "caused by variations in the 
amount of investment in [oil fields]" (8).
c. The international distribution of oil fields is such that a great proportion located in 
third world countries are higher grade/low operating costs fields. As a result of a 
series of factors pertaining to their history (colonisation, political independence, the 
initiation of industrialisation, the political and economic claims of new emerging 
domestic classes etc.), few third world countries progressively emerged from the 
status of providers of rent-free oil fields to foreign oil companies, to 
owners/operators of oil fields. With such progressive social transformations, 
nationalisations of oil fields and/or the increase in international oil prices enabled 
many third world oil exporting countries to operate to their advantage a new 
international redistribution of oil surplus profit. The gains obtained from such shifts 
are the basis for the most ambitious industrial plans implemented in many oil 
exporting countries of the periphery.
The favourable international context under which Algeria has been able to appropriate 
its share of oil rent has profoundly marked its industrial policy of accumulation 
concerning both the acquisition of the objective conditions of capital in the form of the 
most sophisticated machines (which from an immediate point of view cannot be 
autonomously reproduced), and the fulfilment of the condition of reproduction of
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variable capital mainly in the form of subsistence food imports. Whether in its 
objective (constant capital) or subjective (labour power) components, capital 
accumulation therefore proceeded (exclusively for the latter and increasingly for the 
former) on the sole contribution of oil rent. By allowing for the most intensive 
industrial accumulation of capital in the Algerian social formation, the mode of 
consumption of oil receipts and their magnitude acted as the motor-engine of social 
transformations of relations of production along capitalist lines.
3. As a result of the historical particularism of such a capitalism, its development 
proceeded more as a consequence of the deliberate state policy of accumulation than as a 
result of the spontaneous historical conditions associated with the emergence of an 
economic surplus based on an already well established social division of labour with its 
correlated developed classes. As such, and in the absence of well developed domestic 
classes (and particularly a capitalist class), the extension and development of 
commodity relations becomes inseparable from the post-colonial state itself. As the 
manager and promoter of capitalist development, the Algerian state de facto posits 
itself not only as the substitute to an absent domestic bourgeois class capable of 
imposing a capitalist project on the rest of society, but also as the main social force 
whose dominance dictates and defines the forms under which the development of such a 
capitalist class is to proceed.
From what precedes it can be stated that while food crisis reflected the particular 
conditions of development proper to peripheral capitalism, the regulation of the value 
of labour power via the control of wage foods became at the same time the condition 
under which such a peripheral capitalism could proceed. The corollary of the 
perpetuation of such a contradiction tends implicitly to suggest that, under conditions 
of peripheral capitalism, the conditions of extraction of surplus labour (though not 
excluding relative surplus value) are still dominated by its absolute form (the 
rationale of cheap food policies also contains the mechanisms of capital needs for the 
production of relative surplus population).
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In its mode of exposition this thesis is articulated in four parts. Taking an historical 
perspective, Part I deals with an assessment of the extent of the destruction of the 
Algerian peasant economy under the impact of French colonisation. As a result of the 
particular violent conditions under which French colonisation served as a vector of 
penetration and diffusion of capitalist relations of production, the extent of agrarian 
transformations which occurred during the colonial presence lasting 132 years 
acquired an authentic character of a revolution in the agro-pastoral basis of 
precolonial Algeria. Parallel to successive authoritarian population displacements, the 
colonial power proceeded to a systematic tribal land confiscation directly geared 
towards the constitution of an export-oriented capitalist agricultural sector within the 
exclusive hands of the colonists. As a result of its greater dependence on nature for its 
reproduction (the relative economic autarchy that prevailed among the tribes was 
linked to an insufficient economic surplus which in itself was a reflection of. a social 
division of labour which did not go beyond the threshold of the elementary agricultural 
division of labour), the agro-pastoral economy was unable to adapt to a profound 
alteration and/or shrinking of its land base. While preserved in its forms through the 
reproduction of the old technique of production and its labour process, the 
preservation of subsistence crops, the use of family labour, the ownership of land, 
etc., peasant economy was increasingly dominated by capitalist relations of production. 
The conjunction of coercive means and market mechanisms profoundly altered simple 
commodity production (the main characterisation of simple commodity production is a 
situation typical of agricultural producers who direct their activity towards the 
immediate internal needs of the household members through an essentially 
agriculturalist occupation and the development of rural industry; as such this mode of 
production is characterised by an identity between production and consumption). 
Under the requirement of capital for the maximum extraction of peasant surplus, 
simple commodity producers were increasingly integrated in commodity relations to
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meet their needs for cash to acquit their tax dues, part of their immediate consumption 
as well as the acquisition of some industrial inputs necessary for the organisation of 
the production process. Peasants were also incorporated in capitalist relations of 
production as sellers of labour (this process is typical of the diffusion of commodity 
production which results in the progressive destruction of rural industry). The 
integration of peasants in both commodity and labour markets proceeded from the 
process under which their social differentiation was operated . Under the impact of 
commodity relations and the dominance of capital, peasants' integration in the social 
division of labour necessarily resulted - depending on their initial resource 
endowment in terms of land, labour etc. - in their progressive differentiation into 
distinct social categories. Under the historical context of the colonial development of 
capitalism there emerged the modern social categories of poor peasants, a category 
"unable to reproduce themselves by household production [and which] exchange their 
labour power on a regular basis and come to form a category reproduced through the 
sale of labour power" (9): this category encompasses landless, near-landless, 
sharecroppers etc.; middle peasants who are relatively able to reproduce themselves 
through family labour (the stability of this category is only relative); and rich 
peasants assimilated to capitalist farmers engaged in accumulation, producing for the 
market, purchasing outside labour, relying on industrial inputs and whose raison
Besides the profound alteration in the domestic agro-pastoral economy and the specific 
characteristics of its decomposition, the colonial era of the capitalist development of 
Algeria inaugurated mainly the privileged development of an important colonial 
capitalist agricultural sector realised at the expense of the domestic economy and 
catering mainly for needs outside the indigenous population (most of the colonial 
exports catered for French consumers and French industry while Algerian imports 
were, as a result of the decidedly unequal distribution of wealth and income, intended 
almost solely for the needs of settlers).
d'etre/to make a profit.
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The cumulative effects of the drastic reduction of the land at the disposal of the tribes, 
the consequent alteration in their mode of farming, the weight of the demographic 
pressure etc, contributed to producing in the open an increasing mass of pauperised 
and proletarianised peasants with neither the means of producing their own 
subsistence as direct producers, nor the possibility of employment .
As a result of an absent domestic industry capable of absorbing the mass of pauperised 
peasants and the type of technological model upon which colonial farming was based 
(settlers resorted to an essentially labour-saving technology combining intense 
mechanisation - particularly in cereal farming - and the practice of seasonal labour 
during peak seasons in vine growing), the employment of the majority of the 
population depended essentially on the contribution of the peasant sector alone (only 
emigration was to some extent able to promote a diffusion and alteration of the 
increased economic marginalisation of peasants). Through its ability to reproduce 
labour power during a great part of the year, the peasant economy reproduced the 
subsistence condition of such a reproduction. Via-a-vis the capitalist sector, the 
peasant economy became not only the main supplier of labour power but also the 
regulator of cheap labour (during the last years of colonisation, and as a result of the 
massive military operation which displaced about 3 million peasants and froze all 
their corresponding supporting resources for 7 years, it can be assessed that the 
peasant economy assumed these two functions on a much wider scale).
As a result of the privileged links with France that served to consolidate the colonial 
sector (the colonial sector can be considered as an organic appendix vis-a-vis the 
metropolitan economy), the development of capitalist relations of production did not 
result in promoting a major process of capital accumulation beyond both the immediate 
interests of the colonists and the sphere of colonial agriculture. Based on a total 
rejection of the political expression of all domestic classes as well as on their 
economic subordination to the French bourgeoisie (which resulted in their increased
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pauperisation), colonialism was not able to contain a dissent which culminated in an 
exclusively peasant war of liberation. The colonial inheritance after a period of 132 
years was in the form of a developed capitalist agricultural sector devoid of its colonial 
owners (on the eve of the political independence of Algeria there was a massive exodus 
of European settlers towards France), a ravaged economy after an intensified all-out 
war of seven years, a national bourgeoisie in its infancy, an insignificant proletariat, 
a small class of large landowners, a large petty bourgeois class distributed among 
different professions, an important organised army, a predominant fraction of 
pauperised peasants and an absent industry. Caught in social contradictions brought 
about by an historical development which had wrested political control from its own 
domestic classes, Algeria faced a radically new situation when its gained its political 
independence.
Part II sets out the post colonial conditions of capital accumulation proper. As a result 
of the specific impact of colonisation on the class configuration of the Algerian social 
formation, the post colonial strategy of development emerged mainly as a result of the 
influence that the occurrence of oil rent produced on the financial ability of the post 
colonial state. The importance of a sizeable oil rent appropriated on the world energy 
market conferred upon the state the necessary resources that compensated for an 
otherwise deficient economic surplus (particularly agrarian), large enough to finance 
its industrial project. In this respect the diffusion of capitalist relations of production 
was achieved through a state legitimation based on industrialisation. The peculiarity of 
such a policy is that it did not directly require a capitalist class, i.e. in its classical 
sense. Such a class, in its genesis, was the "creation" of the state strategy of 
accumulation, and as such the light industrial activities complemented the state sector 
of heavy industry. While creating mutually consolidating bonds between the "private" 
sector and the state sector, such a sectoral division of labour served as a sharp 
emulator in the overall development of capitalist relations of production. The 
promotion of industrialisation was not however limited solely to the massive
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accumulation of fixed capital. The formation of an urban proletariat that such an 
accumulation of fixed capital enabled, was made possible as a result also of an already 
existing mass of "free” labourers and pauperised peasants. Under the impact of the 
rapid development of wage relations, peasant agriculture was no longer in a position to 
meet the sudden new food demand that industrialisation conferred on a growing urban 
population. While the constitution of a permanent industrial proletariat exhausted the 
dominant regulatory subsistence function performed by peasant economy, the necessity 
for preserving a minimum rate of return of capital dictated that the management of the 
value of labour power met the requirement of capital valorisation itself. Since at 
subsistence level the value of labour power is that of the necessary wage foods required 
to guarantee its reproduction, it is, all things being equal, on the management of the 
agricultural sector and specifically the sector producing wage goods that the objective 
of full development of capital accumulation at large and industry in particular will be 
realised. However, in the absence of a profound alteration in agrarian structures 
capable of providing the extra rural job opportunities, and increased agricultural 
production for the growing urban population, the attenuated direct effects of the state 
capitalist strategy on employment creation (because of a high organic composition of 
capital) were able to contend with neither the massive movement of rural exodus, nor 
the development of emigration proper. The agrarian strategy was born out of such a 
necessity.
In Part III consideration is given to the treatment of the agrarian question proper. The 
study of agrarian structures is perceived from the viewpoint of capital requirement 
for the availability of cheap wage foods. The realisation of such an objective js mainly 
assessed through the conditions under which the development of agrarian capitalism 
itself was promoted and which consists in the preservation and development of the ex­
colonial estates under state capitalist management, and an extension of capitalist 
relations in agriculture via the suppression of pre-capitalist relations of production 
(as a matter of fact this is one of the undeclared aims behind not only the Algerian
programme of land reform but also behind most of the land reform programmes in 
most peripheral capitalist countries). The preservation of the peasant economy as a 
source of cheap food is also assessed. Overall level this part studies the conditions 
under which the increase in agricultural production (and subsequently rural 
employment) was attempted. More specifically this part assesses the impact that the 
ex-colonial sector and the reform of the agrarian structures have produced in terms of 
the emergence of an agricultural surplus in the form of wage goods to meet the 
constraint created by the development of the wage-earning system. The study of 
Algerian agriculture reveals the imbalance and uneveness existing in the different 
modes of production. Chapter one examines the characteristics and performance of the 
most advanced capitalist agriculture in relation to its state management. At the level of 
this sector the roots of a stagnant agricultural production associated with the 
state/junker form of management of the estates are clearly established. Chapter two 
examines the pattern of agricultural development in the so-called "traditional" sector, 
only to find the co-existence of different modes of farming based on different land 
tenure systems under private ownership stretching from pre-capitalist forms 
(khamassat, indivisible property or indivision), capitalist forms proper, to the 
substantial dominance of small peasant farmers. The relatively better performance of 
peasant agriculture which does not, however, cancel the overall tendency towards a 
stagnant food production is also assessed. Chapter three analyses the significance of the 
1970 agrarian reform through its two main objectives: the simplification of the land 
tenure system as a whole and the extension of state capitalist agriculture in the form of 
the creation of a formally new sector of agricultural revolution. With the attempt to do 
away with all forms of pre-capitalist relations in agriculture and formally 
eliminating all forms of permanently hired wage labour, this chapter assesses the 
effect of the nominal suppression of absolute ground rent and the limits associated with 
the promotion of a form of farmers' agriculture based on sole owner farmers.
In Part IV the actual terms under which the supply of cheap wage foods is regulated are
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considered. In addition to the direct organisation of wage food production essentially 
limited to the centralised management of the ex-colonial sector consolidated by the 
creation of a sector of "agricultural revolution", the management of cheap labour is 
complemented by the use of cheap food imports (as a result of the combined effects of 
international food surpluses - particularly European - and an overvalued rate of 
exchange which also cheapens all imports), and a systematic use of state domestic food 
pricing policy. Chapter one highlights the structure of food needs and its evolution. The 
terms and significance of such an evolution are followed up from the viewpoint of the 
parallel hierarchical distribution of food availability between the main social groups. 
Chapter two examines the economic and financial aspects of the policy of regulation of 
the value of labour power proper. Financial considerations are essentially directed 
through an assessment of the "cost" of food subsidies and their mode of financing. The 
study of the economic aspect of cheap food policy highlights for its part the 
contradiction contained in the deployment of a food strategy based essentially on import 
substitution.
In the final part of this thesis the fall of international oil prices is investigated in 
terms of the impact that the drastic reduction of oil rent is likely to produce on the 
conditions under which capital accumulation and its correlated cheap food policy has so 
far proceeded.
The period covered for the purpose of this research begins with the French 
colonisation of Algeria and ends in principle in 1980 (as a result of the economic 
changes inaugurated by the post 1980s new policy of liberalisation, a data reference to 
the post 1980s period is made only for the purpose of a trend illustration).
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PART I
COLONISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE
In t roduct ion .
French colonisation in Algeria lasted 132 years. Over this period which stretched from 
one century into another, the colonial presence (which in effect temporally still 
outstrips the post- independence history of Algeria), was at the origin of the deepest 
modern transformations ever to be experienced by the Algerian social formation in the 
form of the destruction of its natural economy, the massive land confiscation and 
expropriation of its peasantry, the generalisation of commodity relations, the 
intensification of pauperisation and proletarianisation of its population, and the 
extension and development of the wage system, etc. From the standpoint of the pre­
colonial social formation (see below), the irruption of French colonisation inaugurated 
an authentic revolutionary era in terms of the socio-economic effects it generated. As a 
result of the passage from one mode of production to another, the destruction and 
dissolution of the ancient order reached an intensity which was considered to have been 
only "surpassed in the colonisation of America" (10).
The extent of the socio-economic transformations involved on the one hand and the 
importance that the colonial legacy itself was to assume in the unfolding of the post­
independence organisation of the Algerian economy and society on the other, largely 
justify the particular study of the colonial history of Algeria. More specifically the 
focus of the chapter essentially revolves around the conditions under which French 
colonisation served as a vector of penetration of capitalist relations. The driving force, 
under whose impetus the entire social panorama of nineteenth century Algeria was
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"restructured", was embodied in the conditions surrounding the constitution of the 
colonial agricultural sector. As a result of its open character of an exclusively 
agrarian colonisation of settlement, the colonial period of Algeria can be rightly seen 
as the history of Algeria's first authentic capitalist agrarian revolution. The profound 
destruction and disorganisation of the indigenous society combined with the segregated 
development operated by the colonial power in favour of the exclusive interests of the 
settlers, ultimately created both the negation of the colonial order proper and the new 
conditions under which the vacuum of the colonial power now redefines the strategy of 
the domestic classes and groups. The full perception of such a long historical movement 
needs, however, to be punctuated by an appreciation (however brief) of the nature of 
the Algerian social formation on the eve of the colonial penetration in order to better 
assess both the causes behind the long period of colonisation itself (over a century), 
and the full extent of the French influence on the one hand, and of how the conditions 
under which the constitution of the colonial agricultural sector was operated, reshaped 
- through a drastic alteration of its material basis - the entire configuration of the 
Algerian social formation and set, at the same time, the new terms of development of 
its main groups and classes (in short the study of colonial Algeria remains inseparable 
from the study of a peripheral capitalist formation). Let us successively follow the 
progress of this movement.
I. A brief preliminary historical background: pre-colonial Algeria.
Preceding the French conquest Algeria - or rather that fraction of the Maghreb which 
was to become modern Algeria - was part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire whose 
representative was the Bey who derived his power from the military cast of odjak and 
the jannissaries (Turkish soldiers). The nature of Turkish power was such that it did 
not extend beyond a limited fraction of the population, i.e. that precisely located around 
the town-state. Beylical land, or rather that portion of the land out of which Beylical 
power drew its taxation, belonged mainly to Makhzen  tribes (literally the tribes
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which exempted the payment of Turkish taxes), i.e. those tribes which, because of 
their immediate location within the vicinity of the Turkish power around urban 
centres (11), were unable to extricate themselves from such duties. Unlike the 
Makhzen tribes whose favourable natural agricultural land basis - land fertility - 
allowed for the payment of a fraction of their surplus produce, the Raya (or Siba) 
tribes, i.e. the rebellious tribes, enjoyed a much larger autonomy and independence 
vis-a-vis the coercive Turkish tax power. The payment of taxes by such tribes was 
kept to a minimum. The resistence of Raya tribes (in fact the majority of the 
population) to paying tax due to the central power, a feature which has not passed 
unnoticed by historians such as A. Noushi, J. Berque, R. Galissot, and A. Laroui, etc., 
has usually been attributed to the insufficient level of agricultural surplus, which 
could not bear continuous deductions for tax purposes. The social scientist Lahouari 
Addi, who studied in detail the pre-colonial period of Algeria, clearly states this point: 
"As far as the Maghreb was concerned, the agricultural surplus has always been 
insufficient, and this insufficiency has marked its history" (12). The social condition 
under which the pre-colonial Algerian formation guaranteed its reproduction was 
achieved through an essentially tribal framework. The collective organisation of the 
labour process combining agriculture and livestock farming remained uniformly 
communal, whether in the mountainous regions, where a form of sedentary 
agricultural prevailed, or in the wide regions of the steppes. As a result of the limited 
size of agricultural surplus (itself in fact a result of a limited social division of 
labour), there prevailed a relative autonomy between the different tribes themselves. 
The existence of a large pasture land prompted a form of itinerant economic activity 
combining both the pursuit of livestock breeding based on the possibility of a 
continuous regeneration of the reproductive capacity of the land as a result of the 
permanent displacement of the tribe, and cereal farming in association with the use of 
fallow land. The predominance of one form of agricultural activity over another, 
stretching from the nomadic form of agriculture of the desert south based mainly on 
livestock breeding, the semi-nomadic form of farming proper to the population of the
high plains and the steppes combining livestock breeding and itinerant cereal farming, 
to the sedentary form located on the land with the highest rainfall (mountain and 
coastal plains) or with a sufficient water endowment (as in the case of the southern 
based oasis), was in all cases on the same social mode of organisation: the division of 
labour was operated through the communal organisation of society into distinct tribes. 
In turn, within each tribe the organisation of labour was performed by each distinct 
extended family, composing the backbone of the tribe. It was therefore on the basis of 
the quantity of labour deployed by the members of each extended family that the 
product of the tribe was distributed. Property rights existed but were exercised 
independently of any payment of rent. The communal ownership of the land was not 
however accompanied by a communal organisation of the labour process. As pointed out 
by L. Addi, "Nomadism does not exclude the notion of private property - on the 
contrary this notion is even exacerbated - but it is incompatible with private landed 
property" (13). This specific tribal framework summarised the dominant relations of 
production of pre-colonial Algeria. As a social form of organisation it expressed both 
the causes and the consequences of the insufficient development of the division of 
labour. Viewed from the standpoint of a poor endowment of agricultural land, the 
communal mode of organisation was the channel through which the reproduction of the 
different social groups was realised through their tribal expression. Viewed from the 
standpoint of the social division of labour, the tribe reproduced the same 
subordination, vis-a-vis  nature, in the absence of a major agrarian technical 
innovation. While taking the best advantage of a hostile nature, the communal mode of 
organisation of pre-colonial Algeria also perpetuated such a hostility. This is what P. 
Anderson expresses in the following passage: "Thus organised, the nomadic societies 
showed admirable capabilities in getting the best out of their inhospitable 
environment.. However, the nomadic mode of production functioned within extremely 
rigid limits...Unlike agriculture the nomadic mode of production was unable to improve 
labour productivity for the means of production was not land which is modifiable both
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qualitatively and quantitatively, but livestock which, because of its dependence on land 
to which nomadism does not touch, can only undergo an essentially quantitative 
increase.The fact that in the nomadic mode of production the means of labour and its 
object were to a great extent one and the same thing (livestock), imposed to the 
elevation of labour productivity insurmountable limits" (14). The pre-eminence of 
agro-pastoralism over the exclusive sedentary life attached to agricultural farming 
because of the unfavourable natural conditions, explains to a large extent the absence 
of the emergence of a substantial agricultural surplus capable of initiating the 
beginning of a social differentiation that unavoidably accompanies the development of 
any social division of labour. The agro-pastoral mode of production that characterised 
pre-colonial Algeria was therefore marked by the seal of autarchy and stagnation 
(15). The domination of an essentially rural activity highlighted in turn the absence of 
a significant division of labour between town and country (6). The social reproduction 
that prevailed was what alone guaranteed the balance between production and 
consumption (17). The characterisation of such a society also produced its own forms 
of power. The poverty of agricultural surplus generated within such a tribal formation 
was not able in particular to sustain a form of state in its modern sense, i.e. a state 
consolidated through the deepening of the social division of labour whose reproduction 
is intertwined with that of society. Instead, and as a result of the absence of the 
realisation of the development of the major social division of labour, the 
unchangeablness of the archaic mode of production that characterised the agro-pastoral 
pre-colonial Algeria contrasted a great deal with the "never-ceasing change of 
dynasty" (18), a characteristic of the fragility of the central power. In the historical 
context of that time, i.e. up to the 12th century, dynasties drew most of their power 
not so much from the insufficient domestic agricultural surplus but from the control 
over resources of external origin: the flourishing gold trade originating from the 
Eastern and Asian regions and passing through North Africa. Their power fluctuated 
with the importance of such a trade. The decline of the trade network benefitting
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Medieval Europe marked another round of political crisis and a collapse of the central 
power of the Maghreb and that of their affiliated flourishing towns. After such a trade 
decline only the course, the sea piracy, during the 16th and 17th century continued to 
provide for the indispensable external resources for the constitution of new dynasties. 
Throughout both historical phases (the phase of expansion of Eastern trade and the role 
played by the course), the correlation between the doing and undoing of dynasties and 
that of the fluctuation of external resources constantly confirmed the week agrarian 
basis of the central power and the never-ceasing change in dynasties. The independence 
of the central power from the general characteristic pertaining to the organisation of 
the social labour process proper to the agro-pastoral mode of production found its 
ultimate confirmation within the first days of the French conquest of Algeria. Indeed 
while the power of the Dey (the representative of central power) collapsed within the 
very first days of the French penetration, on the contrary the control and 
"pacification" of the tribes was such that, as a result of fierce resistence, it took the 
French several decades and more to achieve their complete subjection and domination 
(19).
II.The decomposition of the traditional society and the emergence of the colonial 
econom y.
The colonisation of Algeria (see Appendix AI.1 for map of the country) was in essence 
an economic colonisation, an appropriation of all its social forms of resources and 
wealth: land, water, forest, minerals etc (this is not to say however that it was not 
also emminentely political as the changes brought about, deeply altered Algeria's social 
and political institutions; by focussing on the economic side of things, one is only 
bringing to attention the material precondition of such a change). The achievement of 
such a movement coincided intimately with the progressive formation and consolidation 
of a capitalist sector, agrarian in nature and and ethnically European (particularly 
French) in terms of settlement. In its genesis the development of capitalism and 
capitalist relations of production was based on the realisation of the historical
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preconditions of capital itself, i.e. the divorce of the producers from their own means 
of production, which incidentally are also the economic conditions of the production of 
their means of subsistence. "The capitalist system presupposes the complete 
separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realise 
their labour...[ for ]... the expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant 
from the soil, is the basis of the whole process" (20). In the context of pre-capitalist 
Algeria (21), the expropriation of free producers and the destruction of the basis of 
their social organisation was achieved through two main channels; direct violent 
measures - particularly during the first phase of colonisation - such as military 
conquest, land confiscation, juridical means, forceful displacement of the indigenous 
population, etc. followed by the manifestation of the much subtler economic 
mechanisms proper.
A. The direct mechanisms of land confiscation.
The study of such mechanisms is of great significance. Through them one follows not 
only the consolidation of colonial capital accumulation but also assesses the 
progressive weakening and destruction of the indigenous social formation through the 
constant alienation of one of the factors upon which the condition of its own 
reproduction was based: land. Such mechanisms evolved with the parallel consolidation 
of the colonial military power proper which faced continuous widespread tribal 
rebellions and uprisings. During the earliest years of the French presence in Algeria, 
however, at a time when neither a coherent policy of colonisation or a fixed doctrine 
existed (French colonisation started as a mere military adventure), "all what mattered 
was to defeat the enemies rather than administer subjects" (22). During the initial 
phase of conquest the system of peasant economy upon which the socio-economic 
organisation of pre-colonial Algeria was based could be considered basically unaltered 
in its reproduction. The immediate effect of colonisation resulted essentially in the 
confiscation of land belonging to the central power and its dignitaries following the
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defeat of the central power. With the constitution of the bureaux Arabes in 1844, the 
policy of systematic confiscation of the tribal land started to take shape (the bureaux 
Arabes, an entirely military institution, was among the first instrument of 
implementation of the colonial policy for dismantling the land asset of the indigenous 
population). With the subdivision of the Algerian territory into a civilian zone (i.e. a 
French zone) and an Arab (Algerian) zone in 1845, the indigenous population directly 
fell under the ruling of military law, i.e. martial law (23). The rule of economic and 
political segregation was set on a clear and deliberate distinction whereby "to the 
French [corresponded] the French law, to the foreigners the international law [and] to 
the indigenous, the military law" (24). In 1844 the land belonging to the tribes which 
opposed early resistence to French colonisation was confiscated. In 1846 the policy of 
land confiscation was taken one step further when tribal land was "amputated" with the 
justification that it was not being farmed. "The non-farming of the land is a sufficient 
cause of expropriation for the sake of public utility" (25). The loose interpretation of 
such legal dispositions led to the confiscation of pasture land or simply fallow land. 
Such measures affected most of the agro-pastoral tribes (i.e. most tribes) which 
required large territorial areas for their extensive livestock activities, as well as 
those involved in cereal farming based on biennial rotation combining cereals and 
fallow land. "Land confiscation based on property title verification (that is individual 
property rights) in a country where landownership was collective, enabled a further 
systematic expropriation of peasant-farmers". In the region of Algiers alone, out of 
the recorded 168,000 ha, 78% were appropriated by the State to be distributed to 
European colonists. The share which accrued to the indigenous population was only 
11,500 ha (26).
While awaiting the consolidation and generalisation of the French Napoleon legal 
system codifying private property rights (achieved through two famous laws in 1863 
and 1873), the widest operations of land confiscation remained the policy of 
regrouping  or tightening  of the tribes on administratively fixed territories upon
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which the rights of the tribes were then formally recognised. "Thus the tribes were 
declared simple possessors of the land and in return for an amputation of their rights, 
received a property right on the land that the state wants them to have" (27). Based on 
the "assumption" that the tribes owned a disproportionate amount of land, this policy 
succeeded in expelling them de facto from their ancestral land. "The regrouping ended 
up by leaving to the Algerian a portion of the land, variable, according to the regions, 
the humour of the French civil servant or the power of the colonists, which they could 
farm or fructify at will. France brought to Africa an inalienable and revolutionary 
value: the concept of private property, which allowed to give a good conscience to Paris 
and better profit to the colonists" (28). The colonial attack on the tribal land was 
aimed in the last analysis at the dismantling of the collective ownership of the land and 
its transformation into an individual ownership open to circulation through sale. The 
realisation of the objective of private property rights was achieved through two 
complementary laws: the Senatus Consult law of 1863 and the Warmer law of 1873. 
The terms of the Senatus Consult were the consolidation of the property rights of the 
tribes (over a land on which a limitation was already introduced following the policy of 
regrouping). On the land not yet limited by previous regrouping operations, the policy 
of "consolidation" achieved the same result: a reduction of the land asset of the 
indigenous community as a result of an authoritarian geographical distribution of the 
tribes. Outside the delimitation of a communal land, the remaining land became State 
land, i.e. a land accessible to colonisation. In the aftermath of the Senatus Consult, 
during the years 1863 and 1865, the disruption of the ancestral social organisation of 
the tribal communities, coupled with bad harvests, was to lead to the worst famine of 
the time. During this period a minimum of 500,000 people died of hunger. M. 
Lacheraf, an Algerian historian who wrote about this period noted that "while the grain 
reserves of the settlers remained intact, not a single move towards mutual help, be it 
private or official, was organised in favour of the hungry on the part of the alien 
masters of the country, many of whom rejoiced faced with prospect of an appropriate
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extermination" (29).
Seen in perspective, the Senatus Consult law was a preparation for the development 
and the generalisation of private property. The land restriction of the tribal land 
brought about by the Senatus Consult did not affect the mode of collective ownership of 
the land as such, it only restricted the scope of its extension. The aim of such colonial 
laws, "ignoring" the characteristics of the land ownership of the tribe, based in fact on 
a private form of ownership but subsumed however under the category of a collective 
ownership, was to simply convey the fallacy of the existence of the notion of "naked 
property" in so far as tribal lands were concerned. Karl Marx who had a first hand 
experience of Algeria at that time gives a clear cut assessment of the form of 
ownership of land and of its juridical status. "It is Algeria which preserves the most 
important features - after India - of the archaic [by this Marx means without central 
power] form of landed property. Tribal and family indivisible property was the most 
prevalent form of property. Centuries of Arab, Turkish and finally French domination 
have proved unable - except during the very last period, officially since the 1873 law 
[i.e. the Warnier law] - to break the organisation based upon blood and the principles 
which derived from it: the indivisibility and the inalienability of landed property" 
(30). Based on Muslim law, the dominant feature of ownership of the land remained 
basically collective. The rationale of this type of ownership was the preservation and 
protection of the material basis (i.e. land) of the social organisation of the community 
and of the society itself. This preservation was achieved by the reinforcing power of 
two powerful binding rules: indivision on the one hand and chefaa (see below) on the 
other. Indivision preserves the land from its loss vis-a-vis the community. In fact 
"it is a successoral rule of Muslim law which institutes the durability of the real asset 
in the case of bereavement of a property holder" (31). The Chefaa rule, by preventing 
the land to be sold to any person or entity alien to the community completes the 
protection of the economic survival of the community and guarantees therefore its 
social reproduction. The Muslim law is therefore in essence a law which reinforces the
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endo-alienation of the land while it erects coercive barriers against its exo-alienation. 
The Warnier law of 1873, a colonist inspired law par excellence, was precisely 
directed against these two legal pillars (Chefaa and indivision) which so far prevented 
the tribal land from the insatiable needs of a host of speculators and usurers. It 
substituted the Muslim legal system with the French Napoleon legal code. The legal 
dispositions governing the tribal land ownership were "frenchified", i.e. governed by 
the rules of private ownership. In its first article the Warnier law leaves no doubt 
about its aim: "The institution of real estates property in Algeria ... is governed by the 
French law. As a consequence, all real rights .. based on Muslim law ... which would be 
contrary to the French law are abolished" (32). Property titles were issued to 
individual members of the community but not all members were issued with them. All 
those eligible parties, theoreticaly entitled to a property right, were simply dismissed 
from the distribution of such titles when their land share was considered insignificant 
or when the Muslim inheritance mechanisms were too complex to be sorted out. The 
"simplification" which accompanied the execution of the Warnier law produced 
overnight the first modern generation of landless peasants (33). In effect the 
institutionalisation of private property was only the prelude to the definitive collapse 
of the social structures of the peasant economy as a result of the shrinking of the land 
base through the pauperisation of its owners. "By puting an end .. to the indivision of 
the land, the legislative power geared its attacks to the ancient labour process and to 
the conditions of its reproduction: each Fellah (peasant farmer) must face all 
constraints without external support. Collective grains reserves disappeared and the 
small peasant was henceforth subject to climatic hazards and at the same time exposed 
to usury and expropriation" (34). The transformation of the land into a commodity, 
achieved at the same time the condition of its circulation and eventually that of its 
corollary: the separation of direct producers from their material means of 
subsistence: land. The implication of such a transformation is however much deeper. 
The transformation of the social status of land, one of the main components necessary
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to social production, meant in fact the destruction of that society itself. As K. Marx put 
it "through the individualisation of the landed property one achieves the political 
objective at the same time: to destroy the very basis of this society" (35).
B. The economic mechanisms of expropriations.
Conversely to the generalisation of private property, the destruction and domination of 
the peasant economy was speeded through its integration in the sphere of commodity 
relations. But it is worth mentioning that such subsumption did not proceed smoothly 
on its own. The means which operated such an integration was achieved by the 
development of the colonial tax system which also proved most efficient in the 
extraction of an economic surplus from the peasantry . From 1845 onwards the 
payment of taxes in kind was suppressed and replaced by a payment in cash. This 
obligation forced the peasant producers to valorise their production through 
commodity exchange, thus disrupting the traditional mechanisms of exchange and 
distribution of the social product. The new terms under which the peasants were to pay 
their tax dues were also accompanied by an increased taxation. The Algerian peasantry 
was subject to a different tax system over and above that to which were also subjected 
the European settlers. From the standpoint of both systems a discriminatory treatment 
of the peasantry prevailed. The peasant tax system was openly discriminatory in that it 
openly excluded the colonists from the same treatment. If the common tax system 
appeared fairer because it was based on homogeneous rates for both Europeans and 
Algerians, the distribution of such rates revealed that the highest rates of indirect 
taxation concerned mainly those goods most consumed by Algerians. The following table 
gives evidence of this point.
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Table 1.1: Consumption tax differentiation between Algerians and French.
Products most consumed by Algerians Taxes Specifically European products Taxes
Sugar Fr 5 - -
- - Cheese Fr 3.00
- - Lard Fr 3.00
- - Pork Fr 6.00
Tea Fr 25 - -
Green paper Fr 20 - -
Candles Fr 10 - -
- - Wine Fr 0.32
Source: Henni, Ahmed. "La colonisation agraire et le sous-developpement en Algerie". SNED. Algiers. 1981. 
p. 103.
The contribution to which the peasantry was put in raising the public finances of the 
colonists appears much more clearly when one looks closely at the indigenous tax 
system proper. In its structure the indigenous tax system includes many items, the 
most important of all being that termed the Arab taxes. Arab taxes were direct taxes 
ventilated between 4 main posts: the Achour, the Hokor, the Zakat and the Lezma 
taxes. The first three were direct agricultural taxes by definition. The Achour and 
Hokor taxes were levied on farmers on the basis of the size of their land holding. The 
distinction between these two taxes depended mainly on the juridical status of land. The 
Achour was levied on a supposedly private land. It represented about Fr 15/ha, or the 
equivalent of 105 kg of wheat + 80 kg of barley/year/10 ha of land. In 1958 this rate 
was increased to Fr 25/plough (the plough representing here the theoretical measure 
of 10 ha of land). The hokor tax was levied on the tribal land (arch land) as well as on 
the state "rented" land to the tribes (Azel land). Initially fixed at Fr 25/plough/year 
this tax was increased in 1885 to Fr 30. The zakat tax was specifically a tax on the 
size of livestock.
According to Henni Ahmed the weight of these taxes was such that "80% of the [poor] 
peasantry had to draw in its physiological minimum to meet [their payment]" (36). At 
the difference of these taxes - which were by definition a tax on capital - the lazma tax 
was a tax on persons and households (its rates varied from Fr 20 to Fr 22.5 for the
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former to between Fr 5 & Fr 15 for the latter depending on the level of income). The 
result of such a discriminatory tax system was such that, in 1909 the 2.5 million ha 
farmed by Algerians allowed the treasury to raise Fr 17 million, while the one million 
ha cultivated by Europeans farmer raised nil" (37). An increasing fraction of the 
"Arab tax system went also directly to those colonist controlled European local 
collectivities: 10% in 1845, 30% in 1852, 40% in 1859, 50% in 1861, 60% in 
1868 and 50% in. 1873.
The channeling of resources from the peasantry to the colonists was further increased 
by the introduction of complementary indigenous taxes. The system of Additional 
Centimes supplemented the previous taxes by devising means to increase the 
resources at the disposal of the colonists. With this system and for each Fr 1 of Arab 
tax paid, the population was to pay in the form of additional centimes x number of 
centimes. The system of Extraordinary Centimes was another juridical device, a sort 
of a tax rate to the third degree. The aim of the system was officially justified in order 
to "finance the operations of consolidation of the [colonial] landed property" (38). 
These two taxes levied Fr 3.5 million in 1891 or the equivalent of 22% of Arab taxes 
during the same year (Fr 15.9 million). Indirect Arab Taxes included a wide range of 
rates: taxes on scattered rural dwelling, on indigenous market places, on sweeping (in 
order "to finance the cleanliness of the colonist-villages" (39), on dogs (a tax without 
any similarity for the European settlers), on animal slaughtering, on rented 
accommodation, on consumer goods (see above), etc. Tax services, i.e. labour rent and 
animal rent: this special form of levy, feudal in nature, binds both the peasant and his 
animals (horse, mule, donkey, cattle) to provide yearly, 3 days of free work for the 
colonial administration. A fourth day of compulsory free work was also imposed on the 
peasantry for the prevention of fires and/or improvement of rural roads. When this 
category of taxation is taken into account the extraction of the peasant surplus labour 
was thus operated this time under the form of the free use of labour power. The 
indigenous code was a codified list of fines based on vaguely determined offenses - up
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to 41 - such as "mistakes", "breeches", "acts of hostility", etc. to which the Algerian 
population was subject . War fines were applied as a punishment to the rebellious 
peasantry. Between 1830-1865 Fr 58 million were levied through this channel and 
during the period 1870-1900 Fr 35 million (the 1871 uprising alone led to the 
confiscation of 446,000 ha and a fine of gold Fr 11 million).
Between the indigenous and the fines the colonists raised resources equivalent to 65% 
of their total expenditure (Fr 173 million) between 1830-1900. The following 
structure of the budgetary resources summarises the pre-eminence of the 
contribution of the peasantry to the colonial budgetary resources.
Table I.2: State budgetary resources (distribution of taxes): 1901-1915 (U: Fr millions).
Tax specification Amount
Arab tax and additional centimes 42.6
Indirect tax on consumer goods 78.9
Tax on mortgages 24.0
Tax on tobacco an beverages 36.9
Housing tax 10.3
Patent 10.1
Stamps 21.8
Fines 03.5
Income tax 01.0
Tax on mines 00.3
Source: Ibid. P. 104.
As the Algerian population was about 8 times that of the settlers, the above tax 
structure shows that "the quasi totality of taxes came from the productive effort of the 
peasantry, from its acquisition of consumer goods, taxes on housing and dwellings as 
well as from the proceeds of fines which alone brought in to the treasury more than the 
proceeds of the companies which exploited the mines of iron ore, phosphates, etc" 
(40 ).
How do Algerians benefit from such a heavy tax system? The following figures help 
reveal the extent of the imbalance between their contribution and their benefit. During 
the same period (1901-1905) the proportion of expenditure (Fr 9.7 million) 
catering specifically for the Algerians (muslim cult, court, education, etc.) barely
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represented 4% of budgetary taxes. For a demographic ratio of 1 to 8 in favour of the 
Algerian population, and for the same per capita of posts as above, the Europeans 
obtained Fr 57.2 million or over 6 times more than the Algerian population altogether. 
From what follows it clearly appears that the function of the colonial tax system was 
mainly based on the maximum drain of the economic surplus generated by the 
peasantry in favour of the colonial power and the colonists. As expected such an 
appropriation and control of the economic surplus opened the way to a process of 
pauperisation of the indigenous peasants. On the basis of the combined effects of intense 
expropriations, the extension of monetisation of the economy and the destruction of all 
social mechanisms of preservation of the peasant economy such as Chefaa and 
indivision, the peasants had to resort more and more systematically to the local 
usurous money lenders for a loan by mortgaging their plot of land. The inability of 
those to pay back resulted in their expropriation. The usury mechanisms of 
expropriation can in fact produce high returns in terms of the land acquired. Thus 
when a peasant mortgaging his land could not pay back the loan, the usurer, 
particularly when dealing with indivision, could ask to buy the entire family land or 
put to auction the mortgaged land. The latter procedure being costly (recorded 
procedural costs per ha exceeded the price of the ha), made the entire co-owners of 
indivision incapable of meeting such costs. Such practices enabled land speculators and 
usurers alike to acquire land at insignificant prices. The case of entire tribes 
dispossessed in this manner was not uncommon at that time. Those peasants in debt who 
were unable to meet the payment of their taxes and/or fines resorted to the sale of 
their holding when they did not already loose it through the practice of usury: the 
mechanisms of expropriation developed without limit (41). The number of operations 
concerning land seizures and sales by auction increased in intensity. By the turn of the 
20th Century such operations were counted by the thousands.
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Table 1.3: Volume of land transfers in favour of colonists.
Number of transfers Period of transfers
6 4 6 1 8 7 0 - 1  8 7 4
7 0 9 1 8 7 5 - 1  8 79
1 , 165 1 8 80 - 1  8 8 4
2 , 09 6 1 8 8 5 - 1 8 8 9
1 , 987 1 8 9 0 - 1 8 9 4 .
Source: X. Yacono "La colonisation dans les plaines du Chelif" quoted by A. Benachenhou. "Formation du 
sous-developpement en Algerie". Algiers. 1978. P. 70.
The actual areas covered by such operations being not known, the number of operations 
serves as a fairly good indicator of the intensity of expropriation of the peasantry. Up 
to 1898 the sale of real estates from Algerians to Europeans was well over 600,000 
ha while that acquired by Algerians was only 160,000 ha.
The conjunction of the military, juridical and economic mechanisms contributed to the 
destruction of the collective property through the freedom to buy and sell which 
facilitated its transfers to the colonial sector as well as to a faction of the Algerian 
landed property. The dissolution of the peasant economic system was pursued parallel 
to the policy of official colonisation, i.e. a colonisation in favour of small European 
peasant-settlers based on a free distribution of concessions of land. By 1880 an 
estimated 880,000 ha were acquired in this manner, of which 165,000 ha, obtained 
through free transactions between Algerians and Europeans (42). The official 
colonisation of settlement developed around centres of colonisation (a concentration of 
settlers near their concessions). By the end of the 19th century 264 of such centres 
were created for a French population of more than 195,000. The characteristics of the 
colonial agricultural sector during this period were not significantly different from 
those of the indigenous sector. Cereals were still the dominant crop. Farming 
technology was limited to the introduction of the iron plough which enabled deep 
ploughing. This period also witnessed a timid emergence of agricultural credit and 
basic infrastructure works (railways, roads, etc.) as well as the construction of the
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first dams - 8 dams were built by 1880 - (43). If this early colonial period 
introduced a breach in the social structure of the peasant economy (particularly in its 
land base), its effects were by far more negative on the indigenous population proper. 
The pacification of Algeria at all costs coupled with continuous rebellions affected the 
availability of the labour force. From 1830 to 1876 the Algerian population 
experienced a negative rate of growth: it dropped from 3 million to 2.4 million 
persons. The fear of social unrest also led the colonial power to considerably restrict 
the movement of persons to a point whereby the settlers had to resort to a costly 
seasonal immigration from France and Spain (44). The actual development of colonial 
agriculture was made possible only when the complete dismantling of the tribal 
economic system also resulted in the shrinking of the land base capable of supporting 
an increased number of pauperised peasants. From 1880 onwards when the Warnier 
law produced its effects resulting in the unprecedented acceleration of the dismantling 
of the collective land asset of the tribes, the colonial power could be considered to have 
provided the colonial agrarian capitalism with all the necessary conditions for its 
expansion: access to land, the generalisation of the use of money, a segregationist 
policy in favour of settlers, the availability of free labourers, the existence of a 
guaranteed outlet for colonial exports (45), a class of capitalist entrepreneurs 
(farmers, traders, bankers) etc, and favourable terms of access to farm credit etc. 
During this period of capitalist expansion and until the great depression of the 1930s, 
the colonial agricultural sector reinforced its land base by 55,000 ha and created or 
expanded 476 centres of colonisation while the aftermath of the Warnier law enabled 
free colonisation - the acquisition of land through market mechanisms - to increase 
the size of the sector by well over 1.6 million ha. After one century of colonisation 
nearly 3 million ha of the best land were taken away from the indigenous population to 
create the settlers' agricultural sector. An important characteristic that accompanied 
the constitution of the colonial agricultural sector - particularly when the confiscated 
land was distributed on a concessional basis - was that the settlers' beneficiaries did
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not incur the payment of any rent during the gratis acquisition of the land. As one 
knows, the price of land is "determined by ground rent" (46), or that "..the purchase 
price of land ... is merely another way of expressing the capitalization of ground rent." 
(47).
The creation of the necessary conditions that enabled the appropriation of a sizeable 
fraction of the tribal land resulted, on the one hand, in the parallel constitution of an 
important colonial capitalist agricultural sector and, on the other, in a profound 
alteration in the organisation of the indigenous agriculture. In what follows our aim is 
to study in detail the organisation of these two agricultures.
111. The development of colonial agrarian capitalism .
The main land mark in the development of the colonisation of Algeria can hardly be 
dissociated from that of the colonial agricultural sector itself. The size of this sector, 
in terms of arable land (48), progressed in the following manner: in 1830 there was 
no land under colonisation scheme; by 1880 the total area land increased to 1.04 
million hectares, and by 1962 2.7 million hectares. The most prominent development 
of colonisation took place between 1880 and 1930. It was during this period that the 
economic colonisation acquired its main characteristics: the integration of the Algerian 
economy in the French market through its specialisation in the production of raw 
materials and agricultural products. The colonisation of Algeria acquired the form of an 
essentially exclusive agricultural colonisation with vineyard and cereal farming 
playing the dominant poles of capital accumulation.
A. The w ine-grow ing agricu ltu re.
A fortuitous event transformed the fate of colonists into a structural advantage. In 
1875 Phylloxera destroyed large sections of France's vineyards. This crisis was to 
prove profitable for the colony which took over the French market (before the 
phylloxeric epidemic the size of the French wine growing sector was 2.4 million ha; in 
1890 it fell to 1.8 million ha). In the space of 50 years the size of the colon vineyards
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was increased by 10 fold:
Table I.4: The extension of the colonial wine growing sector between 1880 and 1930.
Year Area
1 8 8 0 24,000 ha
1 8 8 5 71,000 ha
1 8 9 5 122,000 ha
1 9 3 0 235,000 ha
Source: Ibid., pp. 116-134.
Yields and production also increased during this period. Between 1919 and 1930 
production doubled, increasing from 6 million hectolitres (hi) to 13 million hi, 
corresponding respectively to a yield of 36 and 54 hl/ha. The existence of guaranteed 
outlets on the French market and the financial returns per ha - the net financial 
return per ha in the viticulture was up to 8 and 9 times that procured by cereals - 
favoured the development of the overall conditions conducive to increased productive 
investment: the development of financial capital, discount centres (2 in 1878, 24 in 
1891), farm credit institutions (in 1880 the 'Credit Fonder & Agricol de I'Algerie" 
and the "Credit Lyonais" were created), cooperative credit institutions ("C redit 
Agricole Mutuet'), etc. On the labour market side, the expansion of the productive 
capital in the wine-growing activity also enjoyed favourable terms of access. As a 
result of this dismantling of the peasant economy, the use of the indigenous labour 
force tended also to emerge as a systematic phenomenon. During the early years of the 
crisis of French vineyards, the European settlers relied essentially on a seasonal 
European labour force (mainly made of French peasants ruined by the phylloxeric 
crisis) paid at a higher level of wages than the indigenous population. At that time the 
use of the indigenous population was strictly confined to those activities requiring no 
particular skill and performed on a seasonal basis. With the progressive recovery of 
French vineyards and the instability of the market outlet the French and Algerian 
viticultures catered for the same French market with the result that any 
superimposition of two good harvests created a crisis of overproduction (49),
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concerns for a reduction in costs of production led to a reduction in wage rates and thus 
to "the rapid elimination of European workers and their replacement by indigenous 
workers" (50). Progressively the indigenous labour force gained access to more 
qualified jobs such as trimming, maintenance, graft, etc. but the bulk of the tasks was 
still performed on a seasonal basis. The availability of an abundant indigenous labour 
force tapped at will, as a result of its increased pauperisation, offered the ideal 
conditions for its own cheap employment combining low wages, long period of work and 
the absence of any social law of protection (51). The search for a wage activity, a 
direct consequence of the destruction of the peasant economy, was becoming a 
widespread practice. The main conclusion of a manpower survey conducted in 1934 
stated: "We can say in all these regions [i.e. the main indigenous population centres] 
the search for an outside job has become part of the way of life...Earnings outside their 
villages appear so necessary to the great majority of the indigenous peasants of Algeria 
that one wonders how they did manage without it in the past" (52). As intensive an 
activity as it may appear, vineyard work did not require a year-through workforce. 
The intensive labour requirement only coincided with peak periods of harvest and 
trimming, while maintenance and conservation corresponded to very low employment 
opportunities (the autumn period corresponds to a slack period par excellence). The 
availability of an important labour force enabled therefore the colonial agriculture to 
use at remunerative terms whatever necessary quantum of labour was required (in 
1957 the proportion of total agricultural wages paid by the colonial agricultural 
sector in relation to the value of the gross agricultural output was estimated (53) at a 
mere 17%). Indirectly, this systematic irregular use of the labour force evidences the 
contribution of the "traditional" sector to the development of colonial agriculture: the 
availability of the supply of an important labour force on the one hand and the 
remuneration and reproduction of this labour force at times of unemployment due to 
the erratic needs of the colonial capitalist sector on the other.
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B. The colonial cereal agriculture.
In terms of foreign earnings contributions, cereal farming was the second major 
sector of capital accumulation, but in terms of size, cereals occupied the majority of 
colonial land. Land devoted to cereals (excluding fallow land) evolved as follows:
Table 1.5: Land area under cereal cultivation (ha) excluding fallow land between 1872 and 1928.
1872 1880 1918 1925 1928
158,000 232,000 721,000 882,000 803,000
Source: Ibid., p. 86 & p. 137.
The availability of land offered from the start an opportunity for cereal farming. In its 
early stage, i.e. before the consolidation of the colonial agricultural sector proper, the 
organisation of colonial cereal farming gave poorer results compared to the indigenous 
agriculture for "not owning livestock herds, most colonists resorted to the practice of 
primitive rotation alternating cereals with fallow land" (54). With the development of 
credit facilities and fertilizers consumption, the extension of this sector, using the 
methods of dry farming, was greatly enhanced by its intensive mechanisation (55).
Table I.6: The mechanisation of the colonial cereal agriculture in 1900-1930 (unit=number).
1901 1915 1930
Seeders 1 33 9 05 NA
Reapers 424 1,559 NA
Harvesters 981 3,459 NA
French ploughs (i.e. iron ploughs) N.A 81,522 257,000
Arab ploughs N.A 8,439 NA
Source: S. Bedrani "Les Politiques Agraires en Algerie". CREA Algiers, p. 22.
But the development of cereal agriculture remained stimulated more by protective 
prices and a range of bonuses rather than by exceptionally high yields as shown below 
(56).
39
Table 1.7: Yields trend in the colonial cereal farming in 1909*1929 (quintal/ha).
1909/13 1918/20 1921/23 1924/26 1927/29
9.7 7.3 5.2 7.4 9.7
Source: A. Benachenhou, 0 p. Cit., p. 262.
The reasons for such low yields were bound up with the farming practices in use. The 
practice of biennial rotation combining cereals and fallow land was not given up by the 
settlers. The multiplication of ploughing practices in order to eliminate weeds and 
increase the softness and humidity of the soil suppressed the possibility of livestock 
activity and weakened the fertility of the topsoil through water and wind erosion 
without any substantial compensatory increase in the use of fertilizers (57). If cereal 
agriculture had the attributes of a modern agriculture, in so far as its mechanisation 
was concerned, it however lacked intensification. Intensive farming was mainly 
restricted to industrial crops, fruit trees and market-garden products. But this sector 
was not however a dominant pole of capital accumulation if compared to cereals and 
wine-growing farming which in 1934 made up 80% of the settlers' income.
C. The consolidated land structure of the colonial agriculture. (58)
By the 1950s the definitive characteristics of the colonial agricultural sector were 
well established: the size of the sector had reached its definitive size, land 
concentration had produced its results and the specialisation of the land was already 
structurally consolidated. The colonial sector extended over 2.7 million ha (27% of 
the total agricultural land) distributed between 22,000 farms (3% of the total 
farms). On average each colonial farm represented 124 ha against only 11 ha for the 
"traditional" sector. The real structure of the colonial sector however revealed a 
different picture.
40
a. The land structure.
Within the colonial sector land distribution has tended towards a constant 
concentration producing a picture quite different from that upon which the ideology of 
official colonisation was based.
Table 1.8: Structure of land distribution in the colonial sector * (1950).
Number of farms % Size of farms (ha) %
Smaller than 10 ha 7,432 34% 22,585 0.8%
10-50 ha 5,585 25% 135,273 5.0%
50-100 ha 2,635 12% 186,881 7 .0%
100 ha & over 6,385 29% 2,381,929 87.0%
TOTAL 22,037 1 00 2,726,666 100
Source: A. Benachenhou, 0 p. Cit., p. 259.
*ln 1930 the number of farms below 10 ha (8,877) covered 2% of the total land of the sector 
while those between 10 and 50 ha (7,140), those between 50 &100 ha (8,877) and above 100 ha 
(5,411) respectively extended over 9%, 15% & 74% of the farmland of the sector (59).
The distribution of the land was extremely unequal. The majority of farmers (60) - 
34% - had less than 1% of the land while 87% of the total colonial land was 
concentrated within the hands of less than one-third of the total farmers (61). The 
distribution of the land in turn reveals the extent of the dominant capitalist interests: 
with 1,506,666 ha, cereal land extended over 55% of the total colonial agricultural 
sector but as much as nearly half of this area was kept as follow land: 682,034 ha or 
the equivalent of 83% of the actual cultivated cereal land (824,632 ha). This cereal 
agriculture was mainly undertaken by large farmers: 90% was located within farms 
exceeding 100 ha (62). Such a characteristics explains to a large extent the degree of 
mechanisation of this sector. In 1934 cereal farming provided one third of the income 
of the colonial agricultural sector. But viticulture was by far the main source from 
which the settlers derived most of their earnings and profits (50% of incomes on 
average (63)). The development of this sector extended over 348,500 ha (or 13% of 
the total European sector) owned by 11,500 farms, 28% of whom controlled 65% of 
the sector (21% of total viticulturists with holdings less than 10 ha only controlled 
2% of the land). The average size of farms tended to be lower than that of the cereal
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sector: over 37 ha if one excludes those properties which controlled 2% of the total 
sector and 30 ha with their inclusion (64), but this lower size was more than 
compensated for by the much higher cash value of the crop which on average accounted 
for 50% of the total income derived by the colonial agricultural sector. The weight of 
large farms in the distribution of income generated by this agriculture was also 
prevalent for all other forms of farming however subsidiary they may be.
Market-garden farming extended over on an area of 20,600 ha (less than 1% of the 
sector), distributed between 6,800 farmers, 50% of whom belonged to farms of 50 ha 
and above. Fruit trees which occupied an area covering 53,000 ha (2% of the total 
colonial sector) located mainly in the fertile northern belt, provided over 10 million 
trees (7 million citrus trees representing 88% of the Algerian orchard and 3 million 
of olive grove). This production involved 5,700 farmers, 32% of whom belonged to 
the category of larger farmers (100 ha and above) who controlled 67% of the area 
cultivated. Large estates were also predominant in livestock rearing: 90% (464,000 
heads) of the total sheep flock, 62% (35,000 heads) of the total goat flock, 75% 
(98,000 heads) of the total swine herd, 71% (114,000 heads) of the total bovine 
herd, 93% of pasturages (320,000 ha), 70% of fodder crops (27,000 ha) and 86% 
(12,500 ha) of natural meadows belonged to the largest estates. The following table 
offers the best overall illustration of such a colonial agricultural structure:
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Table 1.9: Distribution of European crops between the different types of farms (%).
C ro ps Small farms 510 ha Middle farms 105X5100 ha Larae farms & 100 ha % in Jotal farms % in total _Alaerla_
Cereals 0.3 9.0 90.7 30.20% 20.9%
Fallow land 2.0 7.3 92.5 25.00% 25.8%
Vines 2.2 32.3 62.5 12.70% 89.8%
Pulses 0.3 9.2 90.5 1.75% 29.2%
Market-garden 20.6 42.2 37.2 0.70% 36.7%
Fruit 5.0 27.8 67.2 11.95% 26.6%
Industrial 1.0 21.0 78.0 0.802 43.0%
LIVESTOCK
Pasture land 0.3 6.5 93.2 12.6% 19.7%
Fodder 1.9 28.7 .69.4 1.46% 70.2%
Perm. nat. meadows 0.6 13.2 86.2 0.50% 52.7%
Sheep 0.6 8.9 90.5 - - 9.5%
Goats 7.8 30.3 61.9 — 1.0%
Cattle 4.2 24.2 71.6 -  - 11.3%
Swine 7.4 17.5 75.1 -  - 0.0%
EQBESI
Wood, Esperto-grass zoneO 3.1 96.9 10.00 56.6%
Unproductive land. 2.2 15.5 82.3 2.00 16.2%
% Of Farm Area 10.83 11.8 87.3 100 % 27%
Source: H. Isnard "Structure de la colonisation agricole en Algerie a la veille de I'insurection", Mediterranee 
N9 2-3 Avril-Septembre 1960. P. 19.
From the above table there appears a clear specialisation between the three types 
farming. Large farms were multicropped with cereals as the main crop. Their activity 
included work on vineyards, pulses, industrial crops and livestock. Middle farms were 
characterised by three main crops: vineyards, market-garden products and livestock 
rearing. Small farms were essentially geared towards market-garden products.
The work of all types of farms included also animal husbandry and fruit tree 
cultivation. The orientation of production in each case depended on the size of the farm 
and the type of land which dictated the type of production most compatible with the 
highest monetary return. This is in fact a major feature of colonial agriculture: the 
economic activity was essentially a commercial activity geared towards profit 
maximisation. The choice of a crop was always that which guaranteed the highest 
monetary returns. In their mode of management each type of farm displayed its own 
characteristics
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b. The modes of farming in the European sector.
European farms were heavily dependent on the use of labour force. In 1950 over 90% 
of them were directly dependent on it (65). The forms of farm management were based 
on a variety of labour contract depending on the type of involvement of the landowners 
in the management of their farms. Nearly half the landowners were absentee landlords 
who entrusted their land to sharecroppers and/or farmers. The highest rate of 
landowners directly exploiting their farms was to be found amongst smallholders 
(78%), as against 65 % of middle farmers and 50% of large landowners. The main 
forms of labour contracts used by European farms were the wage system and the 
Khamassat (a specifically indigenous form of sharecropping whereby, in return for 
the contribution of the landowner in terms of land, seeds and implements, the 
Khamasse - the sharecropper - farms the land under the provision of 1/5 
remuneration on the net farm crop. This system of sharecropping was most prevalent 
in Eastern Algeria. In the Constantine region over 1/5 of the European land, 
representing 1/4 of the farm area, was farmed by 7,000 khamess viz. 70% of all 
khamess, in the European agriculture. Out of the 22,000 farms, over 2,000 resorted 
to the khamassat system (1,282 farms used the khamassat as the exclusive form of 
land farming, while 936 of them resorted to it in a partial way for land reclamation 
purposes). The majority of colonial farms (86%) relied on a combined wage-earning 
system. While 4,600 of them (1/4) resorted exclusively to a seasonal labour force 
amounting to over 2 million days work, only 4% of them employed a permanent work­
force and the remaining 62% (13,692) relied on a combination of both seasonal and 
permanent work-forces (66). The overall view of this employment situation is 
illustrated by the following table.
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Table 1.10: Employment structure of the European farms in 1950 (U=number).
Category of workers Number of workers and number of days work
Khamasse
Permanent wage workers
Seasonal workers as expressed by the number of days work
10,138 
120,652 
21 million days works
Source: H. Isnard, Ibid. p. 97.
Of the khamess, 83% were employed by farms above 50 ha, mostly located on dry land 
(67). In the category of farms relying exclusively on seasonal employment, we find a 
great proportion of farms below 50 ha (80%) which used about 1.6 million days 
work. The great concentration of employment (about 54%), both seasonal and 
permanent, was to be found mainly in large farms above 50 ha (7,738), compared 
with 46% in farms below 50 ha (6,643). If one takes into account those farms which 
employed exclusively a permanent labour force (i.e. 689 farms) only 5% of farms 
relied on this form of wage system. Though the exact distribution of employment 
between large and middle farms is not known it however remains significant that such 
employment concerned a more or less even number of farms but with an extremely 
uneven distribution (farms above 50 ha covered 94% of the total area of the colonial 
sector). The concentration of employment is thus mainly on large farms above 50 ha . 
In themselves the characteristics of employment in colonial agriculture were 
therefore largely determined by such large farms using both permanent and temporary 
labour (68). The main characteristic of such an agriculture was its entire dependency 
on the indigenous rural proletariat "which represented a permanent settlement 5 to 6 
times larger than that of the European landowners half of whom absentee and was 
further reinforced by hundreds of thousands brought in by seasonal migration" (69). 
In contrast to this highly mechanised sector based on a high land concentration and 
entirely geared towards the international market (in 1929 79% of wine production, 
21% of cereals, 33% of citrus fruits, 49% of potatoes, 70% of pulses, 72% of olive 
oils, 90% of tobacco, 98% of esperto grass, 86% of cork-tree, 90% of phosphate and 
98% of iron ore were exported), we find an indigenous agricultural sector endowed
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with different structures and subject to a different form of determinism as far as the 
orientation and organisation of its production are concerned.
IV. The "traditional" agricultural sector.
In its formation the indigenous agricultural sector directly bears the scars of the 
genesis of the colonial sector itself. In an historical perspective the formation of the 
indigenous agricultural sector indeed remains inseparable from that of the colonial 
sector, with the history of the development of the former the mirror image of the 
latter. The extension of the colonial sector beyond the Beylical land and that of its 
dignitaries, has systematically coincided with the expropriation of the indigenous 
peasantry. In essence the movement of expropriation was a non-stop process involving 
a steady and progressive displacement of the indigenous population more and more 
sloppy and marginal land. It was this very phenomenon of expropriation which was to 
mark the birth of the Algerian proletariat itself. In turn, the development of the rural 
proletariat was to reflect the constant indicator of land confiscation which accompanied 
the history of capitalist penetration in the Algerian countryside. It was through the 
development of colonial agriculture and social differentiation that "traditional 
"agriculture acquired its main characteristics. Thus the shrinking of its land base, the 
fragmentation of the land to an extremely uneconomic extent (70), the low fertility of 
the land (71), the proletarianisation and pauperisation of an increased proportion of 
the agricultural population, etc. were all the dominant factors which were shaped 
directly or indirectly by the mode of capital accumulation. As paradoxical as it may 
appear at first sight, the indigenous agricultural sector extended over 73% of the total 
agricultural land and controlled 96% of total holdings.
Table 1.11: The land holding structure of the Algerian agriculture (1950).
Colonial agricultural sector Indigenous agricultural sector Total
Holdings (number) 
Agricultural land (ha)
22,037 (3%) 
2,726,666 (27%)
630,731 (96%) 652,769 
7,349,166 (73%) 10,075,832
Source: Ibid. p .85.
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The first contrast between the two agricultures was the considerable difference 
between the amount of land at the disposal of each category of holding: 124 ha/holding 
in the European sector against 11 ha in the indigenous sector (on average the size of a 
settler farm was over 10 times larger than that of an Algerian farm). If one takes into 
account the fertility differential between the two types of farm, the real economic 
difference goes well beyond the mere comparison of sizes. One sees therefore how on 
grounds of natural conditions of production alone, the "average" settler was put in a 
much more advantageous position (72). The mechanisms at the origin of such an 
unequal distribution was the economic law which prevailed in the orientation of the 
colonial agriculture: the orientation of production in accordance with the highest 
monetary returns, i.e. the search for the land with the highest fertility. It was 
therefore such an economic law which both directly and indirectly shaped the whole 
socio-economic panorama of Algeria as well as the sectoral configuration of its 
agriculture. Compared to the colonial sector the structure of the indigenous sector did 
not display the same degree of land concentration.
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Table 1.12: Structure of the indigenous agricultural sector (Number, % & ha).
Class area Number of farms Farm area (ha)
S m a ll <1 ha 48,021 (9%) 19,409 (0.3%)
} 355,982 (65%) }1,277,350 (18%)
holdings 1< X <10 h 307,961 (56%) 1,257,584 (17%)
M idd le 1 0 < X < 5 0 h a 162,513 (30%) 3,105,409 (43%)
} 178,946 (33%) } 4,189,961 (59%)
ho ld ings 50 < X <  100 ha 16,433 (3%) 1,084,552 (15%)
Large
ho ld ings > 100 ha 8,382 (2%) 1,663,892 (23%)
Total 543,310 7 ,1 3 1  ,2 0 3
Source: H. Isnard, "Structure de I'agriculture Musulmane en Algerie a la veille de Pinsurection". 
Mediterrannee N9 2-3 Avril-Septembre 1960. (The above figures are our own calculation on the 
basis of H. Isnard's article).
In their typology such farms are Indicative of the degree of social differentiation 
operated between the category of poor, middle, and rich peasantry with, however, a 
predominance of the first category. The highest farm area (59%) was concentrated 
within the middle farm category representing 1/3 of the total farms (in the colonial 
sector these middle holdings only controlled 12% of the sector). The largest farms 
extending over 23% of the land, were concentrated within only 2% of the total 
indigenous farms. As such this distribution represented the highest land concentration 
within the sector with farms averaging about 200 ha (in the colonial agricultural 
sector the average size of a large farm was well over 370 ha). Farm concentration was 
highest however within the small holding category, with 65% of farms owning less 
than 10 ha over an area covering 18% of the total sector (73). On the whole these 
were the two major characteristics of the land structure of the traditional sector: a net 
predominance of the category of middle farmers (though a high degree of land 
concentration was achieved in the category of large farms, such a concentration did not 
secure an overwhelming proportion in the total sector), and a very high concentration 
of farmers within the smallest holdings for every 10 farmers more than 6 farmers 
had holdings not exceeding 10 ha of low fertility (74).
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We now turn to the question of how did such a land structure relate to its agricultural 
use ?
A.The agricultural structure of the indigenous sector.
Compared to the colonial sector the indigenous agriculture was essentially a 
subsistence economy, an economy essentially geared towards simple reproduction. The 
indigenous agriculture was overwhelmingly based on cereal farming which absorbed 
70% of the land. In 1950 over 3 million ha were devoted to cereals (particularly 
wheat) while 1.9 million ha representing 33% of the land under cereal cultivation, 
were laid fallow. This mode of subsistence farming was combined with extensive 
animal husbandry on fallow land and pasture land. Land most compatible with intensive 
livestock rearing such as fodder crops, permanent meadows, represented less than 1% 
of the total land (30,000 ha). The main pasture land (1.6 million ha), was reduced to 
brushwood, forest, shrubs, etc. only enabling an extensive itinerant form of animal 
husbandry (75). The indigenous population owned 5 million sheeps (90% of the total 
ovine flock), 3.3 million goats (98% of the total flock) and 0.9 million head of cattle 
(85% of the total herd). The overwhelming importance of sheep denoted a predominant 
characteristic of a typically Mediterranean form of subsistence farming. The existence 
of a large communal pasture land also offered the conditions for the development of 
pastoral nomadism. On the whole cereal farming and extensive animal husbandry 
extended over 90% of the indigenous agricultural land (76). The remaining land 
concerned on average 138,000 ha (2% of the total) of crops such as olive-trees and 
fruit trees (particularly fig-trees). Market-garden products, mainly for family 
subsistence purposes, extended over 35,000 ha (less than 1%). Only a small section 
(1%) of the indigenous agriculture was directly involved in cash crop activities. 
Tobacco farming was developed on 31,000 ha (particularly in Eastern Algeria) and 
vineyards on 40,000 ha in Western Algeria. The weight of subsistence farming based 
on a biennial rotation combining cereals and extensive animal husbandry on fallow land 
remained therefore an overwhelming characteristic of the indigenous agriculture.
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It is however at the level of Its mode of farming that such an agriculture better 
restores its particularisms.
B. The mode of farming in the indigenous sector.
Indigenous farms, particularly those below 10 ha, were mainly family holdings 
whereby most of the activity was directly performed by family members. Wage- 
earning prevailed mainly in the category of holdings between 10 and 50 ha where 
58% of them relied on seasonal workers (77). The dominant form under which land 
was being leased was the typically indigenous sharecropping system remuneration at 
the rate of 1/5. 55% of the farm land between 50 & 100 ha and 64% of the land of ! 
large farms above 100 ha were directly farmed by khamasse (80% of all khamasse 
were located in Eastern Algeria against 30% and 42% respectively in Central and 
Western Algeria). The importance of khamassat was in itself the expression of the 
emergence of a rural proletariat. From this perspective the process of expropriation 
which accompanied the formation of the colonial agricultural sector, also benefited a 
section of the indigenous landowners (particularly middle and large owners). The 
importance of khamassat in the indigenous sector was due to the social forces which 
operated the retention of expropriated peasants as simple sharecroppers (78). The 
trend in the number of sharecroppers of this nature was a good indicator of both the 
extent of expropriation prevailing among the rural population and also the consequence 
of the slow emergence of a capitalist agriculture capable of transforming the 
expropriated peasants into full-time agricultural worker (the absence of any 
significant colonial industrialisation also explains the degree of retention of 
expropriated peasants within the indigenous agricultural sector). By the beginning of 
the 20th century the existence of an agricultural proletariat (khamess and 
agricultural workers) was well established and its size even outstripped that of 
landowners themselves.
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Table 1.13: Rural proletariat and structure of the agricultural population between 1901 and 1930.
Y e a r Landow ners F a rm e rs Khamess A g r ic u ltu ra l 
w o rk e  rs
Active agr. 
popu la tion
Total agr. 
popu la tion
1901 620,898 37,715 350,715 151,108 1,160,437 3,230,647
1910 530,211 N.A 426,851 207,707 N.A 3,525,768
1914 565,218 40,755 407,050 210,205 1,223,228 3,605,449
1930 616,544 50,771 634,600 428,032 1,730,947 4,419,943
Source: A. Benachenhou, Ibid. p. 236.
From 1910 onwards the number of landless and near landless was already far greater 
than the number of landowners (by 20% in 1910, 9% in 1914 and 72% in 1930). 
Between 1914 and 1930 the number of proletarianised peasants had more than 
doubled. Between these two dates, it respectively represented 43% and 61% of the 
total active population (79). Compared to the colonial sector, the indigenous 
agriculture was also under-equipped throughout (the persistence of Khamassat 
expresses itself in the absence of any major technological alteration in the labour 
process of indigenous farms).
Table 1.14: Comparative degree of mechanisation of the indigenous sector (1930).
Number of Indigenous farm machinery As a % of total agr. farm machinery
French plough 88,562 44%
Local plough 339,650 99%
Harvesters 3,334 20%
Mobile engines 120 8%
Threshpers
Self propelled ploughs
177 11%
- Above 15 horse power 8 3 %
- Below 15 horse power 269 7 %
Source: Ibid. p. 216.
The extent of the technological backwardness of the indigenous sector cannot however 
be viewed from the sole standpoint of total farm machinery pool. As a result of the 
differential size and the specific qualitative characteristics of the two sectors, the 
extent of the technological gap of the indigenous sector appears in fact much greater 
than that suggested by the above figure. Far from being a "natural" feature, the limited 
mechanisation or the lack of a substantial investment capable of multiplying
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agricultural labour productivity and therefore of increasing agricultural output, was 
the result of the colonial policy based on the identification of capital accumulation with 
the exclusive development of the colonial agricultural sector (the different channels - 
particularly fiscal - which operated a constant drainage of the indigenous agricultural 
surplus, are not alien to the technological backwardness of the sector). In the field of 
agricultural credit which was the main channel of acquisition of modern technology and 
consolidation of infrastructure, this colonial policy of economic and social segregation 
contributed for its part to the reproduction of the technological gap of the indigenous 
agriculture.
C. Agricultural credit and capital accumulation.
The development of agricultural credit emerged as a financial requirement of capital 
accumulation through an expansion and diversification of agricultural production. The 
setting up of credit institutions was brought about by financial and banking 
institutions from both France and Algeria including the Bank of Algeria, the Land and 
Agricultural Credit of Algeria, the Mutual Agricultural Credit, the Credit Lyonais etc. 
The organisation of such institutions was monopolised, through their board of 
management, at regional and local level, by economically powerful colonists in order to 
secure their own interests and those of the colonial sector at large. But the inequality 
of access to credit among settlers themselves was not absent. The following table based 
on the institution "les Caisses Agricoles", which supposedly officially catered for the 
credit needs of the small settlers clearly shows the degree of differentiation achieved 
among the colonists.
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Table 1.15: Structure of loans among Europeans in 1925. (U: Fr).
Individual loans Number of borrowers Amount borrowed
Below Fr. 15,000 10,950 32,980,000
15,000 < x < 30,000 890 20,440,000
30,000 < x < 50,000 370 10,920,000
Above 50,000 60 5,130,000
cooperative loans 12,260 8,930,000
Source: G. Dumenil,"La Banque d'Algerie", 1927, p. 153 quoted by A.Benachenhou Ibid. p. 148.
Out of 12,270 individual borrowers 89% of them (10,950) had access to only 47% 
of the total individual loans while the smallest fraction (11%) gained access to more 
than 50% of the total loans. As far as the indigenous agricultural landowners were 
concerned, let us hear the comment of the one-time governor of Algeria, M. Violette: 
"For the indigenous population, the situation was much more serious, as many Mutual 
Credit bodies ignored them, etc. let us say more simply that the indigenous 
agricultural credit was practically non-existent" (80). In order to fight the 
widespread forms of usurous credits to which the small indigenous peasants were 
subject , an indigenous credit institution was created: La Societe Indigene de 
Prevoyance(S\P) the Indigenous Provident Society (81). As for the colonial credit 
institution, the functioning of the S.I.Ps was appropriated by the indigenous landed 
elite at the expense of the poor peasantry. The conditions of credit distribution were 
such that "only those who enjoyed financial solvency and social reputation benefited 
from loans. We arrived at this singular paradox of having established a common fund, 
financed by all, but allocated to the satisfaction of the needs of the most well-off, while 
the poor, though bound to membership contribution, were excluded from the 
advantages of the fund" (82).
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Table 1.16: Loans granted by the S.I.P between 1900 and 1934 (83). 
(U= Fr millions)
Year Number of members Total contribution Loans Help (grant)
1900 338,000 8.7 NA NA
1910 540,000 21.0 9 0.004
1920 579,000 41.0 1 9 0.200
1930 622,000 83.0 37 0.100
1934 604,000 91.0 24 0.300
Source: A. Benachenhou. Ibid., p. 183 and p. 220.
The exclusion of the small peasants from the scope of the credit allocation of the S.I.P 
meant that the usurous credit practices to which they were subject, remained 
unchallenged as were the economic mechanisms of expropriation and pauperisation 
(the drop in membership level between 1930-1934 tends to suggest that many 
peasants abandoned the agricultural profession altogether).
On wider scale the unambiguously unequal distribution of the credit funds during the 
last years of French colonisation (84) clearly speaks for itself.
Table 1.17: The agricultural credit distribution in 1954-1960.(U= Fr million).
The traditional sector % share of 
the traditional sector
The colonial sector % share of 
the colonial sector
1954 30 22% 107 78%
1955 30 21% 109 79%
1956 20 15% 115 85%
1957 20 16% 107 84%
1958 20 17% 95 83%
1959 30 21% 112 79%
1960 40 22% 139 78%
Source: Ibid., p. 308.
The amount of credit allocated during this period to the indigenous sector (Fr 190 
million), was less than the equivalent credit accruing to the colonial sector during the 
two year period 1954-1955 (Fr 216 million). Up to the last years of French 
colonisation, the development of agrarian capitalism remained committed to the 
exclusive achievements of the colonial sector. As will be seen in the next section, this 
commitment however was soon to prove self-defeating: the mode of capital
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accumulation upon which the colonial policy of "development" was based entered into a 
period of crisis whose effect was to generate the social forces which were to challenge 
the very existence of the colonial order itself.
V.The crisis of colonial development: the end of the colonial order.
The crisis of capital accumulation can be traced back to the Great Depression of 1929. 
The crisis of capital accumulation, in the sense of a stagnation of production or its slow 
growth was reflected through the study of the two main centres of capital accumulation 
itself: wine-growing and cereal farming.
The crisis of vineyards between 1930 and 1960 was reflected in the drop of cultivated 
land (393,000 ha in 1936/40, 350,000 ha in 1956/60), production (18 million 
hi in 1934/35, 15 million hi in 1956/60), and yields (61 hl/ha in 1928, 50 hl/ha
in 1931/35, 43 hl/ha in 1956/60) as well as a stagnation of exports (12 million hi
during 1931/35, 1951/55 and 1956/60). Between 1933 and 1935 export earnings 
of wine growers fell by half as export prices dropped from Fr 190 to Fr 80 thus 
adding to the already depressed prices during the Great Depression itself. Indebteness 
increased among wine growers leading to bankruptcies and further land concentration.
For cereals the overall situation was similar. Between 1930 and 1950 land under 
cultivation increased only by 2% (from 807,000 ha to 824,000 ha), yields 'stagnated 
around 10.8 quintals/ha during 1929/39 and 1957 despite intensive mechanisation 
(85) - the number of combine harvestors increased from 440 (1930) to 4,650 
(1960) and wheel tractors from 5,334 to 23,000 during the same period - and 
production remained literally stagnant. The effects of the 1929 crisis considerably 
depressed export prices and the incomes of cereal farmers, thus producing the same 
sequence of events as in the case of wine-growing: bankruptcies, indebtedness, a drop 
in the economic growth of the sector, increased land concentration (86) etc.
In the aftermath of the 1929 crisis a policy of stabilisation was triggered by France to
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overcome the crisis of capital accumulation. In the wine-growing sector, as a result of 
the anarchical production of wine which constantly led to the recurrence of 
overproduction on the French market, new vine plantations were forbidden from 1931 
onwards. Such a measure was accompanied by compulsory distillation, withholding of 
wine production (i.e. the constitution of compulsory stocks) and a guaranteed support 
price. Similarly, in return for a limitation of production through a prohibition of any 
extension of the crop land, a fixed price (87) was guaranteed to cereal farmers. The 
result achieved by such a policy of stabilisation was that, by forcing capital 
accumulation to accommodate itself with a fixed level of production in physical terms 
as well as in value terms, it created the conditions for an increased mechanisation, 
particularly in cereal farming (88). The onset of World War II brought to a stand­
still the policy of stabilisation, and capital accumulation regressed once more and with 
it agricultural production. The following table evidences the extent of such a crisis.
Table 1.18: Level of production (1939/45).
1939 During the war 1950
Wheat 12 Mqt 2 M qt 1 0 M qt
Barley 10 Mqt 1 M qt 8 M qt
Wine 18 M hi 6 M hi 1 4 M hi
Sheep (number) 6 M 3 M 4 M
Source: Rapport general du plan de Constantine, p . 15 quoted by A. Benachenhou. Ibid. p. 271.
After World War II, capital accumulation was pursued in accordance with the nature of 
the measures of economic recovery. In the colonial agricultural sector and the 
capitalist sector at large (including a fraction of the indigenous economy), the policy 
of intervention remained identical: generous agricultural credits and increased 
mechanisation (credit for the acquisition of farm machinery increased from Fr 2,210 
million during 1945/47 to Fr 6,033 million during 1950/52).
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Table 1.19: Mechanisation trend in the colonial agricultural sector after World War 11.(1947-60).
1947 1954 1956 1958 1960
Wheel tractors N.A 11,600 13,650 20,000 20,500
Caterpillar tractors NA 7,400 8,050 8,600 8,170
Total 5,900 19,000 21,702 28,600 28,670
Combine harvesters 1,200 3,200 4,050 4,500 4,700
Source: G. Duprat "Revolution & autogestion en Algerie". Armand Collin, 1973. pp. 81. Rapport General du 
Plan de Constantine, p . 15, quoted by A. Benachenhou, Ibid. p. 271.
In the "traditional" agricultural sector, the realisation of the generalised poverty of 
the indigenous population resulted in the formulation of the first programme of 
agrarian reform in favour of the Algerian peasants. A specialised body, CAPER (Caisse 
d'Accession a la propriete et a Sexploitation Rurale), a fund for access to property 
and rural ownership, was created to meet such an objective. The result achieved was 
however marginal. Between 1944 and 1954 CAPER distributed about 19,000 ha (89) 
among 1,790 peasants (an average of 10 ha per beneficiary), for an initial target 
population of 600,000. The colonial promotion of the "traditional" agriculture 
through farm credit did not depart from the past policy bias. During 1955 the credit 
section of the S.I.P distributed Fr 2.6 Billion of credit among their 500,000 
members. During the same year the credit allocated to the capitalist section of 
agriculture, with a value of Fr 104.4 Billion (and which concerned 52,000 
landowners), represented the equivalent of more than 97% of the credit resources 
allocated to the traditional sector. The major aspect of the last years of French 
presence in Algeria was however dominated by the emergence of a new centre of capital 
accumulation: the exploitation of hydrocarbons (90). But the discovery of this 
resource coincided as well with the official launching off of the Algerian National War 
of Liberation in 1954. Though the popular resistence, particularly predominant in the 
rural areas, never really ceased throughout the history of French colonialism, it was 
only towards the end of 1954 that the different political parties present (91) 
regrouped in a united front - the Front de Liberation National (FLN) or the National
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Liberation Front - were able to agree on both the means (violence in place of 
peaceful), and the ends (political independence in place of assimilation and 
integration) and wage one of the bloodiest wars (92) of political liberation. In a 
systematic scorched earth policy conducted by the French army, entire rural zones 
were declared prohibited and cleared away of their occupants, resulting in one of the 
single most important historical displacement and regrouping of the population. The 
creation of such military no-go areas also resulted in the elimination of the supportive 
agricultural and livestock resources for about three million peasants and their 
families. On a wider scale, level the French military strategy of the physical 
elimination of the guerillas was always complemented, whenever possible, on a 
systematic destruction of all forms of resources and means which directly or 
indirectly served to perpetuate rural warfare. This policy resulted in the destruction 
of forests serving as a refuge, the elimination of livestock, and the destruction of 
dwellings, cereals stocks, crops, farm machinery, bridges, and roads, etc. The balance 
sheet of the social and human cost of the intensified escalation of warfare that led to the 
defeat of the French government, can be roughly summarised in the following table.
Table 1.20: Balance sheet of Algeria at the end of colonisation.
1.5 million dead
3.0 million displaced peasants in concentration camps
400.000 prisoners
500.000 refugees living in Morocco and Tunisia
8.000 destroyed villages
Several thousands orphans and widows 
Over two million unemployed
4.5 million poor persons in complete need of basic subsistence
Source: M. L. Benhassine and L. Boukra "Le proces historique de formation du secteur d'etat en Algerie (bilan 
de 20 ans d'experience), Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques. 
Special 20eme Anniversaire. OPU. Alger. 1981. P. 221. Ian Clegg. Workers' Self- 
Management in Algeria. Allen Lane Penguin Press. 1971. P. 44.
The costly pacification of Algeria which was so necessary for the pursuit of colonial 
capital accumulation was ultimately defeated in 1962. The official history of colonial 
Algeria was over but the legacy of capital accumulation after 132 years of colonisation 
remained. "Algeria has lived its capitalist phase of development during colonisation,
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but this capitalism only produced proletarianised classes from peasants reduced to 
poverty and emigration, to a petty bourgeoisie blocked in ail its aspirations towards 
economic and social promotion" (93).
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CONCLUSION: the colonial legacy.
The French presence in Algeria lasted 132 years. Colonial in essence, the history of 
this presence coincided with the consolidation of capital accumulation on an essentially 
agrarian basis. The development of this colonial agriculture centered on vineyards and 
cereals. Both involved a process of farmland extension and concentration. The main 
characteristics of such a specialisation was its organic link with the French economy. 
Capitalist in nature this agriculture achieved high profit returns through the use of 
intensive mechanisation, low wage rates and preferential remunerative prices on the 
French market (94). But if the colonial agricultural sector was modern in appearance 
through a permanent increased use of farm machinery, it was however far from being 
intensive in results. Yields were not significantly high. The biennial rotation 
alternating cereals with fallow land, a very traditionally, extensive farming practice, 
characterised colonial cereal farming which can be typified as an essentially extensive 
modern farming practicing a sort of "mining" agriculture. Based on profit and 
preferential price advantages with the French metropolis, colonial agriculture 
specialised also in the much commercially rich cash crops such as vine, citrus fruits, 
and market-garden products. Originally based on the direct expropriation of the 
peasants for the constitution of its land base, the development and modernisation of this 
agricultural capitalist sector generated in turn little impact on employment. In 1954 
it was estimated that 25% of agricultural workers worked less than 45 days per year, 
50% less than 100 days and 75% less than 290 days (95). In the labour-using sector 
of wine growing the estimated quantum of labour per hectare fell from 100 days in 
1938 to only 56 days in 1959 (96). The major result achieved by this capitalist 
agriculture which remained throughout its history organically dependent on the 
French market for the valorisation of its exports and on a generous agricultural credit 
policy for its expansion, was by far its contribution to the creation of an important 
proletarianised Algerian population. As such it acted as a powerful factor of social
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differentiation. By the turn of the century, there was an estimated 621,000 
indigenous landowners against only 373,000 in 1960. Through the long process of 
land confiscation and constitution of colonial agriculture, the number of landless and 
near landless swelled, while the generalisation of mechanisation and the type of 
farming rendered superfluous the economic necessity of a sustained proportion of 
permanent workers. The increased instability of labour employment which resulted 
from this form of capital accumulation pushed an increasing proportion of the rural 
proletariat and the pauperised peasants on a non-stop migratory movement towards 
urban cities - the proportion of the urban indigenous population increased from 7% of 
the total urban population in 1886 to 18% in 1954 (97) - and progressively towards 
permanent emigration proper: in 1948 there were 180,000 emigrants in France as 
against 300,000 in 1954 and 350,000 in 1962 (98).
The nature of this form of capital accumulation remained agrarian throughout the 
French presence in Algeria. The consolidation of this sector according to the needs of 
the colonists was set in an organic relation vis-a-vis the needs of the French market: 
raw materials such as iron ore, tobacco, esperto-grass, phosphate for the French 
manufacturing industry, and agricultural products for the French food industry in the 
form of wine, cereals, citrus fruits, industrial crops, olive oil, market-garden 
products etc. In turn the colony became a market for French exports. Algeria's imports 
included food products (22% on average during the 1950s), raw materials such as 
fuels, oils fats (11% of total imports), metal and metal product and machinery (9% 
on average of the value of manufactured imports) and farm machinery, passenger cars 
and other transport equipment (20% on average during the same period). The urban 
economy was mainly based on the import/export activities linked to the trade between 
the colony and the metropolis as well as on the organisation of the colonist consumer 
market proper (80% of the urban population was European in 1954). The structure 
of income distribution between the European population - Fr 360,000 per head on 
average - and the indigenous population - Fr 29,000 per head (99) - revealed in
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turn the correspondence between the structure of imports and the concentration of 
high incomes thus revealing the extent to which the "relative prosperity of Algeria 
only benefited a small minority" (100). As an indication of this inequality, in 1955 
10% of the total population - one million settlers - controlled about 50% of total 
income (101).
After 132 years of intensive economic colonisation, and despite the full exercise of 
free trade between the colony and the metropolis, the characteristics of the Algerian 
formation were essentially those of an underdeveloped/peripheral economy with the 
constitution of an economic enclave in the form of a capitalist agricultural sector based 
on the international valorisation of cash crops and raw materials entirely within the 
hands of the colonists (102). Such an enclave also meant that the colonial economic 
exploitation of Algeria had produced little or virtually no structuring effects or 
integration between its economic sectors (the development of the colonial sector and its 
expansion depended exclusively on the French market and the French industry at 
large). The Algerian economy operated de facto as an appendix to the French economy. 
Through this particular form of labour specialisation, all forms of economic growth 
were transmitted under the form of increased trade between the enclave (103) and the 
metropolis with imports mutually reinforcing exports. The entire economic 
integration was operated between an export sector and the French economy. In essence 
the economy was based on a dominated form of capital accumulation.
The experience of colonial Algeria also showed how the confinement of capitalism 
within the exclusive sphere of colonial agriculture and its exclusive organic 
dependence on French capital, explains to a large extent the absence of any significant 
industrial capital accumulation (104). The emergence of an important proletariat 
remained therefore without the production of the economic conditions necessary for its 
employment, and this even when emigration is taken into account. What however 
further magnified the extent of the pauperisation of the indigenous population, beside 
that expressed by the pattern of overall income distribution, inequality and the
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absence of any industrial indigenous industrial proletariat, was by no means the extent 
of deterioration and destruction of subsistence farming itself. Under the influence of 
vineyards and cash crop expansion, food crops deteriorated and cereal farming was 
progressively pushed back on the less fertile land. The regression of traditional 
farming based on cereals and complemented with animal husbandry - the expression of 
peasant simple commodity production - took many forms and followed the initial 
rupture between the tribe and its ancestral land (this rupture was particularly 
evident when the land at the disposal of the tribes was systematically reduced and/or 
when entire tribes were by order of authority displaced). It developed through the 
resulting pressure produced by an increased population on limited land of poor quality. 
The old traditional farming methods which combined cereals and animal husbandry on 
fallow land could not be reproduced. The proportion of cereals tended to increase more 
and more at the expense of the reproductive capacity of the land. The reduction of 
fallow land and with it the reduction of animal husbandry and its lost fertilising 
property through manure, weakened the reproductive capacity of the land (105). The 
pressure on land was particularly high in the category of small holdings below 10 ha 
(106). The largest regression of subsistence farming was however carried out after 
1954 with the policy of the last massive colonial population displacement. Unlike the 
earlier policies of regrouping (before and particularly after the Senatus Consult of 
1863), which severely restricted the land asset of the tribal population, the 1954 
policy of regrouping forced 1/4 of the indigenous population, or about 1 out of 3 
peasants (107), out the land altogether. In an attempt to cut off the National Liberation 
Army (the military organ of the popular rebellion) from its backbone, the peasantry, 
about three million peasants and their families were driven by force from their 
villages to regrouping centres, a form of collective concentration camp, transforming 
the evacuated land into no-go areas for 8 years. The worst hit regions were 
particularly those where most of the poor subsistence farming was located, the land 7 
where the guerillas were operating: the mountainous and forest zones as well as the
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surrounding areas. This movement of displacement disconnected about three million 
people from their traditional resources (small animal husbandry on forest and pasture 
land, small cereal farming, a few fruit trees etc.). But the loss of such resources was 
without any compensation as the already populated zones (villages, valleys, piemonts 
etc.), which received the displaced population, could not materially offer any. In other 
words this movement of "de-ruralisation" led to a complete proletarianisation of the 
displaced. "In the zones of colonisation, the policy of regrouping has transformed 
seasonal workers, who combined traditional farming with alternative periods of 
seasonal work, into permanent agricultural workers but it has also, it is amply 
evident, created reservoirs of labourers through the regrouping of old, new and future 
workers" (108). The loss of the land (109) without any alternative policy of 
employment transformed the displaced into refugees in their own country. The means 
of subsistence of the displaced population were mainly based on contingent work, 
assistance and particularly the money orders from dependent emigrants (110). The 
proletarianisation of an increasing proportion of the population was therefore being 
developed on a contradictory basis: the regression of subsistence farming - and 
therefore the disruption of the balance between the food needs of the population and the 
material mode of organisation for their satisfaction - on the one hand, and the 
development of export crops (a mode of organisation of production corresponding to 
needs different from those of the proletarianised peasants) on the other. The 
proletarianisation of peasants was therefore accompanied by their inability to produce 
their own needs either directly as independent producers or indirectly as wage earners 
(paradoxically it was also peasant economy which de facto continued to provide for the 
food condition of labour power reproduction). The triggering off of such a contradiction 
and its preservation and development on an ever increasing scale over more than a 
century, ultimately resulted in the challenge and destruction of its colonial premise. 
The defeat and elimination of the colonial order created however an unparalleled 
precedent in the history of colonialism. The political independence of the colony was
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accompanied by the exodus of all it settlers. This vacuum, which heralded radically 
new perspectives for the contending domestic classes, also highlighted the sense of a 
different and more subtle legacy, that of the colonial economic system itself: "the 
coloniser contented himself taking in his luggage only appearances, discreetly leaving 
behind the essentials: his commodity economic laws" (111). The redefinition of the 
power bearers that accompanied the political independence of Algeria has far reaching 
implications. Broadly speaking it raises the fundamental question of how the removal 
of the colonial state redefines the entire strategy of the different domestic groups. At a 
more specific level, the transition to a politically independent Algeria raises two main 
issues: How will the new policy of capital accumulation be pursued and in whose 
interests? and how will such a new strategy of development affect the question and 
status of a land which dominated the entire capitalist phase of colonial Algeria? The 
questions are dealt with consecutively in Part II and Part III.
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64-But farmers with 200 ha were not uncommon. In 1939 the farm owned by the
71
firm La Socite des Domaines du Caid Es Sebt had an area of 2,000 ha (during this
A.
period 8% of farms belonged to companies).
65-Only smallholders (1,775 in all), were directly dependent on the labour force of 
their family members.
66-lt was assessed that the use of a seasonal labour force by this category of farms 
amounted to about 19 million days work. Such a figure cannot be translated with 
accuracy in terms of a theoretical corresponding manpower. It can however be assumed 
to represent a few hundred thousands of workers: 350,000 if one assumes the 
employment of a worker during a period of 58 days work/year or 234,000 if one 
assumes a 3 month work/year.
67-Such a practice denotes that if the development of colonial capitalism produced an 
agrarian proletariat, it has not eliminated this pre-capitalist form of farming.
68-A broad estimate of the proportion between permanent and temporary workers can 
be given on the basis of the following calculation: Total employment in the colonial 
sector: 130,790 permanent workers+ 22 million of days work representing the 
contribution of the seasonal work force. On the assumption that a permanent worker 
works on average 300 days/year (or 25 days/month), it is about 39 million days of 
work which were provided by the 130,790 permanent workers. For the entire 
colonial sector, total employment would have amounted to about 60 million days of 
work, more than 1/3 of which provided by seasonal employment (if however the 
notion of full agricultural employment was relaxed to a much lower realistic figure 
than the 300 days, the proportion of seasonal workers would have been much more 
significant).
69-H. Isnard, Ibid. p. 9, who adds "the colonisation breeded a vast Muslim proletariat, 
half-floating, whose means of subsistence were more and more reduced to the meagre 
wages paid by the masters of the soil". As it will be seen later on in this chapter the 
agricultural colonisation of Algeria, if it produced a proletarianisation of the peasants 
it did not produce any alternative mode of their employment. If the capitalist 
penetration produced the necessary divorce between the peasant and their means of
livelihood in the agricultural sector it however failed to generate an authentic capital 
accumulation in the industrial sphere. This experience of colonial capitalism offers a 
good illustration of an unachieved form of capital accumulation.
70-65% of holdings extended over 18% of the total land area of the indigenous 
agriculture. As such this situation prohibits any possible improvement of the economic 
situation of the majority of such smallholders.
71-The concentration of the colonial land was overwhelmingly located on the most 
fertile land. "Forced back into the hills and mountains, especially in Algeria and 
Tunisia, the native farmers have been compelled to plough slopes that were far too 
steep and, until the late war, the French had failed to instruct them in the technique of 
soil conservation" R. Dumont. Types of rural economy. Methuen and co. ltd. 1970, p. 
168. But if the first part of the statement is correct we however disagree with R. 
Dumont on the second part of the statement. The problem of marginalised peasants was 
not strictly speaking a matter of soil conservation but rather that of the roots of their 
insufficient land provision.
72-As seen earlier on, one of the characteristics of capital accumulation in the 
colonial context of Algeria was its fulfilment of "entrepreneurship" on a segregated 
basis: the financial and commercial colonial bodies were catering for the exclusive 
interests of the settlers. From the point of view of the indigenous farmers, the initial 
physical segregation associated with the sectoral distribution of the land, was further 
reinforced by the economic differentiation operated by the segregated access to the 
financial and commercial institutions of capital. "Access to the European credit funds 
and to the ordinary financial institutions was restrained if not prohibited by the 
political segregation and the status of the land. These bodies made of the French titles of 
property the condition of attribution of loans" (A. Benachenhou Ibid. p. 219). Given 
the concrete conditions under which emerged the dual structure of Algeria's 
agriculture, the distinction between "modern" (i.e. European sector) and "traditional" 
(i.e. "domestic" sector), becomes unavoidably filled with both a theoretical
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misconception and an ideological mystification.
73-lt was this social category,with that of the already landless peasants, which 
constantly fed the permanent flows of rural migrants as temporary labourers and/or 
permanent workers within the overall agricultural sector. This floating army of 
reserve supplied the first generation of the urban proletariat, both in Algeria and in 
France.
74-On average each small landholders farmed 3.5 ha. In the colonial sector the 
smallest farmers owned on average 3 ha. The difference between these two categories of 
peasants was that the latter lived off the land which enabled them to produce cash crops 
(market-garden products as well as animal husbandry, vineyards fruit trees etc.) 
while the former survived off a land of a much lower fertility which transformed him 
into a semi-proletarianised labourer forced to sell his labour force on a permanent or 
seasonal basis (the majority of the indigenous peasants resorted to outside employment 
on a systematic basis.
75-Communal pasture land, outside the boundary of individualized holdings, 
represented 3.7 million ha with 2.2 million ha (59%) located in areas under chronic 
rain shortage.
76-Such a specialisation of the agricultural activity was uniformly distributed 
throughout the total territory. The proportion of the agricultural land allocated to 
cereal farming and animal husbandry was respectively 91%, 83% and 90% in 
Eastern, Central and Western Algeria.
77-Though larger farms also resorted to wage earners, it was never on the same 
extent. The geographical distribution of wage earners between Eastern - 42%- (the 
predominant region of cereal farming regrouping the highest concentration of the 
indigenous agricultural sector) and Western Algeria - 80% - (the smallest 
concentration of indigenous agriculture and also the highest concentration of colonial 
agriculture), evidenced the little impact of the penetration of capitalist relations of 
production in the indigenous agricultural sector as a whole.
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78-The importance of khamasse in the indigenous sector does not however imply that 
the rate of expropriation of peasants was higher than in the European agricultural 
sector. It only imply that the transformation of expropriated peasants does not take the 
same economic form: capitalist in the colonial sector (with some exceptions), it 
remained mainly formally capitalist in the indigenous sector (the relation of divorce 
of the producer from his means of production was not accompanied by a capitalist 
relation of combination between the labour force and the land).
79-In contrast, the number of farmers who worked the land on a leased basis did not 
significantly increase. Such a situation tends to suggest that the number of indigenous 
absentee landlords did not considerably increase during this period: 6% in 1901 and 
8% in 1930. On the other hand the proportion of farmers in the colonial sector was 
much more important (25% in 1930) thus reflecting a situation whereby a much 
more important number of European landowners abandoned the direct management of 
their farm (in 1950 about 1/2 of the landowners were absentee landlords).
80-Quoted by A. Benachenhou, Ibid. p. 148.
81-Membership to such Societies was compulsory and the financial contribution was 
recovered by the same procedure as that of ordinary taxes.
82-Massiat L'usure en Algerie. 1961, p. 231. Ibid. p. 183.
83-The per head contribution can be considered to represent an increased burden for 
the poorest sections of the peasants: Fr 23 in 1900, Fr 30 in 1910, Fr 71 in 1020, 
Fr 133 in 1930 and Fr 150 in 1934. The insignificance of the financial help to the 
poor peasants (less than 1% of the total loans), was also in itself a further significant 
indicator of the deliberate discriminate colonial policy against peasant agriculture. It 
is also worth mentioning that less than halfp the membership contribution was 
systematically distributed (27% in 1934). '
84-The allocation of agricultural credit during this period coincided with a period 
most favourable to the development of the indigenous sector with a set of measures 
aimed at fighting rural poverty. Such a policy was in effect a device to create the 
economic conditions capable of offsetting the socio-economic conditions of deprivation
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and pauperisation upon which the popular - particularly peasant- backed movement of 
war of liberation was deriving more and more its strength.
85-The logic of mechanisation promoted by a generous credit policy seemed to be more 
geared towards the achievement of a labour cost reduction rather than increased yields.
86-Between 1930 and 1940 the proportion of smallholders between 0 and 10 ha fell 
from 26% to 20% of the total farm area of the colonial sector while farms above 100 
ha increased their share from 74% to 80%. The total farms between these two dates 
fell from 26,153 to 25,000. Such a movement of concentration did not exclude the 
indigenous sector.
87-Between 1933 and 1936 a guaranteed price of Fr 115/quintal was in use. It was 
also this period that saw the creation of O.A.I.C, the Algerian marketing board for 
cereals in 1936 with competence extending over the monopoly of cereals trade on both 
the national and international markets.
88-Combinec/ harvesters increased from 449 (1930) to 1,200 (1947). This policy 
of mechanisation was achieved through a consolidation of the debt of farmers and a rise 
in agricultural credit. The development of mechanisation, a constancy of colonial cereal 
farming, must have produced permanent depressing effects on the level of employment.
89-Lazregh, M. The emergence of classes in Algeria. Westview Press. Boulder 
Colorado. 1976, particularly Chapter 4. The Dynamic of Incipient Classes, pp. 57- 
86 and Clegg, I. Op. Cit., Chapter 2. A colonial Prehistory, and particularly the 
Section entitled 'Nationalist Politics and revolution' pp. 31-38.
90-lt is estimated that 1.5 million persons died during the 8 years that separated the 
official triggering of the military warfare against France and the official declaration of 
the political independence of Algeria in 1962.
91-The constitution of the land fund was based on the acquisition of land as well as the 
nationalisation of irrigated land insufficiently farmed. The resistence of settlers to 
such a reform explained to a large extent the failure of the programme which, if 
implemented, would have in fact required more than a simple redistribution of land.
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The contradictions of the colonial power were such that while promoting a programme 
of land reform, it also embarked at the same time on one of the largest movement of 
expropriation of peasants after the start of the Algerian war of liberation in 1954. 
This policy of pacification which took the form of a massive movement of population 
regrouping, displaced away from their land about three million persons (1/4 of the 
population) between 1954 and 1960.
92-A. Benachenhou summarises as follows the significance of this new centre of 
capital accumulation: "In total, the capital accumulation in the oil sector, while 
achieving a non negligible economic "growth" was by nature geared towards exports 
and like wine during 80 years, put the Algerian economy into contribution vis-a-vis 
accumulation on a world scale; the control of French capital in this field of 
accumulation, cancelled any possibility to use it [oil] in order to start an authentic 
policy of development ". Ibid. p. 335.
93-Ollivier, M. La politique aqraire de !'Aloerie: evolution et perspective, thesis. 
Grenoble, 1972, p. 120. quoted by A. Benaouda Svsteme Productif Algerien et 
independance nationale. OPU. Algiers. 1983. Tome I. P. 64
94-Through a series of subsidies and financial guaranties the export prices of the 
colonial sector have always tended to be above world prices.
95-A. Benachenhou. Ibid. p. 356.
96-H. Isnard quoted by A. Benachenhou. Ibid. p. 355.
97-lt is worth mentioning that such rates of growth are net, i.e. they do not take into 
account the proportion of the population which had already emigrated. Moreover such 
rates ought to bear in mind the historical conditions which shaped the demographic 
development of the population: effects of years of famines, epidemic diseases, human 
losses due to the continuous military repression etc. all factors which combined tend to 
produce a deflationary effects on the different rates of urbanisation.
98-Despois, J. La population Algerienne au 31 Octobre 1854. Annales de Geographie, 
Volume 65. pp. 55/56 and Raffinot, M. and Jacquemot, P. Le capitalism d ’etat en
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Algerie F. Maspero, 1977, p. 220.
99-Norbey, O. The economy of Algeria The Economies of Africa. G. Allen and Unwin. 
1969. p. 477.
On the basis of the then prevailing exchange rate, the average income per European was 
£365 while that of the indigenous only £29.5, a ratio of 1 to well above 12.
1 00 -lb id .
101-Amin, Samir The maqhreb in the modern world: Algeria. Tunisia._MorocQQ, 
Chivers, Penguin edition, 1970.
102-Without exaggeration such a sector could be assimilated to a foreign sector and its 
representative those of foreign capital. The particular colonial experience of Algeria 
only draws too well a clear cut line between the economic interests of France through 
its colonists and those of the indigenous population.
103-The notion of enclave ought to be understood in its broadest sense so as to include 
not only the strictly productive sphere such as mining and agricultural but as well all 
those activities which guaranteed the reproduction of the colonial status of Algeria as 
such, i.e. the status necessary for the durability of its economic exploitation.
104-Which was catered for by the French industrial capital.
105-72% of the total farmland was devoted to cereals in the indigenous sector against 
only 55% in the colonial sector but the proportion of fallow land in the latter was 
83% and only 63% in the former in 1950.
106-Such a pressure can be assessed through the contribution of each category of 
farm in the total cereals production. In 1950 21% of the total indigenous cereals 
production accrued to the category of holdings bellow 10 ha against 47% to holdings 
between 10 and 50 ha and 31% to holdings above 50 ha. The proportion of the above 
category of farms in the total farmland of the sector was respectively 18%, 43% and 
39%.
107-M. Lesne Les centres de reoroupement en Alaerie in Annales de geographie, 
Volume 7. 1962, p. 600.
108-lbid. p. 597.
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109-No source has ever been able to assess the extent of the land thus withdrawn from 
cultivation.
110-The contribution of emigration in sustaining traditional farming (the main 
provider of emigrants), has always been important. In certain regions such 
remittances represented up to 80% of the their earnings. "The emigrants remittances 
increased from Fr 11 million in 1950 to 38 million in 1955. At this date such 
transfers represented an amount greater than the total bulk of agricultural wages". R. 
Benattig Politique economiaue de I'etat et revolution de la situation de I'emoloi e tdes  
revenus en milieu rural (Algerie 1962-1979). These 3®me cycle Paris. 1980. P. 
21 quoted by S. Bedrani L'agriculture Algerienne face au marche mondial in Les 
Politiaues Aaraires en Aloerie. CREA. Algiers (non dated), pp. 32/33 (footnote NQ2).
111 -G. Montchausse Steppe Alaerienne: causes et effets d'une desertisation. Peuples 
Mediterraneens. Volume 1-1977. pp. 141-142.
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PART II
THE POST-COLONIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF 
DEVELOPMENT: OIL RENT AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
In tro d u c tio n
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the colonial era culminated in a violent 
national war of liberation which lasted 8 years of bitter fight resulting, on the 
Algerian side, in a death toll of 1.5 million. The end of French colonialism closed one 
period of conflicts and at the same time opened another. The fate of a new politically 
independent country with a colonial legacy whose weight was to prove "ever present in 
its absence" (1), was brought to the open in relation to both the inherited economic 
system at large as well as to the different domestic classes whose historical 
development was directly associated with the development of colonialism itself. The 
immediate outcome of the defeat of the French army resulted in an intense conflict for a 
vacant power and control of state apparatus (2). Contending classes and groups 
remained closely confined to petty bourgeois elements attached to the then main 
repository of power, the National Liberation Army. As pointed out by M. Lazregh the 
pre-independence goal of such a class was directly "an independent Algeria, where full 
expression of class interests would no longer be limited by colonial superstructure" 
(3). Power crystalisation and consolidation underwent three main phases: The 
provisional apparatus embodied in the GPRA (September 1958) and the Ben Bella 
regime of 1962-1965. From 1965 onwards, i.e. since the coup d'etat against Ben 
Bella, the stability of the political system, and the consequent underlying continuity in 
its economic programme, has only been interrupted by the natural death of colonel H. 
Boumedienne.
Along with state consolidation, the transition from the colonial to post-colonial period
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was accompanied with the setting up of the economic project compatible with its own 
reproduction: the promotion of an accelerated industrialisation (the post-colonial 
economic "strategy" inaugurated therefore the economic project most compatible with 
the reproduction of the new power-holders encrusted in the apparatus of the state). 
The identification of the post-colonial economic project with the role of the state is 
based on the economic pre-eminence of the state sector itself (in actual fact the pre­
eminence of the state is that of a total hegemony embracing all aspects of social life). 
As a result of such an economic hegemony, state capital accumulation progressively 
impregnated through its structuring effects - in the form of a generalisation of 
commodity production - the entire Algerian social formation: in short capitalist 
development (ideologically referred to and and perceived under the label of 'national 
development'), progressively imposes itself as the dominant social norm of material 
production. The full expression of the state economic policy as embodied in the 
successive plans from 1967 onwards, cannot however be understood outside the 
realisation of two important sets of factors: the initiation of reforms to render more 
compatible the new exigencies of the economic project with the consolidation of the 
interests of the class that controls the state, and the specific conditions under which it 
was possible to generate an important non-agricultural economic surplus capable of 
financing the ambitious state policy of industrial development. It is to these two points 
that we first turn our attention.
I. The pre-conditions of realisation of the state policy of accumulation.
A. The transitional period of reforms: 1962-1967.
The study of this period is essential to the understanding of the domestic preconditions 
vital for the promotion of capital accumulation, viz. the consolidation of the state and 
the constitution of its economic basis: the public sector. Seen in this context the 
mobilisation and allocation of economic surplus becomes inseparable from the 
consolidation of the state and its economic intervention. In other words the state
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becomes the main expanding vector of capitalist relations of production spreading from 
the sustained extension of capital accumulation in the state public sector. The 
realisation of such an objective was achieved through a set of corresponding measures: 
the setting up of appropriate administrative structures in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the different plans of development, the extension and generalisation 
of the state ownership of the means of production in an expanding public sector 
initially based on the exclusion of foreign interests through nationalisation (4), the 
centralisation and control of the financial and banking conditions under which the 
circulation and production of capital is guaranteed, the creation of the economic units 
which are the backbone of the public sector etc. The fulfilment of such objectives 
proceeded along the following lines.
a. The administrative reforms.
After 1962 the administrative institutions inherited from the colonial era were 
reformed in order to adapt them to the requirements of the new mode of capital 
accumulation. The nature of these administrative reforms was marked by a great 
decentralisation at the communal and regional level, the two levels of the national 
implementation. The territory was divided into: Wilayate (administrative regions) 
and communes (village level). The popular assembly of the Wilayate was chaired by a 
representative of the central government while the structure of the A.p.Cs (popular 
assemblies of the communes) and the election of their chairmen was decided by the 
electors of the commune (at least in theory). Both the commune and the Wilaya 
(singular of Wilayate) enjoy a financial autonomy but they still depend very much on 
the central government for their development budget.
b. The policy of nationalisation.
A greatly decentralised and co-ordinated administrative structure was felt inefficient 
if on the other hand the state does not enjoy any control over foreign capital (5). In 
may, 1966 insurance and mining companies were nationalised. During the summer of 
1967 the distribution networks of ESSO, MOBIL and B.P were nationalised. During the
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same year the interests of many foreign manufacturing companies were also affected. 
The programme of nationalisation has gone well beyond the period of transition and 
affected mainly oil interests (6) particularly at prospecting and production level.
c. The creation of state enterprises.
All nationalised assets were put under the management of state owned companies which 
became the main economic agents of state capital accumulation (7).The power of the 
state has been further extended by the creation of specialised boards with monopoly 
powers: ONACO (the Algerian marketing board) with a monopoly over food imports and 
exports, OAT with a monopoly over tourist industry, ONAP fishery, ONT transport, 
EGA electricity and gas, and SNCFA railways etc.
d. The financial measures.
Until 1962 the management of the treasury and the supply of money and insurance 
were under the direct control of France. As a sign of her financial and monetary 
independence Algeria created the BCA (Central Bank of Algeria) and the FAD (the 
Algerian development fund) in 1962. A national insurance company was created in 
1963 and during the same year foreign exchange control was introduced. In 1964 the 
Algerian currency was created and its value defined (8). During the same year the 
Algerian saving Bank (CNEP) was also created. Prepared by such reforms Algeria 
embarked on its ambitious policy of accumulation.
B. The source of capital accum ulation: oil rent.
The study of the experience of Algerian development is inseparable from the study of 
two interwoven sets of conditions under which capital accumulation was being 
achieved: the mobilisation of the economic surplus itself on the one hand, and the 
conditions under which social groups operated such a mobilisation in view of its 
allocation on the other. In the conditions surrounding the emergence of an openly 
deliberate Algerian policy of development (APD) (9), the central question remains 
that of the generation of the source of accumulation itself or more precisely the study
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of the conditions which allowed for the realisation of the objective of capital 
accumulation at the level of the Algerian economic formation. In the context of Algeria 
the main source of capital accumulation was oil and the nature of such a product makes 
it also the source of an important rent.
As a form of goods produced for sale and purchase, oil is a commodity but a commodity 
whose production takes place mainly on an international scale. As such, it is the 
commodity upon which the network of international capital in the world energy market 
is built'. Accordingly the oil industry epitomises the economic sector where the 
internationalisation of capital is best achieved. From the standpoint of exporting 
countries, the production of oil is also the de facto basis of their economic integration 
(not to say their immersion), in the world capitalist market relations (10). In order 
to understand the importance of oil for the generation of capital accumulation, it is 
therefore important to understand the significance that such a commodity plays in the 
process of capital valorisation at large on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
conditions under which the Algerian ruling class has been able to appropriate to its 
advantage a share of the world surplus profit on the world energy sector.
a. Oil and capital: a theoretical assessment.
The reliance of capital on energy and particularly on the oil form of energy, derives 
from the logic of capital valorisation itself. In the capitalist mode of production, the 
dynamic of capital accumulation is based on the ability of capital to be of a self- 
generating value. The mode of functioning of such a value depends in fact upon the rate 
at which surplus value is extracted from labour. In the modern, present conditions of 
capitalist relations of production, the dominant form of surplus value is relative 
surplus value, i.e. surplus value extracted within the conditions of increased labour 
productivity compatible with a shortening of the working day (11). The conditions 
under which the productive power of the labour force is multiplied is obviously 
through technological sophistication which increases the organic composition of capital 
(c/v). The on-going technological capitalist revolution whereby the extent of unpaid
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labour (surplus-value) is increased (and that of the value of the labour power 
decreased) to meet the limitless needs of capital valorisation revolves therefore 
around the system of machines. As far as energy consumption is concerned it is clear, 
that "capital's need for energy cannot be understood until capital's need for machines 
has been understood, because energy is simply one input into the mechanised 
production of commodities" (12). The energy need of capital is further enhanced by the 
properties of oil commodity itself, i.e. its use-value and its exchange-value. Thus, in 
terms of heat content(13), purity and the span of by-products, oil offers unique 
features when compared to alternative carbon-bearing sources of energy (14). The 
favourable use-value form of oil is also combined with the fact that its favourable 
exchange-value makes it also the cheapest form of energy (Figure II. 1 gives the 
exchange value relation of the main energy sources on the world market). As the 
cheapest energy, oil has therefore become the dominant form of energy consumption on 
the world market, representing about 40% of total energy consumption in 1984.
Table 11.1:Development and structure of consumption of primary energy for 1960 & 1970 (U= million 
CUs (coal units), and 1980 (U=million tons of oil equivalent).
Sources
of energy 196  0 %
World
1 9 7 0 % 1 9 8 4 % 1 9 6 0
Western Europe
% 1 9 7 0 % 19 8 4 %
Coal & other fuels 2,111 4 6 % 2,263 31% 2,179 30% 509 57% 423 28% 256 20%
Oil 1,610 3 5 % 3,285 45% 2,844 39% 286 32% 877 58% 591 47%
Gas 589 13% 1,241 17% 1,409 19% 10 1% 91 6% 190 15%
Hydro-energy 276 6 % 511 7% 485 6% 89 10% 106 7% 107 8%
Nuclear - - - 282 4% - - 15 1% 104 8%
T o ta l 4 , 6 0 0 7,300* 7 , 2 0 1 8 9 4 1,512 1,249
Source: M. Massarat in "Oil and class struggle". Edited by p. Nore & T. Turner. Zed Press, London. 1980. p. 
37 & BP Review of World Gas. August 1985. (‘ Excluding nuclear).
Viewed from the point of view of commodity production, what confers special 
importance to oil as a commodity are the conditions under which the mechanisms of 
price and profit determination are operated. In such a context what is so special about 
this particular commodity is the level of surplus profit it can command at the level of 
the world market and the intensity of the conflicts it can trigger at the level of the
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surplus profit among oil companies, exporting countries and importing countries 
(1 5 ) .
b.The mode of determination of oil prices of production.
The framework of oil price determination and profit appropriation is not confined to 
national markets alone but tends towards a world market determination. In this respect 
the very existence of an international fixed oil price is in itself the expression of an 
international mode of price determination which overrides the specific peculiarities of 
individual regional production conditions. The sphere of production immediately 
dependent on nature (such as the extractive or agricultural spheres of production) 
displays its own peculiarities: the determination of its price of production is operated 
independently of the capacities of capital, unlike for instance in manufacturing, 
whereby market prices reflect the level of prices determined in the last analysis (16) 
on the basis of average labour productivity. Indeed, whenever a fraction of capital 
operating in the manufacturing sphere increases the level of labour productivity 
beyond the average labour productivity as a result of a technological improvement of 
the conditions of production which therefore lowers the cost of production, it is able to 
capture a profit in excess of the average profit, i.e. to a point allowed by the existing 
level of prices of production (17). The ability of capital to generate the condition of its 
valorisation through an ever increasing labour productivity eliminates in the same 
process the temporary conditions under which a fraction of capital has been able so far 
to realise an excess profit above the average profit: the elevation of labour 
productivity and the spread of its penetration into other sectors of the economy, 
establishes a new level of market price lower than the previous one. All fractions of 
individual capitals which are unable to adjust to the new average social conditions of 
production will be progressively eliminated and replaced by the most performing 
capitals. In the last analysis, the end result of this mode of production tends towards 
the realisation of increasing lower costs of production and therefore lower prices of 
production. In other words market prices tend to be determined as a result of the
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generalisation of increased productivity as the price of production is regulated by the 
most favourable conditions of production.
When transposed on the sphere of production immediately dependent on nature, this 
mode of determination of market prices undergoes a major modification as a result of 
the inability of capital to achieve the generalisation of a higher labour productivity 
homogeneously distributed. The mode of operation of the law of value is limited by 
nature itself. Thus the uneven distribution of qualitatively different natural resources 
in time and space is at the same time an uneven distribution of the natural 
productiveness of labour for a given application of capital. As social demand (national 
and international) increases for the products of the extractive sphere (as is the case 
for oil) the necessity to exploit new resources in less natural favourable conditions 
becomes socially unavoidable. This shift in production creates a surplus-profit 
accruing to the capital allowing a higher labour productivity (18) as a result of the 
difference between the price of production of this particular capital and the price of 
production of the capitals invested in the rest of the sphere of production. But, as 
pointed out by K.Marx "the power of nature is not the source of surplus profit, but 
only its natural basis, because this natural basis permits an exceptionally increase in 
the productiveness of labour. In the same way, use-value is in general the bearer of 
exchange-value, not its cause" (19). Unlike manufacturing, the price of production in 
the extractive sphere is determined at the margin, i.e. by the market price of those 
commodities produced under the least advantageous production conditions (20). The 
objective of meeting a given level of demand prevents on the one hand the elimination 
of the capital producing with the lowest labour productivity and guarantees, on the 
other, that this capital gets its share of average profit (21). The energy market (of 
which as we have previously seen oil is an important component-part) illustrates 
clearly such a mode of price determination. The following table shows how on the 
energy market, because of the necessity to meet a given social demand, the least 
favourable conditions of energy production (here coal) regulate in effect the price of 
the commodity energy and consequently help determine the different levels of surplus
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profit which accompany the range of the different natural conditions under which the
world energy production takes place. As far as the carbon bearing sources of energy 
(oil, gas, coal etc.) are therefore concerned, it can be said along with M.Massarat that 
"the individual price of production of American coal regulates the market value and 
market price of all sources of energy, in as much as its individual price of production 
obtains precisely the average profit" (22).
Figure II. 1: Exchange-value relation of main energy sources on world market (23). 
(U =D .M /1 ,000 C.Us).
---------------------- ------------------ ------------------ -----------------_L---------------------- »►
Crude oil in Crude oil in Coal in the Coal in Europe
Persian Gulf the U.S.A U.S.A
& Africa
Source: M. Massarat, op., cit. p. 36.
Because of favourable natural conditions capital has been able to generate the highest 
labour productivity in the Persian gulf and Africa (during the 1960s the actual
production cost was on average $0.54/ton of crude oil in the Near East, $2.16/ton of
Lybian crude, $4.21/ton of Venezuelan crude. During the same period the cost of 
production for coal was $7.4/ton of US coal and $15/ton of West European coal). 
Moreover, because of the higher prices for alternative sources of energy, such a price 
determination potentially opens a conflict and struggle for control over surplus profit. 
As stated above, when land and its resources are subsumed under landed property, as is 
the case of oil fields (24), the case of generation of surplus profit raises the question 
of its distribution. In so far as the question which interests us is concerned, i.e. the
A
D .M /1 ,0 0 0  
C.Us
SubsidiesMarket price
S p Pi: Individual price of 
production
S p Pi
Pi Sp: Surplus profit
C.U: Coal unit -  1 kg of coal
Pi
containig 7 ,000  
calories 
-0 .7  kg of crude 
oil.
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generation of an investment fund for the realisation of the Algerian policy of capital 
accumulation, the conditions under which the surplus-profit generated in the world 
energy market is appropriated is of fundamental importance.
c.Surplus-profit and oil rent.
The mode of appropriation of surplus-profit on the world oil sector has basically 
depended on the extent of the struggle between the conflicting interests which opposed 
the multinational oil companies, the oil importing countries and the oil producing 
countries. Such a conflict appears clearly in the mode of distribution between company 
profit, ground-rent accruing to exporting countries and taxes accruing to importing 
countries. As far as the historical status of the oil-producing countries is concerned, 
particularly those belonging to the category of peripheral capitalism, the terms under 
which their share of surplus profit was appropriated are in themselves a revealing 
indicator of the changes operating and taking place at the level of the class structure of 
their economic formation. Thus, as long as the multinational oil corporations operated 
in the historical context of free concessions, the feudal relation of production which 
characterised the majority of backward countries prevented any alteration in the 
dominant mode of appropriation of surplus-profit. The direct and indirect subordinate 
colonial status of most oil providing countries (the outcome of an economic formation 
dominated by feudal and/or precapitalist relations of production), provided for the 
class basis upon which oil companies were able to minimise the share of surplus- 
profit accruing to host countries. The alliance between international capital and the 
feudal ruling classes fulfilled therefore the conditions for reproduction of their mutual 
interests: unchallenged terms of access to oil fields for the companies and guaranteed 
royalties for the rentier state (25). Like the Trojan horse, the extension of oil 
companies in peripheral countries introduced at the same time capitalist relations of 
production. As such, the introduction of capitalist relations and their development are 
not without major social and class transformation effects. The real breakthrough in the 
redistribution of oil surplus-profit occurred during the mid-1970s. Far from being a
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simple increase in the posted prices of oil (26), the quadrupling of oil prices, realised 
through the cartel OPEC, has only been possible because of the deep social 
transformation which has been taking place within the oil exporting countries 
themselves. The feed back effect of the development of capitalist relations of production 
within the oil industry brought into the open the challenging power of new domestic 
hegemonic classes which succeeded in altering the old power structure between the 
nation state and international capital (the class homogeneity in the economic 
formations of the OPEC countries is however far from being a reality; the different 
modes to which the different uses of oil are subject is a clear. Further, it coincidental 
that the most dynamic proponents of the 1973/74 oil hikes were precisely those 
countries such as Iraq, Algeria and Lybia which "had the most explicitly 'development- 
oriented' ruling classes" (27), as opposed to countries like Saudi Arabia, a typical 
example of a feudal monarchy which uses a large fraction of its oil rent in property, 
treasury bonds and luxury imports. The fear of industrialisation in such a country is 
to be found in the political fear of the unavoidable creation of a working class that such 
an industrialisation would necessarily entail. The systematic reliance on a foreign 
labour force is from the point of view of class rationality the ideal solution to the 
industrialisation contradiction). Through the price crisis of the 1970s, one witnesses 
more particularly the metamorphosis of the state as a rent-receiving landlord into a 
state as a capitalist or. in other words, the transition from a precapitalist mode of 
production to a newly emerging capitalist mode of production. The magnitude of the 
share of surplus-profit appropriated by the oil exporting countries is in itself clear 
evidence of the deep penetration of capitalist relations of production.
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'Table II. 2: Distribution of oil surplus-profit between ground rent, petroleum taxes in importing countries 
and company profits (U=US $ million).
Year OPEC oil producing Oil companies OECD oil consuming Total
countries countries*
Ground rent % share Profi t % share Taxes % share
1950 391 (16%) 895 (37%) 1,123 (47%) 2,409
1955 1,569 (18%) 1,536 (17%) 5,689 (65%) 8,794
1960 2,118 (20%) 2,453 (23%) 6,181 (57%) 10,814
1966 4,792 (20%) 4,799 (20%) 14,654 (60%) 24,245
1970 7,343 (20%) 7,204 (19%) 23,343 (61%) 37,889
1972 13,908 (22%) 7,808 (12%) 41,119 (66%) 62,835
1973 22,691 (23%) 13,428 (14%) 58,602 (63%) 97,772
1974 95,601 (53%) 21,377 (12%) 62,715 (35%) 179,693
1975 85,277 (50%) 17,952 (11%) 68,531 (39%) 171,760
Source: M. Massarat.lbid. p. 56. ('excluding USA & Canada).
Up to 1973 (with the exclusion however of 1950) and against commonly held beliefs, 
the largest share (about 60%) of oil surplus-profit had actually been accruing to the 
oil importing countries in the form of different taxes. Until that year the profit 
distributed between OPEC countries and oil companies had been more or less evenly 
distributed, averaging about 20%. After 1972, though increased in absolute terms, 
the relative share of company profits fell to around 11% of total oil profits (beyond 
such figures, one ought however to point out that it is very difficult to assess with 
accuracy the real extent of corporate oil companies profit. Their world activities, the 
diversification of their downstream activities, the secrecy which surrounds their 
internal financial situation makes it very difficult, even for insiders, to be able to 
assess the extent of their actual profits). The largest share of profit appropriation 
took place within oil producing countries: between 1974 and 1975 it was more than 
half of the surplus-profit generated in the entire oil industry which was appropriated 
by the OPEC countries alone (28). It is this mass of surplus-profit and its 
appropriation by the oil exporting countries which acted as a springboard for the 
consolidation of their respective ruling classes as well as for the further enhancement 
of capitalist relations of production within their economic formation. It is precisely in 
the framework of such a context (29) that the Algerian state bourgeoisie acquired the 
means to establish its own class hegemony over the rest of the society through the
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implementation of its own project of capital accumulation. The international dimension 
of capital accumulation being established we now turn to the study of the actual mode of 
utilisation of oil rent.
11. The mode of consumption of oil rent: the Algerian policy of 
development.
The mode of consumption of oil rent has mainly consisted in its productive 
consumption, that is its use for capital accumulation purposes. The study of this 
accumulation, commonly referred to as the Algerian strategy of development (ASD), is 
conducted through three main aspects: The theoretical justification of the type of 
accumulation promoted, the embodiment of the strategy of investment through the 
study of the different development plans and the conditions of realisation of the policy 
of accumulation and the restatement of the ASD.
A.The theoretical formulation of the type of accumulation promoted.
Broadly speaking the Algerian model of development (AMD), is described by its 
proponents, the state and its representatives, as a strategy whose aim is to secure the 
"economic independence" and full employment - in particular, 1980 was seen as the 
point when the full employment of the labour force would have been achieved - on the 
basis of the valorisation of natural national resources based on the setting up and 
development of basic industries. Concretely put, the process of capital accumulation 
viewed in the form of an important gross formation of fixed capital embodied in the 
heavy branches of industry was to be financed through the export proceeds of the most 
important of Algeria's national resources, i.e. hydrocarbons and other mineral 
resources. An open priority for industry in general and heavy industry in particular 
is therefore at the heart of the ASD, while the concomitant options of the industrial 
choice such as full employment and introversion are seen as the unavoidable long-term 
effects or the natural by-product of the working of the model (the notion of 
introversion or economic independence tends to imply that Algeria will develop the
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ability to produce its own technology, i.e. to be able to internally reproduce the 
technical basis of its labour process; a further implication of the notion of 
introversion is that the intra and inter-sectoral imbalances will be progressively 
eliminated within the national economy)
a. The industrial option of the ASD: the model of industrialising 
industries.
The theoretical justification of the industrial option of the mode of capital 
accumulation finds its architect in the person of the French economist G.D.De Bernis. 
The central option of this model revolves around the identification of those industries 
capable of inducing industrialisation for the creation of industries by itself does not 
necessarily mean industrialisation: "Industrialisation is not the construction of a 
collection of industrial units linked between themselves, but one which represents a 
process of total restructuring of an economic and social set-up under the influence of 
coherent sets of machines" (30). In other words, for an effective policy of 
development to be operational it is important that it is based on a category of 
industries which can be labelled "industrialising industries". The choice of such 
industries must meet two objectives: Increase labour productivity in agriculture 
through the supply of industrial inputs and guarantee the development of the industrial 
sector itself (prior to the development of an industrial sector, the increase of labour 
productivity in agriculture could be achieved in a first stage through what the author 
calls "progress in organisation", i.e. the re-structuration of the relation of land 
ownership through a programme of land reform).
The condition of realisation of the first objective depending on the second, it is 
therefore to the treatment of the second element that De Bernis devotes most of his 
argumentation. The choice of such industries was not selected solely according to the 
needs of agriculture but also according to the needs of a self-sustained industrial 
development capable of absorbing the employment requirement of the urban population
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as well as that of the faction of the agricultural population which has been freed as a 
result of the modernisation and development of the productive forces in agriculture 
(the articulation between agriculture and industry is at the heart of the De Bernis' 
model, but it is an articulation seen from an industrialist's point of view similar to 
that experienced by most developed capitalist countries. In that sense it is for instance 
radically different from the Chinese agricultural model of development whereby the 
industrial development was at the service of agriculture). The selection of those 
industries capable of promoting industrialisation has been justified on grounds of 
historical experience. The textile industry in early capitalist England, based on an 
important domestic and international demand (the restrictions imposed on the domestic 
Indian cotton industry expanded overnight the development of its English counterpart), 
triggered unprecedented opportunities for its own expansion through and with the help 
of the development of the upward stream sector of industries specialised in the 
manufacturing of textile machinery. "It was therefore through the upward stream 
effect linked to the mechanical industry that the industrialisation effect could spread in 
all other sectors, which, owing to the accumulated progress in mechanical engineering, 
could in turn improve their techniques" (31). In other words, had the mechanical 
industry not been able to provide for the development of textile machinery, the 
development of the English textile industry would very probably have been lost to 
foreign competition. In the final analysis the determinant element which made possible 
the process of industrialisation was not the textile industry per se but rather the 
impulse brought on the successive immediate upward stream industries which 
contributed to the creation of the wave-type diffusion of technical progress and 
innovation. The pattern of railway development was similarly interpreted: its 
development induced "an important demand for the products of the mechanical and steel 
industry. In turn the development of these last two industries induced the development 
of all related industries until the movement became self-generating" (32). It goes 
without saying that the generation of the process of industrialisation can be seriously 
hampered if part of its dynamic is lost to another country, i.e. if the increase in the
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essential demand generated the development of upward stream industries located 
outside the boundary of the domestic economy. Thus the specific industrial option of the 
De Bernis model based on the notion of industrialising industries revolves mainly 
around those upward stream industries capable of inducing the necessary backward 
linkage effects associated with the input provision of every non-primary industry 
(33). Once set up, such industries will therefore provide for the necessary industrial 
inputs required both by the agricultural sector in the form of fertilisers, and by the 
industrial sector itself under in the form of tool equipment and all sorts of 
intermediary goods which enter the progressive build up of the capital goods sector 
itself. Industrialising industries, i.e. those industries which modernise agriculture 
and build up the industrial sector are therefore "the steel industry with its impact on 
the development of metallurgy, and mechanical industry, one the one hand, and the 
chemical industry on the other" (34). Thus defined, the De Bernis model radically 
differs from the import substitution model (I.S.M).
b.The import substitution (IS) model and the industrialising  
industries (II) model .
I.S. is another conception of industrialisation based on the substitution of imported 
consumer goods by their domestic production. As such this policy involves in fact two 
types of substitution. At the level of international trade, imports of consumer goods are 
substituted by imports of capital goods (the domestic production of consumer goods 
requires now the import of their means of production); at the level of domestic 
market, imports of consumer goods are substituted by the domestic production of 
consumer goods. The pursuit of this policy is based on the objective of meeting the 
already existing demand, i.e. that of high income groups, as well as that generated 
through the increase in employment opportunities linked with the setting up of the 
consumer goods industry. The promotion of an I.S. policy involves the promotion of 
local industrialists at the expense of the producers catering for the export sector. The
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set of typical policy measures fovouring this mode of industrialisation and the local 
industrialists consists of an overvaluation of the local currency in order to relatively 
cheapen imports, the erection of custom barriers for the protection of the nascent 
industries, and the maximisation of agricultural surplus extraction for the financing 
of imports etc. Ultimately the pursuit of this line of policy tends to be self-defeating as 
the agricultural export proceeds tend to be the main source for financing the constant 
imports of the means of production necessary for the setting up of the consumer goods 
sector. Once this policy goes beyond the results of the first stage of its implementation 
the first signs of its limits appear under the form of an "insufficient domestic demand, 
a low labour productivity in the agricultural sector, and the impossibility of the 
constitution, from downstream to upward stream, of integrated lines of production 
without entering into an increasing costly technological dependency" (35). If the I.S. 
model and the model of 1.1, are polarised, as far as their industrial premises are 
concerned, between consumer goods industries and capital goods industries, they 
however display one important similarity: they both rely on an export sector to 
finance capital accumulation however essential the stress on the difference in the 
nature of their import content may appear. From that standpoint the imports of 
machines to produce consumer goods is indeed very different from the importation of 
machines to produce other machines, i.e. the imports of machines necessary to the 
setting up of a capital goods sector. In other words the choice of sectors (consumer 
goods vis. capital goods) determines the nature of imports. This sectoral emphasis 
implies further differences. While the I.S. model tends to reflect a strategy of 
development dominated by private industrial interests (domestic and international), 
the 1.1, model on the other hand translates socio-economic interests largely vested in a 
powerful state public sector where private interests, if not absent, are not however 
overtly the pivot of capital formation (36). The nature of the sectoral option of the 1.1, 
model further involves its own logic. Unlike the I.S. model, it requires a minimum 
form of planning of resource allocation in order to take into account the nature of 
investments involved which require long maturing periods and a certain form of
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balance in their distribution between the different branches of the capital goods sector. 
In so far as the investment fund is diverted away from consumer industries, the setting 
up of a capital goods sector is unavoidably accompanied by a policy of austerity in the 
short and middle term depending on the period that is required for the manifestation of 
the actual benefits of industrialisation as well as the intensity of their diffusion. In 
short the 1.1, model is in essence a long term strategy of development based on the 
ultimate industrialisation of the economy and the spread of modern techniques to 
agriculture. In the particular context of Algeria the development of an integrated 
industrial economy is also thought to be achieved if it is based on the use of the most 
advanced techniques of production, a means of speeding up the diffusion of 
industrialising effects of the leading industries (or growth poles). Like the I.S. model, 
the De Bernis model appears therefore as the justification of a specific form of 
development of the productive forces exclusively viewed in terms of the development of 
a particular industrial sector, the ramification of which provides for the overall 
elevation of social labour productivity. The significance of De Bernis industrial 
paradigm cannot be attempted at this point. What however ought to be pointed at is the 
extent to which it is methodologically correct to transpose on a developing country a 
mode of development of the productive forces, i.e. mainly that of developed capitalist 
countries, as if it is a development in itself, unavoidable in nature and independent of 
its specific beneficiaries (37). The assessment of such a point requires however that 
we first evaluate the model in its concrete form.
B.The embodiment of the Algerian strategy of development.
The history of the ASD goes back to 1967 with the implementation of the first plan: 
the Triennial Plan 1967-69. The subsequent plans were the Triennial Plan 1970-73 
and the Second Four Year Plan 1974-77. The period 1978-79 which was formally an 
outside plan period that served finish what was left from the previous plans, was 
followed by the First Five-Year Plan 1980-84 and the Second Five-Year Plan 1985- 
89 (as far as our study is concerned its scope does not go beyond 1980. One of the
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reasons for this limit is that the study of the nature of capital accumulation after 
1980 is simply a continuation of the trend identified during the first three plans).
a.The development plans: an overall view.
The initiation of capital accumulation during post independent Algeria finds its 
embodiment in the first plans of development. The overall characteristic which 
emerges from such plans is the magnitude of investments involved.
Table II. 3: Magnitude of planned investment at current prices (AD millions).
Year Pre-plan period Triennial period 1stQuadriennial period llnd quadriennial period 1978
1963 1 , 3 4 4 ) 5 , 9 8  0 *
1 9 6 3  1 ,881}
1 9 6 6  1 ,493}
1 9 6 7  1 , 8 6 6 ) 7 , 5 6 1 *
1968 2 ,507 }
1969 3 , 1 8 8 }
1970 6 , 2 18 )3 5 , 90 6*
1971 17,429 }
1972 9 ,2 59 }
1973 13,000 }
1974 15,438 } 1 1 0 , 6 1 2 *
1975 22,405 }
1976 28,369 }
1977 44,400 }
1978 5 5 , 7 1  0
Source: Ch. Palloix "Industrialisation et financement lors des 2 plans Quadriennaux (1970-77). Revue du 
Tiers Monde Tome XXI.N 83. Juillet/Septembre 1980. p. 537. (* refers to the total magnitude of 
investments of the respective plan periods).
After the pre-plan period, the volume of investments literally rocketed from .the 3 
Year-plan onwards. The 1974/77 level of investment was 15 times that of the first 
plan while the investment for the year 1978 alone was already half of the record level 
of the second Four-Year plan. Expressed in relation to GDP, the weight of the 
investment effort was even more significant regarding the rate of accumulation.
Table II. 4: The accumulation effort as a percentage of GDP.
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
10% 13% 8% 10% 11% 13% 15% 28% 33% 35% 41% 32% 40% 45% 55%
Source: Series statistiques 1967-1981. MPAT. Algiers. October 1984. C. Palloix. Ibid.
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By the end of the Second Four-Year Plan gross domestic investment accounted for over 
half total GDP. This gross fixed capital formation did not include the Investment 
contribution which took place outside the public sector, however small it may seem to 
be (38). As such, the rate of investment promoted by the Algerian ruling class is not 
simply high by the standard of domestic economy alone. Algeria's considerable 
investment effort was also one of the highest in the world.
Table II. 5: Comparative investment effort for some selected countries.
C o u n tries
Gross domestic investment 
(as a % of GDP) at current prices
Gross domestic investment 
Average annual growth rate (%) (constant prices)
1 9 6 0 /7 3  1 9 6 5 /7 3 1 9 6 0 /7 3  1 9 6 5 /7 3
Algeria 29 .8 29 .9 7.7% 2 0 .7 %
Argentina 19.6 19.6 5 .2% 7 .7%
Barbados 22.7 2 2 .8 5 .0% 5 .6%
Bolivia 16.0 16.3 3 .2% 1.2%
Brazil 18.2 18 .2 8.5% 1 3 .5 %
China (republic) 24.1 18.2 15 .3% 13 .5%
Egypt 14 .4 13 .8 1 .6% 2 .2%
Ethiopia 13.3 13 .8 6.4% 5 .6%
Greece 27.6 2 8 .3 9 .0% 10 .0 %
Hong Kong 22.1 2 2 .2 1 0 .2% 9 .2%
India 15.8 16.5 4 .1% 4 .0%
Ireland 15.8 16 .5 4 .1% 4.0%
Malaysia 16.7 17 .2 7 .4% 7 .1%
Morocco 13.2 13 .9 6 .8% 6 .4%
Iran 18.2 19 .5 13 .5% 1 4 .3 %
Source: United Nations World Tables. 1976.
In all aspects the period of plans was one of intense investment. From the standpoint of 
their structure, such investments are even more important.
b.Investment allocation and the centres of capital accumulation.
The distribution of the investment fund between the main sectors of the economy 
reveals the industrial emphasis of the ASD.
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Table II. 6: Share of industry in total planned investment at current prices (U: AD millions).
Planned investments Realisations
P lans T o ta l In d u s tr ia l % share of T o ta l In d u s tr ia l % share of
in v e s tm e n t in v e s tm e n t in d u s tr ia l in v e s tm e n t in v e s tm e n t in d u s tr ia l
investment in v e s tm e n t
1 9 6 7 / 6 9 10 , 559 5 , 1 6 8  4 9 % 7,651 6 , 05 7 79% *
1 9 7 0 / 7 3 2 4 , 4 0 0 10 , 1 1 8  4 1 % 3 5 , 9 0 6 19 , 0 1 5 5 3 %
1 9 7 4 / 7 7 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 4 8 , 0 0 0  4 3 % 1 1 0 , 6 1 2 65,314 5 9 %
Source: Ch. Palloix. Ibid. (39)
With an average share of 58% of total investment being channelled to the industrial 
sector, the industrial option of the ASD transpires through the 11 planned years. In 
comparison, the share of total investment accruing to agriculture was 12% 
(1967/69) (40), 15% (1970/73) and 10% (1974/77) (41). The supremacy of 
industrial investment in turn imposes itself with its own feature: the polarisation of 
industrial investment themselves.
c.The distribution of industrial investments.
Although about 60% of total investment went to industry, the industrial projects 
themselves were not evenly distributed. One single sector alone, the hydrocarbon 
sector, absorbed the highest share of total industrial investments while sections such 
as mechanical & electrical industries, intermediate goods industries (steel, 
metallurgy, building goods etc.) and consumer goods industries absorbed the rest of 
industrial investment (42).
Table II. 7: Overall structure of industrial investments.
Industria l sectors 1967/69 plan 1970/73 plan 1974/77 plan Total (1967/77)
Hydrocarbons 
Capital & consumer 
goods sectors
3,223 (53%) 
2,834 (47%)
7,880 (45%) 
9,638 (55%)
28,936 (47%) 
32,834 (53%)
40,039 (47%) 
45,306 (53%)
TOTAL 6,057 (100) 17,518 (100) 61,770 (100) 85,345 (100)
Source: Ibid p. 539.
The characteristics of such a structure can be considered to be at the heart of the
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Algerian policy of development. As such this policy involves two distinct centres of 
capital formation. A gross fixed capital formation in the hydrocarbons sector harnessed 
to the double requirement of ensuring on the one hand the international valorisation of 
hydrocarbons and the procurement for the rest of the economic sectors of the financial 
means of accumulation, and on the other hand a gross fixed capital formation in the 
industrial sectors best suited for overall domestic capital accumulation. Let us 
consider closely the significance of such a distinction.
I.The role of capital accumulation in the export sector.
In the introductory section of this chapter, the role of oil was mainly perceived in the 
context of the international sphere of capital circulation under the category of oil rent. 
The oil price increase of 1974 was particularly seen as the device for operating a 
reallocation of surplus profit to the advantage of oil exporting countries. The 
particular conditions under which each oil producing country operated its own strategy 
of oil rent maximisation was not however considered at that stage. The increase in oil 
prices is not in itself a sufficient condition (however necessary it may be) for the 
maximisation of oil rent. An efficient control over the surplus profit generated in the 
oil industry requires conditions other than those of the simple valorisation of the sale 
prices. An increase in oil prices, if it does increase the value of oil products, does not 
by itself ensure maximising the share accruing to oil producers.The effective domestic 
control over research, exploitation, prospecting, production, distribution and 
marketing are all important stages to be integrated within a policy of surplus 
maximisation and as such are as important as the price increase itself. The importance 
of the extent of capitalist relations of production determine in turn whether oil rent is 
appropriated by way of a simple increase in posted prices, as is the case of countries 
like Saudi Arabia, or whether such an increase is appropriated involving a systematic 
control from the oil fields level, to the filling station, as is to a certain extent the case 
in development oriented countries like Algeria, Iraq and to a lesser degree Libya. 
Nationalisation and the promotion of a domestic oil company at the level of oil
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exporting countries, in conjunction with oil prices increase are without any doubt 
much more powerful mechanisms of surplus retention than a simple increase of posted 
prices. The policy devised by the Algerian State to organise the mechanisms of control 
over the generation of its economic surplus in the oil sphere of production was very 
close to such a scenario. As early as the 1950s hydrocarbons were already perceived 
as an alternative to the so far prevailing colonial mode of capital accumulation based on 
cereal farming and vinegrowing. In post independent Algeria, the importance of the 
economic weight of hydrocarbons was easily perceived both as a centre of capital 
accumulation in its own right and as an important source of foreign earnings.
Table II. 8: The economic weight of hydrocarbons in the Algerian economy (U: Billions of AD & %)
Year 1. GDP without its hydrocarbons component 2. Hydrocarbons component of GDP 3. Weight of 2 into 1
1 96 5 11,000 2 ,1 0 0 1 9 %
1 966 10,300 2 ,7 00 2 6 %
1 96 7 11,271 2 ,5 78 2 6 %
1 968 13 ,059 2 ,7 9 4 2 0 %
1 969 14,280 2 ,9 5 4 2 0 %
1970 16,344 3 ,2 1 4 1 9%
1971 17,892 2,290 13%
1 97 2 2 0 ,1 82 4,451 2 2 %
1 973 22,033 6 ,452 2 9 %
1 9 7 4 2 5 ,4 24 18,418 7 2 %
1 97 5 30 ,8 68 15,561 5 0 %
1 97 6 38,019 19,630 5 1 %
1 977 44 ,0 19 2 3 ,5 85 5 3 %
1 978 60,005 2 4 ,4 7 0 4 1 %
Source: M. Raffinot & P. Jacquemot. "Le capitalism d'etat Algerien". F. Maspero. 1977 and Series statistiques 
1984.
From the mid 1960s onwards the weight of hydrocarbons became increasingly 
predominant in the social product. Since 1973 hydrocarbons emerged as the most 
single important economic activity of all sectors (before 1973 it was only marginally 
second to the activity of trade). As a source of foreign earnings hydrocarbon 
contribution emerged over the years as the most significant and single source of export 
earnings.
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Table II. 9: Share of hydrocarbons in total export earnings(%).
1954 1958 1963 1965 1967 1974 1977 1980 1982 1983 1984
0.3% 2% 61% 54% 77% 92% 96% 98% 98% 98% 97.5%
Source: UN. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.
The transition from colonial to post-colonial Algeria clearly reads in the radical shift 
that the hegemonic weight of hydrocarbon earnings operated against the contribution of 
agriculture. Compared to the insignificant performance of the 1950s the 1980 figure 
reveals the extent to which, with 98% of total exports earnings, the international 
contribution of oil has become de facto the sole contribution of the entire Algerian 
•economy. But for hydrocarbons to become the condition for the realisation of capital 
accumulation requires however that the condition for the realisation of such a policy is 
being met. In other words, the mode of allocation of the hydrocarbon rent is 
inseparable from the prior mobilisation and control of the economic surplus itself. The 
foreign ownership of hydrocarbons, in so far as it entails an independent autonomous 
strategy of management based on the maximisation of profit share accruing to foreign 
capital - dominated mainly by French interests - soon became incompatible with the 
ambitions of the Algerian State whose economic project required a complete re 
assessment of the relation of production prevailing in the oil industry. The new ruling 
class was also aware that "Algeria must not content itself with the role of raw material 
exporter. She must attempt to domestically transform them and initiate on their behalf 
a process of industrialisation of the entire country. National riches must primarily be 
used for the enlargement of national economic potentialities" (43). As to the mode of 
exploitation of hydrocarbons based on the pursuit of co-operation with oil companies, 
Algeria opted for a policy which went far beyond that of a simple royalties receiver. 
Between 1967 and 1970 the first measures towards nationalisation were introduced. 
The assets thus acquired went to the Algerian oil company SONATRACH (44). Until 
1970 only non-French interests were affected by these measures (45). Among those 
hit were BP, ESSO, MOBIL, PHILIPS, SOFRAPEL, AMIF etc. The February 1971
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nationalisations extended to French interests. The system of concessions was abolished 
altogether. All gas fields and distribution networks became state property (46). The 
rate at which the operating surface area (the concessions) of foreign companies shrank 
is an interesting insight into the new power of SONATRACH itself (47). By 1971 the 
power of SONATRACH was absolute since 98% of the oil surface area was directly 
under its control. At an output level, the structure of oil production reveals even 
further the power of the new policy makers. As soon as 1972 the relation between 
foreign companies & SONATRACH was completely inverted: by 1972 the production 
share held by foreign companies had been reduced to the level of SONATRACH's in 1966 
(48). After 1971 both hydrocarbon production (up to 77%), and its distribution 
were under direct State control. The adoption by Algeria of the majority rule of 
shareholding (51% of assets under Algeria's control and 49% under foreign control), 
provided the new basis whereby the new policy of joint venture with foreign 
companies was initiated (49). The new conditions under which the Algerian dominant 
class was able to define the new terms of control over oil rent in relation to other 
classes and particularly vis-a-vis foreign capital, coincided with the pursuit of its 
economic project. The realisation of the ASD required therefore the development of the 
hydrocarbon sector under the direct ownership rule of the Algerian dominant class.
2. The role of capital accumulation in the domestic industrial sector.
Outside the scope of capital accumulation taking place immediately within the 
hydrocarbons sector, the promotion of the domestic industrial sector was seen as the 
ultimate purpose of capital accumulation proper (50). As seen earlier the share of 
these industries amounted to 47% in 1967/69, 55% in 1970/73 and 53% in 
1974/77 of all industrial investments. The internal distribution of such industrial 
investments by category of industry gives in turn the following structure.
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Table II. 10: Structure of industrial investment excluding hydrocarbons (U: millions of AD & %).
1 9 6 7 / 6 9 1 9 7 0 / 7 3 1 9 7 4 / 7 7 1 9 6 7 / 7 7
Capital goods industries 1 , 4 5 7 7 , 1 0 1 2 2 , 7 3 0 3 1 , 2 8 8
( 5 1 %) ( 7 3 % ) ( 7 1 % ) ( 6 9 % )
machine too| jndustries(mechanical 600 1,937 6,235 8,772
& electrical industries)
Intermediate aoods industries (enerav. steel. 857 5,164 16,495 22,516
metallurgy, construction materials industry)
Consumer goods industries 1 , 051 2 , 2 6 5 8 , 6 2 6 1 2 , 9 4 4
(textile, chemical products leather, ( 3 7 % ) ( 2 3 % ) ( 2 7 % ) ( 2 9 % )
food industries etc.)
Extractive industries 3 2 6 2 , 7 0 4 7 8 1 , 0 7 4
(1 2 % ) ( 3 % ) ( 2 % ) ( 2 % )
Total 2 , 8 3 4 9 , 6 3 8 3 2 , 8 3 4 4 5 , 3 0 6
Source: Ch. Palloix. Ibid.
For the entire period of the three plans, capital goods industries absorbed 69% of 
industrial investment and consumer goods 29%, the remaining industrial investment 
(nearly 2%), went to mining industries. The emphasis was clearly on the sector of 
means of production. But the internal structure of this sector reveals its own stress. 
The usual emphasis placed on the capital sector derived its rationale from the role of 
the sub-sector producing machine-tools, i.e. the ,ability of certain types of machines to 
produce other machines. It is in fact this particular sub-sector which determines the 
entire path of development of the capital goods sector. In the mode of industrialisation 
of Algeria such a priority was in fact inverted (but only if one looks at the distribution 
of industrial investment). Between 1966 and 1977 machine-tools industries only 
accounted for 28% of total investment accruing to capital goods industries. With such 
an investment structure consumer goods industries absorbed a much larger fraction of 
investments than machine-tools industries: AD 12,944 million against AD 8,772 
m illion.
At an overall level, the policy of industrial investment mainly favoured the 
hydrocarbons sector (47% of all industrial investments). Such a structure clearly 
reduces therefore the degree of contribution of the machine-tool industry in the 
overall gross fixed capital formation (51) whether in the capital goods sector or in the
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consumer goods sector. The absence of emphasis on the machine-tool industry appears 
to be the paradoxical result of a strategy whose claimed objective was inspired by the 
complete integration of its industrial sector. In turn the nature of the relation existing 
between the hydrocarbons sector and the intermediate goods sector does not by itself 
promote either machine-tool industries or consumer goods industries. What is more 
important is the fact that the persistence of a heavy structure of investment captured 
mainly by the hydrocarbons sector raises the question of the line of demarcation 
between the development of hydrocarbons and that of the industrial sector (so far the 
rate of integration between the hydrocarbons sector and the intermediate goods sector 
does not go beyond the supply of the latter to the former of sheets of iron for 
reservoirs and pipeline tubes). "The acceleration of fixed capital formation in the 
hydrocarbon sector ... witnesses also the difficulty to ensure an international 
valorisation of hydrocarbons compatible with the setting up of an industrial system 
endowed with an internal balance - particularly when this domestic industrial 
productive system has the tendency to report upon the hydrocarbon sector's 
difficulties in increasing production - accelerating in this manner the rate of 
investment of the hydrocarbons sector already very much solicited by international 
capital" (52). Eventually such an issue will depend on the net foreign earnings 
contribution of hydrocarbons, i.e. the level of economic surplus net of the 
hydrocarbons own needs for fixed capital formation. As to the ability of the capital 
goods sector to operate with a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the hydrocarbons sector, 
it remains to be seen. So far the very initiation of industrialisation depended in its 
entirety on the export proceeds of hydrocarbons. From the development above three 
main characteristics of the ASD can be expounded.
It is a strategy based on a double imbalance: an imbalance between agriculture and 
industry in favour of the latter, and an imbalance favouring the development of 
hydrocarbons at the expense of the capital goods sector in general and machine-tools 
industries in particular. Such a double imbalance therefore makes the ASD neither a
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proper agricultural policy nor an industrial strategy (understood in the sense of a 
promotion based on the development of the core of capital goods industries: machine- 
tool industries).
The ASD is characterised by an intensive formation of fixed capital: In value terms and 
at current prices, the volume of investment resources which were channelled to 
creating the necessary productive capacity of the nascent industry, was cumulatively 
increased with ever greater intensity. Between the first and the second plan, the 
yearly amount of resources involved were multiplied by two, while between the second 
and the third plan such resources was multiplied by nearly four. The amount of 
investment involved was as follows: AD 2 Billion/year during the 3 Year-Plan, AD 4 
Billion/year during the First Four Year Plan, AD 15 Billion/year during the Second 
Four Year Plan.
The investment effort was the result of one single entity: the Algerian State capitalist 
class. Be it in its elaboration, conception or realisation, the ASD was in fact the 
exclusive expression of the dominant class and that of its industrialist faction. At no 
stage whatsoever in the elaboration of the overall policy of "development" was there 
found the slightest contribution by those social groups or classes outside the structure 
of power. Both in its conception and execution the "strategy of development" was 
eminently authoritarian. The implication of the economic role of the State (or rather 
the classes that control its apparatus), through its conception of development, bears a 
direct relation to the terms under which was shaped the mode of organisation of the 
agricultural sphere of production. The role of the State questions therefore the very 
finality of its economic project: a development for whom? To be able to address such 
issues requires in the first place an analysis of the conditions of realisation of the 
State mode of capital accumulation.
C.The condition of realisation of the Algerian strategy of development.
What is meant by "the conditions" of realisation of the Algerian policy of investment is 
not only the sets of factors in the absence of which the developmental projects would
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have been impossible, but also the actual conditions which accompanied and which 
therefore were part of the implementation process of the policy itself (53). In the 
first set of conditions we can distinguish two main factors: the social conditions 
associated with the emergence and development of state bureaucratic capitalism and the 
financial conditions which made possible the pursuit of the policy under the form of a 
constant reliance on external debt (this is the capitalist nature of accumulation in so 
far as it presupposes unlimited needs for expansion). In the second set of conditions the 
terms under which the policy of "development" was pursued, were the growth of 
unemployment on the one hand and the integration of the Algerian economy in the world 
market on the other (54). For methodological reasons, the assessment of the conditions 
of realisation of the mode of capital accumulation will be approached under two main 
headings: the external and the internal conditions of realisation.
a.The external conditions of realisation of the mode of capital 
accumulation.
I.The financial conditions of accumulation.
If hydrocarbons absorb a significant share of the investment fund, its contribution to 
the financing of such investments is also important. The entire process of capital 
accumulation itself revolves strictly around the concept of oil rent seen both as a 
means and as an end. As a means, the growth of oil rent provides for the necessary 
expansion of the hydrocarbons sector itself, as an end, the hydrocarbons sector 
provides therefore for the net oil rent which can be used outside its sector. The 
relation between the expansion of the hydrocarbons sector and the industrial sector 
tends to acquire a residual status. In other words, since the expansion of the 
hydrocarbons sector depends entirely on the world market and not on the rest of the 
domestic economy (55), in the last analysis it is the world market which determines 
the volume of oil rent which can be invested in the industrial sector once the 
conditions of accumulation in the hydrocarbons sector are already being met. For total 
capital accumulation to proceed at a given fixed level (56), so far no automatic
108
mechanisms can ensure that the development of capital accumulation within the 
hydrocarbons sector can guarantee in the same course of event a parallel increase of 
the net oil rent for investment in other sectors. As it happened, the extension of capital 
accumulation has been constantly associated with an increasing reliance on external 
sources of financing, directly in the form of foreign borrowing, and indirectly as a 
result of the export earnings associated with oil rent.
Table II. 11: The financing sources of capital accumulation (U: AD millions).
1967/69 1970/73 1974/77
1.Foreign borrowing 840 ( 9 % ) 5 , 76 8( 23 %) 26,160 ( 2 9 % )
2.Budgetary savings - 2 4 8 ( - 2 6 % ) 2,286 ( 9 % ) 29,839 ( 3 3 % )
3.Domestic savings 6,250 (66%) 8,596 (35%) 10,938 (1 2%)
4.Monetary financing 2,600 (27%) 8,041 (32%) 23,340 (26%)
Total 9,442 24,694 90,273
Source: Ch. Palloix. Ibid. (5 7 ).
From the above one can assess the specific conditions under which the reproduction of 
capital has been taking place. If one looks at items 3 & 4, which reflect the strictly 
internal sources of finance, their contribution fell from 93% during 1967/69 to 
67% during 1970/73 and 38% during 1974/77. As far as direct external financing 
(i.e. the external debt of Algeria) is concerned, its volume increased from 23% during 
the first Four Year Plan to 29% during the Second Four Year Plan. The real 
contribution of the external source of financing, direct & indirect, was however far 
greater than that suggested by foreign borrowing alone. Since the 1970s the budgetary 
saving has become de facto the main contributor, through oil taxation, of the financing 
of budgetary investment. As such, budgetary saving clearly appears as an indirect 
source of external financing. The overall contribution of the external sources of 
financing to the reproduction of fixed capital formation has considerably increased 
from 32% during 1970/73 to 62% during 1974/77. What this doubling of the 
external contribution of the sources of financing tends to show is that "the formation of 
gross fixed capital which was underway during the Triennial Plan and the First 
Quadriennial Plan was not able to develop during the second plan an autonomous
internal capacity of financing on the basis of the productive system which was being 
set up" (58). More fundamentally, what the analysis of the different sources of 
financing is about is the fact that the mobilisation of the economic surplus in the 
Algerian economic formation is taking place mainly on an exogenous basis. In other 
words the reproduction of the productive system which was being set up tends to 
depend on a capital whose circulation is taking place mainly in the world capitalist 
market. The organic link existing between productive capital and circulating capital is 
split between two distinct types of economic formations: the Algerian economic 
formation which determines the needs in terms of productive capital (fixed capital and 
labour), and the developed capitalist economic formations which produce the 
constituent elements of such a capital, mainly fixed capital, but increasingly also 
labour in the form of wage goods imports (59). To put the matter differently, one can 
say that the conditions of production of capital are being divorced from its conditions of 
reproduction.
The second element which enters into the increasing emphasis on the external source of 
financing is the net foreign earning contribution of the hydrocarbons sector itself.
Table II. 12: The net foreign earning contribution of the hydrocarbon sector (U: U.S $ Billions) (60).
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8
Resources of the sector
■Export proceeds 3.9 3.9 4.6 5 .5 5 .8
-Foreign borrowing 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 2 .2
Total resources (I) 4 .8 4 .9 5 .8 6 .8 8
ExDenditures of the ?ec|or
-Investment 0.8 1.2 1.9 2 .9 2 .6
-Debt servicing 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6
Total expenditure (II) 1 .2 1 .4 2 .2 3 .3 3 .2
Net foreign earnings 
of the sector (I- II).
3 .6 3 .5 3 .6 3 .5 4 .8
Source: M. Mekideche in "Le secteur des hydrocarbures" OPU. Algiers 1983 p. 324. The U.N. Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983.IMF. C.Palloix. Ibid.
Despite favourable circumstances (the period under investigation underwent the 
largest oil price increase), the net purchasing power of hydrocarbons, once its own
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financial needs for accumulation and expansion purposes were satisfied, had not 
substantially increased. With the exception of 1978 it had in fact been constant. It is 
therefore this inability on the part of hydrocarbons to substantially raise the net 
foreign earning balance which explains the increased reliance of capital accumulation 
on foreign borrowing (if one considers food imports as part of an incompressible level 
of consumption - which is the case since food imports are essentially wage goods - then 
the real net balance of foreign earnings for capital accumulation is even further 
reduced). In the absence of an ability to generate a source of financing from within, and 
one independent from hydrocarbons, foreign earnings remain the main restriction to 
the present mode of accumulation. In the meantime, the reliance on external sources of 
financing, both as a condition and as an end to this capital accumulation, becomes in 
itself a characteristic of the ASD.
2.The cost of external financing.
The reliance on the developed capitalist economies for the pursuit of capital 
accumulation has involved, from the point of view of economic surplus, different 
forms. In what follows our purpose will centre on an assessment of such conditions, 
whenever statistically possible, and on their significance vis-a-vis  the overall 
policy of industrialisation. One immediate measure of such a levy on economic surplus 
is the problem of debt servicing in general and the magnitude of interests on loans in 
particular (61). Interests paid in relation to the level of foreign borrowing and to the 
terms under which such loans are contracted, are an interesting indicator. The sheer 
weight of external borrowing has steadily been increasing over the years.
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Table II. 13: External debt of Algeria (U: US $ millions and %).
Year Debts outstanding un-disbursed 2. Debt outstanding disbursed 3.share of 2 in GNP
1 9 6 7 1,401 4 9 3 1 4 %
1968 1 , 505 599 1 5 %
1969 1,747 741 1 6 %
1 9 7 0 1 , 986 9 7 0 1 9 %
1971 2,141 1 , 365 26%
1 9 7 2 2,694 1 , 488 21 %
1974 6 , 002 3 , 3 0 4 2 6 %
1 9 7 6 11 , 975 5 , 8 4 6 3 5 %
1 9 7 7 14 , 976 8 , 31 6 4 2 %
1 9 7 8 2 0 , 0 5 7 1 2 , 65 9 5 0 %
1 9 79 2 3 , 8 4 2 1 5 , 07 8 3 9 %
1 9 8 0 2 3 , 1 8 7 1 5 , 07 8 3 9 %
1981 2 1 , 6 8 5 1 4 , 3 9 2 3 5 %
1 9 8 2 2 0 , 3 0 9 1 3 , 95 3 3 3 %
1 9 8 3 18 , 85 8 1 2 9 8 4 2 8 %
1 9 8 4 1 6 , 81 2 12,211 2 5 %
1 9 8 5 18 , 3 6 4 1 3 , 6 6 4 . 2 5 %
Source: Computed on the basis of the following sources: World Debt Tables: External debt of developing 
countries. 1982/83 Edition, the World Bank. T. Benhouria "L'economie de I'Algerie” Maspero. 
Paris. 1980. World Tables 1976 and 1986-87.
From a relatively low level (14%) in 1967, the magnitude of the external debt 
rocketed to 35% of GNP in 1981. From US $ 493 million it increased to US $ 14 
Billion. Per head, the external debt increased from $1.3 per person in 1967 to about 
$760 per person in 1981. It is clear that the enlarged opportunities for capital 
accumulation opened up by international capital have been significant (the persistent 
appropriation by hydrocarbons of the majority of investment raise, on the other hand, 
the question of the fate of development of the capital goods sector particularly since the 
development of an export sector cannot be prevented from developing its own autonomy 
vis-a-vis  the domestic economy). In terms of external resources the weight of 
external borrowing can be measured through the magnitude of the total debt service.
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Table II. 14: Total debt service (U= US $ million).
Year Principal repayment Interest repayment Total debt service (T.D.S) T.D.S/Exports (%)
1 97 0 42.6 32.9 9.7 4.0%
1971 67.7 51.6 16.1 8.0%
1 97 2 189.0 138.0 51.0 14.6%
1 9 7 4 709.9 491.4 218.5 16.6%
1 97 6 773.5 433 .0 340.5 15.5%
1 9 7 7 1,027.8 639.7 382.2 17.6%
1 97 8 1,451.0 893.1 558.5 23.6%
1 9 7 9 2,690.0 1,537.2 1,153.4 27.0%
1 98 0 3,710.0 2,405.0 1,306.0 24.0%
1981 3,879.7 2,399.0 1,480.7 27.4%
1 98 2 2,888.6 1,368.2 4,256.7 39.6%
1 98 3 3,230.2 1,220.6 4,450.8 32 .7%
1 9 8 4 3,268.7 1,290.0 4,458.8 33.6%
1 98 5 3,256.3 1,297.3 4,583.6 33 .3%
Source: Computed on the basis of the World Bank Debt Tables and the International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1983 (the contribution of IDA is non existent).
From the 1970s the proportion of export earnings devoted to servicing the debt has 
steadily increased and during the last 3 years it exceeded 25%. Besides servicing and 
particularly the magnitude of interests paid (the contribution of international 
institutions has been kept to an insignificant minimum with less than 2% of the total 
borrowing: see on this point Appendix AII.1), other forms of deductions of economic 
surplus exist. The sophisticated technology which accompanies the setting up of 
industrial units involves the extra cost of technical assistance (according to T. 
Benhouria - Op. Cit. p. 322 - in 1972 Algeria disbursed, above the wages paid in the 
local currency, for the technical assistance in the industrial sector alone - about
20,000 persons - the equivalent of half the remittances of the 80,000 Algerians 
emigrants during the same year), as well as for all sorts of services provided by 
foreign consultancies (studies, expertise etc.).
The economic integration of Algeria in the world capitalist economy through its 
exports, imports and the organisation of its economy, involves compliance with the 
working of the usual international trade mechanisms: the mechanisms of transfer 
prices operated between the main firms and their subsidiaries, the working of adverse
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terms of trades vis-a-vis the periphery, the price of patents, the overcosting of 
industrial projects (some of the initial value of certain industrial projects was 
increased by 100%, 200% and even more) etc. All these mechanisms and their 
combination draw heavily on the level of actual economic surplus available for 
investment purposes. If the reducing effects of such mechanisms are hard to assess, 
taking them into consideration raises however at least the identification of the 
different channels through which international trade operates its multiform 
reductions on the level of economic surplus at the disposal of society, even if from the 
point of the capitalist mode of development of Algeria such forms of consumption of 
economic surplus are seen as unavoidable conditions of capital accumulation.
b.The internal conditions of realisation of capital accumulation.
1. Unemployment and mode of accumulation.
In its essence the ASD appears as an extraordinary accumulation of machines seen as 
the backbone of industrialisation and therefore of development (62). It was such a 
mechanistic and linear concept of industrialisation which therefore divorced de facto 
the objective of employment from industrialisation. In other words employment was 
being taken care of by the automatic creative effects associated with the intensive 
accumulation of gross fixed capital formation conducted on the basis of the most 
sophisticated techniques. As C.Palloix put it "the industrialist's thesis acts as if the 
accelerated formation of fixed capital which would only depend on a 'good' (I) transfer 
of technology, would lead ipso facto to the immediate adaptation of the new labour 
force to the system of machines, or to the immediate transformation of individual 
workers into a 'collective worker'. But the collective worker is a 'social machine" 
which can neither be assembled nor for that matter dismantled at will" (63). The 
contradiction of the systematic adoption of the most sophisticated technology and the 
existence of a fundamentally unskilled labour force is certainly the most important 
feature of the labour condition of the ASD (64). Such a contradiction contains at least 
two fundamental implications: the strategy of investment contains the mechanisms of
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an income distribution imbalance between the agricultural sector and the industrial 
urban sector (65), and an imbalanced income distribution, within the labour force in 
favour of skilled labour, and between labour and capital (as a result of the capitalistic 
nature of the labour process). In other words, the income distribution imbalance 
between social groups polarised between the owners of the means of production (i.e. all 
social groups which derive their economic and political power from the State property 
of the means of production) and the large faction of unskilled workers (66). Whatever 
the apparent motives and justifications that are put forward by the proponents of the 
technological option of the strategy (and therefore of the strategy itself), the overall 
policy of industrialisation is to be assessed in the last analysis in terms of the class 
interests it promotes and the social contradictions it generates in the pursuit of such 
interests. The identification of such interests will thus in turn reveal the orientation 
given to the development of the productive forces. In this respect the ASD only 
inaugurates the post-colonial conditions under which the social product is being 
redistributed between the different classes or how the new dominant class inaugurates 
the new socio-economic conditions of its own reproduction.
1.1.The sectoral distribution of employment.
The diffusion of employment attached to the development of industrial projects clearly 
indicated its concentration in the non-agricultural sphere of production.
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Table II. 15: Distribution of employment creation between the different spheres of production during the
different development plans (U:1,000).
Spheres 
of production
1967/69 plan 1970/73 plan 1974/77 plan 1978/82
period
Total labour 
creation
Agriculture 60 (41%) -60 (-52%) 97 (14%) -10 (-2) 86 5%
Industry 38 (26%) 84 (29%) 130 (19%) 93 (16%) 345 20%
Public work 11 (7%) 108 (37%) 209 (31%) 153 (27%) 481 29%
& construction
21 (7%) 35 (5%) 28 (5%) 95 5%
Transport 13 (9%)
Trade & services 21 (7%) 75 (11%) 112 (20%) 221 13%
Administration 12 (8%) 116 (40%) 131 (19%) 187 (33% 441 27%
Total
145 (100) 289 (100) 677 (100) 563 (100) 1,674 100
percentage (8%) (1 7% ) ( 40% ) (33% ) (100)
Source:"Series Statistiques'M 967-82. MPAT. Direction Generate des Statistiques. 
1984. Op. Cit. p. 7 (negative figures relate to the actual fall in employment).
In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the employment aspect of the ASD, we need 
first to assess the evolution of the employment situation since 1967.
Table II. 16: Employment situation between 1967 and 1982 (U: 1,000).
spheres of production Employment situation in 1967 Employment situation in 1982
Agriculture 8 7 4 5 0 % 9 6 0 2 8 %
Industry 1 , 237 8 % 4 6 8 1 3 %
Public works construction 71 4 % 5 5 2 16%
Transports 5 3 3 % 1 4 8 4 %
Trade & services 321 1 8 % 5 4 2 1 6 %
Administration 3 0 6 17% 7 5 2 2 2 %
Total 1 , 748 1 00 3 , 4 2 2 1 0 0
Source: Op. Cit.
Between 1967 and 1982, the overall level of employment was increased by about 
twofold. 95% (about 1.6 million) of total employment creation during this period took 
place outside the agricultural sector. With a mere 5% employment increase over a 
period of 15 years, or an insignificant increase of the order of 0.3 % per year, the 
agricultural population had to content itself with rural migration to release population 
pressure estimated at a minimum of 3% per annum. Given the colonial history of rural
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migration, it can be said that this phenomenon was further intensified by the present 
mode of accumulation. As such there is a clear continuity from the view-point of 
agricultural development, between two apparently different policies of development. It 
is also to be noted that most employment creations during the post-independence period 
within the rural areas concerned mainly services (trade, transport etc.) and not 
necessarily the direct agricultural sphere of production (67). Moreover, whenever 
employment opportunities were increased such as during the Three Year Plan, such 
jobs opportunities were simply linked to short term project works (replanting of 
forest, public work projects). The drastic fall by 52% of the number of agricultural 
jobs during the First Four Year plan is clear evidence of the volatility of agricultural 
job creation. The highest employment creation (40%) took place during the sole 
Second Four Year Plan. With the exception of the First Three Year Plan however, the 
percentage increase of industrial employment has not been consistently among the 
highest rises. In fact the share of industrial employment has been decreasing since the 
First Four Year Plan: 29% during 1970/73, 19% during 1974/77, 16% during 
1978/82. For the entire period 1967/82 industrial jobs only accounted for 20% of 
total job creation.
In contrast to this sector which absorbs the majority of total investments, the sector 
of Public Works & Construction employed 29% of the working labour force. The most 
striking feature of a strategy of development which is eminently industrial is the 
proportion of its workforce employed in services and particularly administration. 
With 40% of its work force in services, the Algerian economy displayed in its early 
stages a characteristic which paradoxically is to be found mainly in much more 
industrially advanced countries. In such circumstances it is indeed expected to find in 
the early stages of mobilisation of economic surplus, in order to increase the 
productive capacity of society, a high proportion of labour directly employed in 
productive activities. A relatively industrially backward economy endowed with a 
relatively developed structure of employment is what epitomises best the overall
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employment picture of present day Algeria. In essence however this inadequacy is in 
itself a reflection of the mode of management of the interests of the dominant class: the 
bureaucratic management of the social labour process requiring increased reliance on 
a veritable army of civil servants capable of administratively controlling every aspect 
of the process of production and circulation of capital in the entire sphere of state 
property - and even beyond, into the realm of civil society at large. To quote R. 
Tlemcani on the same matter one can add that "this complex task [the state management 
of peripheral capitalist development] can only be done by the bureaucracy as the 
personification of capital in post-colonial society" (68). Independently of the 
rationale behind the present structure of employment (69) and the nature of job 
creation, the question of the extent of such employment creation in relation to social 
requirements on the one hand, and the nature of such increases in relation to income 
distribution on the other remains.
1.2. Employment creation and labour market.
The demographic characteristics of the Algerian population are at the centre of the 
problem of job requirements (70). From the point of view of its structure, the 
Algerian population is young. It is also a population with one of the highest rates of 
growth: above 3%. Given the demographic characteristics of such a population, and the 
adoption of the different scenarios of computation (see Appendix AII.2), the ASD 
satisfies the objective of labour requirements only under the restrictive assumption of 
excluding half the active population (the female population) from the labour market. 
In the framework of hypothesis I, the impact of the ASD has not even been capable of 
offsetting the natural increase of the potential active labour force. In absolute terms 
the fraction of the population which is theoretically out of work has not been reduced 
though in relative terms the theoretical rate of unemployment has been brought down 
from 63% in 1966 to 58% in 1982 (such findings are correlated by a recent 
publication, based on different sources, by R. Tlemcani who concludes "it can clearly 
be inferred that the state policy [i.e. of capital accumulation] has virtually 
marginalised two thirds of the total labour force" (71).
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Table II. 17: Evolution of the rate of unemployment (U: 1 ,00 0 ).
1966 1967 1969 1973 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
1 .Total labour force 4,700 4,868 5,217 5,992 7,185 7,425 7,686 7,986 8,239
2. Total employment creation 1,725 1,748 1,893 2,182 2,859 3,018 3,153 3,280 3,422
3. Total unemployment 2,975 3,120 3,324 3,810 4,326 4,407 4,533 4,706 4,817
4. Rate of unemployment 63% 64% 64% 63% 60% 59% 59% 59% 58%
Source: Series Statistiques. Op. Cit.
The magnitude of job requirements has meant that an increased proportion of the 
population had to "export" itself for work to Europe and particularly France with an 
intensity never experienced before. After a colonisation which lasted 132 years, the 
number of emigrants during the year of official political independence (1962) was 
200,000. In 1968 the number reached 249,000 and in 1975, 850,000 (72). Thus, 
at a time when Algeria embarked on its "strategy of development" it contributed in the 
space of seven years to increasing the level of emigration to a stage never reached 
before during the entire colonial period (in the 1970s "Algerian workers accounted 
for nearly two-third of all workers from the third world employed in France" (73). 
The intensity of the phenomenon hastened by the new mode of capital accumulation can 
only be assessed in terms of the hastening of the dissolution of the traditional peasant 
agriculture. In terms of agricultural population, the concentration of job creations in 
the urban centres has necessarily meant an acceleration of the economic mechanisms of 
rural migration. The yearly number of rural migrants who left the countryside for 
urban centres rapidly increased: 7,000 during 1966/68, 40,000 during 1968/70,
80,000 during 1970/73 (74), 130,000 during 1973/77 (75). The growth of such 
a rural exodus which partly expressed the symptoms of an agricultural crisis with 
deep colonial roots, is also the expression of a continuity: the extension of capitalist 
relations of production promoted by the "new" mode of accumulation brought about by 
the ASD. From that aspect, the speeding up of rural migration which affected both 
subsistence and modern farming, skilled and unskilled labour alike, the destruction 
through appropriation by industry of agricultural resources such as land, water, the 
devalorisation of agricultural work etc. are all part of the same conditions under which
the mode of development of the productive forces was realised in their urban 
configuration (76).
1.3. Capital accumulation and income distribution.
In terms of wealth distribution the Algerian strategy of development created its own 
mode of social polarisation. The first dominant aspect of income distribution is its 
extreme imbalance between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
Table II. 18 Sectoral distribution of income and population (U: %).
Year Agricultural
Population
sector
Income
Non-agricultural
Population
sector
Income
1967 NA 32% NA 68%
1969 NA 28% NA 72%
1973 43% 15% 53% 84%
1974 45% 16% 55% 84%
1975 44% 15% 56% 84%
1976 43% 16% 57% 84%
1977 41% 15% 59% 85%
Source: A. Benachenhou "L'exode rural en Algerie" quoted by Ch. Bernard, Op. Cit. p. 761. For the period 
1967/69: M. Raffinot & P. Jacquemot, Op. Cit. p. 199 (only for the income distribution 
aspect).
From 1967 onwards the distribution of total income between the two main economic 
sectors has taken place on an extremely polarised basis in favour of non-agricultural 
activities. If as early as this date the share of income distributed was in favour of non- 
agricultural activities, the evidence is that the State strategy of industrial 
development only deepened, through its implications, the already existing income 
distribution imbalance. Translated in terms of distribution by income level the 
sectoral imbalance gives place to an even deeper social differentiation, the sign of a 
further evidence of the unequal terms of control over the economic surplus in both 
spheres of social production.
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Table II. 19: Income distribution during the First Four Year Plan.
Average monthly income Population 
U= AD 1969 %
(U = 
1973
1,000)
%
Total income 
1969 %
(U = AD million) 
1973 %
L o w  In c o m e  c la s s e s
1 400 5,650 43% 5,940 39% 2,200 18% 2,680 17%
2 700 3,200 24% 3,640 24% 2,240 18% 2,700 17%
Middle income classes
3 1,200 2,495 19% 2,810 19% 2,820 23% 3,8002 4.5%
High income classes
4 2,200 1,575 12% 2,175 14% 3,440 28% 4,890 31.5%
5 3,500 350 3% 435 3% 1,300 11% 1,430 3.0%
Total 13,200 100 15,000 100 12,000 100 15,000 100
Source: M. Raffinot & P. Jacquemot. Op. Cit. p. 200.
If all income classes were divided into two different categories, the overall income 
distribution takes place on the following inverted basis. While the top one-third of the 
population controls about 2/3 of total income, the largest fraction (2/3) of the 
population only has access to one-third of total income (77). A high level of 
unemployment on the one hand, and a wide imbalanced income distribution on the other 
are the conditions under which was satisfied the labour dimension of the Algerian 
strategy of industrialisation. This type of development, which reflects the particular 
mode of consumption of economic surplus, determines its own mode of control over 
social product, i.e. a mode of income distribution in favour of the representatives of 
capital encrusted in the apparatus of the state. The industrial production process being 
based on a high organic composition of capital using the most sophisticated and advanced 
technologies implies that any increase in productivity will accrue to the owners of the 
means of production as well as to the most skilled workers upon whom is based the 
actual management of the sophisticated industrial units. The extent of unemployment, 
the prevalence of unskilled labour, the weakness of trade unions etc. are in turn the 
necessary mechanisms whose working ensures a form of income concentration at the 
expense of labour.
2.The State and capital accumulation.
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From its start the Algerian policy of accumulation has been closely associated with the 
State economic policy. As the most important job provider and investor, with an 
exclusive monopoly over the banking, monetary and financial institutions or as the 
regulator of prices, production, wage-rates etc., the influence of the State is 
overwhelming. "There is no sector of the reproduction of social life where the state 
does not intervene either directly or indirectly. It acts as law maker, investor, 
planner, importer, exporter, manager, owner, judge and police officer. The state in 
post-colonial policy is everything" (78). The strength of this State, based on a 
prominent public sector, was derived from its ability to control and allocate a sizeable 
economic surplus, at the level of the industrial and hydrocarbons sectors as well as at 
the level of the largest fraction of the agricultural sector. The question of the State use 
of this economic surplus or the mode of consumption of the economic surplus, 
confronts "the awkward question of the function of the State in a class society. Implicit 
in most liberal models is the assumption that the State is a neutral and benevolent 
arbiter attempting to maximise a social welfare function" (79), a sort of "disembodied 
force standing above civil society" (80). As the institutional backbone of any class 
society, the State is however neither immune nor independent from those social forces 
which operate from within its machinery. In order to assess the economic policy of the 
State it becomes therefore unavoidable to ask: in whose class interests does the State 
function?
From an historical perspective the Algerian State is a colonial creation. As such the 
colonial state, both in its apparatus and in its function, was shaped according to the 
dominant interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie based on the necessary 
subordination of the domestic classes (particularly the peasantry) in order to realise 
the objective of the colonial mode of accumulation based on land appropriation, surplus 
extraction, the development of an export agriculture and a mining economy, all of 
which consolidating the benefits of the colonists and the French metropolis. From that 
perspective the fostering of the capitalist relations of production in colonial Algeria 
was inseparable from the use to which the different factions of the French bourgeoisie
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put the State and its apparatus, i.e. the realisation of their hegemony as an economic 
and political class over other Algerian classes. It was also during this colonial period 
that the bureaucratic and administrative development of the State apparatus acquired 
its most extensive form. The political independence of Algeria has necessarily led to the 
emergence of a post-colonial State (81), a power structure unaltered in its 
administrative apparatus but occupied by a new dominant class, the petty bourgeoisie 
under the hegemonic leadership of the military group (the property of a dominant 
class is derived from its ability to ensure that its own economic reproduction and that 
of society at large coincide).
As far as the relation between the State and the domestic classes is concerned, the 
transformation of the colonial State was not pursued with the aim of the dissolution of 
the relations of class domination associated with the working of the apparatus of the 
colonial State. As into many African experiences "the movement which brought [the 
ruling State members] to power was not structured in a way which permitted control 
over the leaders by certain classes nor was it committed to giving political power to 
particular classes" (82). Given the political agenda of the warring factions for the 
political independence of Algeria from France, "their task was not to dismantle the 
inherited state apparatus but to strengthen it and [in the logic of their political vision] 
ensure its dominance in the emerging class struggle against peasants and workers" 
( 83) .
In the aftermath of the political independence of Algeria, the coming to power of a new 
class with its different factions, has necessarily meant that it enjoyed a relative 
autonomy vis-a-vis the domestic classes. In the absence of a powerful domestic 
bourgeoisie - the colonial development of capitalism in Algeria has not allowed for 
more than a subordinated junior form of an indigenous bourgeoisie (84) - and a 
developed class of workers (here too the mode of colonisation of Algeria produced 
rather a class in formation than a class in an achieved form). "The numerically small 
proletariat is drowned in the immensity of the pauperised masses, from which it
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comes, to which it remains attached and with which it is often an integral part" (85). 
The existence of well developed administrative machinery as a means of managing the 
expanding state sector confers from the start a bureaucratic characteristic of such a 
mode of development. Rather than being "a committee for managing the common affairs 
of the whole bourgeoisie" (86) as would have been the case for a fully matured 
domestic bourgeoisie, and in the absence of the latter, the post-colonial State becomes 
itself a bourgeoisie in the making. Rather than directly promoting the private sector 
(and by private sector one refers to that whose property is not based on "the 
producers' own labour" but "on the employment of the labour of others" (87)), the 
state sector becomes in fact partly its substitute. The development of capitalism is not 
conducted directly via the private sector but rather indirectly through the promotion 
and expansion of the State bureaucratic sector (88). Rather than being in opposition to 
the private capitalist sector, the expansion of the public sector is also that of the 
private sector. The use of subsidies, the supply of cheap industrial inputs, tax rebates 
and/or exemption and different forms of tolerated tax evasions, the supply of a cheap 
labour force through the control of the price of wage goods, favourable terms of access 
to credit etc. are among the main channels through which a transfer of value from the 
"public" sector to the fast growing private capitalist sector is operated (89). The 
public sector becomes the ante-chamber of the development of the private capitalist 
sector. The class character of such an economic project is obviously blurred by the use 
of a populist ideology presenting the State as the State above society, the Algerian 
society as a classless society of universal harmonies, and the capitalist strategy as the 
strategy of "national development" (90). While the State property of the means of 
production placed the core mechanisms of economic surplus control within the hands of 
the new State, it was certainly the provision of the substantial oil revenues which in 
fact contributed to a large extent to disguise the class character of the new regime. By 
allowing for the alleviation of the rate of surplus extraction from the domestic sphere 
of production, the provision of an important oil rent was able to defuse the class 
tensions which would have unavoidably occurred (substantial oil revenues did not
therefore expose the social reproduction of the different domestic classes, and 
therefore of capital, to the conventional conflicting generation of economic surplus). 
As such oil rent directly contributed to providing the economic basis for the relatively 
conflict-free reproduction of the different classes and particularly the hegemonic 
faction of the dominant class: the state bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
The mode of development of State bureaucratic capitalism implies by its nature that 
the classical mechanisms of regulation of the capitalist system such as price 
determination, the free circulation of commodities, labour, capital, the condition of 
profit determination etc. are necessarily altered through State's mediation. As T. 
Benhouria sums up the issue "the categories which were the driving forces of 
capitalist growth, competition, the equalisation of the rates of profit through the free 
circulation of capitals, goods and men, cease to operate within state bureaucratic 
capitalism" (91).
The bureaucratised state capital is thwarted in its expansion through the centralisation 
of the mechanisms of market regulation. However "degenerated" this form of capitalist 
development may appear, it neither can be dissociated from the emergence of a 
domestic bourgeoisie - in formation, nor from the development of an increased urban 
proletariat and an increasingly differentiated peasantry dominated by landlessness and 
increasing poverty.
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CONCLUSION.
The mode of accumulation which has been pursued by Algeria was essentially based on 
industrialisation. The achievement of such an objective has been accompanied by an 
increasing "diversion" of actual economic surplus, particularly in its oil rent form, to 
benefit of the hydrocarbon export sector (the main provider of foreign earnings as 
well as the guarantor of foreign borrowing) with the result that the net share of 
financial external resources accruing to the other sectors of the economy has tended to 
remain constant. As such the hydrocarbons sector appears not only as the main 
provider of oil rent but also as the main consumer of such an oil rent. The path 
between the centre of accumulation in the export sector and the centre of accumulation 
in the other domestic sectors remains so far determined only once the needs for capital 
formation within the export sector are already been met.
The emphasis of the strategy of development on heavy industries did not result in 
developing the sector most identified with the capital goods sector: the machine-tools 
sector. Given the present distribution of sectoral investment, this sector receives in 
fact a smaller share of resources than the consumer goods sector. After the export 
sector, the single most important sector remains the sector producing intermediate 
goods. Though defined as a model of "industrialising industries" the Algerian strategy of 
development appears neither as a model based on capital goods industries as such, due 
to the subordination of the machine tools industries vis-a-vis intermediate goods 
industries, nor as a model based on consumer industries as such due to the 
subordination of the latter by the intermediate goods industries. The pre-eminence of 
the hydrocarbons sector both in the overall gross formation of fixed capital and in 
foreign earnings is in fact what characterises best a mode of international labour 
specialisation still based on the promotion and development of an economy based on 
mono-exports (however strategic the importance of the exportable product may be).
In its external mode of realisation the ASD was accompanied by a deep integration in
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the world capitalist economy through both the conditions of reproduction of the 
elements of capital (the objective conditions, i.e. the technological reproduction of 
fixed capital, as well as the subjective conditions, i.e. the reproduction of the labour 
force through the imports of wage goods), and the development of its export sector 
(92). The very valorisation of hydrocarbons meant also that, because of the oil self- 
sufficiency of East-European countries, Algeria's partners are essentially capitalist 
partners (93). Whether as supplier or importer, Algeria remains dominated by its 
capitalist partners. The mode of orientation of Algeria's development in relation to the 
world capitalist system is, from that perspective, inseparable from the class nature of 
the post-colonial State which anchored the Algerian economy in the world economy on 
the basis of the hydrocarbons sector which also served as the basis for domestic capital 
accumulation and its organically corresponding class articulation.
Throughout the planned period the nature of industrial investment has been pursued 
using the most sophisticated techniques available. Despite the extraordinary 
development of industrial investment and the increase in the absolute level of 
employment, persistent inadequacies still remain however between the level and 
nature of employment opportunities and the characteristics of the labour market 
dominated by a high proportion of a young labour force on the one hand and a low 
proportion of skilled manpower on the other. The concentration of industrial 
investment in urban areas has also meant that the policy of development remained 
throughout a non-agricultural policy. Agriculture which supported the majority of the 
population before the emergence of the oil industry entered into a decline after the 
initiation of the ASD (see part III). As such the characteristics of an essentially 
agrarian society, as Algeria showed in the 1960s, did not serve as the direct objective 
of development. Its promotion was in fact postponed to the aftermath of an 
industrialised Algeria. The role of the peasantry was therefore directly subordinated to 
the objective of industrialisation whose process was in the hands of the State 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie and that of its different factional interests.
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As a result of the relative ease with which the state was able to raise its exchange 
earning surpluses, the rapid promotion of Algeria's industrial policy inaugurated at 
the same time - and this despite its attenuated effect on employment creation - an 
extension of wage relations on a scale which, when expressed in an increased food 
demand (particularly urban), soon exhausted the capacities of domestic agriculture 
altogether. The management of food demand imposed itself with a force of compulsion 
and emerged as an integral part of industrialisation itself. The necessity to meeting the 
new urban food demand became a precondition of capital itself: through the 
reproduction of its subjective condition (the physiological preservation of labour 
power), but also a reproduction most compatible with its own valorisation (the 
production of subsistence goods compatible with the production of the value of labour 
power at its lowest cost possible). Imposed by the very rationality of capital (once 
given the length of a day's work, the determination of the value of labour power is also 
at the same time that of surplus labour itself with the result that for a given level of 
technical progress or a given organic composition of capital, the value of labour power 
is inversely related to the value of surplus labour), the emergence of cheap food/cheap 
labour/low wages policy soon acquired the characteristics of) a part entiere. As the 
embodiment of a mode of regulation of labour power, the supply of cheap wage foods 
was obtained in two manners: the state promotion of capitalist organisation of 
agricultural production and direct state intervention based on cheap food imports and a 
pricing policy. The extent to which such objectives were to be achieved and the type of 
contradictions that the pursuit of cheap labour policy necessarily create are dealt with 
consecutively in Part III and Part IV.
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NOTES
1-Lazregh, M. Op. Cit. p. XIV.
2-Such conflicts in fact were ever present in the different political and military 
bodies which were part of the unfolding of the process which was to lead to the actual 
war of liberation. The eminence of the political independence only led to an 
intensification of such conflicts. The actual occurrence of such an independence 
resulted in many instances of overt military action against opponents, (on this point 
see M. Lazregh op. cit)]
3- Op. Cit. p. 84.
It can also be added that such an objective could be said to be shared by most groups and 
classes. What however makes the petty-bourgeoisie elements more sensitive to such an 
objective is precisely their overwhelming presence within the most powerful body of 
power: The army.
4-Such an exclusion of foreign interests does not by itself mean the exclusion of 
capital in the sense of a social relation of production.What one ought to see beyond such 
nationalisations is merely the Algerian state claim for political and economic hegemony 
over the domestic conditions of capital accumulation.
5-The small class of private capitalists was offered substantial incentives (profit tax 
exemptions during the first five years of their investment, generous terms of access to 
loans etc.) in the setting up of consumer goods industries and services.
6-See following section.
7-In 1976 the two main national enterprises SONATRACH for hydrocarbons and SNS 
for steel employed about 30% of the total industrial work force.
8-The Algerian Dinar, with AD= 18 Milligrammes of gold. Until August, 1969, the 
AD was at par with the French Franc.
9-lf so far conventional approaches have interested themselves with capital formation 
as such, i.e. through its different magnitudes and its rates of growth, our approach 
however differs in the sense that it is based on the study of the social forces which are
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an integral part of the actual process of accumulation, i.e. the class interests which are 
presupposed in the process of development and which develop along such a process. For 
the sake of convenience we will indifferently refer to this accumulation policy under 
the terms of either the "Algerian Strategy of Development" ASD or the "Algerian Model 
of Development" AMD. Our compliance with such commonly used labels remains 
however subject to a reserve in so far as their reference to "development" is more 
filled with an ideological content than it may at first sight appears, i.e. a notion of 
development "handled as an ostensibly neutral, non-class process..." to coin Pandeli 
Glavanis, North Africa Edited by R.Lawless & A. Findley. Croam Helm. New York. 
1984. p. 120.
10-What such an integration entails is that the interpretation of the policies of 
development of such countries (of which Algeria is our particular concern) proceeds 
mainly from impact that the oil industry produces on the penetration and expansion of 
capitalist relations.
11-This dominant form of surplus-value does not exclude the generation of absolute 
surplus-value based on different forms of lengthening of working time.
12-Renfrew, Christie Why does capital need energy? in Oil & class struggle Edited
by p. Nore & T. Tuner. Zed press. 1980. p. 13.
13-In order to compare different carbon-bearing sources of energy such as oil, gas, 
coal etc., a conversion factor is used whereby 1 coal unit (C.U)= 1kg of coal 
containing 7,000 calories = 0.7 kg of crude oil for the same calorie content.
14-The comment of the following oil expert is very clear on the point. "It would be 
quite correct to assume that, as a particular use-value form of energy, crude oil 
displays considerable advantages compared to coal in all respects, from its immediate 
production to its transformation into thermal energy. In addition, the by-products of
crude oil find numerous uses in all sectors of industry; but to get rid of the residues of
coal requires additional costs". Massarat, M. The energy crisis: the struggle to 
redistribute surplus orofitlbld p. 34.
15-The nature of the conflicts and contradictions that such a distribution entails
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within countries is assessed in our case from the point of view of the study of the 
Algerian economic formation according to its own class specificities. The extension of 
such findings to other oil exporting countries cannot therefore go beyond similarities 
and broad characterisations.
16-Disturbances as a result of the imbalance between supply and demand are not taken 
into account here. Price variations above and below value are assumed to cancel out 
each other so that prices are equal to value.
17-The price of production = costs of production + average profit. By definition 
therefore, a market price is a price of production.
18-Only when land is subsumed under landed property. At this stage we are not 
assuming its existence, at this stage we are not interested in issues pertaining to the 
mode of distribution of surplus-profit yet.
19-Marx, M. Capital. Volume III, Laurance & Wishard, London 1974. p. 644, quoted 
by Massarat, M. Ibid. p. 28.
20-This situation is in fact similar to that of the manufacturing sphere of production 
itself whereby the highest labour productivity reaps a surplus profit above the 
general price of production in the rest of the sphere. But if the dynamic of capital here 
is not restricted by the generalisation of a higher labour productivity within the 
entire sphere, in the extractive sphere however, limits are set to the competition of 
capital for the increase in labour productivity.
21-It goes without saying that if demand decreases, the first category of capital to go, 
would be that which can only aim for average profit. The production of a substitute 
(e.g. nuclear energy) by determining the new conditions of production will impose its 
sanctions on those producing in the lowest range of labour productivity. The 
perspective of a full application of the law of value without the generation of a 
differential rent in the sphere of energy production can only be conceived when the 
nuclear energy becomes the only form of energy production, i.e. in the case whereby 
the production of energy or more precisely its manufacturing is freed from its natural 
constraints.
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22-lbid p. 35
23-lbid. p. 36. It is also worth mentioning that without subsidies, the capitalist 
organisation of European coal production would not have been possible without a 
certain form of 'socialisation of losses either directly through the nationalisation of 
the coal mines as in France & Britain or indirectly in the form of subsidies to the 
industry" (Ibid p. 35).The most favourable natural conditions of coal production are 
located in the USA.
24-The different forms of ownership of oil have not been a once and for all fixed 
forms. From a historical standpoint the feudal property of land (and the class nature of 
ownership) ought to be distinguished from its capitalist form of ownership.
25-When an open colonisation is the rule, as was the case of Algeria until 1962, such 
an alliance is simply not needed and capital rules by military means, what becomes an 
issue however is the impact of the diffusion of the capitalist relations (through 
international capital), the destruction of the feudal mode of production and the genesis 
of new social classes. The destruction of subsistence farming remains up to now the 
testimony of the penetration of capital in the agricultural sphere of production.
26-Posted prices are different from consumer prices. Posted prices are the prices at 
which oil companies buy oil from exporting countries. Cf. on this point the interesting 
book by Chevalier, M. Le Nouvel Enieu Petrolier. Calman-Levy, 1973
27-Nore, p. Ibid. p, 71.
28-Compared to the level of surplus profit in 1960, the 1974 price increase allowed 
the OPEC country members to multiply their share of profit by 47 while the increase 
was only 10 fold for the oil companies and the importing countries. But in all cases the 
absolute level of profit increased for all partners.
29-The share of surplus profit from oil accruing to each OPEC member country and 
Algeria in particular has not been attempted as such at this level.The main purpuse so 
far of the analysis was mainly to highlight: a. through the international distribution of 
oil surplus-profit the origin of the source of capital accumulation potentially 
available to all providing countries, b. the conditions under which the redistribution of
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surplus profit has been possible, i.e. the development of capitalism (however uneven 
and incomplete) in the oil exporting countries. As far as the latter point is concerned 
one ought to point out that the development of capitalism in the periphery in general 
needs not necessarily be associated with an open liberal ideology. In so many instances 
of national development" or 'socialising' ideologies, it is becoming, more and more 
difficult to dissociate State interests and private interests. Generally speaking the state 
does not always produce an ideology which is a direct reflection of the class interests it 
promotes. It rather always wants to appear as the state above class interests.But we 
know that the state can only be conceived as the bearer of the class that invests its 
structure and its apparatus.
30-Perroux, p. quoted by De Bernis in Approaches de ouelaues conditions pour 
I'industrialisation des oavs sous develoooes. Undated paper of a conference held in 
Algiers University between 1973 and 1974. Algiers, p. 4.
31-Ibid. p. 10
32-lbid. De Bernis rightly distinguishes between countries in the process of 
industrialisation and industrialised countries.His preference for the former 
formulation, unlike the latter, does not imply any idea of an achieved process. 
Industrialisation is therefore rightly seen as a self generating movement which ends 
up affecting all aspects of economic sectors as well as of society itself.
33-"Linkage is reduced to the fact that an input of the newly established industry is an
I °output of the to-be created industry or vice-versa". Hirshman, A. The strategy of
Ia
economic development. Yale University, 1969, p. 103.
Forward linkage effects on the other hand are defined as the output utilisation of every 
activity that does not by its nature cater exclusively for final demand.
34-De Bernis Ibid. p. 12.
35-P. Salama and P. Tissier ^industrialisation dans le sous-deveioemenf. Petite 
Collection Maspero. Paris, 1982, p. 82.
It goes without saying that the alternative open within a strategy of IS can be based on 
the development of an export sector based on consumer goods promotion.
36-Such a distinction does not by its nature imply that a state public sector is not 
controlled by private interests. The legal form of ownership of the means of production 
does not necessarily reflect the economic control over the social product. The 
development of capitalism is consistent with a variety of property forms.
37-When the issue of development is involved the central question to be addressed is 
always: development for whom? or in other words to what specific social needs is 
harnessed the development of the productive forces?
38-The assessment of the level of private investment is not ordinarily available in the 
current economic official publications.The sheer economic weight of public investment 
has literally dwarfed if not simply eliminated any estimation of private investment 
from current literature. The percentage share of the private sector in the domestic 
value-added reflects by contrast and a contrario the overwhelming weight of the 
public sector: 1967: 67%, 1969: 54%, 1971: 23%, 1973: 18%.
39-Other sources such as A.Benachenhou in "Forces sociales et accumulation du 
capital" and M. Raffinot & P. Jacquemot in Le capitalism d'Etat Alaerien give a much 
lower percentage rate of industrial investment. The former source gives 55% while 
the latter 52%. The only advantage in using the Palloix, Ch. source is that it is the 
latest of all (1980). The problem of accuracy and even of reliability of data pertaining 
to Algeria in general ought not be under-estimated.
40-A. Benachenhou. Forces Sociales et accumulation du capital au Maohreb. Annuaire 
de I'Alfrique du Nord, 1973, p. 327.
41-Tayeb Said Ahmed. Le developpement industriel de iAioerie. Edition Anthropos, 
1981, p. 37.
42-This is so only in so far as the hydrocarbons sector is compared to each individual 
section of the capital goods sector and consumer goods sector.lf however the distinction 
is being made only in terms of the hydrocarbons sector vrs the rest of the individual 
sector, then the percentage share of industrial investment during the 1967/77 period 
is 47% for the former and 53% for the latter.
43-Henri Madelin Petrole et politique en Mediterrannee occidentale. A.Collin Paris.
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1973. p. 162.
44-Created by the end of 1963, initially SONATRACH was conceived as a company in 
charge of the transportation of hydrocarbons and their marketing. In later years its 
prerogatives extended to research, exploration, production, processing, petrochemical 
activities etc.
45-French oil interests were preserved due to the existence of the 1965 agreement of 
cooperation between Algeria and France. In a return for a regime of concessions 
covering an area of 180,000 km2 rich of oil, a guaranteed supply to meet France 
domestic oil needs and a set of advantageous fiscal measures (including levels of posted 
prices lower than those charged to oil companies operating in other oil producing 
countries) granted to French companies, the 1965 agreement granted Algeria an outlet 
for her export (mainly made up of wine), the absorption of her emigrants in the 
French economy and the perspective of a financial aid (for a period of 5 years France 
promised an annual credit of N.F.F 200 million with a grant element of N.F.F 40 
million, the rest disburseable over a period of 20 years with a rate of interest of 3%).
46-Known gas reserves in 1971 ranked Algeria amongst the 4 ^  largest reserve 
holder after the USSR, the USA and Iran. See K. Ammour, L. Leucate and J.J. Moulin. 
La voie Alaerienne de developoement. F.Maspero. Paris 1974. p. 46.).
47-See Appendix AII.3.
48-See Appendix AII.4.
49-On the basis of the new policy of bilateral deals prospecting operations which can 
last several years are at the entire charge of the foreign partner. It is only in the case 
of the discovery of commercially interesting fields that the previous expenses of 
prospecting are shared between Sonatrach and the prospecting company.
50-The question of the path between the accumulation within the hydrocarbons sector 
and within the industrial sector raises important issues.In particular the central 
question is: does the development of hydrocarbons guarantee by its nature an automatic 
development of the internalised gross fixed capital formation ? Some attempts have 
been advanced in the present piece of research.
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51-This explains why the proportion of machinery in total imports remained at a 
constantly high level: 23% (1967), 31% (1969), 36% (1972), 43% (1974), 
45% (1978), 36% (1980) and 38% (1981). See UN Yearbook o f international 
Trade & statistics.
52-Palloix, Ch. Ibid. pp. 541/542.
53-The notion of "condition"is preferred to that of the "effect" of the strategy. The 
shortcoming of an analysis based on the notion of "effects" is that effects tend to suggest 
consequences associated with a strategy while the notion of "conditions of realisation" 
are therefore an integral part of the policy of accumulation while "effects" are simply 
derived consequences out of such an accumulation process.
54-In fact these two factors, rather than being mere by-products or a result of the 
policy which is being pursued, are in fact an intimate structural component of the 
mode of capital accumulation itself: intensive accumulation of the most advanced capital 
using techniques of production against the background of a relatively backward 
economy.
55-For hydrocarbons to rest on the domestic economy, it is essential that the 
development of hydrocarbons is geared exclusively to the domestic market, i.e. that the 
role of the international market is reduced to an insignificant aspect.But this is clearly 
not the terms under which is geared the valorisation of national natural resources.
56-Due to the determinant weight of the world capitalist market in the realisation of 
the overall condition of capital accumulation, the problem of sectoral proportionality 
necessary acquires a political determination.
57-Budgetary saving is "the excess of definitive budgetary resources issued from 
taxation above the amount of operating budget and investment budget" Palloix, Ch. Ibid. 
p. 545.
From the 1970s onwards oil taxation has become greater than the budgetary 
investment, so that the net positive budgetary saving reflects the fact that the 
budgetary investment is financed from oil taxation, i.e. a taxation which depends not 
only on the volume of exports but on the international oil prices. From the 1970s
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onwards budgetary savings reflects therefore the contribution of oil taxation.This can 
therefore be considered as an indirect external source of financing. (*the negative 
value of budgetary savings means in fact that it is ordinary taxation which financed 
budgetary investment).
58-lbid. p. 550.
59-As be seen, the reproduction of the labour force has tended to be more and more 
dependent on the import of wage goods.
60-Due to the impossibility of having access to the proportion of foreign borrowing 
exclusive to the needs of the hydrocarbons sector, the calculation of the net foreign 
earning contribution of the sector cannot therefore be expanded beyond 1978 and
1974.
61-This is not to suggest that Algeria must not pay any interest on contracted 
loans.The shortcoming associated with the magnitude of interests paid is that it does not 
take into account the conditions under which the payments are being met.When a 
country borrows, it tends to underestimate the future resources which will be at its 
disposal when it has to pay back.The present inability of most underdeveloped 
countries to meet their obligation of payment is a clear evidence of such a 
contradiction.
62-lt is interesting to note that such a linear conception of industrialisation conveys
its own paradigms: the intensive accumulation of fixed capital guaranties the condition n  
of a progressive generalisation of industries, industrialisation guaranties a balanced ^  
development between industry and agriculture, the setting up industries guaranties the 
formation of a class of workers capable of its management etc.
63- Op. Cit. p. 533.
64-The rationale behind the option for the use of advanced technologies is given to us 
by De Bernis. Three main reasons are put forward: a. A country is no less dependent 
when using backward than modern technologies, b. Modern technologies are the only 
capable ones for endowing a country with a guaranteed position in the international 
division of labour, c.Modern technologies do not require a great amount of skilled
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labour force.
65-The ASD contains from that standpoint a specialisation of the economic activity 
(which in effect is urban by essence) as the localisation of investments is distributed 
between three main growth poles which happen as well to be the three main urban 
centres of Algeria. From that perspective, the localisation of investment becomes a 
powerful reinforcing economic mechanism of rural migration.In this context the 
relation between towns and countryside becomes a relation inseparable from the mode 
of accumulation.
66-Such an income distribution is the mirror image of the ASD which is i essence a 
class project of development of the productive forces on the basis of the State 
ownership of the means of production.In the last analysis, the ASD is no more than the 
social project of the dominant class, a project curiously identified with the technical 
achievement of the developed capitalist economies, in other words an ideal of capitalist 
development.
67-R.TIemcani. State and Revolution in Algeria. Westpoint Press. London. 1986. p. 
10 .
68-See on this point Ch. Bernard. I'empoi a la ville et I'emooi a la campaone. une 
comolementarite compromise en Alaerie. Monde En Developpment. N936.1981. p.67.
69-Though this structure coincides with the interests of the dominant class and in this 
sense it is eminently rationale from the point of view of such class interests, there 
remain however the question of the cost of such a structure in relation to the question 
of the effective use of economic surplus.
70-Since the mode of capital accumulation is being pursued according to the interests 
of the dominant class and not those of the working class, it goes without saying that 
such demographic requirement (as seen earlier) are not part of the requirement of the 
mode of development of the productive forces. It is therefore capital which determine 
its needs in accordance with its own expansion rather than the population determining 
its own capital needs. As one can see, such a mode of determination is eminently 
capitalist in nature (to have an idea of the challenge that a young population sets in
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terms of a goal to be reached by capital accumulation, in 1985 the comparative 
percentage of the population below age 15 compares as follows: Algeria 45%, Morocco 
41%, Egypt 40%, Developing countries 37%, Developed countries 22%. The 
Economist. 26 November-2 December 1988).
It is also worth mentioning that in 1983 the proportion of technicians, engineers and 
executives represented 5.6% of the total employed population while those employed 
without skill represented 47.4%.
71-As total increments of labour creation relate in fact to labour creation 
independently of the sex (and of age also), the inclusion of the effectively employed 
female population is rendered unavoidable. In fact such a method of proceeding is also 
part of the official method of calculation employed by Algerian statisticians. (The 
magnitude of the incremental female population is computed from 1977 to 1982 
(because of a lack of data) on the basis of an extrapolation of the pattern of female 
employment between 1966- 90,500- and 1977- 139,000).
72-With the exception of the 1975 figure derived from T. Benhouria. L'economie de 
TAIaerie. Maspero. Paris. 1980 p. 372, the data are derived from B. Dellouci & 
M.Mehani [.'emigration Alaerienne in La population de I'Alaerie. CICRED. 1974. pp. 
8 8 /9 0 .
73-R. Tlemcani. State and revolution in Algeria. Westview Press Boulder Colorado & 
Zed press London. 1986. p. 168.
74-Philip, A. President of the OECD Development centre in his forward to Trebous, M. 
book: Mioration and development: the case of Algeria. Development centre of the OECD. 
Paris 1970. p. 7.
75- A. Prenant Essai d'evaluation et d'interoretation de la croissance urbaine en 
Aloerie: 1966-1974. March 1976. Quoted by A. Benachenhou. L'exode rural en 
Alaerie. Algiers. 1979. p. 11.
76-Raooort general du deuxieme plan ouadriennial quoted by A. Benachenhou Op. Cit.
p. 10.
77-"The urban fact is reinforced by industrialisation and the induced direct and
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indirect effects can be already felt in the field of employment. The development of 
commerce and exchange, the organisation of administrative, financial and political 
functions reinforce the role of the towns as a pole of development of the regional 
economy". C. Bardinet La repartition oeoaraohiaue de la population Alaerienne in 'La 
population de PAIg6rie" Op. Cit. p. 78.
78-The real extent of income distribution is however much more unequal than that 
suggested by the above table. The unproductive modes of consumption of the economic 
surplus (i.e. the diversion away from productive investments) by the different 
sections of the dominant classes involve other forms of consumption (and difficult to 
evaluate) which cannot be identified with the observed levels of monetary incomes. 
Such modes of consumption involve free access to housing, to ownership of a car, to 
frequent free travel abroad, to food supply, to the exclusive use of certain 
infrastructures and services (health care, holiday facility etc.). The extent of the gap 
between the bottom and top income classes can be much wider if its calculation 
involves the play of different bonuses. When this is the case wage gaps of the order of 1 
to 20 in the agricultural sector and 1 to 64 in the non-agricultural sector are not 
uncommon. See on this particular point T. Benhouria Op. Cit. p. 323 and , M. and 
Jacquemot, p. Op. Cit. p. 200.
78-K. Griffin and , A.R. Khan. Poverty in the third world: Ualv facts and fancy 
models. World Development. Volume N9 6. p. 302.
79-R. Tlemcani Op. Cit. p. 13.
80-First, Ruth. Libva: class and State in an oil economy in "Oil and class struggle". 
Op. Cit. Footnote No 7. p. 140.
81-Von Freyhold, Michaela. The post-colonial state and its Tanzanian version. Review 
of African Political Economy. No 8. January-April 1977. p. 87.
82-The notion of post-colonial state is borrowed from Hamza Alavi. The state in 
post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. New Left Review. N9 74. July-
Auaust 19^72. > /
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84-1 bid.
85-M.L. Benhassine and L. Boukra. Le processus de formation de du secteur d'Etat en 
AIaerie in Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques". OPU. 
Algiers. 1982. p. 224.
86-K. Marx and F. Engels. Communist manifesto". Progress Publisher. 1965. p. 43.
87-K. Marx Capital. Volume One. Lawrence & Wishard. Progress Publishers. 1974. 
p. 716.
88-The state ownership of the means of production does not by itself necessarily 
contradict capitalist production. The valprisation of capital does not require an 
exclusively individual form of ownership. The development of the wage earning system 
and the absence of control of the means of production by the workers are all what is 
required to guarantee such a valorisation.
89-Such methods of promotion of the private sector are not indiscriminate and in 
many instances they depend on the particular regional, ethnic, family links or 
connections that are established between the private entrepreneurs and the 
representatives of the State bureaucracy. Very often however the frontiers between 
private and state interests are blurred due to the dual status assumed by many state 
representatives who harness their political power to the consolidation of their 
interests in the private sector. In that sense the private bourgeoisie is only the hidden 
screen of the state bourgeoisie. As pointed out by Hugh Roberts "the development of 
state capitalism has entailed the massive expansion of the administrative apparatus of 
the state but has also ... permitted a substantial development of private enterprise" The 
Algerian Bureaucracy. Review of African Political Economy. Ng24. May/August 1982. 
p. 52.
90-For a critical assessment of the notion of 'development' see A. Phillips. The 
concept of development. Review of African Political Economy. N9 8. January-April 
1977: 7-20.
91-T. Benhouria Op. Cit. p. 432.
92-The technological basis of its industrialisation originated mainly from the most
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advanced capitalist economies: essentially the USA and Western Europe. The share of 
total imports originating from the USA, the EEC countries and other European 
capitalist countries was 73% in 1967, 76% in 1970, 71% in 1975, 68% in 1977, 
80% in 1980 and 78% in 1983.
93-In 1967, 91% of Algeria's export were to North America & Western Europe; for 
the following years the proportions were 83% in 1970, 88% in 1975, 94% in 
1977, 87% in 1981 and 93% in 1983.
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PART III
THE UNFOLDING OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION.
Introduction
The conditions under which was obtained the supply of wage goods under the 
requirement of cheap labour were behind most of the agrarian transformations initiated 
by the post-colonial state. Such transformations came about through two main 
processes: the emergence of the experience of "autogestion" or "self-management" 
during the 1960s and the programme of land reform during the 1970s. The experience 
of agrarian self-management concerned essentially the new conditions under which the 
ex-colonial sector was re-appropriated from the colonists and "re-organised". In 
essence the experience developed more on the level of ideology than that of the actual 
relations of production. If formally the idea of self-management referred to the 
spontaneous conditions under which the work force already employed on the colonial 
estates carried on the process of production without their French landlords, the 
fundamental relations of production upon which were organised estates (such as the 
organisation of the technical division of labour, the wage earning system, the 
supporting structures, the mode of remuneration, etc.) remained largely unchallenged 
by the new conditions. If formally the agricultural workers, now organised in 
managing committees, were in charge of the abandoned (and/or nationalised) colonial 
farms, the real owners of the means of production, i.e. those who effectively control the 
relations of production, and who now ceased to exist under the form of a multitude of 
individual landowners, had now become the new state through its multi-form 
institutional embodiments: the marketing boards, the credit institutions, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, etc. The transition of Algeria from the colonial period to the 
independence period has not resulted in any major alteration in the relations of 
production upon which the development of the colonial sector was so far based. What
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was altered as a result of the substitution of the multitude of European farmers by one 
new category of landlords - the post-colonial state - was essentially the terms under 
which the appropriation of agricultural surplus between France and Algeria was 
redefined to the benefit of the Algerian state and its class representatives.
In so far as the rural poor (the landless, the near landless, the sharecroppers, the 
temporary workers, the unemployed all of whom located on the strata of poor and part 
of the middle peasantry) were concerned, the transformation of the colonial estates into 
"self-managed" farms had not brought about any major change in terms of job 
opportunities through a process of land redistribution (the exception remaining the 
creation of the war veterans co-operatives which by definition benefited the middle 
peasantry rather than the small or poor peasantry). The reproduction through state 
reapropriation, of the colonial sector and not its destruction through a radical land 
reform in favour of the poor peasantry, prevented therefore any significant 
transformation of the agricultural structures away from the inherited capitalist path of 
development. With the prohibition of any peasant occupation of the colonial land 
(particularly on cereal land) as early as December 1962 (1), the agrarian tendency 
which had been nurtured under the overwhelming weight of the peasantry within the 
Popular Army of Liberation during the last years of the armed struggle for 
independence, was brought to an end with the state officialisation of "self-management". 
The direct involvement of state institutions in the running of the ex-colonial sector 
conferred to the post-colonial state all direct and indirect means of control over the 
ex-colonial farms. The mode of management of the ex-colonial estates had become a 
"Junker road ' of agrarian development but without Junkers (2). The extension, 
development and the consolidation of state property over this fraction of the 
agricultural sector dominated the whole of the first decade of post-independent Algeria. 
From its early development the experience of "self-management" had meant that the 
"the re-assessment of agriculture in accordance with the real situation of the peasantry 
in the marginal sectors was definitively ignored" (3). Between the issue of an agrarian 
reform in favour of the peasantry, and the preservation of the ex-colonial farms, the
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latter imposed itself on the agenda of the new ruling class. The concept of land reform 
which eventually prevailed was defined only after the interiorisation of the colonial
methods of management and organisation h^ uccu well assimilated and reproduced and 
the industrial option became the centrality of the economic policy of the new state. In 
this context the conception of agrarian transformations which were to be inaugurated 
bore the stamp of an essentially industrialist and urban conception of development.
In contradistinction to the peasant conception of agricultural change which was upheld 
during the war in the agrarian programme contained in the Congress o f the Soummam 
(the Congress of the Soummam, held in the midst of waging war for liberation and 
political independence by the interior army - as opposed to the external fraction 
isolated in Tunisia and Morocco - and held on August 20th 1956, envisaged the 
conception of change in conformity with the hegemony of the peasantry), the new 
programme of land reform arose out of a different class perception and conception 
altogether. In its essence the promotion of the programme of "agricultural revolution" 
(AR) was defined essentially in opposition to the "private" agricultural sector. The 
implicit assumption behind such a project of agrarian transformations lies, given the 
de facto preservation of the mode of management of the estates, in the extension and 
diffusion to the rest of the agricultural sector of the mode of organisation already 
existing in the state agricultural sector proper. As such the main objectives of 
"agricultural revolution" consisted in the elimination of large properties as well as the 
nationalisation of absentee landowners. At the outset, the declared aim of the programme 
of land reform was openly in favour of a farmer road to agricultural development. The 
integration of communal land in the fund of AR also constituted another important 
characteristic of this programme: the breaking up of all different forms of land 
property and their fusion into a homogeneous form closer to a capitalist use of the land. 
The constitution of the new agricultural sector was based on the redistribution of land 
under a co-operative form for its beneficiaries but with the state remaining the 
ultimate owner. In view of the limited number of nationalisations (exceptions were 
particularly high while the proportion of absentee landlords and large properties 
proved smaller than expected), the bulk of the land integrated in the new sector was
essentially of a communal origin, i.e. land of not particularly high fertility that the 
commune rented to small and/or landless peasants. In other words, as contradictory as 
it may at first sight appear, the measures of nationalisation affected the small 
peasantry which rented such communal land more than the middle and particularly 
large landowners who did not resort to renting the communal land and who were also 
able to escape the nationalisation measures using the procedure of exception and/or 
because of the different methods of concealment (false status of residence for absentee 
landowners - the urban location of residence of landowners was considered a condition 
of land nationalisation by the Algerian reformers - the artificial use of joint- 
ownership for large landowners, etc.). By focusing exclusively on the private sector 
and on the fraction of land beyond the state agricultural sector of "self-management", 
the Algerian reformers displaced and inverted the sense of an historical contradiction, 
that which prevailed and presided over a century of land confiscation and which now 
finds its embodiment in the substitute of the colonial sector, i.e. the post-colonial state 
agricultural sector. As such and in so far as the overall unequal distribution of the land 
goes (one of the raison d'etre of the agricultural "revolution" was precisely to fight 
such a land imbalance), "the fundamental inequality does not lie so much between small 
and large private property, [however relevant such a contradiction may appear, it can 
however only be so in the absence of any distinction between juridically different 
sectors, which is far from being the case here] than between the private sector and the 
self-managed sector. Thus the socialisation (or better the state control), of the ex­
colonial sector has not abolished the perennial dis-equilibrium between "a people 
without land" and "a land without people". It has only, by institutionalising an 
uncrossable juridical barrier, assigned to this sector definitive limits, bringing thus 
to an end the process of land confiscation of the "traditional" private sector (which 
incidentally does not prevent the process of land concentration from being sustained 
within it)" (4). Through the new conception of agrarian change centered on a 
contradiction located within the private/traditional sector, and not within the entire 
agricultural sector, one witnesses that the historical dualism, created under colonial
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conditions, is still nurtured and reproduced under the new conditions of AR, and that the 
programme of land reform which can be identified with the small peasantry as such, i.e. 
the landless and the near landless, is also ignored. What the programme of AR in fact 
achieved is an extension of the model of farming prevalent in the "self-managed" sector. 
As such it has neither been able to absorb and integrate the small peasantry in the 
economy (the model of state farming, because of its size and the capitalistic nature of 
its process of production, employs the smallest proportion of the labour force), nor 
create any significant impact on the rural labour market ( the majority of the 
beneficiaries of AR were already employed). As pointed out by N. Abdi, the programme 
of land reform has "tended to abolish the peasant condition, not by encouraging its 
development but by breaking totally away from it" (5). The reproduction of peasant 
economy obeys de facto the rationale of cheap labour/cheap wage through the logic of 
simple commodity production. To the colonialy created agricultural contrast dominated 
now by a polarization of a state sector enjoying the highest concentration of the largest 
fertile land, and a private sector employing the highest proportion of the labour force, 
a further sector was added  ^ with an intermediate profile based on the use of 
industrial inputs but the least endowed of all in terms of land and land fertility. As a 
result of the programme of AR, the polarisation within the overall agricultural sector 
has been maintained and deepened further: on the one hand the state agricultural sector 
has been augmented by the sector of AR, on the other a more formally "laminated" 
private sector dominated by middle property but where large private property was 
formally eliminated.
On the whole, the programme of land reform appears as the consolidation of the extended 
state capitalist form of ownership of the land while in the "private" agricultural sector 
its contribution consisted essentially in consolidating the private ownership of the land 
most compatible with its capitalist use, that is a form of property based on the 
promotion of the fusion of the category of landowner into the category of capitalist 
farmer. Populist and socialising in rhetoric, the programme of land transformation 
also ended up as a compromise for it neither achieved the bourgeois goal of a radical
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nationalisation of the land based on the elimination of absolute ground rent and the 
enhancement of the development of a capitalist agriculture based on the peasantry, nor 
the Junker road of agricultural development proper (the state acted rather as a 
condensated substitute for all Junkers). Let us now assess to what extent such 
transformations were able to meet the objective of capital requirement for cheap wage 
goods in the different agricultural sectors.
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CHAPTER I
THE AGRICULTURAL SELF-MANAGED SECTOR. 
Introduction.
The performance of the ex-colonial farms (now ideologically perceived under the label 
of 'self-management'), cannot be perceived without the prior study of the new 
conditions under which was operated their management. The main proposition that runs 
through this chapter is that - as a result of the bureaucratic mode of management of the 
estate production process (crop organisation, land regrouping, credit policy, labour 
management, reconstitution of fixed capital, marketing practices, etc.), the promotion 
of cheap food policy has been achieved with the result of a decreasing, or at best a 
stagnant production.
Paradoxically enough the history of 'self-management' has been nothing but the 
progressive hegemonic state control of the ex-colonial farms. As one of the earliest 
revelations of the class nature of the new power bearers, the status of the ex-colonial 
farms soon became the focal point of social conflicts. Indeed, as one of the immediate 
effects following the proclamation of the political independence of Algeria was the 
massive exodus of the majority of European settlers (about 1 million), the nature of 
the conflicts concerned mainly the control over the abandoned European assets (the 
massive exodus was also accompanied, on the part of many settlers, by systematic 
destruction and/or sabotage of the properties left behind: industrial plants, capital 
equipment and machinery, houses, etc.). In the context of the 1960s, the European 
exodus was to trigger two types of problems whose effects were to be felt for the many 
years to come: The departure of all French settlers also meant the departure of all 
engineers, doctors, technicians, civil servants, skilled workers, managers, etc. or, in 
other words, a complete professional vacuum affecting all aspects of the social
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organisation of Algeria. After this exodus most economic activities were thus brought to 
a complete halt. From the viewpoint of their extreme effects such consequences are seen 
by many as "unparalleled in the history of liberation from colonialism" (6) as they 
"meant the disappearance of a whole bourgeoisie, [and] of capitalists" (7). The 
European exodus meant the desertion of over 22,000 farms covering an area of the 
2,700,000 ha. A period of total confusion was set in motion. As G. Duprat put it "the 
vacuum, triggered at the top by the absence of central power and at the bottom by the 
massive exodus of Europeans, created between the month of July and October 1962 an 
authentic revolutionary situation" (8). A period of conflict commenced for political 
power at all levels of Algerian society and particularly in the countryside for the 
control of abandoned farms. Between 800,000 and 1,000,000 ha (9) - out of 2.7 
million ha - went under the direct spontaneous managing authority of the first 
spontaneous committees of workers, thus giving birth to the first initiation of what was 
to become the experience of self-management. At that stage all what mattered was more 
the preservation of the conditions of production on the colonial estates in the absence of 
their owners rather than the realisation of a different social project based on workers 
management proper.
On the ground the conflicts which arose between the permanent workers of the ex­
colonial farms and the representatives of the new emerging power, the ALN (the 
National Liberation Army) and the different state representatives, brought to a halt the 
extension of power of farm workers initiative. The reinforcement of state political 
power, led by A. Ben Bella after the overthrow of the Provisional Government of the 
Algerian Republic (GPRA), went along with the creation of BNBV (Bureau National pour 
la protection des Biens Vaccants: National bureau for the protection of vacant assets), 
an institution, which by its actions, de facto instituted itself as the real manager, as 
well as the mouthpiece of the abandoned estates, or in short, the substitute for the 
absent European landowners (until 1963 the central power acted against peasants in 
defense of the settlers' assets into a view to their coming back). In principle BNBV was 
to assist the workers in the management of the vacant estates. Most important BNBV
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elaborated the famous Decrees of March 1963 (10) which institutionalised the 
existence of vacant assets:
-18 March, 1963 Decree: It definitively officialised and legalised the existing vacant 
estates which fell under state protection.
-22 March, 1963 Decree: It set the rules of organisation of self-management under the 
authority of its organs: the General Assembly, the Workers Council and the Managing 
Committee.
-28 March, 1963 Decree: It determined the rules of income distribution which in fact 
amounted to the conditions under which the agricultural product of the estates was to be 
appropriated through its distribution between: a/ a national investment fund (or to use 
the official terminology, the contributions to the National Collectivity), which included 
the contribution to the amortisation fund of the state, the national fund of investment 
and the national fund for the creation of employment; b/ the wage fund of workers and 
c/ the constitution of a social fund in the case of any residual in excess of the above 
contributions. After the publication of the 1963 March Decrees, the BNBV was 
transformed into BNA.S.S (Bureau National d'Animation du Secteur Socialist: the 
national bureau for the animation of the socialist sector). This metamorphosis denoted, 
at least in principle, the emergence of an ideology openly in favour of a socialist 
transformation of Algerian agriculture. Following the decrees of March 1963, the first 
nationalisations of land hit the biggest colonial landlords. Between 150-200 thousand 
ha were thus acquired (up to that date colonial farms were still legally the property of 
their French owners. What the March Decrees in effect achieved was simply the 
notification of their state of vacancy). A further 300,000 ha were secured through the 
confiscation of the land assets of the CAPER (Caisse d'Accession a la Propriete et a 
I'Exploitation Rurale: fund for the accession to property and rural farming) (11). On 
October 1st, 1963 all foreign landlords were finally nationalised (12) without 
compensation and a year later, on October 4th, 1964 it was the turn of all Algerian 
landowners who were nationalised on the grounds of their collaboration with France 
during French colonisation. By this date the land base of the self-managed sector (SMS) 
was completed (even if it was never to coincide with that of the colonial sector) and its
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structure defined.
I. The internal structure of the self-managed sector.
From the start the estates were endowed with specific structures. In principal the SMS 
functioned on the basis of the following organs:
1-77?e General Assembly, composed of all permanent workers (13) of the self managed 
farms, is theoretically the sovereign organ in matters concerning farming plans, 
investment, marketing, labour organisation, etc. It elects the Workers Council (14) 
which represents it and acts on its behalf.
2-The Worker Council decides upon matters of purchase and sales of farm machinery, 
recruiting and sacking of workers. It adopts the internal regulation of the estate and 
elects the Managing Committee.
3-The Managing Committee was elected among the Workers Council or the General 
Assembly. It is responsible for the daily management routine of the estate. It is elected 
for 3 years with a renewal of 1/3 of its members each year.
4. The President chairs all meetings of self-management organs. He is the legal 
representative of the farm. He is in principal assisted by a Director (or a management 
"charge") after approval by the Communal Council for the Animation of self­
management (15).
5-The Director is appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and represents the state at 
estate level. He makes sure that the financial and economic operations of the farm are in 
harmony with the prevailing procedures, he vetoes farming plans and schemes of work 
whenever they are not in accordance with the objectives of "national planning", he 
decides on the level of employment for permanent workers, he keeps the accounts of the 
farm, etc. Given their respective prerogatives, the President and the Director appear 
as antagonistic holders of the same power. Their position within the estate is a perfect 
example of a dual authority which is not alien to the nature of the problems encountered 
in the daily running of the "self-managed" estates and to the subordinated status of the 
estates vis-a-vis the state bodies at large.
From the start, the estates were incorporated into a complex system of bureaucratic
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relations of control embracing every single aspect of their organisation. The mode of 
functioning of the estates reflected a rationality characterised by an open divorce 
between the juridical representation of the estates and their actual mode of 
management, but a divorce obscured only as a result of an over ideological 
representation of self-management in contrast to the actual capitalist relations of 
production of which the estates were an integral part. In practice, the General Assembly 
rarely meets. Beyond the handicap of its large and cumbersome size it has hardly 
operated as the sovereign organ of the estate. The Workers Council, if it exists in most 
farms, only meets for the election of the Managing Committee (whenever it is 
possible). The election of the Managing Committee often takes place outside the 
prerogatives of the General Assembly or of the Workers Council (16). Its nomination is 
often imposed by ONRA the National Office for the Agricultural Revolution (created in 
1963 by the 18th March Decree, ONRA was the first body to be in charge of the 
management of the SMS), or the FLN (National Liberation Front, the one state Algerian 
party) which individually try to impose their own members.
Beyond the determination of its internal structure, what however determines the status 
of the SMS remains by no means its mode of management, or the conditions under which 
its conditions of production and reproduction proper are operated.
II. The ONRA policy of management of the self-managed sector.
Along with the famous March Decrees, ONRA was created. The objectives given to ONRA 
were: "To organise the management of the abandoned farms and to realise the 
government programme of agrarian reform" (17). Until its dissolution, ONRA policy 
was focused essentially on the first objective alone. From the start the ONRA mission 
was altogether contradictory and its means of accomplishment remained essentially 
based on direct intervention. In an attempt to set up all the economic structures 
necessary for a normal activity of the estates such as credit provision, the supply of 
farm machinery, the organisation of the marketing network, the accounting control 
etc., ONRA failed to recreate the economic environment that the colonial sector so far
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enjoyed. In an attempt to re-create the same economic environment as that enjoyed by 
the colonial estates (after the massive exodus of the French in 1962-63 the supporting 
structures of colonial agriculture were either severely disrupted or simply ceased to 
exist), ONRA simply substituted itself to the market mechanisms proper with the 
result that the re-constitution of the supporting structures became more and more 
equated with the direct intervention of ONRA at all levels of the states. From 1963 
onwards, most of ONRA policy was essentially centered on the setting up of specialised 
bodies for credit, farm equipment and marketing. Being a replica of colonial structures 
or directly inspired by colonial experience, the inefficiency of these bodies soon showed 
up in view of the rule of direct administration followed by ONRA. Henceforth, it was 
ONRA which fixed all economic parameters affecting the self managed farms: labour 
organisation, wage-rates, distribution of profit, book keeping, the size and structure of 
the estate, the farming methods, the supply of inputs, the mode of their utilisation and 
their volume, the type of technology, etc. This singular mode of management (of 
supposedly "self-managed" estates) resulted in an unprecedented bureaucratic 
centralism. As the sole decision maker, ONRA organised the entire conditions of 
production and reproduction of the estates. As such, this policy stretched from the 
conditions of circulation (and valorisation) of agricultural production to the conditions 
of production (manpower and capital) of the estates. The different direct levels of 
intervention of ONRA concerned mainly the marketing boards, the credit policy, the 
farm machinery policy as well as the actual re-structuration of the estates.
A. The marketing policy of ONRA.
The dominant characteristic of the policy of intervention of ONRA revolved essentially 
around the conditions of circulation of the agricultural product of the estates. During 
the first years of independence, and up to 1964, the "self managed estates" (SME) 
marketed their produce on the private market albeit with increasing interference from 
the local representatives of the state. The first national marketing agency ONACO (the 
Algerian Board for Commercialisation created during December, 1962), was 
established for fruits, vegetables and wine. The creation of ONACO was not however 
followed by a proper funding in terms of infrastructure endowment. The means at the
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disposal of this board being insufficient, ONACO was not materially able to compete with 
the private brokers and intermediaries. The main activities of the board were rather 
concentrated exercising monopoly over exports and imports: ONACO was not a 
specialised marketing board per se. With the development of ONRA, the original 
attributions of ONACO went to two marketing co-operatives responsible for the 
commercialisation of fruits and vegetables of the SMS. The CORE (Co-operative 
d'Ecoulement: Marketing co-operative), was responsible for the marketing operations 
on the domestic market and the CORA (Co-operative de la Reform Agraire: agricultural 
reform co-operative) the co-operative in charge of the processing and packaging of the 
products of the SME geared towards exports. In principle the CORAs were administered 
by a council composed by the presidents of the managing committees but "in practice, 
they were administered by the state. Their creation was accompanied by the prohibition 
[for the SME] of free sale and the obligation of delivery of their products to their 
counters [CORAs]" (18). This authoritarian policy exercised by ONRA vis-a-vis the * 
SMS, was not however often accompanied by an efficient clearing away of awaiting 
harvested crops. Prolonged stocking in the open air often led to the loss of a 
considerable part of the production which was always supported by the estates. On the 
whole, crops were badly transported, stocked and processed. Moreover sold crops were 
not always accompanied by accounting justifications, and payments were never made on 
the spot (it took many months between the time the farm sells its produce and the 
moment when it gets the proceeds of the sale). Delays of sold crops, and therefore delays 
in the payment of wages to the estates, wastes due to the bureaucratic marketing 
organisation of the estates, etc. were among the main factors that accounted for the bad 
performance of the estates, the drop in the marketing share of the produce of the estates 
through official channels, the increase in on farm consumption and the fall of ONRA 
itself.
The marketing of cereals however escaped the authority of both ONACO and ONRA. OAIC 
(the Algerian board for cereals), was one of the very first boards to be created. Its 
scope of intervention integrated the marketing activities covering cereal and dried
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vegetable trade on both the domestic and international markets. Unlike the 
commercialisation of fruits and vegetables, the marketing of cereals was performed on 
the basis of a integrated state monopoly transcending both the SMS and the private 
sector.
B. The credit policy.
The inability to meet the regular payment of the workforce, combined with the inability 
to meet the financial condition of reproduction of the objective conditions of production 
(replacement of the fixed elements capital as well the necessary intermediate inputs) 
were among the two main recurrent sources of conflicts which constantly opposed the 
estates to ONRA. At its immediate level of determination, such financial difficulties of 
the estates were perceived as the direct results of the state bureaucratic management of 
the marketing policy. More specifically, such difficulties were the mere expression, 
perceived through its financial dimension, of the bureaucratic conditions under which 
the valorisation of the estates produce was realised and which resulted in the constant 
need for the necessary resources to guarantee the continuity of the production process. 
This situation soon became dependent on the state policy of credit allocation and on its 
many contradictions. Up to 1966 the financial authority, in term of agricultural 
credit, was BCA, the Central Bank of Algeria. The circuit of credit allocation was in turn 
mediated through a complex network represented by ONRA and its agencies. ONRA 
obtains a credit budget which it then distributes to CCRA, the Co-operative Centre for 
Agrarian Reform, which in turn distributes it among the 2, 000 SMEs through its 
credit section (19). The system of credit allocation functioned with great delays 
because of conflicts arising between ONRA and BCA in the first place. One of the 
problems involved was the fact that individual estates were not separately accountable 
as a result of the absence of the individualised accounting of the estates. At that stage 
ONRA was unable to identify the performing estates from the non-performing. As such 
the estates were bureaucratically managed in bulk as if they were homogeneous units 
undifferentiated in their farming methods, their labour organisation, their land
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endowment, their labour productivity, etc. ONRA, which kept the overall accounts of the 
SME and the global loans received, was therefore unable to give BCA "the justification 
in advance of the use of the credit" (such justifications were among one of the 
permanent sources of contention between the two institutions). In the words of the then 
Minister of Agriculture and also Director of ONRA, the financial responsibilities of BCA 
went as far as to "contest the farming costs per ha and such or such crop in order to 
minimise them in relation to the 1962 period, while most input prices fetched a 
vertiginous increase and manpower costs substantially increased" (20). The outcome of 
this conflict was that the credits granted to the estates were as erratic as insufficient. 
In all cases however, the estates supported financially both the institutions which run 
them according to their authoritarian bureaucratic rules but also bore the 
inefficiencies which resulted from the policy imposed on them. The hampering effects of 
bureaucratic rules were also patent in the case of maintenance and farming technology.
C. Farm machinery and the conditions of reproduction of fixed capital.
The SME did not own their own maintenance workshops. The farm machinery section of 
SAP, which took the name of UMA (union of farm machinery), was in charge of this 
task. The constitution of UMA resulted from the integration of the equipment pools of 
CAPER and the Co-operative for the Use of Farm Machinery: CUMA (21). The pooled 
property of UMA was hired to the SME. But UMA was not always able to satisfy the 
demands from the estates as credit, spare parts and skilled manpower were scarce. One 
of the financial difficulties of UMA came from the peculiar situation of the SME 
themselves. Indeed, as the latter did not directly obtain the proceeds of their sales, it 
was materially impossible for them to meet, without sometimes considerable delays, 
the cost of maintenance. This financial insufficiency of the SME was a hindrance which 
also stood in the way of an adequate replacement of over-used equipment 
disproportionately requiring more and more maintenance costs.
From the above considerations pertaining to the mode under which the conditions of 
production and reproduction of the estates were managed, one clearly sees how this 
period of creation of the supporting structures of the estates led in practice to their
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complete domination by the state via its divers agencies. This domination took different 
forms depending on the characteristics of the structures themselves (and the political 
circumstances of the moment). Beyond the details and the characteristics of the policy 
proper to each supporting structure, the state reappropriation of the colonial 
ownership of the estates, fulfilled at the same time the essential condition, e.i. the 
control over the economic surplus generated in this specific sphere of production. As a 
result of the state bureaucratic style of management, the methods of agricultural 
surplus extraction, were not necessarily among the most efficient or optimal methods. 
In such a context, the experience of ONRA was a perfect illustration of such inefficient 
forms of surplus drainage. Up to 1966, the bureaucratically centralised mode of 
administration of the SMS led to a total economic 'black-out' of the estates. In the 
absence of a mere accounting individualisation of the farms, it remained impossible for 
individual farms to know their degree of performance, or for ONRA to allocate 
resources accordingly. This situation of confusion went on until the introduction of the 
1966 reforms.
III. The economic reforms of the self-managed sector.
In the words of the reformers themselves, the aim of the reforms was to fight the policy 
of bureaucratic centralism which characterised the administration of the SMS. The 
pledge towards an autonomous management of the estates was accompanied by the 
dissolution of ONRA in 1966 (the official dissolution of ONRA was not however 
announced before 22nd February, 1968). From 1966 onwards all ONRA attributions 
went to MARA, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural reform. Both the 
supporting structures of the SMS and the internal organisation of the estates 
themselves were reorganised.
A. The internal restructuring of the estates.
As in the past the reforms originated from outside the estates and at no point were the 
immediate producers part of the mechanisms of the decision making process. With the 
1966 reforms the President was no longer elected by the Managing Committee but by 
the General Assembly. The choice of candidates was however imposed. The two candidates
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for the post of President were chosen by representatives of the FLN Party, the unique 
official trade union of Algerian workers (UGTA), and the political local authorities APC 
(Communal Popular Assembly) dominated by landlords and leading business figures. 
The bureaucratic and authoritarian style of management of the estates remained in its 
entirety: the power which organised the estates was the same one which "reformed" it. 
Following the 1966 reforms, the presence and attendance of permanent workers at the 
General Assembly meetings was made compulsory and "faulty", i.e. absentee, workers 
were faced with a discharge threat. This authoritarian and bureaucratic style of 
management, which hardly differed from that of ONRA itself, reflected the extent to 
which MARA was prepared to go. As put by M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot, "one could not 
dream of a more bureaucratic solution to fight the dis-incentiveness of workers for a 
system which did not even allow them the possibility of translating their will into acts" 
(22).
The system of economic stimulants and participation to the benefits were reintroduced 
by the reforms. Permanent workers were granted the right to own a family plot. The 
workers' right to an accommodation was also recognized but only after satisfying the 
priority demands of managers and technicians. Under the initiation of the 1966 
reforms, workers were at last entitled to social security benefits (such a right 
however only became effective since 1971), while the Ordinance of February 1975 
suppressed the post of Director. This last measure must not however be interpreted to 
mean much in terms of more autonomy and independence of the estates vis-a-vis the 
state and its specialised bodies. This decision proved that, with the establishment and 
reinforcement of all mechanisms of state intervention, the post of Director was no 
longer required. The dependence of the estates vis-a-vis the upstream and downstream 
supporting structures was still as total as before. In terms of the actual mode of 
management of the estates, the suppression of the post of Director remained purely 
formal.
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B. The reforms of the supporting structures
a. The reorganisation of farm credit.
Considerable progress was achieved with the introduction of the principle of individual 
accountability of the estates. An accounting and management co-operative CCG (Co­
operative de Comptabilite et de Gestion), was created for this purpose. During the 
harvest of 1966-1967 la caisse Algerienne de Credit Agricole Mutuel (CACAM), the 
Algerian Fund for Mutual Agricultural Credit (23) was in charge of the financing of the 
estates. From 1968 onwards it was BNA (The National Bank of Algeria) and not BCA 
which became responsible for such operations. CACAM was therefore integrated in the 
agricultural section of BNA. With these reforms, the management of the estates fell 
under the direct authority of both MARA and BNA. Henceforth agricultural credits were 
granted on the basis of the types of crops to be grown (defined by MARA) and labour 
norm costs per ha (defined by BNA). With the 1966 reform the management of the 
estates became therefore also directly regulated by financial and banking capital. The 
role of BCA implies that all norms proper to capital valorisation are now directly and 
fully applied to the estates.
b. The marketing reorganisation.
As a temporary measure (which lasted from 1966 to 1968), COREs and CORAs merged 
into a new co-operative: UNCAC (Union des Cooperatives Agricoles de 
Comm ercialisation : Union of Marketing Agricultural Co-operatives). After 1968 a 
more systematic organisation of state marketing networks was initiated along the policy 
of generalisation of specialised boards under the aegis of MARA. Six main boards were 
created during the period. OFLA, the Algerian Marketing Board for Fruit and Vegetables, 
marketed fruits and vegetables on the domestic and international markets, supplied food 
industries with the necessary inputs, provided seeds to the producers, etc. ONCV, the 
National Marketing Board for wine, created in August 1968, buys and processes the 
wine grapes produced by the SMS. ONALAIT, the National Board for Milk and Dairy 
Products, was created in December 1969. It is a multipurpose agency and its objectives 
are to cover the needs of the population in milk and dairy products. ONALAIT collects and
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processes the milk produced by the SMS as well as that of the private sector, but within 
the limits left by the competition of private collectors in so far as the latter sector is 
concerned. ONAB, the National Board for Animal Feed, was created in April 1969. Its 
original objective was to import, produce and market feed. Since 1970 its role extended 
so as to include imports, production and marketing of meat for current consumption. 
ONAMA, the National Board for Farm Machinery, was in charge of the entire domestic 
market for the supply of all farm machinery, its marketing and its repair etc. ONAPO, 
the National Board for Olive Products, was created in December 1969. Its mission was 
to collect, process and market olives and olive oil. Its suppliers are mainly the private 
sector which controls 80% of the domestic production and marginally the SMS. The 
essential characteristic of the boards is that they are all state monopolies. As such their 
power of control over the estates is absolute. Their prerogatives extended over the 
control of the entire production process of the SMS in terms of inputs (in terms of 
their prices, their type and their volume), output prices, crop specialisation, farming 
methods, determination of the level of remuneration of the labour force, etc. vis-a-vis 
the SMS, these boards appear as the unique intermediaries between the producers and 
the consumers. Through the administrative price system (agricultural prices are fixed 
by decree), the state ability to fix the terms of exchange between the estates' production 
and the non-agricultural production is absolute. In such an environment, the producers 
control neither the price fixed by the boards nor the amount of proceeds that the boards 
retain and which make up for their own investment, commission, profits, etc. The build 
up by state bodies of the necessary mechanisms of control over the agricultural produce 
of the estates, which continually contributed to achieving the divorce of the direct 
producers from the condition of realisation of their products, was further continued in 
1974 with the extension of the marketing network for fruits and vegetables. Henceforth 
the estates ceased to supply their produce directly to OFLA, but to a new service co­
operative, CAPCS (the Communal Multivalent Agricultural Co-operative of Services). 
Its role is manifold: It collects the produce of fruits and vegetables from the SME of its 
commune, sells the production to the retailers which then supply the consumers, and
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supplies the COFEL, the Co-operative for Fruits and Vegetables, which heads the CAPCSs 
of the province), with any surplus left over for the needs of their communal 
jurisdiction. The inter-regional transactions being forbidden, CAPCS is supplied by the 
COFEL of its Wilaya, the administrative territorial province, with any surplus of 
fruits and vegetables from other communes. COFEL centralises the surplus from all 
CAPCSs attached to its Wilaya and distribute it between the different CAPCSs according 
to their needs. In turn, when the needs of the Wilaya are not met, the COFEL obtains 
from OFLA the quantities required. OFLA operates on national and international markets. 
It centralises the surpluses from all the Wilayate (plural of Wilaya) of Algeria and 
distributes them according to the deficit of each Wilaya. OFLA in principal proceeds to 
the necessary imports in qase of an overall deficit. OFLA exports fruits and vegetables 
of the SMS as well as those of the sector of Agrarian reform. OFLA also exports dates 
from the private sector (for a description of the lengthy and complex state marketing 
network that regulate the circulation of the estates production, see corresponding chart 
in Appendix III Figure 1). With the 1974 measures, the overall configuration of the 
surrounding structures of the SMS, i.e. the upstream and downstream state monopolies 
surrounding the SMS, shows as follows (24):
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Figure 2: The supporting structures of the self-managed estates.
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The progressive build up of reforms and institutional changes that have taken place
around the management of the ex-colonial sector, achieved at least three main results. 
An ever increasing state intervention in the running of the SMS, a divorce between the 
production functions and the distribution functions of the estates and a state take over of 
the conditions of circulation (and therefore of valorisation) of the product of the 
estates.
In themselves such results fulfilled the same function which is essentially the 
extraction of the maximum agricultural surplus that is enabled by the total control of 
the production process of the SMS. The forms, particularly bureaucratic and parasitic, 
that such an extraction of economic take, are not however free from generating specific 
effects upon the very conditions of formation of such a surplus itself.
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In what follows, an attempt will be made to assess the extent to which state intervention 
contributed to increasing the performance of the estates and by way of consequence, the 
intensity with which such a policy affected the formation of the agricultural produce 
itself. Our argument is that there has been a negative impact of the performance on the 
estate as a result of such a state mode of management.
IV. The side effects of the state intervention in agriculture.
The idea of performance can have many meanings. The underlying definition of 
performance is here referred to in terms of the lines along which the conditions of 
reproduction, objective as well as subjective, of the estates were actually met. In 
particular three main situations can be distinguished depending on the mode of use of 
economic surplus at large. The case of a simple reproduction whereby the conditions of 
production of labour and capital are reproduced identically to themselves (this 
situation serving to preserve the level of output at an even and constant level, the 
amount of investment is therefore just enough to replace capital at its previous level), 
the case of a reproduction on a larger scale whereby the elements of production are 
reproduced and replaced at a greater magnitude level (the category of investment 
involved here increases the productive capacity of the estate), the case of a decreasing 
and regressive reproduction (here the level of investment is not even enough to keep 
the level of capital and labour constant). Given such methodological pre-condition, an 
appreciation of the performance of the estates will, in the last analysis, depend on the 
mode of utilisation of economic surplus and the conditions under which labour 
productivity is being increased. The performance of the SMS can be depicted in physical 
as well as in monetary terms. Given the manipulatory aspect of price fixing by the 
state, a monetary approach to the performance of the estates is bound to be misleading 
particularly when it is not complemented by other criteria. The economic performance 
as measured by quantities produced in relation to the area cultivated, is therefore used 
as a gross indicator of efficiency. This measure of efficiency implicitly conveys other 
elements such as the amount of labour used and its skill, the quality and quantity of 
seeds, the quantity and types of fertilizers used in accordance with the nature of the
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land cultivated, the amount of water available per ha, the type of farm machinery, etc.
In what follows we will attempt to assess the main objective conditions, and 
particularly the condition of their reproduction, upon which the organisation of the 
agricultural process of production of the estates rests.
A. The land factor of the self-managed sector.
As one of the most important basic objective conditions of production, the study of the 
land factor of the estates is relevant from the point of view of both a quantitative aspect 
(size) and a qualitative aspect (structure and fertility). For historical reasons that go 
back to the colonial formation of the sector (see chapter I), the land of the SMS 
regroups the best agricultural land of Algeria. As such, such a natural endowment 
makes the estates sizeable whether in absolute, relative, or real terms. Though in 
principal the land base of the SMS is that of the colonial sector, discrepancies exist 
however between them, and the former never coincide with the latter. The 1964 survey 
(also called the "structures" survey), revealed a land area of 2,300,000 ha for the 
SMS. The agricultural survey conducted in 1950, i.e. before the independence of 
Algeria, revealed a cultivated area of 2,700,000 ha for the colonial agricultural 
sector. Between these dates about 400,000 ha appeared to have disappeared from the 
SMS land endowment. If one also takes into account the nationalisations of certain 
Algerian landowners in 1964, which brought to the land asset of the SMS an extra
200,000 ha, the loss to the SMS is of the order of 600,000 ha. It is also proved that 
during the years immediately prior to the independence of Algeria, many Algerian 
landowners acquired French properties. Moreover, and according to G. Duprat, "a 
certain number of [colonial] farms remained within the hands of the Popular National 
Army and few lands, once used by the settlers in deduction upon the communal land, 
were not put into self-management" (25). As will be seen at a later stage, the land base 
of the estates underwent further losses to the benefit of an industry which was located 
on agricultural and/or irrigated lands (26).
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Table III. 1. 1: Farm structure of the SMS ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 5 ) .
Structure Farms Number % Size Area (U=1, 000 HA) %
<100 ha 106 5 % 5 0.2%
100 < X  < 5 0 0 479 2 4 % 1 5 9 7 7 .0%
500 < X <1, 000 634 3 2 % 5 2 0 22.0%
1, 000< X <2, 000 554 2 8 % 8 5 6 37.0%
X>2, 000 221 11 % 7 6 2 33.0%
TOTAL 1, 994 1 0 0 2, 302 1 0 0
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I'Algerie.
What best characterises the farm units of the SMS is certainly their size, if not their 
gigantism. The average size of a farm unit is well over 1,000 ha and 40% of the farms 
have an average area well above the 1,000 ha. If we take a somewhat lower figure (500 
ha), 70% (or 93% of the total land of the SMS) of farm units cover an area of well 
over 500 ha. If by international standards, particularly in relation to agricultural 
properties in the USA, Western Europe or the USSR, the average size of an estate is 
large, in practice its structure is not associated with efficiency or economies of scale. 
The present size of the farms of the SMS was in fact the result of the policy of land 
regrouping operated by ONRA when it took office in 1963.
B. The policy of land regrouping.
The history of the land structure of the estates was the result of a combination of three 
factors: The conditions prevailing during their initial constitution between 1962- 
1963, the policy of land regrouping operated by ONRA and the constitution of the CAAMs 
(Agricultural Co-operative of War Veterans) in 1965-66. It was in the midst of the 
heated debate on the status of the colonial estates, and their mode of management, that 
ONRA undertook a regrouping of the land from 22,000 farms into 3,000 and finally
2,000 estates, that is a reduction in the number of farms of the order of 100 to 9. Such 
regroupings were conducted without the use of any consistent yardstick. At the 
beginning, and given the unfolding political project of the emerging power block, there 
were some unavoidable limiting factors. With the French exodus most documents 
pertaining to the cadastral lay out of the colonial farms had either been taken with
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their owners or simply destroyed. The type of information available to ONRA during the 
regrouping was reduced to the name of the European landlord and the area of his/her 
property. If all communes had their land register, the latter "referred to the original 
situation prevailing during the attribution of colonial plots. Depending on the case, it 
has been kept up to date for only a small number of years and at best until the beginning 
of the century. In no place was there ever to be found any trace of the phase of free 
colonisation during which the settlers bought or helped themselves, by any means, to 
the properties which were recognised "Algerian" by "the Commission of Transaction and 
Partition" (Commission des Transactions et Partages)" (27). If the absence of an up to 
date survey which was felt to be a serious constraint in the way of a coherent policy of 
land regrouping, ONRA however devised no intermediate consistent method to conduct its 
policy. In most cases Improvisation was the rule. Only in a few cases were the workers, 
with a long working experience on the ex-colonial farms, consulted. The SMS was 
formed on the basis of estates each composed of several colonial properties. The result 
which was achieved led to the constitution of farms with scattered plots miles apart. The 
formation of SMS by simple addition of colonial properties hardly produced 
homogeneous estates either from the point of view of the physical distribution of land or 
the crops grown. The concern of ONRA during this process of land concentration seemed 
to have only been concerned with the scarcity of managers (Directors) to assign to each 
estate. In many cases the availability of Directors determined the number of constituted 
farms. In no case was the concentration of a land dictated by the consideration of 
economies of scale, a better lay out of the plots, a better use of the managing 
capabilities of the workforce, a more efficient use of the farm machinery, the 
constitution of farms of one plot, etc. (28). Such a lay out of the estates which was not 
proper to Mitidja alone - the basis of our reference pertaining to the land 
restructuring of the estates - (Mitidja, a coastal plain, with the best agricultural land, 
has been the symbol of both land colonisation and its negation: the emergence of a 
socialist agriculture), was often the result of a tangling up of the SMF (self-managed 
farms) among themselves as well as with the privately owned land. Thus, it is not 
uncommon to find an entire SMF interpolated between a parcel and its own farm, or the
buildings originally attached to an exploitation on another farm, etc. An attempt by the 
workers of the estates to overcome this land mosaic and proceed to a more sensible land 
distribution through parcel exchanges, took place but was never encouraged by ONRA. In 
fact the 1965 events (the military coup that brought to power Colonel H. 
Boumedienne), were to accelerate the tangling up of the land. When the military came to 
power after the 1965 coup, the war veteran co-operatives, the CAAMs (29) were 
created out of the land base of the SMS. The constitution of the CAAMs was a unilateral 
decision decided for evident political reasons: to calm down the dissatisfied war veterans 
by giving them the land they initially fought for (30). The CAAMs were constituted with 
no consultation of the workers of the estates. With the help of the Army (which now 
calls itself the Popular National Army), between 300 and 400,000 ha were distributed 
to about 10,000 rural war veterans and between 350 and 400 co-operatives were 
constituted. Unlike the SME these co-operatives were run with a relative autonomy 
vis-a-vis  the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture (31). The formation of the 
CAAMs was realised with a relative freedom concerning the choice of land, its lay out 
and the crop it supported. G. Muttin, notes that "when certain parcels which were 
included in the chosen farm were not convenient because of their low agronomic value, 
they were left to the estate. On account of this a lot of resentment arose among the 
workers of self-management who felt discriminated against" (32).
On grounds of the day to day management routine of the estates, the combined effects of 
the scattered lay out of the estate and the arbitrary amputation as a result of the 
creation of the CAAMs, entailed an inefficiency in the use of both farm machinery and 
manpower: the distance between the different plots of lands being high in many cases, 
the use of farm machinery and manpower become too costly, the supervision of work 
cumbersome, the profile of skill of the existing manpower incompatible with the size of 
the farms, etc. Another important characteristic of these estates is that their 
regrouping failed to take into account the factor of a common cultivation (except for 
those few farms of one lot). The managing of different crops pertaining to the same farm 
did not go without technical and organisational difficulties.
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In an attempt to lessen and limit the excesses which resulted from the indiscriminate 
bureaucratic land regrouping instigated by ONRA, a reverse policy was initiated by the 
MARA in 1973-74. The result achieved was insignificant, and as such hardly affected 
the overall structure of the land distribution of the estates: between 1973 and 1976 
the number of estates rose from 1,994 to only 2,071, hardly affecting the real 
structure of the sector. While awaiting a land distribution which makes economic sense, 
the present qualitative aspect of land structure of the "Socialist Sector" does, without 
doubt, represent a sub-optimal structure compared to the structure of the land 
operated during the colonial period. As such the quantitative and qualitative regressive 
reproduction of the land asset of the estates is only too obvious.
C. The farm machinery situation of the self-managed sector.
With farm machinery one is in fact looking at the main embodiment of constant capital. 
As the sector with the highest organic composition of capital, the evolution of the 
machinery pool of the SMS, perceived from the view point of both mechanisation proper 
and biological technology (selected seeds, use of fertilizers, etc.), bears ceterus 
paribus a sensitive relation to the performance of the sector. As a proportion of the 
total farm machinery, the privileged endowment of the SMS appears quite clearly.
Table III. 1. 2: Farm machinery situation in the SMS (1978). p t.
_______________________________________________________________ ./-n
Farm machinery 1 9 6 5 1 97 8 1 9 8 4
Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
agri. pool agri. pool agri. pool
1. Tractors 18,762 49% 20,178 48% 33,412 54%
2. Harvester-threshers 2,418 46% 2,225 56% 33,412 54%
3. Husbandry Implements 38,733 40% 51,259 55% 4,893 86%
(ploughs, etc.)
4. Transportation equipment 10,512 45% 9,587 36% 46,914 79%
(lorries and trailers)
5. Other machinery 28,346 61% 18,131 79% 30,522 97%
(seed driils.fertilisers spreaders..)
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I' Algerie. 1972, 1982, 1983-84. (33) pp 9
Except for the transportation equipment for which the SMS holds 36% share (i.e. the 
lowest share of the sector), this sector enjoys individually the highest farm machinery 
endowment of the whole agricultural sector. Given the lack of time series data for each
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category of equipment and the importance of tractors in the actual carrying out of 
agricultural production in all its aspects, e.g. trailing, ploughing, fertiliser spreading, 
transportation, etc., the study of farm machinery of the SMS is mainly perceived 
through its tractor substitute. De facto, tractors perform also most of the actual 
required traction (between 1967-1976, animal traction in the SMS dropped from
17,000 horses and mules to 6,687). The sheer size of the SMS also means that the 
tractorisation aspect of farm mechanisation has also become a structural feature of the 
machinery endowment of the sector. The significance of tractors in the overall 
production process depends in the last analysis on how efficiently they are used. As such 
the essential characteristics of the stock of tractors, which bear a strong relationship 
to farming efficiency, are their age, the extent of their replacement, their rate of 
breakdown, their number, and their mode of use (the poor qualification and training of 
tractor drivers and the use of tractors as a means of personal transport outside 
agricultural purposes - a practice not uncommon in the Algerian context - bear a 
strong relationship on the extent of wear and tear of the equipment). From 1967 to 
1977 the number of tractors in use in the SMS hardly underwent any change.
Table III. 1. 3: Trend in the pool of tractors: 1967-1977 (U = 1, 000 units).
1967 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Tractor^ w heep 11 13 12 12 13 13.5 13.4 13 13
Caterpillar tractor 6 5 4.8 4.8 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.5 5.6
Total 17 18 17 17 19 19 19.2 18.4 18.6
Index 100 105 99 100 110 110 111 107 108
Source: S. Bedrani. L'agriculture Algerienne depuis 1966. OPU. Algiers 1981. P . 46.
According to a survey carried out in 1972, 24% of tractor(wheels)were over 10 years 
old (or about 2, 972), 37% of tractor wheels were over 6 years old (or about 4, 458) 
and the proportion of tractor crawlers with an age of over 10 years was 36%. If an 8- 
10 year period corresponds to an average life span of a tractor (34), this means that in 
1972 between roughly 5,000 and 6,000 tractors needed replacement. The actual 
acquisition of tractors (both categories) were 7,400 for the period 1970-73 (i.e.
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1,850 on a yearly average), and 5,330 for the period 1974-77 (i.e. 1,342 on a 
yearly average). On the basis of the replacement figure of 1972 (between 5,000 and 
6,000), and in order to maintain a constant tractor pool (case of a simple 
reproduction), the SMS only acquired about 1,850 units during the same year or the 
equivalent of 31% to 37% of its needs. The overall pool in 1973 being 18,924 and that 
of 1972 17,251, meant that older and inefficient tractors have been kept in use. Thus, 
as far as the 1972 replacement requirement alone goes, and if one takes into account 
the number of new tractors acquired on average by the SMS since 1972, the needs of 
1972 were not to be met until around 1974-75 (35). By itself this situation creates a 
cumulative deficit as the required replacement of each single year has to be replaced at 
a much latter stage. This situation produces therefore a tractor pool which tends to 
grow older and older: between 1973 and 1976 the proportion of tractors over 6 years 
old increased for tractor wheels from 41% to 57% , and for tractor crawlers from 
48% to 51%. As pool grows older the rate of breakdown tends also to increase (36).
Table III. 1. 4: Proportion of out of order tractors (%.)
Type of tractors 1 9 7 2 1 9 73 1974 1975 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7
Tractor wheel 1 4% 1 6% 17% 16% 1 7% 1 8 %
Tractor crawler 2 2 % 2 0 % 19% 18% 19% 2 0 %
TOTAL 17% 17% 19% 18% 1 9 % 2 0 %
Source: Ibid.
Thus, if at an overall level the SMS enjoys a better farm machinery than most other 
sectors, the state of its tractor pool, on grounds of its size and replacement 
requirement, does not suggest, given the adoption of the prevalent technological mode of 
production, that the organisation of the agricultural process of production is being 
conducted with the highest efficiency (by extrapolation one assumes that, the state of 
other farm machinery being not radically different from that of tractors themselves, 
the SMS machinery pool on the whole is neither sufficient nor in a good technological 
state). But unlike the state of its farm machinery pool, the situation regarding 
fertilisers is different.
171
D. The fertiliser situation of the self-managed sector.
In the intermediate consumption of estates, fertilizers represent an important 
component. Over the years the increase in fertilizer consumption has been substantial.
Table III. 1. 5: Consumption of fertilisers by the SMS: 1966-77 (U= million of fertilising units).
Type of fertilisers 1 9 66 1970 1973 1 9 7 7
N 12.3 2 3 .8 70 .9 50.7
P 22 3 0 77.5 85
K 17.7 13.4 37 30 .4
Index (1966= 100) 100 1 2 9 356 3 1 9
F.U/ha of cultivated land * 4 8 5 0 1 3 3 1 4 4
Source: Ibid. p. 37. * (excluding fallow land).
Between 1966 and 1972 the increment in consumption per ha of cultivated land 
(excluding fallow land), ha been multiplied by well over 3. This important increase 
reflected the outcome of a deliberate policy of intensification for which the increase in 
industrial inputs consumed by agriculture was seen as the direct pre-condition for any 
growth of agricultural production. From the point of view of results however, the 
impact of fertilisers on the production of cereals (outside permanent crops, cereal 
farming constitutes over 2/3 of total crops), remained unnoticed.
Table III. 1. 6: Cereal yields (U= Q/ ha).
Year 1963 1964 1965 1967 1970 1971 1972 1974 1977 1980
Cereals 9.7 6.7 7.3 3.7 7.5 8.5 10.8 7.5 5.4 9.3
Source: M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot, op. cit, p. 386 (for the period 1963-67). Annuaire Statistique de 
I'Algerie. (for the period 1969-80).
Except for the year 1972, the yield achieved in 1963 remained the highest for about 
the two decades. If the causes of low performances were to be associated with fertilizer 
consumption per se, then what is at issue is the indiscriminate use of fertilisers. In 
other words, what one perceives through the example of the policy of intensification, is 
the kind of perception pertaining to the causes of agricultural crisis. The emphasis on 
an over-consumption of industrial inputs de facto ignores the social roots (as 
embodied in the dominant relation of production) behind the problem of a stagnant 
agricultural production (see below). The absence of responsiveness between fertilisers
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consumption and yield increases, clearly shows the limits associated with the linear 
vision proper to a purely technical determination of agricultural stagnation. The mode 
of consumption of fertilisers and modern inputs in general, is therefore inseparable 
from the social conditions under which the process of production is itself organised. The 
administrative conception of fertilizer consumption was in essence bureaucratic. "Until 
1971-72, the norms of utilisation imposed by MARA were uniform for the whole 
territory and as such they did not take into account differences between soils as to their 
deficiency in nutritive elements. After 1972 the norms only took into account 
differences in rainfall" (37). Among the other factors which lessen the efficiency of 
fertiliser use one notes: The insufficient preparation of soils prior to the application of 
fertilisers, a bad spreading of fertilisers (in 1978 for instance there were only 4,140 
fertiliser spreaders for the whole SMS or the equivalent of 1 spreader for 500 ha); 
delays (as a result of a bad programming of fertiliser distribution, fertilisers hardly 
got to the estates in due time); shortfalls in fertiliser availability, etc.
In summary, and in so far as the technical determination of agricultural production was 
concerned, a constant contradiction between the management of the different inputs, has 
characterised such a management. Tractors did not follow the minimum requirement of 
their simple reproduction and fertilisers were not used in accordance with a certain 
sequence involving a preparation of soils, an optimum combination between the 
elements N, P and K in accordance with the variability of soils, an availability of 
fertilisers at the right time, rainfall conditions, etc. Like the objective elements of 
production, the treatment of the subjective conditions of production contributed for 
their part in creating inefficiency in the mode of management of state farms.
E. The management of the labour force of the self-managed sector,
a. Overall trend.
The evolution of the labour force employed in the SMS underwent considerable changes 
over the past two decades. Between 1964 and 1981 it dropped by 16% with around 
38,500 workers leaving the sector.
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Table III. 1. 7: Evolution of the labour force of the SMS (U = 1,000).
Category of worker 1 9 6 5 1 9 67 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1981
Permanent 1 3 4 1 1 4 1 7 3 1 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 8
workers
Seasonal 1 0 0 1 1 9 1 0 2 1 2 0 9 9 87
workers
Index ( 1 9 6 6  = 1 0 0 ) 10 0 1 07 1 1 8 1 00 8 5 8 3
Source: S. Bedrani. Ibid. p . 58 (period 1964-70) and Annuaire Statistique de I' Algeria. Ibid. 
p. 162. (period 1972-81).
Except for the period 1967-70, the proportion between permanent and seasonal 
workers has not changed much over the years. In overall terms, these two categories of 
workers worked the following number of days.
Table III. 1. 8: Number of days worked (U= million d ays).
1 9 67 1 9 70 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1981
Number of days worked 62.6 63 .2 58.7 53.6 52.6 51.6
Index ( 1 9 6 7 / 6 8 = 1 0 0 ) 1 00 101 9 4 85.5 8 4 8 2
Source: Ibid.
The evolution of the number of days followed the evolution of the labour force itself. 
Between 1967 and 1981 the drop in the number of days worked amounted to 17.5%. On 
average an appraisal of the amount of labour provided per worker/year can be 
illustrated by the following table.
Table III. 1 .9: Average number of days worked.
1 9 67 1 9 69 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 6 1 9 78 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0
Number of days/worker/year 248 2 2 9 251 2 6 8 261 2 6 5 2 6 3
Index (1967/68=100) 1 0 0 9 2 101 1 0 8 1 0 5 1 0 7 1 0 6
Source: Ibid.
It appears therefore that the number of average days/worker/year has tended to 
increase from 1969-70 to 1977-78 and even if it dropped in 1978-81, it remained 
well above the level of 1966-79 and 1980-81 (see Appendix III Figure 2).
In itself such a ratio does not however mean much. Indeed it may well be that the total
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worked/worker/year) is performed by workers who for instance have worked 100, 
200 or even 300 days during this year. The amount of labour provided during one 
particular period depends more on the number of days worked than on the number of 
workers. In other words, the level of employment in agriculture cannot be equated with 
the number of workers (the amount of labour depends as well on the amount of work 
performed by each category of worker: permanent and seasonal). To assess the 
significance of such a ratio, it is essential that the determination of the labour force be 
attempted in the first place. Indeed if one defines the full employment of the 
agricultural labour force on the basis of the use of a worker for a period of let us say 
250 days' work per year, an assumption not unrealistic in the case of Algeria (see on 
this point A. Tiano, "Le Maghreb entre les mythes"), one can ask, on the basis of the 
number of worked days: What was the level of employment and to what extent there was 
a deficit or an excess of workers.
Table III. 1 .10: Determination of the theoretical level of employment: case of 250 days/year 
(U = 1,000 workers). (38).
1967 1969 1973 1976 1978 1979 1980
Level of employment 250 253 235 214 209 210 206
Number of workers - level of employment. +1.6 +22.9 -0.6 -14.4 -8.9 -12.5 -10.7
Source: Our own based on relevant figures already quoted.
This calculation shows that a drop in the number of workers employed in the SMS over 
the years has been associated (since 1973) with the diminution of real employment. 
From 1967 to 1972 however overemployment seems to have been characteristic of the 
sector. The overall movement of this labour force, and its structure, were subject to 
various determinants generated by conditions prevailing within the SMS as well as 
outside the sector.
b. Determinants of the labour situation in the self-managed sector.
Until the early 1970s the number of workers increased at a steady pace. The emergence 
of the experience of "self-management" was accompanied by an ideology which was 
openly in favour of workers. The political and social circumstances at that time, which
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still reflected the relative power enjoyed by peasants and workers, played therefore a 
certain role in the upward trend of the labour force. Moreover, at that time -1960 - 
agriculture was still the most important economic activity (21% of GDP was secured 
by agriculture, against only 7% in 1979) and the main job provider (39). But if the 
first half of the decade following the independence of Algeria was dominated by the theme 
of self-management and the consolidation of the economic basis of the state which 
accompanied it, by the mid 1970s the change in the political power reversed the 
economic priorities just as an ambitious industrialisation project was embarked upon. 
In many ways the logic of capital accumulation was at the root of the compression that 
the SMS wage fund underwent since 1969, and with it, the level of the work force 
itself. The compression of the wage fund of the SMS was seen as an effective way to 
reducing costs, and therefore food prices. Wages were thus narrowly seen as mere 
costs. At that date, i.e. 1969, the industrial option of the state became obvious and 
therefore its realisation was embodied with a force of compulsion. Indeed the logic of 
this compression which accompanied the promotion of cheap food policy, was essentially 
dictated by the necessity of raising the maximum agricultural surplus possible in order 
to minimise the level of food imports. The evolution of the manpower cost illustrates 
this situation.
Table III. 1.11:  Evolution of the cost of manpower: 1963-71., (U= AD million).
1 9 6 4 1 9 65 1 9 6 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 70 1971 1 9 7 2
Manpower cost. 4 0 8 5 7 8 6 5 9 7 3 0 6 1 7 601 4 4 4
Index 1968= 100). 62 8 8 1 0 0 111 9 3 91 6 7
S o u rc e : Duprat, Gerard. Op. Cit. for the period 1963-68; S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 132 for the period 1968- 
1971 and Benhouria, Tahar. op., cit., p. 48 for the year 1971-72.
The evolution of the manpower cost went through two stages: it increased until 1969- 
70 and has considerably dropped since. In 1971-72 the level of the wage fund can be 
considered to be well below that of 1966-64 (40). Except for a minor increase 
(6.7%) in 1962-63, the wage rate of the agricultural sector was not altered until 
1972 (41).
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Table III. 1 .1 2 :  Trend in the agricultural wage rate (U = AD/8 hours work.)
1961 1963 1964 1971 1972 1974 1975
Wage rate* 7.06 7.54 7.54 7.54 9.8 12.25 15.3
Index (1963=100) 94 100 100 100 130 162 203
Source: S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 131. (‘Such wage rates are gross nominal current rates).
In relative terms (wages to total costs), and at current prices, the reduction through 
compression went from 54% between 1963-64 to 42% between 1971-72 .
Table III. 1.13: Labour cost in total cost (%).
Year 1963 1964 1966 1967 1969 1970 1971
% in total cost 54% 57% 56.9% 56% 52% 45% 42%
Source: Duprat, Gerard and S. Bedrani. Op. Cit.
The low remuneration of the agricultural labour force (a corollary of the overall state 
policy of agricultural surplus extraction), and the overall conditions which prevailed 
within and without the SMS, explains to a large extent the development of the adverse 
conditions affecting the reproduction of this agrarian labour force, particularly from 
the very point of its skill and its age distribution. Mitidja, which most typifies the 
experience of self-management experience, and the nature of the problems it 
encounters, illustrates this situation. From 1968-69 onwards, the number of 
permanent workers leaving the estates increased, partially because of the bad 
conditions prevailing in the sector (particularly the level of wages), and also because 
of better job opportunities generated by the industrial projects. The main 
characteristics of this labour force leaving the agricultural activity were: Its size, its 
age and its skill. From 1969 to 1970 the number of leavers from 40 estates (42) in 
Mitidja represented between 15% to 13% (43) of the total work force. According to 
the survey conducted by G. Muttin, the number of leavers appeared however to be much 
higher during the same period. The percentage of leavers varied from 30%, 44% and 
22% of the total workforce under investigation (44). The number of leavers was 
higher in industrial areas. For all the Mitidja the age structure of leavers was as
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follows.
Table III. 1 .1 4  : Age structure of Mitidja workers.
Age Age 
group
structure of permanent workers Age structure 
M ARA survey
of leavers according to 
C.N.R.E.R.S.R survey
15-20 1 % 1.100% 2%
20-25 10% 20.52%] 80%
25-30 14% 21.70%]
30-35 12% 15.56%]
35-40 13% 10.92%]
40-45 9% 6.95%] 15%
45-50 9% 5.40%]
50-55 8% 2.98%]
55-60 9% 1.98%]
60 and over 15% 12.89%] 3 %
Total 100 100 100
Source: G. Muttin. Ibid. p. 363.
The age group 20-30 (or about 25% of the total workforce), represented over 42% of 
leavers. The age group 20-40 (or about 50% of the total workforce), represented 
between 70 and 80% of leavers. The age group 40 and over (50% of the total work­
force) represented 30% of leavers, of which a high proportion of workers were over 
60. The importance of the second age group, i.e. (20-40), in the age structure of the 
permanent work-force, coupled with a reduction over the years of the total number of 
agricultural workers, is such that the agricultural labour force of the estates is getting 
older with the likelihood of its growing less and less efficient. The last (and not the 
least) characteristic of leavers was their qualification. The category of leavers was the 
most qualified (45): "Those who leave are not only the youngest but the most qualified 
as well. Only the non-qualified and the old stay" (46). In turn the prevalent policy of 
training is not specifically geared to raising the skill profile of the immediate 
producers. Training has been mainly catering for the needs of agricultural engineers 
and technicians (who tend to remain more at offices than work at grass roots level), 
rather than for direct producers (47) who are facing a more and more complex 
technical organisation of production as a result of the introduction by the MARA, of new 
crops and sophisticated farm machinery. Like the objective conditions of reproduction, 
the conditions of reproduction of the agricultural labour force have been steadily
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deteriorating. As a result of the requirement of the pursuit of the cheap food policy 
necessitated by the overall conditions of capital accumulation, the overall 
characteristics of the agricultural labour force such as its comparatively low price of 
remuneration, its quantitative compression, its tendency towards aging, etc., were 
accompanied by other adverse terms of trends occurring in the sector.
F. The performance of the estates: some indicators.
From 1964-65 onwards, proceeds or the monetary valorisation of the physical 
production of the estates, had been declining at a steady rate with the result that the 
proceeds in 1963-64 were in fact much higher than in 1970-71. The inflated level of 
proceeds since 1974 only reflects the impact of the upward revision of most 
agricultural prices, a revision which as will be seen in the conclusive part of this 
chapter, was more than compensated for by the increase in the level of overall costs.
Table III. 1 .15: Evolution of the value of some agricultural output of the estates (U=AD million at 
current prices).
1964 1965 1968 1969 1970 1971 1974 1976 1978 1979 1980
Total proceeds 974 1, 128 978 936 858 909 995 1,894 2,562 2,688 3,639
Index (1968=100) 99.5 115 100 96 88 93 102 193 262 274 372
Source: Duprat, Gerard, p. 478, S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 174 for the period 1974-1976 and S. Bedrani. 
Vers un renouveau de I'agriculture Algerienne? Monde En Developpement. N9 36 1981. p. 40.
For the entire period, but with the exception of 1976, the estates were thus financially 
managed with a deficit. The drop in proceeds (without taking into account the effect of 
inflation), was also accompanied by the freezing of producer prices for over a decade 
( 48 ) .
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Table III. 1. 16: Production prices index (1965=100).
Product 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 7 1 96 8 1 9 6 9 1971 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 75 1 9 7 6
Soft wheat 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 1 8 1 4 4 1 9 2
Hard wheat 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 1 0 6 1 0 6 1 0 8 128 1 7 2
Barley 1 0 0 1 0 0 NA 1 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 3 5 1 6 5
Chick peas NA NA N.A N.A 1 0 0 1 0 0 111 111 2 4 7
Broad beans NA NA NA NA 1 0 9 1 0 9 7 3 7 3 2 7 3
Lentils NA 1 0 0 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 2 5 5
Esperto grass NA 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 6 1 5 6 1 5 6 1 5 6 1 5 6
Wine NA NA 1 0 0 1 2 7 1 2 7 1 2 7 1 3 9 1 3 9 NA
Sugar beet NA 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 101 NA NA
Table olives NA NA NA NA 1 0 0 1 0 0 101 NA NA
Oil NA NA N.A NA 1 0 0 N.A NA 1 7 2 1 7 2
Source: S. Bedrani quoted by Benhouria, Tahar. Ibid. p. 118.
In terms of the physical performance proper, the overall situation of the structure of 
agricultural production displayed an overall downfall trend.
Table III. 1. 17:  Evolution of the main products of the SMS:1965/74 (1965=100).
1 9 6 5 1 9 67 1 9 6 9 1971 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4
Cereals 1 0 0 1 0 8 1 0 9 1 1 3 9 2 1 0 4
Pulses 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 3 6 76 8 6 9 2
Vine 1 0 0 4 2 5 8 61 4 0 4 4
Citrus fruits 1 0 0 8 4 7 9 8 7 8 7 9 3
market-garden products 1 0 0 7 7 8 6 7 4 71 51
Source: Benhouria, Tahar.lbid. p. 97 (period 1965-74) and Annuaire Statistique de I'Algerie 1982 and 
1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4 .
With the marginal exception of cereals, the production index for the main agricultural 
products displayed a non-stop downward trend for two consecutive decades. In relative 
terms, i.e. in relation to the overall agricultural sector, the level of performance of the 
SME as measured on the basis of 6 major crops (cereals, pulses, vegetables, industrial 
crops, citrus fruits and vine growing), displayed the following characteristics.
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Table III. 1 .1 8 : Production performance weight of the SMS.
Crops % of total agricultural production in 1969-70 % of total agricultural production in 1979-80
Cereals 28% 34%
Pulses 57% 39%
Vegetables 46% 33%
Industrial crops 65% 65%
Citrus fruits 89% 86%
Vine- growing 87% 91%
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I'Algerie. 1981.
With the exception of cereals, the weight of the SMS contribution in agricultural 
production did not display any upward trend. As a matter of fact its percentage weight in 
total agricultural production steadily decreased. The case of wine growing is not 
significant in itself. As the main producer, the increased weight of the SMS share in 
total production implies rather that the degree to which that crop was being abandoned, 
was much greater among private producers than in state agriculture. In terms of 
yields, the overall position of the SMS shows a steady downward trend.
Table III. 1 .19: Yields of the major crops of the SMS: 1970/1984 (U= quintal/ha and 
hectolitres/ha).
C ro p s
1970
Y ie lds
1980 1984
Rate o f
between 1970 -1980
In crea s e
between 1980
Cereals 7.5 9 7 + 2 4 % - 1 5 %
Pulses 4 3 2 - 2 5 % - 3 3 %
market-garden prod. 7 2 6 2 67.4 - 1 4 % + 9 %
Industrial crops 4 8 5 5 4 9 + 14 . 5 % -1 1 %
Citrus fruits 1 1 3 101 6 3 - 1 1 % - 3 7 %
Vine (U= hectolitres) 3 0 18.4 1 0 - 3 9 % - 4 5 %
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I'Algerie 1981, 1982 and 1983-84.
If one excludes cereals and industrial crops between 1980 and 1984, the drop in yields 
is both general and considerable for the entire period 1970-1980. In their own terms, 
such results express the direct dimension of the crisis of the Algerian agriculture at 
large and of the SMS in particular. For most products there has been a regression or at 
best a stagnation.
If one looks at other conditions of production within the SMS, one cannot avoid noticing 
other signs of regression. 250,000 ha, of which 10,000 were irrigated, have been lost
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to industry; 84% of the area needed to be replanted in order to maintain a simple 
reproduction of orchard, has not been achieved; and 92% of citrus fruits land have not 
been replaced (replacement only concerned 2,000 out of 12,000 ha), etc. In value 
terms, the study of the regressive condition of reproduction, has been conducted by J.C. 
Karsenty (49). The methodology of his piece of research is based on a comparison 
between the planned investment necessary to keep the level of fixed factors of 
production constant, and the realised investment, for a period of 12 years (1962- 
1974). The determination of the value of the selected four main fixed factors of 
production was based on a minimum cost evaluation (the cost of reference was that of 
the year 1969). The details of the structure of investments appeared as follows:
Table II 1.1.20:Evaluation of the renewal of certain fixed factors of production during 1967/74 
(U=AD 1,000).
Level of resources compatible 
with simple reproduction
Planned
Investment
Realised
Investment
% of realised 
investment
Equipment 1 , 25 4 , 0 00 1 , 40 4 , 5 00 640 ,951 5 1 %
Plantation 9 7 9 , 0 0 0 5 3 7 , 3 9 3 1 5 5 , 4 7 8 1 6 %
Livestock 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 1 1 , 2 0 0 86 ,861 4 3 %
Irrigation 2 0 , 0 0 0 2 5 9 , 0 6 4 136,804 6 2 %
TOTAL 2, 653,000 2 , 41 2 , 1 60 1 , 02 0 , 0 94 3 8 %
Source: Ibid. pp. 130-131.
Had planned investment been realised, all fixed factors of production would have been 
reproduced to their original value. From the above table, it clearly appears that, in 
terms of realised investment, the replacement of all fixed factors of production has not 
been met up to 62% of their value. The rate of realisation of individual planned 
investments stretched from 16% to 62%). In terms of the above degree of replacement 
of their fixed factors of production, the estates materially find themselves in the 
impossible situation of meeting the requirement of an expanding agricultural 
production and an increasing labour productivity. From the viewpoint of their 
reproduction "the regression of fixed factors has probably influenced in a considerable 
manner the stagnation of all the productions of the SMS during this period" (50).
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From all aspects of production organisation and its conditions, the estates displayed all 
the characteristics of a sector in crisis with declining production, employment, 
manpower skill, yields, proceeds, etc. From the viewpoint of the mode of management of 
the estates, one can conclude that in effect, the bureaucratic administrative form under 
which the state operated the extraction of the agricultural surplus originating from the 
estates, ultimately altered the very conditions of formation of the agricultural produce 
itself, resulting in the overall declining performance of the sector.
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CONCLUSION
The experience of self-management or more precisely the state management of the ex­
colonial sector has resulted in an inability to translate the potential of the sector into 
increased production and increased labour productivity. The centrally administered 
bureaucratic running of the estate has particularly meant that at no point were the 
workers part of any significant decision making process concerning the farming 
methods, the norms of production, the marketing conditions, the organisation of the 
technical process of production, etc. As such the control and incorporation of the 
producers, rather than their association and involvement in the conditions of
production, have been the constant line of policy pursued by the state and its
representatives. The state control of all conditions of production and reproduction of the 
estates bears in that respect a direct relation in determining the level of performance 
of the whole sector. Viewed from the financial side, the overall gross financial results
of state agriculture displayed a permanent state of deficit.
Table 111.1.21: Financial results of the state sector (U= AD million)
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 1 976 /1  977 1 9 7 7 / 7 8 1 9 7 8 / 7 9 1 9 7 9 / 1 9 8 0
Total costs (1) 2 ,101 2 , 2 1 4 3 , 1 1 5 4 , 0 6 9 4 , 6 7 0
Proceeds (2) 2 , 26 3 1 , 825 2 , 5 6 2 2 , 6 8 8 3 , 6 3 9
Result (2) - (1) + 1 6 2 - 3 8 9 - 5 5 3 - 1 , 3 8 1 - 1 , 0 3 1
Ratio of (2) to (1) 107.7 82.4 82.2 66.1 77.9
Source: S. Bedrani Vers un renouveau de I'agriculture Algerienne. Op. Cit. p. 41.
As pointed out by G. Muttin, if a responsibility is to be advocated on the basis of such 
results, it is certainly not that of workers, for to do so would make the workers 
"support the consequences of decisions which were imposed on them" (51). Beyond the 
identification of those social forces which control the conditions of production and 
reproduction, what is at issue however is the nature of agricultural development which 
is being pursued. From the viewpoint of the peasantry, the continued co-existence of 
the state management of the ex-colonial farms and the exploitation of the ideology of 
self-management, only managed to precipitate their further economic and social
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marginalisation. Beyond the industrial mode of accumulation proper, the development of 
their proletarianisation and pauperisation was achieved through the de facto 
preservation of capitalist relations in the running of the ex-colonial farms combined 
with their consolidation on the basis of the justification of the "failure" of self­
management. While the development of capitalist relations was pursued under the 
banner of "self-management" and "socialist agriculture", the preservation of agrarian 
structures conforming in essence to a Junker capitalist development (i.e. based on large 
capitalist estates), was however pursued without Junkers as such. The substitution of 
the neo-colonial state for the colonial state, was not however accompanied by the 
substitution of colonial landlords by a domestic land elite. The political substitution was 
not accompanied by the economic restitution of the estates in favour of a domestic land 
elite as such. The absence of the latter (the development of colonial agrarian capitalism 
which was pursued for the essentially exclusive interests of French landlords did not 
objectively allow for the emergence of a powerful enough class of indigenous 
landowners) has directly contributed to preventing the emergence of a proper Junker 
development of Algeria's post-independent agriculture.
On the other hand the "freezing" of capitalist relations of productions on the ex-colonial 
sector which accompanied the consolidation of the state managed agricultural sector, did 
not however offer the alternative of a capitalist development of agriculture based on a 
farmer road as such. The preservation of the overall features of colonial agriculture 
eliminated all immediate peasant claims on a land whose very genesis resulted from the 
long process of land confiscation and peasant pauperisation and proletarianisation. As 
the unquestionable direct depository of colonial landowners, the post-colonial state 
operated therefore with the same independence vis-a-vis  both the domestic 
landowners and the peasantry in general. This class continuity between two apparently 
distinct historical periods is evidently the outcome of the colonial history which 
produced both a relatively powerless land elite on the one hand and, on the other, a 
mass of pauperised and proletarianised peasants unable to fulfill the ultimate aim for 
which they waged the bloodiest war of their history, i.e. accession to land. In short the
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capitalist character of the colonial estates was taken over by a class (or class in being), 
with capitalist aims, but devoid of any form of capitalist apprenticeship. The status of 
the post-independence ruling class was essentially in that respect of a petty bourgeois 
nature. While excluding itself from an outright Prussian mode of development of 
agriculture, or a farmer road of development (the class nature of the petty bourgeois 
post-colonial state, by preserving the same colonial land structure and land ownership, 
simply perpetuated the divorce of the land from the pauperised and proletarianised 
peasants), the development of state-managed agriculture resulted in the preservation 
of the same antagonistic contradiction which characterised its early formation, i.e. 
since its colonial history: the preservation of the ex-colonial agricultural sector and 
the reproduction of the economic mechanisms generating the pauperisation and 
proletarianisation of the Algerian peasantry. Such a preservation was however 
maintained only on the basis of a compromise. The rejection of the farmer road found its 
own justification in the exploitation of the ideology of self-management while the 
justification of the state/Junker mode of management of the ex-colonial estates found 
its justification in the confiscation of land from its colonial landlords but without its 
distribution to domestic landowners.
While the persistence of a stagnant agriculture increasingly raised the question of the 
status of the estates and their mode of management, the crisis of the peasantry in turn 
was not in any way perceived in connection with the historical development of what has 
now become a state agriculture. The "SMS" subtracted itself from any form of land 
transformations. As in the past, it was the "traditional" agricultural sector which 
provided the substance for such transformations. In view of the on-going food crisis, 
the diffusion and extension of capitalist relations, through the initiation of land reform, 
and the corollary elimination of all pre-capitalist forms of land use in order to develop 
the productive forces, was ultimately seen as the main objective. In the following two 
chapters our aim is to emphasize the contradictions of such a programme but also 
highlight its main limitation: the pursuit of the objective of food production increase is 
totally divorced from the fate of the peasantry.
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NOTES
1-Abdi, N. Revue Du Tiers Monde, XVII, N2 67, Juillet-Septembre 1976, p. 667.
2-See in particular Lenin, V. "Le develoooement du capitalism en Russie". CEuvres 
Completes. Tome 3. Editions Sociales and Editions du Progres Moscou. 1977.
Lenin, V. Programmes Aoraire de la Social-Democratie dans la 1ere Revolution Russe. 
de 1905-1907. Tome 13. Edition Sociales and Editions du progres.
A good account of the theoretical significance and interpretation of the "Prussian road" 
of development of agriculture is given by Wilson, Antony. The 'Prussian Road' of 
Agrarian Development: A Reconsideration. Economy and Society. Volume 11 Number 4 
November 1982.
3-N. Abdi. Op. Cit. p. 668.
4-Y. Guillermou. Revue due Tiers Monde. Volume XVIII, N2 71, July-September, 
1977. p. 608.
5- Abdi, N. Ibid. p. 672.
6-I. Clegg. Workers' Self-Manaoement in Algeria. Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 
1971. p. 40.
7-lbid. p. 39.
8-G. Duprat. Re volution et autogestion rural en Aiaerie. Editions Armand Collin. 1973. 
p. 57.
9-T. Benhouria. L'economie de I'Algerie. F. Maspero 1980, p. 33 put forward the 
800, 000 ha figure, while the then Ministry of Agriculture, Mr Mahsas. Tautooestion 
en Aiaerie. Edition Anthropos. 1975, p. 40, speaks of 1,000,000 ha. These 
inadequacies are in fact quite common in the Algerian data gathering bodies.
10- For a detailed assessment of such Decrees and that of their thorough significance 
see in particular I. Clegg detailed analysis Op. Cit. in particular Chapter 4: The Decrets 
de Mars. pp. 57-74.
11- CAPERs were created in 1955 and were part of a colonial land reform scheme to 
distribute 250, 000 ha to 150, 000 peasants (these figures are those of Benhouria, 
Tahar. Op. Cit. footnote N2 3, p. 35). CAPERs programme was also part of a political
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programme. It was thought that the distribution of land to the peasants would lessen the 
popular support to ALN and defeat the process of war and struggle for independence.
12- No data is available to measure the extent of the land nationalised.
13- Is considered permanent, any worker who performed a continuous 6 months work 
(1963 legislation) in any SM farm or a minimum of 200 days work per year (1969 
text).
14-Only in farms with a minimum work-force of 50 workers.
15- The communal council for the animation of self-management is an outside body to 
the state which does not exist very often or if it exists it scarcely functions. Its 
members are the president of managing committees of the commune, a party 
representative, a trade union representative (U.G.T.A), an army representative and the 
administrative authorities of the commune.
16- According to A. Tiano. Le maohreb entre les mvthes. PUF 1967, the managing 
committee is not democratically elected or re-elected in 50 to 85% of cases.
17- Mahsas, M. Ibid. p. 132.
18- G. Lazarev. Autogestion aoricole en Aiaerie quoted by M.Raffinot, and P.Jacquemot. 
Le capitalism d' etat Aioerien. F. Maspero. 1977. p. 279.
19- CCRA (Centre Cooperatife de la Reforme Agraire: co-operative centre for agrarian 
reform) was in fact the name given to SAP (the provident agricultural society). The 
difference between CCRA and S.A.P is only a difference of wording used to hide the 
ideological colonial connotation attached to S.A.P. S.A.P was a colonial agency in charge 
of a multivalent mission centered on the backing up of the traditional sector on 5 fronts: 
cereals section, machinery section, supply section, advisory section and credit section. 
CCRA represents therefore the credit section of the SAP. To give the credit distribution 
to such an institution which during colonial times was unable to cope with the sole needs 
of the traditional sector was seen by many as symptomatic of the inadequacy of an 
agricultural credit policy which catered for the broader and more complex financial 
needs of the ex-colonial sector. Furthermore the decision to withdraw the credit 
structure to the private sector carried little concern vis-a-vis the consequences it 
may have on the performance of this sector.
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20-A. Mahsas. Op. Cit. p. 175.
21-CUMA (Co-operative d'Utilisation du Materiel Agricole: co-operatives for the use 
of farm machinery), created before the independence of Algeria, was catering for the 
needs of the colonial sector.
22-M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot . Ibid. p. 305.
23-CACAM was the colonial credit agency which was catering for the financial needs of 
the colonial agricultural sector.
24- G. Muttin. La Mitidia: decolonisation et esoace aeoaraohiaue. O.P.U Alger. 1977. p. 
374.
25-Duprat, Gerard. Op. Cit. p. 166.
26-In many cases water for irrigation purposes was diverted for the needs of industry.
27-G. Muttin . Ibid. p. 186 who adds: "Every thing went as if colonisation had to throw 
a chaste veil on its land transaction".
28-G. Muttin, who conducted a study on land distribution of the SMS in the Mitidja, 
plain brilliantly synthesized the characteristics of the farm land typology of the 
estates.
29- Official statistics still integrate the CAAMs and their activities within the SMS. 
There is therefore no separate statistical treatment of the C.A.C.A.Ms and the rest of the 
SMS. In the official jargon the CAAMS and the SMS are called the "Socialist Sector".
30- During the long 7 years of war it waged against France, and which cost Algeria 1.5 
million persons, the National Liberation Army drew the majority of its fighters from 
the peasantry. The non-rural war veterans and the most politically powerful, benefited 
for their part from loans exceeding the AD 1 million. One also ought to point out that the 
actual distribution of the CAAMs benefited mainly war veterans issued from the middle 
peasantry.
31- Though the CAAMs benefited from better conditions during their formation (the 
formation of the CAAMs was realised with a relative freedom concerning the choice of 
land, its lay out and the crop it supported), their land characteristics still however 
convey the same limiting factors than that of the SMS: scattered plots, intermingling
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with private land, bad regrouping, large size of the exploitation, etc.
32-G. Muttin. Op. Cit. p. 187.
33-Data pertaining to the post-1978 period do not refer exclusively to the SMS alone 
but to the "socialist sector", i.e. the sector including the SMS, the sector derived from 
land reform as well as the machinery pool of CAPCS (which incidentally does not cater 
exclusively for the state dominated agricultural sector). In what follows, and as a 
result of such a constraint, our analysis will be mainly centered on the year 1978, the 
reference to the year 1984 cannot be taken at its face value since by definition the 
private sector also has access to the use of farm machinery through the procedure of 
renting.
34- Which in the case of Algeria, and for reasons mentioned earlier, is a rather 
optimistic assumption.
35- Replacement needs: 5,000 to 6,000. The number of new tractors acquired was:
1972: 1850, 1973: 1850, 1974: 1342, 1975: 1342 or a cumulative total of 6,384.<
36- The problem of spare parts coupled with the inefficiency of the repair boards 
ONAMA tend to increase the period of immobilisation of equipment in general. It is a 
common practice for the estates to wait several months and sometimes well over a year 
to get either the desired equipment and/or the repair done.
37- S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 37.
38- This calculation only serves the methodological point that what matters more is not 
the actual level of workers but rather a level of employment in accordance with the full 
employment of workers.
39- See Appendix 111.1.
30- With a rate of inflation of the order of 15%, the level of the wage fund in real 
terms would have been AD 377 million.
41-For sake of comparison, in the non-agricultural sector the minimum wage rate 
was:
9.660 (1961): positive difference= AD 2.6 (+36.8%)
9.960 (1963): positive difference= AD 2.42 (+32.09%).
10.88 (1971): positive difference= AD 3.34 (+44.29%).
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13.84 (1972): positive difference= AD 4.04 (+41022%).
16.64 (1974): positive difference= AD 4.39 (+35.83%).
19.20 (1975): positive difference= AD 3.9 (+25.49%).
One also ought to point out that the experience shows that the agricultural minimum 
wage rate tends in fact to be institutionalised as the real maximum rate.
42- Findings reported by G. Muttin. Op. Cit. p. 362.
43- Respectively MARA estimates, and C.N.R.E.S.R estimate (Centre National de 
Recherche en Economie Rurale et Sociologie Rurale: national centre research in rural 
economy and sociology).
44-Respectively for the 3 estates of I' ARBA, the 7 estates in the Wilaya of ROUIBA, and 
the estate of HADJOUT.
45- In her study of self-management in Mitidja, C. Chaulet gives the following 
proportions of the degree of illiteracy of the workers of the estates: 6% of workers read 
and write French, 9% of workers read and write Arabic, 85% of workers are illetrate.
46- G. Muttin . Ibid. pp 364-365.
47- In themselves such factors cannot achieve much if on the other hand the 
agricultural work is de fact devalorised by society (in a society where non- 
agricultural and particularly non manual activities provide better, higher and easier 
gains (and social status), as is the case in Algeria, the incentive to engage in 
agricultural activities vanishes and leads to urban migration where at least, for the 
same skill, the income gained is much higher (not ton speak of the access to social 
services) and within the agricultural activity itself (the producers are not encouraged 
produce more and work harder as the incentive to work, in the first place, seems to 
have deserted the Algerian countryside altogether). At the level of skilled labour the 
same phenomenon is observed. In 1969 "among 200 engineers 400 Algerian 
technicians none of the former and only a dozen of the latter actually worked at field 
level". S. Bedrani. L'aariculture Alaerienne depuis 1966. OPU. Algiers 1981, p. 64.
48-For the sake of comparison, the inputs prices evolution for the following main 
items increased as follows:
-Tractors wheels 100-180 (1969/73)
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-Harvester threshers 100-135 (1969/73)
-S eed-d rill 1 0 0 - 2 50  (1 9 6 9 / 7 3 )
-Lorry (12 tons) 100-200 (1973/77)
-Lorry (3 and 4 tons) 100-200 (1972/77)
-Potatoes (seeds/quintal) 100-193 (1973/77)
-Pesticides 100-1 14 ( 1 9 7 3 / 7 7 )
49- J.C. Karsenty. Les investissements dans I'agriculture Alaerienne. Problemes 
agraires au Maghreb . Edition Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, 1977.
50 - Ibid. p. 132.
51 -G. Muttin. Ibid., p. 409.
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CHAPTER II
THE PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.
In t roduct ion .
The performance of the private agricultural sector (PAS) cannot be conceived a priori 
without an assessment of the set of factors and historical circumstances which largely 
determined its features. As such the characteristics of the PAS are largely the result of 
a deep-rooted historical process of decomposition of the natural economy under the 
combined effects of the conditions which surrounded the genesis of the colonial sector 
and the more subsequent impact of generalisation of commodity relations on peasant 
economy. In terms of representation, and unlike the SMS, little is however known about 
the private agricultural sector (PS) even if it represents the major agricultural 
sector in terms of land endowment (70%). The bias has its own historical roots. In 
colonial times, the agricultural sector was the pool from which colonists constituted 
their own sector. In the course of colonisation, the history of the colonial agricultural 
sector was considered as the dominant history, or as the forefront sector in the official 
history of colonisation. As such, our knowledge of the traditional agricultural sector has 
always been subordinated to that of the European sector. After independence, a certain 
form of continuity, in the imbalanced dual representation of the agricultural sector 
persisted. The concern of the neo-colonial State was mainly centred around the 
management of the ex-colonial farms alone, and this for two main reasons. On the one 
hand there was the unavoidable issue of an important sector without its colonial 
landowners (1) and on the other there was the problem of the political power of the 
Algerian landowners within the new ruling class. In a way, and up to the 1970s, the 
PAS was completely left to its own and only as a by-product of the programme of 
"agricultural revolution" in 1971/72 did it become a centre of interest for the new 
political power. The present study of the PAS centres on the analysis of its structure
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prior to the introduction of the study of its transformation, i.e. the study of the 
programme of "agricultural revolution". The impact of the agricultural 
transformations on the PAS will be considered in the concluding remarks following the 
study of the agricultural revolution proper.
A.The land base of the private agricultural sector.
The formation of this sector is in itself interwoven with, and the by-product of 
colonisation. The initiation of the constitution of the colonial agricultural sector was the 
product of a violent dispossession of the collective domestic owners of the land: the 
clans, tribes and religious institutions (2). In the course of such a process, and as an 
organic by-product, both the geographical and economic boundaries of the indigenous 
sector proper were progressively shaped (3). Land appropriated by European settlers 
being of the best quality, the constitution of most of the land of the Algerian sector took 
place, because of the successive forms of displacement of the peasantry, on essentially 
marginal and sloping soils, as evidenced by the following table.
Table 111.2.1: Topographic distribution of the private sector.
Class
area
Number of farms 
U=1(000
Plains
%
Plain/
hills
%
Hills/
mountain
%
Semi
mountain
%
Mountain
%
Undetermined
%
Total
%
<  1 ha 7 2 18 2 3 2 5 3 8 5 1 0 0
1 <  X <10 ha 3 6 9 3 5 1 0 2 8 9 1 6 2 1 0 0
1 <  X <50 ha 8 9 4 9 1 8 18 1 0 4 1 1 0 0
>  100 ha 7 4 4 1 9 2 0 1 3 2 2 1 0 0
Total 5 3 7 3 5 1 0 2 7 9 1 7 2 1 0 0
Source: Manpower Survey in the private agricultural sector quoted by S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 73.
Out of the 35,000 farms, only 35% are located on soils suitable for proper cultivation, 
i.e. on plains, while the rest 65% are situated in places most favourable to wind and 
water erosion. In terms of area distribution, the 35% of farm units cover 42% of the 
total area of the sector. The general indicator of the topographic aspect of the private 
land being so, there however remains the problem of assessing its size, since an open 
conflict exists between the different data sources(4). Between 1950 and 1972 the
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PAS has tended to display a constant reduction in its land base when no available 
concrete evidence supports such a movement. The issue at stake tends to suggest that the 
progressive reduction in the land base of the private sector only affected a specific form 
of property: mainly large farms. As such, the discrepancy between the actual size of the 
sector and what the data show lies in the attitude of big landowners in underestimating 
their property considering the ever permanent threat of a land reform. Though between 
1962 and 1971/72 most State intervention in agriculture was mainly focused upon the 
management of the ex-colonial sector, the imminence of an agricultural reform had 
always been in the air. The transformation of the colonial sector into a "socialist 
agriculture", the intense radical political debate that accompanied it, was perceived as a 
potential threat to all landowners and particularly large ones. The 1964 
nationalisations of the Algerian landowners who collaborated with the French colonial 
power was a concrete measure that lead landowners to fear the any time occurrence of a 
radical land reform. The military coup of 1965 brought to power a more open threat to 
the landowners as a land reform was promised for 1966, then for 1967, until 
eventually the actual project of "agricultural revolution" (5) was issued on November 
1971. The most accurate account of the PAS was initiated by the colonial power in 
1950 at a time when the threat of a land reform did not exist for domestic landlords 
( 6 ).
Table III.2. 2: Structure of the PAS in 1950.
Size of farms Number of farms (1,000) % Area (1,000 ha) %
-< 1 ha 105.9 16 .8 3 7 .0 0.5
1 < X <10 ha 3 3 2 .5 52 .7 1 ,3 4 1 .0 18 .2
10< X <50 ha 167.1 2 6 .5 3 ,1 8 5 .8 4 3 .3
50< X <100 ha 16.5 2.6 1 ,0 9 6 .0 14.9
>  100 ha 8 .4 1.3 1 ,6 8 8 .0 2 3 .0
Total 6 3 0 .7 1 0 0 7 ,3 4 9 .0 1 00
Northern Algeria 54 3 .3 -  - 7 ,1 3 1 .2 -  -
Source: "Tableau de I'economie Algerienne". 1960. p. 129 quoted by M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot. Op. Cit. p. 
313.
The most striking feature of the structure of the PAS is the extreme imbalance between 
the number of farm units and their size. The majority of farms (70%), controlled less
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than 1/5 of the total area of the sector (such farms represented the 'stronghold' of most 
of the poor peasantry). Conversely 4% of farms controlled well over 1/3 of the sector 
and the middle farms (1/4 of all farms) controlled nearly 1/2 the size of the sector. 
The access to land was therefore very unequal and indirectly hints at an important 
differentiation of the peasantry.
When however the first post-independence survey was carried out in 1965 in order to 
asses the extent of the agricultural sector in general, and primarily that of the sector of 
self-management, the new data produced a somewhat different picture of the private 
sector.
Table III.2. 3: Structure of the PAS in 1965 .
Size of farms Number of farms (1,000) % Area (1,000 ha) %
<  1 ha 1 3 4 .0 2 3 .0 5 9 .0 1.0
1< X <10 ha 2 8 8 .0 4 9 .0 1 ,26 0 .0 21 .6
10< X <50 ha 147 .0 2 5 .0 2 ,9 6 7 .0 5 0 .8
50< X <100 ha 11.8 2 .0 7 6 5 .5 13.1
> 100 ha 4.6 0.8 7 8 6 .9 13 .5
Total 5 8 6 .8 1 0 0 5 ,8 3 9 1 0 0
Source: Statistiques Agricoles N9 5, Juin 1968. Ibid. p. 313.
Compared to the 1950 survey, the overall area of the sector dropped by over 1.5 
million ha. This diminution coincided to a certain extent with the variation in the area 
pertaining to average farms, and above all large farms (50 ha and over) with the latter 
accounting for 82% of the overall drop. Between 1950 and 1965, it was over 20% of 
the total area of the private sector which disappeared from the statistics. This land 
shrinking process was not to stop. Amid the implementation of the programme of 
"agricultural revolution" a new survey of the private sector was carried out in 1973 
(7). The findings of the survey were as follows.
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Table 111.2. 4: Structure of the PAS in 1973.
Size of farms Number of farms (1,000) % Area (1,000 ha) %
"15579 " ” 2779 6” 076 l7 7
4 0 6 .8  5 7 .2  1 ,5 7 2 .6  28 .7
13 4 .5  18 .9  2 ,5 6 5  4 6 .9
9.7  1.3 6 4 2 .8  11 .7
3 .4  0 .4  6 2 2 .4  11.3
Total >7674" 1 0 0  ”  "5 ,464  TOO
Source: G. Muttin. "Agriculture et dependance alimentaire en Algerie", Machrek Maghreb N9 90, October
November December 1980. p. 55.
Between 1964 and 1973, the PAS "lost" 375,303 ha, or 6.4% of the total area. 
Compared to the 1950 figure, the sector was reduced by 1,884,737 ha or 1/4 of its 
original size. In fact the extent of the "loss" was much greater if one takes into account 
the fact that part of land of the ex-colonial farms was acquired by Algerian landlords 
during the last years of colonisation, as well as in the aftermath of the political 
independence of Algeria. In total, an estimated 2 million ha "disappeared" from the data. 
Here again, the largest drop was displayed by large farms. Compared to the 1965 figure 
their size has nearly been halved (2,784,000 ha in 1950; 1,265,322 ha in 1973). 
The overall account of the variations affecting this specific category of farms, is 
summarised in the following table.
Table III.2 .5: Fluctuation in the area and the number of farms over 50 ha.
Class area Reduction in the number of farm units 
1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 5  1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 3
Reduction in the area (ha) 
1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 5  1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 3
50 <  X <100 ha 
£  100 h
- 4 , 7 0 5  -2 ,1  1 0 
- 3 , 8 4 4  - 1 , 2 4 6
- 3 3 0 , 5 1 5
- 9 0 1 , 8 9 5
- 1 2 2 , 7 6 1
- 1 6 4 , 4 0 7
Total - 8 , 5 4 9  - 3 , 3 5 6 - 1 , 2 3 2 , 4 1 0 - 2 8 7 , 1  68
Grand total - 1 1 , 9 0 5 - 1 , 5 1 9 , 5 7 8
Source: Based on data already given in previous references.
As fa r as th ese  holdings are  c o n cern ed , the reduction  in the ir n u m b e r is not as
significant as the reduction in their size. Indeed as land concentration proceeds, the 
number of holdings do tend to drop, but if in the same process a parallel reduction in 
the number of farms is taking place, such a movement contradicts all the historical
<  1 ha 
1^ X £10 ha 
10< X <50 ha 
10< X <50 ha 
>  100 ha
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trends and movements of land concentration. This contradiction reveals however in its 
own way the amount of land which can be considered to be concealed by the potential 
victims of a programme of land distribution (8). It is also worth noticing that the drop 
in the area of the PAS was more important for the largest farms during the period 
1950-1965. Such a characteristic may indirectly confirm, in a way, the fact that part 
of the land of the colonial agricultural sector which did not appear in the asset of the 
SMS, was in fact appropriated by private landowners and most probably by big 
landowners. According to this line of argument, one can see why large and average 
landowners had more land to hide (or fail to report) between 1950 and 1965 
(1,232,410 ha), than between 1965 and 1973 (287,168 ha). At official levels, the 
inability of the MARA to assess the extent of the PAS, or more precisely to put forward 
the necessary explanation about the missing 2 million ha, remains unchallenged (9).
B. The farm structure of the PAS.
Broadly speaking the Algerian farming system in the private sector is based on three 
main economic units, the nature of which is broadly determined by the interaction of 
their size, their level of employment and their use of modern inputs. The pattern of 
productions is largely determined by the combination of these characteristics (10). 
From the typology of farm structures, three main units emerge: small, average and 
large farms, which when translated in social terms identify at the same time the 
differentiation between poor, middle and rich peasantry.
a. Subsistence and small farm units (the family sector).
This sector represents the poorest section of the PAS, and has a very fragile land base. 
Though representing the majority of holdings (70% in 1950), it only controlled less 
than 20% of all private land. In terms of the ratio of the area available to each holding, 
the situation of this sector worsened between 1950 and 1972: 3.14 ha in 1950, 3.11 
ha in 1965, and 2.9 ha in 1972. Such figures suggest that, if one takes into account 
the number of persons per holding on the one hand, and the demographic rate of increase 
of family farmers on the other, such a sector is very limited as to the number of 
persons it can actually employ and support. A further characteristic of such a sector is
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that it is far from being a homogeneous structure. A fringe of it, particularly holdings 
with less than 1 ha, is the most economically vulnerable. This fraction of the sector 
best epitomises what is referred to as subsistence farming. Unless these micro holdings 
are located on irrigated land, which then makes is possible for their owners to 
specialise in market-garden products, these holdings tend to cater for the exclusive 
food needs of their family members (it is on such holdings that simple commodity 
production is the most entrenched). As these holdings cannot productively support the 
total labour force of a family of 5 (the average size of a family in Algeria is well over 5 
persons), they tend to become a labour pool from which are drawn seasonal and/or 
permanent agricultural workers in the agricultural sector on the one hand, and rural 
migrants on the other. The labour intensity on such holdings tends to depend on the 
outside occupation of family members. Generally speaking, the time spent on these 
micro parcels is determined by the time left over from outside occupations.
The other fraction of this farming system, small farming, constitutes a second complex 
category which combines elements of subsistence farming as well as average farming 
(11). Part of the small holdings share the same characteristics as those of the micro 
holdings, particularly in view of the quantity of labour spent on the farm. Labour 
employed is determined by the comparative income returns outside and inside the farm 
unit on the one hand, and the degree of employment of the family members outside the 
farm on the other. The existence of outside labour reflects in that sense the inability of 
such plots of land to guarantee simple reproduction of household members. In 
themselves these conditions only breed the proletarianisation of peasant producers. The 
average size of small holdings, excluding landholdings with less than 1 ha, has tended to 
decrease overtime: 4 ha in 1950, 4.3 ha in 1964, 3.8 in 1972 (12). This result was 
achieved by a more proportional increase of farm units (22.3% between 1950 and 
1972) than of farm area (17.2% for the same period). Beyond the uncertainty of the 
available data, the absolute increase in the area covered by small farms seems to have 
resulted from a decrease in the absolute size of the micro-holdings (not easy to assess 
on the basis of present data), as well as a result of the land acquired from other
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categories of farms. The subsistence sector and small farms, make up for the majority 
of farm units and the small proportion of farm area.
Table 111.2. 6: Weight of subsistence agriculture in the private sector (by number of farms and farm areas in 
ha).
Year of reference Number of farms as a % of total farms Farm area as a % of total area
1 9 5 0 69.5% 18 . 7%
1 9 6 5 72 .2% 2 2 . 6%
1 9 7 2 79.1% 3 0 .0 %
Source: Ibid.
With less than 1/3 of the total area, this sector represents nearly 80% of total farms 
(if one takes into account the missing 2 million ha and integrate them in the total 
agricultural sector, the farm area of this sector will be drastically reduced to only 
about 20% of the total area). Another feature of small farms is the poor quality of their 
land. 65% of these farms were situated in areas such as hills, mountains etc., which by 
definition were most prone to the adverse effects of wind and rain streaming erosion. 
Given the economic conditions prevailing in this sector, it is widely accepted that a 10 
ha of non-irrigated land is just enough to secure a living at a subsistence level. These 
units tend therefore to cater mainly for the subsistence needs of their owners, and they 
are not essentially market oriented when dry farming is the only possible alternative 
(according to the 1968 Survey, about only 27% of the total irrigated land of the 
private sector were located on the small farms). Labour employed on these farm units 
is essentially of a family origin as the size of such plots is largely exceeded by the 
working capacity of the household unit (13). According to the 1973 agricultural 
survey, the number of households on this domestic sector was 570,046 or 78% of 
households in the private sector. If one takes into account the members of households 
working on farm units (1,078,381 or 70% of all employed domestic household 
members), it is well over 76% of the household members of the private sector who 
were employed by the domestic sector (14).
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Table 111.2. 7: Distribution of working household members (U = 1,000).
Category Total working Household % Household members % Household members %
of farm members working outside their farm working on the farm
0-10 ha 1,531 7 8 % 4 5 2 8 2 % 1 , 07 8 7 7 %
10-50 ha 3 8 5 2 0 % 9 0 1 6 % 2 9 4 2 1 %
50 ha + 3 7 2 % 6 1 % 3 0 8 2 2 %
Total 1 , 95 2 10 0 0.5 10 0 1 , 40 3 1 00
Source: "Recencement Generate de I'Algerie". 1972. Quoted by S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 190.
On the basis of such figures (15), the ratio of the farm area of the domestic sector per 
household member employed, gives 1.5 ha per working member. In the absence of an 
irrigated cultivation, such a ratio cannot provide for sustained economic viability of 
these farming units. Such a prospect is more likely to face the smallest economic units. 
The land distribution being of an unequal nature, those units with an average area 
closer to the 10 ha limit will experience a more viable farming. Given the poor quality 
of the land, domestic farming is mainly a sector of cereal farming, a purely subsistence 
practice. In 1968 87% of properties with less than 5 ha devoted 77% of their 
agricultural land to cereal production and land which remained idle, only represented 
10% of the total area. According to the 1968 Survey the domestic sector produced 35% 
of hard wheat and 33% of soft wheat of the private sector. This amounts to about 5.8 
quintals/ha. In terms of physical output, such a yield represents about 9 
quintals/household member in the domestic sector (for a ratio of 1.5 ha/household 
member). At 1980 cereal prices (AD 100/quintal), the output per worker represents 
an annual income of AD 900 or the equivalent of a bit more than 1 pound of meat per 
month at current retail prices. Supplementary incomes have of necessity to be looked 
for outside the production of cereals alone (within as well as outside the farm unit 
itself when alternative productions do not meet the economic conditions of reproduction 
of the household units), if the household is to guarantee the reproduction of its 
members. Livestock breeding provides for such an alternative. According to the already 
mentioned 1968 Survey, 51% of the cattle of the private sector belong to farm units 
between 1 and 10 ha. Small holdings with less than 1 ha own 4.5% of the private sector 
cattle. The domestic sector controlled about 55% of all cattle. One of the factors which
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explains the paradox between the un-correlated relation between a marginal land base 
and the size of livestock, is to be found in the mode of livestock rearing characterised by 
a clear cut divorce between the private ownership of livestock and the land base of its 
production: the collective grazing land, amounting to .35 million ha, is free of access, 
i.e. free of any form of payment of ground rent (16). But this asset was far from being 
equally owned, and its distribution is rather an illustration of the degree of social 
differentiation among the peasantry.
b.The average farms.
This type of farm lies in between the lowest (up to 10 ha), and the biggest farm units 
(50 ha and above). With this classification the characteristics of the types at each end 
of the sector are bound to overlap. In concrete terms, a clear cut subdivision of size 
cannot be a very rigorous approach. But the intention however is not so much the limit 
beyond which one form of farming is different from another, or overlaps with another 
one, but the subdivision of the overall farm units into essential forms of farming. The 
situation of average farms evolved as follows: 19 ha on average per farm in 1950, 25 
ha on average per farm in 1965, and 19 ha on average per farm in 1973. Up to the late 
1960s, these farm units controlled more than half the agricultural land of the private 
sector with only 1/4 of the total number of farm units.
In absolute terms, their size tended to undergo a decrease similar to the pattern of 
movement within the PS itself. The question as to whether such a sector did undergo any 
fall at all remains open. Compared to small farms, these farms can support, because of 
their large size, a higher proportion of labour force. It is in this category of farms that 
one finds the tendency to produce for the market. These farms employ about the same 
proportion of family members as small farms. The high ratio (6.6 ha/household) 
enjoyed by this category of farms only allowed for the employment of 3/4 of the 
household members. The contradiction between the availability of agricultural land and 
the non full employment of household members can be explained according to different 
situations. Land is unequally distributed and so is that of household members. With a
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concentration of the landed property, the economic use of land produces specific and 
different patterns of labour utilisation well beyond the scope of family labour, full 
employment of the total family labour force exceeds the possibility of the farm units, 
Extensive methods of cultivation restrict the use of family labour, etc.
The land of average farms tends to be of a better quality (50% of its agricultural land 
are composed of plains, and 18% are located on plain/hills). This factor, coupled with 
the average size of a farm unit (19 ha), makes this sector in principle prone to 
efficiency. The 1968 Manpower Survey showed that these farms accounted for 39% of 
wheat production of the private sector, roughly corresponding to a yield of 5.3 
quintals/ha (the proportion of land allocated for the production of cereals represents 
68% of the farm area). Such a performance represents an annual income of 48 
quintals/working family member, or about AD 4,800 or a gross income of AD 
400/month (17). On the basis of the 1968 figures, and as far as the main staple food 
product is concerned, small farms appear however to display a greater yield (5.8 
quintals/ha) than average farms (5.3 quintals/ha). Given the fact that the quality of 
the land of the former is of lower standard than that of the latter, one has to admit that 
the amount of labour spent on small farms is more productive than that spent on 
average farms (all other conditions of production being equal).
If one looks at the trend in the number of average farms there appears a net downward 
tendency, an indication which suggests a certain degree of land concentration (on the 
assumption however that the parallel movement of farm area as indicated by the official 
data, be interpreted with all the reserves that have already been raised). If our 
assumption holds, the unequal distribution of average farms - and therefore the 
concentration of property - is based on a pattern of extensive methods of production. 
Moreover, beyond a certain level, and given the existence of certain relations of 
production, the ownership of land does not become the direct condition of farming but 
rather a source of a rent. On this point, the 1972 general survey of agriculture shows 
that 30% of average farmers hold outside farm activities (66% of which were non­
wage activities). For 30% of farmers, land had therefore ceased to be the main activity.
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By comparison, the proportion of small farmers engaged in outside activities 
represented 33%. The nature of such activities was not identical for the categories of 
leavers. The reason of those engaged in activities outside their farm does not have the 
same significance and/or the same weight, depending on whether one is dealing with 
farmers leaving too small a farm, or large enough farms. Thus, as against 66% in the 
case of average farms, the proportion of small farmers with outside activities, but 
engaged in non-wage professions, was only 22% while those in wage earning activities 
represented 78% (against 34% in the case of average farms). This clearly shows that 
the degree of pauperisation and therefore of proletarianisation - the former providing 
the way for the latter - is more advanced for the category of small farmers and 
subsistence small holdings than with average farms. If in the case of the latter one tends 
to deal more with the case of absentee landlords, in the case of the former one tends 
rather to deal with the social category of rural poor and near landless.
c. The big farms.
Over time, the number of big farms dropped by over 50%, going from 25,070 in 1950 
to 13,174 in 1973. As seen earlier, this trend has probably accompanied a parallel 
movement of land concentration. With less than 2% of private farms, the share of big 
farms area extended over 23%. These large units tend on the whole to be well located: 
63% of them were situated on plains and hills. Their average size fluctuated according 
to rather contradictory findings: 112 ha in 1950, 94 ha in 1965 (-84% between 
1950-1965), 189 ha in 1968 (+201% between 1965-1968) and 96 ha in 1973 
(-51% between 1968-1973). Most findings had their shortcomings. The 1968 
Manpower Survey undervalued the land area of the private sector by well over 1 
million ha compared to the 1965 and 1973 figures. In turn the General Census of 1973 
and the 1965 Survey undervalued the size of the private sector by well over 1 million 
ha, when compared with the 1950 figures (18). With the minimum estimate (94 ha), 
and maximum estimate (189 ha), big farms tend to be at least 4 times and 9 times 
larger respectively than average farms. On the ground, such a natural comparative
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advantage did not result in any significant economic superiority. With about 62% of 
land put into cereal cultivation and while enjoying the best land distribution, prone in 
principle to large scale, farming and economies of scale large farms only produced 
respectively 26% and 28% of hard and soft wheat. In terms of cereal yields per ha, 
these farms produced about 5 quintals of cereals in 1968. If the relationship that exists 
between the size of a farm and its performance, as displayed for instance by average 
farms, was applied to large farms, this transposition would have resulted, given the 
minimum estimate, in large farms producing at least 4 times more cereals, or the 
equivalent of 20 quintals/ha. In the absence of such a significant contrast, what the 
comparison between the three main categories of farms however shows is that yields 
have instead tended to fall (though not very significantly in absolute terms) when the 
size of farms increased (19). At best, no significant difference exists between the three 
main categories of farms when looked at from the stand point of cereal production, a 
commodity which remains by far the largest crop, both as far as total agricultural 
output is concerned, and as far as agricultural land use goes. Though naturally large 
farms are close to capitalist units, particularly since they tend to rely on wage labour 
and produce for the market, the context in which they operate, and/or the farming 
methods along which they operate, do not seem to be conducive on the whole to producing 
performing units (low yields, under-equipped, relatively low contribution to 
agricultural production etc.). A further comparison between the different types of 
farms on the basis of other resource endowments, seems to confirm such 
characteristics (20).
C. Resource endowment o f  the private agricultural sector and farming 
practices.
The 1968 Survey shows that large farms remain on a whole less equipped than middle 
farms, or experience a very insignificant livestock activity (they hold the same size of 
cattle than smallholders with plots of land smaller than 1 ha) (21).
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Table 111.2.8: Distribution of selected fixed factors of production by size of farms.
Categories Tractors Harvester-threshers Lorries Other equipment cattle
of arms % % % % %
< 1 ha 0% 0% 4 % 0 % 4.5%
1< X <10 ha 1 2 % 5 % 3 6 % 1 6 % 51 . 0%
10^ X <  50 ha 5 1 % 4 3 % 2 0 % 4 8 % 22 . 0%
50 ha + 3 7 % 5 2 % 1 6 % 2 4 % 4.8%
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 * 1 0 0 1 0 0
Source: Manpower Survey in the private agricultural sector. MARA. 1968. quoted by S. Bedrani op.cit. p.
288.
Except for harvester-threshers, capitalist farming remains under-endowed for all 
items of resources (22). The case of lorry distribution reveals that small farms 
control as many as average and large farms. This is probably an indication that a rich 
stratum of small peasants was involved in the business of marketing and trading of 
agricultural products. Farming practices, as a reflection of the mode of use of 
agricultural land, remain on the whole identical for the three categories of farms. Like 
subsistence and family farms, latifundia  farms experienced the same pattern of 
cultivation and specialised in the same crop.
Table III.2. 9: Distribution of crops by class area (23).
Crops Less than 5 ha 5 to 20 ha 20 to 100 ha Over 100 ha Over 200 ha
Cereals 7 7 % 75% 6 2 % 6 1 % 6 2 %
Fallow land 10% 2 0 % 3 3 % 2 2 % 2 8 %
Other crops 13% 5 % 4 % 1 6 % 1 0 %
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 00
Source: Ibid.
The proportion of land used for cereals represented in most cases well over 60%. But if 
one looks at a more relevant proportion, i.e. the proportion which is de facto 
monopolised by cereal production (including land that was kept fallow), it is well over 
80% and 90% of the land which goes to cereals alone.
In itself, it is not so much the fact that a high proportion of land is used for cereal 
production that makes for the problem of production inefficiency. The main problem is
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that land is still exploited along traditional farming methods. A more intensive 
cultivation based on a rotation combining say, cereals/pulses or cereals/fodder, etc. 
has not taken over the more traditional rotation of cereals/fallow (hard wheat remains 
the predominant crop). While the former cultivation fixes more nutrients into the 
soils, and therefore increases its natural fertility, the latter rather accentuates the 
degradation of the soil and contributes to low yields (24). The reproduction of extensive 
monoculture does not obey the same logic. Cereals are by essence the staple food of the 
population par excellence. As such they weigh more in the crop pattern of small farms 
than in capitalist units. This explains why the proportion of land under cereal 
cultivation is higher for the former than for the latter. Unlike large units which 
produce for the market, small farming units produce for on farm consumption. The 
prevalence of extensive monoculture in latifundia farms, and on a fraction of average 
farms, may have been influenced by several factors.
The policy of fixed prices has been pursued in a systematic fashion. As such, up to the 
1970s cereal production prices had not undergone any significant change as shown by 
the following table.
Table III.2. 10: Trend in the cereal production price index (1963=100).
1 9 6 3 1 9 68 1 9 69 1 9 7 0 1971 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4
Hard wheat 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 1 8 1 1 8
Soft wheat 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 1 0 6 1 0 6 1 0 6 1 0 8 1 0 8
Barley 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 5
Source: S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 148 (for the period 1963-74)i and G. Muttin. Op. Cit. p. 57 (for the
remaining period).
For a decade, cereal prices did not undergo the change which might have transformed 
them into an incentive to increasing production by way of intensive methods of farming 
(25). The policy of staple food subsidy, the massive state intervention on cereal 
imports, the state control of domestic consumer cereal prices etc., all contributed for 
their part to freezing producers' prices. The huge industrialisation programme 
launched in 1967 created new immediate opportunities for private capital in urban 
areas. In particular this new situation meant higher capital returns outside
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agricultural activities. As an important fraction of landowners engaged in non- 
agricultural activities, the phenomenon of absentee landlords was reinforced, and so 
was the tendency of the flow of resources from agriculture to non-agricultural 
activities. The main category of such resources was represented by absolute ground 
rent, an appropriation of resources enabled by the private form of land property. 
Moreover, as this rent was received outside agriculture, it has also tended to be spent 
outside the agriculture sector. In terms of agricultural investment, the appropriation 
of ground rent and its allocation through consumption, investment and savings in 
exclusive urban activities, meant that the necessary resources required for the 
reproduction (whether simple or extended) of fixed factors of production (land, capital 
and other intermediate consumption goods) have probably not being met in the 
agricultural sector.
The nature of the land tenure system, or the mode of land exploitation, also contributed 
in its own way to the enhancement of such a situation, the perpetuation of which 
maintained private agriculture in a relative state of stagnation. From the stand point of 
the dominant relations of production which determine both the mode of farming, as well 
as the terms under which the agricultural surplus is appropriated, the overall pattern 
prevailing in the sector can be depicted as follows.
Table 111.2.11: Distribution of agricultural land according to the land tenure system (%).
Direct mode of exploitation Rent farming Sharecropper Khamassat (26) Total
(Owner-occupied) (tenanted)
<5 ha 76 .7  11 11 1 1 0 0
5-50 ha 6 6 1 8  11 4 1 0 0
50 ha+ 6 5  2 3  5 7 1 00
Total 6~7 f 3 To T  TOO
33 %
Source: Manpower Survey. 1968. Quoted by S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 292.
If so far one has assumed that farmers were owners, this table shows the extent of the 
difference between the two status. On average 67% of the land was directly managed by 
its farmers/owners with the highest proportion located on smaller properties. If one
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looks at the distribution of large farms, it appears that 35% of them were not run by 
their owners (the distribution of agricultural farms by mode of tenure system does not 
however reveal the corresponding area distribution). Moreover, among those farms 
categorised as farms run by their owners, one ought also take into account the category 
of land under joint ownership (in 1968 21% of land was under the legal regime of 
joint possession). It is therefore very likely that part of the 65% of farms run by 
their owners/farmers contained land which in effect partially belonged to "absentee" 
landlords (27). Furthermore, if one bears in mind the fact that, because of their non- 
intensive farming, large farms leave 30% of their land idle each year, because of this 
farming practice, and because of the pattern of land tenure, on average well above 54% 
of the land was not de facto exploited by big landowners in 1968. For the whole private 
sector, land not de facto farmed by its landowners because of idle land, and because of 
the land tenure system, represented on average 48%, or about 2,024,593 ha, in 1968 
( 28 ) .
Under these conditions, and at this stage, the private agricultural sector appears 
therefore as a sector with a high proportion of urban-based absentee landlords 
(absenteeism being defined in relation to their presence in the immediate process of 
production), with 1/3 of the agricultural land directly managed by non-landlords 
(beyond such facts there remains room for the qualitative appreciation of the nature of 
the land under indirect farming). A great difference however, both social and economic, 
exists between the peasant who leaves his land because it cannot support him and his 
family, and the average and/or big landowner who leaves his land precisely because it 
does support him and his family. In the first case one is dealing with near-landlessness, 
in the second case one is dealing with absentee landlords as well as with the specific 
mode of appropriation and utilisation of agricultural surplus. In view of a stagnating 
sector, the existence of an important fraction of absentee landowners, and the amount of 
ground rent that accompanies it, becomes the visible sign of the amount of resources 
drained out of agriculture (besides that operated by prices and marketing 
intermediaries). The cumulative effects of such a situation are that less investment is
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likely to be made available at farm level (ground rent is spent outside agriculture in 
urban areas), non-intensive farming techniques are reproduced, employment 
opportunities become relatively or absolutely scarce, the tendency towards agriculture 
and rural migration increases, agricultural production stagnates or decreases, and the 
market for industrial products cannot expand, etc. The normal condition of reproduction 
of agrarian capital at farm level therefore undergoes restrictions and limitations. 
According to the 1968 Manpower Survey, the payment of ground rent represented 25% 
of total cost per ha (29). In other words, 1/4 of the agricultural "cost" of production 
and, in consequence, the corresponding value which would have accrued to the direct 
producers and/or the capitalist farmer was appropriated by absentee landlords. In 
terms of market price formation, the existence of ground rent implies its "inflation" in 
order to account for the remuneration of landed property. Unlike differential rent, 
absolute rent "can only be a charge, levied by the landowner, on the existing mass of 
values" (30), a reduction for the capitalist farmer who does not own his land, on the 
amount of resources available for agricultural investment, a reduction of his profit. 
This situation epitomises well the extent to which such a form of private property can 
stand as a barrier to agricultural development. As K. Marx put it: "here, in agriculture 
on a small scale, the price of the land appears as a barrier to production itself. In 
agriculture on a large scale, and in the case of large estates resting upon a capitalist 
mode of production, private ownership likewise acts as a barrier, because it limits the 
tenant in his investment of productive capital, which in the last analysis benefits, not 
him, but the landlord" (31). The first Algerian attempt to do away with such social 
barriers found its embodiment in the Charter of Agricultural Revolution in 1971. But 
before going into the analysis of agrarian transformations and their effectiveness, let 
us first study the employment side of private farming and the performance of the sector 
in terms of overall output.
D. Production performance of the PAS.
The global picture of production structure is summarised as follows.
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Table 111.2. 12: Trends in the main agricultural products of the PAS. (1966/67=100).
Crops 1 9 6 7 1 9 69 1971 1 9 7 2
Cereals 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 4 1 4 6
Pulses 1 0 0 1 17 1 3 7 101
Market- garden 1 0 0 1 2 8 1 6 5 1 5 9
Industrial crops 1 0 0 3 0 7 7 5 5 4 7 5
Fodder 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 3 4 9 8
Citrus fruits 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 3 4 9 8
Olives 1 0 0 8 0 1 3 6 1 4 2
Dates 1 0 0 9 6 1 0 7 1 0 8
Figues 1 0 0 4 8 1 1 5 4 2
Other fruits 1 0 0 9 5 1 0 3 8 3
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I’Algerie. 1978. P. 223.
The trends in production levels have been erratic and fragmentary. The most significant 
upward trend has been for industrial crops. For market-garden products, citrus fruits 
and olives, the trend has been too volatile to fit any upward or downward trend. The 
performance of the private sector is however better depicted in terms of yields, in 
order to take account of the land-related output variations.
Table III.2 .13: Pattern of yields in the private sector for 5 main crops (U= Q/HA).
1 9 6 6  1 9 6 8  1 9 7 0  1 9 7 2
Cereals 5.5 5 .4 4.9 5.5
Pulses 5.4 5 .0 7.0 5 .3
Market-garden products 57 .5 57.5 65.4 5 8 .0
Industrial crops 25 .5 20.0 52.5 40.6
Citrus fruits 76.0 87.0 95 .0 97.0
Source: Ibid.
Of all products, only fruits displayed a constant positive growth. The highest gains in 
yields remained substantially that of industrial crops. For cereals, pulses and market- 
garden products, the erratic changes, remain an indication that output was not under 
efficient control. For cereals and pulses, the average yearly yield during 1966/72 had 
been 5.5 and 5.4, respectively the levels of yield prevailing in 1966/67 (the case of 
industrial crops is special as they are the most unstable of all crops. Their erratic 
fluctuations are a direct reflection of the effects of the shift of emphasis introduced by 
the State policy (36) of intervention (see Part IV Chapter II). On the whole, and with 
very few exceptions, yields therefore tend at best to be constant. In terms of meeting
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the food requirements of the population, which also happens to be one among the fastest 
growing in the world (over 3%), such poor agricultural performance raises the 
question of the status of the agrarian structures themselves. In particular, it is the 
nature of the relations of production within such a sector which is at issue. Indeed such 
relations tend to regulate, in the last analysis, the mode of organisation of the 
production process and the mode of distribution of the agricultural product between 
wages, ground rent and profit, as well as the mode of reproduction of the constitutive 
elements of the production process (the level of re-constitution of all fixed elements of 
capital and their mode of combination, the level of re-constitution of the labour force 
and its skill). A clear assessment of the employment situation in the PAS will help 
highlight this point.
E. The employment situation in the private agricultural sector.
Given the predominance of extensive farming, employment opportunities will depend 
mainly on the size of the farm unit. In turn the nature of the size of the farm unit 
determines the structure of agricultural employment. In particular, with small farms, 
the proportion of outside workers as well as that of permanent workers (32) tends to 
be negligible. As the size of the farm increases, so does the proportion of permanent and 
seasonal workers (the proportion of the family labour becoming relatively scarcer). 
Three main categories of farm workers can be distinguished: permanent workers,
temporary workers and 'family helpers'. According to the 1968 Survey, the 
agricultural employment situation was as follows (33).
Table III.2. 14: Agricultural employment (U = 1,000).
Permanent workers Temporary workers Family helpers Total workers + family helpers
Number % Number % Number % Number %
0-5 ha 3.4 1% 69 20% 272 79% 345 100
5-50 HA 13.0 2%. 379 58% 262 40% 654 100
50 HA+ 6.0 10% 45 76% 8 14% 59 100
Total 22 2% 493 47% 542 51% 1,058 100
Source: S. Bedrani. Op. Cit. p. 291.
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If one looks at the proportion of workers, this category was the highest for large farms. 
With 86% of permanent and temporary workers, they displayed a characteristic 
typical of capitalist units. But if these units employed a majority of workers, their 
overall contribution to agricultural employment was however insignificant.
Table 111.2.15: Share of farm employment.
Total number of workers + family helpers Percentage
0-5 ha 3 4 5 , 1 5 0 32 . 0%
5-50 ha 6 5 4 , 4 5 9 62 . 0%
50 ha + 5 8 , 8 9 0 5 . 6%
Total 1 , 05 8 , 49 9 1 0 0
Source: Ibid.
With 31% of total private agricultural land, large farms contributed to only 5.6%, or 
1/18 of total agricultural employment (34). If one takes into account other 
agricultural activities not strictly related to farms units (such as livestock activities, 
apiculture, etc.), the state of agricultural employment is altered in the following 
manner.
Table III.2 .16: Distribution of total employment in the PAS.
Total number of workers + family helpers Percentage
Non-farm employment 8 3 , 1 8 7 7
0-5 ha 3 4 5 , 1 5 0 3 0
5-50 ha 6 5 4 , 4 5 9 5 7
50 ha+ 5 8 , 8 9 0 5
Total 1 , 14 1 , 68 6 1 0 0
Source: Ibid.
Average and small farms make up the bulk of the agricultural population (87%) as 
well as the bulk of permanent and temporary workers (88%). If one retains the 
limited definition of active population, the later can be estimated at 1,411,536 (35), 
for a total agricultural population of 6.5 million (i.e. 22% of total agricultural 
population). If the total agricultural sector consists of about 1 out of every 4 Algerians 
outside urban areas, it is however the PS which makes the overall contribution (81%). 
This situation is in itself a reflection of the overwhelming weight of the small and
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average farm categories which accounted for 95% of occupied within the PS and 77% 
within the total agricultural sector. However restrictive the definition of the Algerian 
active population may be in assessing the extent of the rate of agricultural employment, 
it is however the functional distribution (i.e. the economic significance) of the occupied 
population which can alone reveal its main employment characteristics.
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CONCLUSION: Rural poverty and the need for an agricultural reform.
As perceived by the Algerian policy makers, the access of poor peasants to the status of 
owners (collective and/or individual) was considered to be a preliminary step in order 
to achieve the necessary production increase (here the perception of agrarian change, 
to achieve the increase in production, is perceived in combination with a parallel 
alleviation of rural employment). Moreover, the perception of land reform, mainly 
confined within the limits of the private agricultural sector, was also seen as the 
ultimate means towards the eradication of rural poverty. The specific study of the 
extent of rural poverty and the volume of land available through the programme of land 
reform will allow for a more realistic assessment of the change brought about by the 
Algerian land reform. Before attempting an assessment of the extent of rural poverty, 
let us in anticipation, assess with R. Sinha the limits contained in the narrowly defined 
conception of Algerian reform equating rural poverty with lack of land or its 
insufficient availability: "If employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector 
cannot be created at a sufficiently rapid pace to absorb the massive increases in the 
labour force, there is no realistic alternative to a meaningful redistribution of land" 
(37). What determine also the extent of a reform is also the extent of rural poverty 
itself. This is not to say that by itself poverty creates the need for a land reform; the 
resolution of poverty via a programme of land reform is also largely determined by the 
nature of the contradiction that the development of capital imposes to the ruling class, 
in other words, and as put by C. Kay, a "land reform has to be analysed in the context of 
the class struggle for power" (38).
Broadly defined rural poverty embraces landless and near-landless peasants (39). 
They automatically include those peasants on the edge of landlessness, i.e. the 
proprietor with a plot of land smaller than 1 ha (in 1973 their number amounted to 
155,991). The other fraction of the peasantry which enjoyed a larger but insufficient 
proportion of land, is more difficult to assess given the currently available data. The 
(1-10 ha) properties are not of the same quality (the distribution of irrigated land is 
not easy to assess), and they are not evenly distributed among peasants. These two
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categories of peasants, and the strictly landless peasants, can however be considered 
from the point of view of the profile and the level of agricultural employment.
The category of employed includes the full-time farmers, the permanent workers in 
both the SMS and the PAS, the seasonal workers in both the SMS and the PAS, and the 
family helpers plus those with an "undetermined" (40) status (to use the same jargon 
as the data gathering institutions). The first category represents the self-employed and 
as such they do not enter into the category of rural poor, but all other categories 
however enter into the definition of landless and near-landless (full and part-time 
agricultural workers are by definition proletarianised peasants because without land or 
an insufficient land). According to the 1968 Manpower Survey, the occupational 
situation of the agricultural labour force in the two sectors concerned 1,426,107 
persons distributed for 81% (1,156,256) in the PAS, and for 19% (269,850) in 
the SMS. By category, 12% were permanent workers, 43% part-time workers, and 
45% "undetermined" and/or "family helpers" (the notion of "Undetermined" and/or 
"Family helpers", is basically used to designate the same social category as used for the 
unemployed; the former being mainly used in the official terminology when referring 
to the SMS, while the latter is essentially used with reference to the private sector 
(41). A more detailed comparative distribution of employment between the two sectors 
reveals in turn the structure of employment in each sector, as well as the overall 
nature of such employment.
Table III.2. 17: Comparative sectoral distribution of agricultural employment (%).
Private sector 
% % %
S.M.S
%
Total ■ Structure of total agricultural 
employment (%)
Permanent workers 2 1 % 3% 7 9 % 4 9 % 1 0 0 1 2 %
Seasonal workers 8 0% 4 3 % 2 0 % 4 6 % 1 0 0 4 3 %
Family helpers and 9 8 % 54 % 2% 5 % 1 0 0 4 5 %
undetermined
Total 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
(structure of each sector)
Total 2 81 % 19% 1 0 0
(relative weight of each sector)
Source: Computed on the basis of the 1968 Manpower Survey.
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With 81% of the total agricultural work force, the private sector employs over 4 times 
as many workers as the SMS (42). This sector appears to be the largest employee, but 
only if looked at from a quantitative approach. The study of the inter-sectoral 
distribution of this workforce reveals the economic nature of agricultural employment 
on the one hand, and the economic implications it has on the Algerian economy in general 
and on the programme of land reform in particular. The main characteristic of the 
workforce employed in the private sector is the predominance of the category of 
temporary workers and family helpers, representing 98% of the private workforce 
(this compares with 22% in the SMS). As far as agricultural employment goes, the 
main difference between the two sectors is therefore the weight the permanent 
workforce represents in each case: 3% in the PAS and 49% in the SMS.
The overall result is that the SMS employed 79% of the total permanent workforce. The 
second characteristic of agricultural employment, and by far the most important, is 
that it is for the most part a non-permanent workforce (88%). The share of the 
private sector in the employment of a non-permanent workforce is the highest with 
98%, as against 11% in the SMS. It is precisely this category of worker (well over 1.2 
million) that best epitomises the rural poor. Temporary workers are underemployed 
workers for most of the year. According to A. Benachenhou, in 1972, 65.4% of seasonal 
workers worked less than 1 month, while 22.3% worked for a period of between 1 to 3 
months. If one excludes the "family helpers", and the "undetermined", the contribution 
of seasonal workers represented 78.5% of the total workforce. The category of "family 
helpers and the undetermined" in fact represents the agricultural unemployed, or more 
precisely the unemployed fraction of the active population related to the different 
categories of household farms. Moreover this category of unemployed bears the effects 
of migration: it is already deflated by those who abandoned agriculture (in retrospect 
the release of workers from the countryside only "hints" at the underlying economic 
forces at work which generate them in the open). In this respect the cumulative past
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flows of migrants are a more accurate way of assessing the way rural poverty 
expresses itself: 17,000 migrants per year for the period 1966/68; 40,000 for the 
period 1968/70; 80,000 for the period 1970/73 (43). The category of non­
permanent workers represents therefore what was left of the landless and near- 
landless peasants: in other words the majority of the active population. They represent 
a perfect illustration of the reserve army in perpetual search for job opportunities. If 
the 1971 land reform is to be assessed at all, it can only be according to its ability to 
change the precarious economic situation of those who are unemployed and/or 
underemployed and, by definition, cannot be employed in urban areas where labour 
opportunities (particularly for unskilled workers) are scarce and competition among 
the unemployed is high. The extent to which the programme of land reform has been 
able to meet the challenge is assessed in the following chapter.
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Notes
1-Given the context of the 1960s, the SMS was more the creation of the prevailing 
political circumstances than the expression of the will of the new ruling class. The 
massive departure of the French colons was neither foreseen nor represented in itself 
the ultimate objective inscribed in the political programme of the different warring 
factions for independence. The political programme of 'national liberation' did not 
contain any specific reference to a nationalisation of the land of the settlers.
2-As stated in Part I of this thesis, beyond this form of collective ownership, land was 
worked on an individual basis. The private ownership of land in the capitalist sense of 
the word - that whose counterpart generate the payment of rent - did not exist as such 
at that time. The predominance of patriarchy as a dominant form of social organisation 
guaranteed the pre-eminence of the collective form of land ownership.
3-Given these historical conditions, the distinction between the "modern" (European) 
sector and the "traditional" (indigenous) sector becomes ideologically tainted when 
modernity is in fact opposed to backwardness. In those terms the dualist distinction is 
certainly false and scientifically unsound.
4-lf the problem is a prima facie a statistical problem, it remains however basically 
an economic one as well as a political one as it will be seen.
5-We deliberately use the official term to characterise the agrarian transformations of 
the 1970s. The appropriateness of the term and the conditions under which it can be 
used will be discussed when the study of the 1971/72 measures will be undertaken.
6-At that time the colonial agricultural sector has by far and large reached its 
definitive size as the process of land appropriation and land concentration was well 
over.
7-One remains doubtfully whether the choice of such a particularly sensitive time was 
most suitable to a census on the private sector. In the absence of an up to date cadastral 
survey and given the imminence of the AR, the information given by the landowners as 
to their property and its extent were doomed to be unreliable since attempts to
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underestimate their property is quite justifiable from their interests point of view.
8-In this respect it can be said that big landlords have long been prepared to the 
prospect of being nationalised. As will be seen, their efforts to avoid the cost of such an 
operation have been more than rewarded.
9-The existence of a "ghost" sector of 2 million ha questions and challenges the whole 
validity of data gathering bodies in Algeria. The omission on such a large scale goes well 
beyond the sole aspect of statistical errors. In fact it calls for a political rather than a 
technical explanation.
10-The size of these units can be determinant, and one ought not forget that, 
historically speaking, the distribution of agricultural land, and therefore of farm 
units, was itself the result of an unequal economic power. If a given economic power 
guaranties the ownership of large holdings, in turn, large farm units tend to reproduce 
and extend this original economic power.
11-It is off course impossible to assess such differences on a statistical basis, and one 
has to rely on a qualitative analysis.
12-A survey conducted by MARA The Manpower Survey in the private sector in 1968 
tends to confirm the 1972 figure. Though the average size of a small farm was 4.3 ha, 
the overall trend, as confirmed by the 1968 Survey, and the 1972 Census shows a 
decline in the number of ha per farm unit.
13-From that point of view this sector, with the subsistence, can better be termed as 
the domestic sector or the farming sector.
14-Here we are only talking of the occupational activity of the household members of 
farmers. Landless peasants as representing the non-household approach is not given by 
the present data. For its part, the household approach does not allow for the total 
assessment of agricultural employment. As to those household members who were 
employed on the domestic sector, there is a need to distinguish between the permanently 
employed, the temporary employed and the family helpers.
15-These figures ought to be taken with some reserve as they seem to conflict with 
other sources. This point will be taken up in due time.
16-The overall pattern of livestock ownership was illustrated by the situation
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prevailing in the Wilaya of Saida in 1974 where 8.9% of cattle breeders controlled 
44.3% of herds. Revue Statistiaue Aaricole N9 14, April 1974, p. 96 quoted by S. 
Bedrani op.cit. The development of extensive livestock breeding raised concerns about 
the necessity to protect the ecological environment and limit the power of cattle 
breeders. Such an objective became in itself part of the AR programme of the 1970s. 
The distribution of livestock as related to the domestic sector, is however misleading in 
view of the fact that 55% of cattle belonged to the 1-10 ha farms. One important 
feature of the private livestock activity in Algeria is that it is an extensive activity, i.e. 
not correlated to the land base of the domestic sector, particularly when large herds are 
concerned. Extensive livestock breeding as related to the size of the farm units of the 
domestic sector, is very limited by definition. The power of large livestock breeders, 
though correlated to the domestic sector, is in fact dependent on the free use of the large 
public pasture land.
17-The gross agricultural product is not off course distributed evenly among 
participants of the same household on the one hand and between farmers of unequal size 
on the other.
18-Such open contradictions confirm in their own way the fact that a whole sub- 
agricultural sector still remains outside the current assessments of the size and the 
structure of the private sector.
19-With the necessary reserves of accuracy concerning the 1968 findings. Since that 
date, no similar survey has been carried out yet.
20-lt is necessary to add that the non transformation of a concentrated scarce 
resources - which land is - into efficient productive use amounts to a waste of economic 
and social resources. As poverty is a social phenomenon related to inequality the 
preservation of an unequal land distribution is a preservation of poverty itself.
21-As seen earlier, the contradiction between the private ownership of livestock 
rearing and the social free use of pasture land, blurs and eliminates at the same time 
the link between the land base of cattle rearing and the actual size of livestock.
22-The fertilisers consumption per type of farm is not known to us. The private sector 
remains on the whole underprivileged. With 60% of agricultural land it only used 28%
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of total fertilisers consumption in 1978.
23-This distribution could not have been presented in the standardised class area which 
so far have been used.
24-Before land is left idle it is first ploughed. This cultural practice therefore puts 
land at the mercy of natural elements. Under the influence of rain and wind, most 
nutrient elements which are on the surface of the soil are therefore washed away. In the 
absence of fertilisers, the traditional rotation of cereals/fallow land, corresponds to a 
mining agriculture whereby the nutrient elements are taken away from the land and not 
ploughed back.
25-The reproduction of extensive farming methods is also a reproduction of the 
conditions not conducive to increased agricultural employment opportunities.
26- As previously seen (chapter I), Khamassat (literally speaking referring to a 1/5 
share) is a form of sharecropping whereby the sharecropper (Khammass) gets 1/5 of 
the net product. Most Khammass, because of their indebteness vis-a-vis  their 
landowners, got tied to the latter. These debts bonds which were also reinforced by the 
strength of the patriarchal power (epitomised precisely by the landlords) produced 
generations of Khamess.
27-In the present circumstances it is not possible to assess this particular point.
28-The method of cultivation was as follows:
Total agricultural land of the private sector(1968) = 4.2 million ha 
Total idle land = 953,904 ha (i.e. 22.4% of total land).
Land under direct cultivation =2.8 million ha (i.e. 67.6%).
Estimated proportion of idle land in the sub-sector under direct cultivation= 644,839 
ha (estimated on the basis of the proportional weight of the sub-sector under direct 
farming (76.6%) and the weight of the sub-sector under indirect farming (32.4%) in 
the total area of idle land). By deducting the corresponding idle land from the total land 
of the sub-sector under direct farming one gets the total land which is de facto farmed 
by its owners, the rest representing the 48% in question. Such findings are only valid 
in so far as they relate to the 1968 figures and in so far as they relate to average
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estimates.
29-Quoted by S. Bedrani, ibid., p. 311.
30-JariusBanaji. Summary of selected parts of Kautskv’s The Agrarian Question. 
Economy and Society. Volume N9 5. 1976. P. 21.
On the point of distinction between differential rent and absolute rent, K. Kautsky 
further writes "The first category [differential rent] does not, unlike absolute rent, 
enter into the determination of the prices of agricultural produce. The former derives 
from prices of production, the latter from the margin between market prices and 
prices of production". LaQuestion Aoraire. Reimpression en fac-simile, F.Maspero. 
Paris . 1976. pp. 118-119.
31-K. Marx. Capital. Volume III, Charles H. Ken and Company. 1909. P. 944.
32-The data do not distinguish between family workers and outside workers. In 
principle outside workers are employed only when the family labour force (be it 
permanent or temporary) is insufficient because of its size or because it is already 
employed on better terms elsewhere.
33-Quoted by S. Bedrani Uaariculture Aloerienne deouis 1966. OPU. Algiers 1981, 
p. 291.
34-In actual fact this rate does not include the degree of unemployment of family 
helpers.. Such a nuance has not been purposefully made at this stage. The 5.6% refers 
in fact to the weight of the active population of big farms than to the actual level of 
employment. A more relevant comparison will be made with the analysis of the state of 
rural employment for the whole agricultural sector, i.e. the SMS and the private 
sector.
35-1,1412,686 representing the active population of the private sector and 269,850 
that of the SMS. Algerian statisticians have a restrictive definition of the active 
population. In their terms it refers to the male population between the age of 18-59, 
less a certain rate of invalids, plus those outside this age group who are actually 
employed, i.e. the young (below the age of 18), the old (above 59) and the employed 
women. One of the contradictions contained in such a definition is that the female 
population is excluded from the definition of employment except when it is employed
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which is not the case of the male population. When using this method we always end up 
underestimating the rate of unemployment.
The de facto exclusion of women from the definition of the active population reflects 
their subordinate social status: the number of employed women only represented an 
insignificant fraction, about 6% and 7% (see N. E. Hammouda, Statistics. ONS. N2 3. 
Avril/Juin 1984. p. 29).
36-For tobacco production, the price paid to private producers has not changed between 
1962 to 1975. The result was the depression of output. The increase in prices after 
1975 has led to a slow increase on the tobacco activity. The experience of cotton showed 
no particular incentive vis-a- is the producers. After the 1970s their activity was 
abandoned. The private producers will not receive any particular stimulants in the 
production of sugar beet whose production remained confined to the public agricultural 
sector. It is in the production of tomatoes that the private proved more dynamic. 
Generally speaking the development of industrial crops remained influenced by the 
inconsistency of the state policy in the choice of the product and/or the choice of prices.
37- Radha Sinha. Landlessness: a growing problem. F.A.O. Rome, 1984. P. 6.
39-The historical origin of the rural poor was associated with the land dispossession 
policy conducted by the colonial power.
40-The "undetermined" category of workers is that which is classified as neither being 
permanent or temporary, in other words it represents the unemployed.
41-See Appendix AIII.2.
42-Beyond considerations pertaining to the relative size of each sector (the private 
sector controls 70% of total agricultural land), the contribution of each sector ought to 
be measured in terms of permanent work opportunities.
43- Prenant Prenant. Essai d'evaluation et d'interpretation de la croissance urbaine 
en Aloerie. 1966/74 . quoted by A. Benachenhou. Op. Cit. p. 11.
Review. Journal of Peasant Studies. Volume 4 N22. January 1977. p.
X244.
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CHAPTER III
THE ALGERIAN AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION 
In t roduct ion .
Caught by the side-effects of an industrial-related sudden increased urban food demand 
that on the available evidence the domestic agricultural sector was overtly unable to 
meet, Algeria embarked - a decade after the recovery of her political independence - 
upon her first major land reform programme. Unlike the experience of self­
management which was more the product of historical circumstances imposed on her as 
a result of the unexpected departure of European settlers - a situation which by itself 
was well beyond the command or the initiative of the leading social groups - the 
programme of agrarian transformations was the result of her own political initiative. 
The programme of Agricultural Revolution (AR) - defined with the aim of 
metamorphosing the panorama of 'traditional agriculture' altogether and substantially 
increasing agricultural production through a radical transformation of the land tenure 
system and the methods of production, the agrarian programme of development of the 
productive forces was labeled with the intent of such a deliberate radicalism (1) - was 
somehow thought to have come about after a considerable delay. From 1962 to the end 
of 1971, landlords were however considered to have been de facto preserved in their 
entire political and economic status (2). In itself the project of Agricultural 
Revolution still contained an important characteristic: at no point did it involve the 
participation of those concerned, i.e. the peasants and particularly the rural poor. It 
was also a typical example of a reform decided upon from the top, a programme devised 
outside the target population, a project of social change reduced to a set of 
administrative measures, whose success depended solely on their degree of 
implementation. These two factors in as much as they affected the nature of the project
2 2 5
itself, influenced the whole process of the development of the AR programme. An 
appreciation of the contribution that such a land reform is going to produce in terms of 
its ability to meeting the new urban wage food demand, requires that we first assess 
the nature of the transformation of the relations of production is has been able to 
promote. The characterisation of the Algerian "AR" is clearly seen through the brief 
assessment of its declared objectives.
A. The objectives of the agricultural revolution.
When land reform is considered, its study raises two main issues: the main objectives 
of the programme of land reform, and the nature of the reform itself, or the terms 
under which it intends to transform and alter the conditions of production and 
appropriation of the agricultural surplus by the different social groups, and to whose 
benefit. Three main objectives can be identified in the Algerian AR.
a. The suppression of absolute ground rent.
This was achieved by abolishing any indirect form of land exploitation and/or land 
ownership. As the characterisation of land ownership is precisely to "gain control over 
a fraction of agricultural surplus labour materialised under the form of ground rent" 
(3) to the benefit of landowners, the suppression of absolute ground rent can be seen 
as another way of promoting the social category of capitalist farmers at the expense of 
landowners.
b. The increase in agricultural production.
This goal was thought to be achievable by means of two new forms of farming units: the 
setting up of a collective form of land exploitation in the form of co-operatives as an 
alternative to large and/or "absentee" private ownership of land. As private ownership 
of land was not abolished as such, a new form of private farm unit was imposed through 
the limitation of large land property. The constitution of average private farms (4) 
was thought to be most conducive to intensive farming.
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c. The elimination of agricultural unemployment.
The setting up of the co-operative sector was thought to be capable of realising such an 
objective, both as a result of the distributive aspect of land proper, and as a result of 
the expected development of intensive farming methods of production.
In its unfolding the implementation of the AR went through two main stages. The first 
stage focused mainly on the constitution of the land fund of the AR proper (the 
formation of such a "land bank", to use the expression coined by K. Sutton (5), 
extended however over the two distinct phases of the reform). The second stage of the 
land reform programme was concerned with the constitution of the AR sector itself 
(also referred to as the co-operative sector (CS)).
On the whole this agrarian strategy was directly associated with the particular forms 
under which the new agricultural sector was organised. Vis-a-vis the "reformed" 
private sector, the programme of AR has, in its principle at least, mainly consisted in 
re-sizing its properties and homogeneising its juridical status.
B. The implementation of the first stage of the agricultural revolution.
The setting up of the land fund of the AR started with the creation of the FNRA (the 
National Fund for the Agricultural Revolution) which was the legal depository of the 
land of the new sector. All land destined to the AR sector was first recorded and assigned 
to this fund. The land assigned to the FNRA originated from two main sources: public 
and private land. As far as the first category of land was concerned, all domanial and 
communal land was recovered by the FNRA through the procedure of nationalisations. 
The 1971 Charter of Agricultural Revolution also "removed ... Habous ... restrictions 
on land used" (6). A "Habous" land is a land belonging to a religious institution. There 
were two types of Habous properties: public and private. Public Habous land is a land 
donated to a religious institution, while a private Habous land is a private land which 
is simply put under the protection of a Habous authority. Private Habous land becomes 
public once a donor's line of descendents becomes extinct. The practice of private
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Habous land was historically developed in order to avoid the abuses of the systematic 
policy of land confiscation by the French colonial power. In the context of the AR the 
public nationalisations of land affected the public Habous land. As far as the second 
origin of the land of the new sector was concerned, the private land acquired by the 
FNRA came from two main sources: Land acquired through integral nationalisations, 
and land acquired through partial nationalisations (the size of private properties was 
limited via the process of nationalisations).
a.The nationalisation of public land.
The process of nationalisations of public land started in 1971. The acquisition of such a 
land met no particular social or political resistance as no particular individual 
economic interests were at stake.The lands belonging to the communes, the Wilayate 
and public "Habous" land, were all nationalised. During this phase, part of the State 
land was also affected. It concerned the nationalisation of part of the land of the SMS 
(7) which was unsuitable for cultivation (difficult access in terms of the farm 
equipment, too great a distance of certain plots vis-a-vis the estate, etc.). The 
outcome of such nationalisations (December, 1975) led to the acquisition of 
1,730,240 ha, a 1/3 of which (600,000 ha) were estimated to be suitable for 
cultivation (8). The immediate implications of such nationalisations concerned two 
main social groups. A category of landowners who strengthened their economic power 
prior to the AR through their ability to rent such a public land (9), and a fraction of 
the small and landless peasantry who was able to remain on the land only by renting 
such a public land. In the process of nationalisation the latter social category was not 
preserved. Another feature of this period (which in effect was politically speaking a 
preparatory period to the nationalisation of private lands) was the highly publicised 
campaign for private land donations (10) which, by July 1975, registered 2,685 
donations amounting to 823,285 ha, i.e. the equivalent of 5% of the total nationalised 
public land.
2 2 8
The preparation for the nationalisation of private property was accompanied by the 
setting up of the administrative and institutional instruments for its realisation at the 
different levels of executive power: the APCE (the extended communal popular 
assembly) at local level, the APWE (the extended Wilaya popular assembly) at 
regional/Wilaya level, the Commissions of appeal of the Wilaya and particularly the 
CNRA (National Commission of AR), the administrative and political organ responsible 
for the definition of the programme of AR and for the measures pertaining to all 
aspects of implementations. Though the APCE (11) was in charge of the direct 
implementation of the programme of AR (census of the land, implementation of 
nationalisation measures, distribution of nationalised land etc.), the main powerful 
organs remained the CNRA and the APWE (for the latter through the power of the Wali 
who acts as the representative of the State at regional level). Given the formal 
representation (12) of the system of executive power, the success of the programme 
of the AR depended very much on the balance of power within the different decision­
making organs, between those in favour of the AR, and those against. As K. Sutton puts 
it, "an opportunity for vested interests to dilute the reform process arose at the outset 
when an extremely localised body, the Assemblee Communale Populaire (APCE), was 
given powers to prepare lists of landowners, absenteeists, and potential recipients of 
land and then to carry out the local redistribution of land and other assets ... In some 
cases large landowners secured dominant influence over APCEs and were able to 
paralyse or minimise the redistribution of land" (13). The influence of the vested 
interests of members of the administrative and political machinery in all decision 
making process concerning AR, was more acute when seen from the viewpoint of 
nationalisation of private land proper.
b. The nationalisation of private property
The nationalisation of private land was preceded by the declaration of residence of 
landowners between March and July 1972, as well as by a land census proper between 
September 1972 and March 1973. In the Charter of AR absenteeism  of landowners
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was a cause of nationalisation, but as pointed out by G. M. Aimeyra "the original text 
[I.e that of the Charter] spoke of landowners who were not exploiting their land, and 
not of absentee landowners" (14). The actual nationalisations only started during the 
summer of 1973. As far as the programme of the AR was concerned, the 
nationalisations of private property were to achieve three main objectives: 
confiscation of the land of all absentee landlords (only absentee landlords with 
properties beyond the threshold of 5 ha of dry land, 1/2 ha of irrigated land and 20 
palm-trees were concerned), as well as their means of production, confiscate the land 
and the means of production of all landlords who did not directly work their land 
(exemptions included all land owners who were too old, over 60, or too young, below 
18, to work their land, widows, emigrants and war veterans), and eliminate big landed 
property through a process of a nationalisation-limitation for those who did not 
directly work and run their farm.
The results of these nationalisations were to depend on the accuracy of the declaration 
of landlords' residence, as well as on the quality of the data relating to the census of 
private land. In such a context, it remains largely open to question whether a land 
census conducted in the climate of a strong threat vis-a-vis landowners was in fact 
conducive to a reliable assessment of what was to be nationalised (in this respect the 
whole success of the AR was conditional upon the size and the importance of land 
nationalised). Attempts by landowners to avoid the nationalisation measures by 
concealing their actual place of residence, the legal mode of exploitation of their land 
and the size of their properties cannot be ignored (15). Beyond considerations 
pertaining to the particular circumstances under which the programme of AR was 
being carried out, it is important to highlight the immediate implications of the 
nationalisation measures proper.
Private property of land is not abolished as such. As stated by the Ordinance of AR 
(16) "the agricultural revolution does not abolish the private property of the means
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of production, but it abolishes‘the exploitation of man by man" (17). Large properties 
are seen as a non-viable form of farming (at least in the context of the PAS). All modes 
of sharecropping and farm tenancy are abolished. Wage labour is in principle abolished 
as land is now compulsorily exploited by the landowner and his family members (the 
private ownership of land is limited up to a point where the reliance on outside labour 
becomes in principle an exceptional possibility).
The rationale behind the limitations on large properties is that average farms will 
require their owners to make more intensive use of their assets. Land limitation was 
defined so that the size of the property would not exceed the "working capacity" of the 
owner and his family. The notion of a family working capacity proved however an 
elastic one, and its measurement varied with the degree of mechanisation. This notion, 
being more a general and a theoretical principle, in practice was the income factor 
which served to determine the extent of the land to be limited. The working capacity of 
an owner and his family (18), was therefore determined on the basis of a land which 
can generate a level of income three times that earned by a fully employed worker in 
the SMS (19). The size of a farm thus defined was further increased as the size of the 
farmer's family was taken into account. For a one-child family, the property was 
increased by one third, but for families of two and more children, the increase could 
not exceed 50% of the upper limit of the maximum size of limited properties (on 
average 43 ha). The nationalisation-limitations leave the landowners with a maximum 
size property not exceeding 15% of the ceiling allowed in a given zone (the land area of 
reference was never the minimum limit but always the upper limit). In order to 
prevent a new form of land concentration (which the Algerian reformers see as a cause 
of non-intensive farming), all forms of land transactions were prohibited, and limited 
properties were to remain within their fixed limits. Such strict legal measures 
clearly point in the direction of the concern of the reformers to promote, through 
coercive farm sizes, the objective necessity of intensive farming. Average farms were 
therefore seen as the embodiment of efficiency.
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In view of the situation of widespread agricultural unemployment, there was however 
a contradiction in such a scheme. If by "punctual wage labour", a provision made to 
reconcile the restriction on the use of wage labour, one understands the necessity for 
limited farmers to necessarily resort to mechanisation, then the impact of the AR on 
employment certainly cannot come from limited farmers. The logic of this scheme can 
only be understood as an attempt to limit the emergence of an important class of 
landowners (and therefore of land concentration) on the one hand, and to encourage and 
promote the emergence of a class of capitalist farmers on the other (20).
If in principle land reform aimed at the suppression of absolute ground rent, all 
nationalised landowners were however promised compensation in the form of a 2.5% 
National bond payable within 15 years. This provision was a compromise: the payment 
of compensation is a form of ground rent paid to nationalised landowners, with a 
difference however. Instead of being paid by farmers and/or peasants, it is now paid by 
the entire society through the commitment of the state. Such a measure nonetheless 
remains limited in essence. The payment of such compensations is made in a de facto 
devaluated currency (developing countries being very often the context of an important 
rate of inflation), eroded even further by the period of 15 to 20 years necessary for 
their actual payment.
C. The assessment of nationalisations.
By March 1973, the assessment of the extent of private properties gave the following 
results.
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Table 111.3. 1: Land under private ownership (Number= 1,000).
Number % Proportion
categories
of different 
of properties
Landowners(total) 1,322 1 00 100
In Northern Algeria 1,255 94%
In Southern Algeria 77 6%
Individual landowners 731 100 55%
In Northern Algeria 673 92%
In Southern Algeria 58 8%
Landowners into indivision* 601 1 00 45%
In Northern Algeria 582 97%
In Southern Algeria 1 9 3%
Source: Benhouria, Tahar "L'economie de I’Algerie". F. Maspero. 1980. Paris, p. 195 and "Statistiques". 
ONS.AIgiers. N9 1. * For 582,000 co-owners in Northern Algeria and 19,000 in Southern Algeria 
there corresponded respectively 172,000 and 6,000 properties.
Two points are apparent from these figures. The concentration of agricultural land is 
mainly located on the Northern part of Algeria which represents about 10% of the total 
area of the country. This geographical dis-equilibrium is mainly due to the fact that 
90% of Algeria consists of the Sahara desert. The proportion of private ownership of 
land into joint possession concerns nearly half the landowners (for this category of 
landownership, there were on average well over three owners for one given 
property). Such a result makes it quite difficult to assess and categorise land accruing 
to absentee landlords and that accruing to limitable owners. The main characteristic of 
properties in joint possession is that they tend not be recorded at all. Their possession 
is mainly fixed by tradition and non-written rules. This is an important aspect of the 
complexity of landed property in Algeria. In the absence of a written assessment of 
landed property and in view of the danger of the land reform, landowners will tend 
therefore to exaggerate the extent of property in joint possession. The nationalisations 
of private owners were conducted on the basis of the results of the perusal of the 
census established by the local executive power (the APCE). The classification of 
landowners according to their situation vis-a-vis AR gave the following results.
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Table 111.3. 2: Distribution of the 4 main categories of landowners according to their respective status vis-a- 
vis the AR as established by the APCEs (%).
Category of farmers % of each category of landowner
I. Landowners non concerned by nationalisations. 76%
II. Other categories of landowners:
Absentee landlords 2 .75 %
Limitable landlords 0 . 61%
The exceptions. 2 0%
Source: Ibid.
In order to highlight these results, we first look at the method by which the CNRA 
derived the four different categories of landowners. A straightforward category of 
landowner was not concerned by the nationalisation measures. Within this category are 
classified, in principle, all landowners with properties not exceeding 5 ha of non­
irrigated land, 1/2 ha of irrigated land or an oasis not exceeding 20 palm-trees (this 
latter category pertaining exclusively to Southern Algeria). The second category of 
landowner was in turn subdivided into two main categories: nationalisable landowners 
(either completely or partially), and those who benefited from the regime of
exceptions. Those who neither fell under one category or the other was considered
absentee landlords. Given this categorisation of landowners, let us look more closely at 
the lists established by the APCEs. One immediate point is that the proportion of 
landowners not at all affected by the nationalisation measures was extremely high:
96.5% (only 3.5% were in effect concerned with the procedure of
nationalisation/limitation). With 20% (21), the proportion of exceptions was equally 
important. According to the report established by the CNRA (22), the total number of 
the four categories of landowner, as established by the APCEs, was 13% short of the 
actual number of landowners as established by the census. In the process of 
"aggregation", on the basis of the list established by all the APCEs, 13% of landowners 
were therefore left out. The undermining of the nationalisation measures was further 
highlighted by the findings of a poll conducted on a sample representing 50% of private 
landowners: the extension of the results of such a poll (so as to include all private
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landowners), showed that the proportion of absentee landlords was 2.93% and that of 
the limitable landowners 2.22%. Whatever gap existed between the findings of the 
census and that of the poll (both of which can be considered to have fallen short of the 
real number of absentee and limitable landowners considering the wide range of 
political and economic means at their disposal), the convergence of interests between 
landlords and local authorities in charge of the implementation of AR, the room for 
manoeuvre allowed by the complexity of the land tenure system etc., justify to a large 
extent the poverty of the actual results of the June 1975 nationalisations.
Table III.3 .3: Results of land nationalisation.
Number of nationalised landowners Nationalised agricultural area (1,000 ha)
Absentee landowners 1 7 , 00 0 631,840 ha +
Limitable landowners 4 , 90 0 768,000 palm-trees
Total 121,900 631,840 ha + 768,000 palm-trees*
Source: Benhouria, Tahar Op., Cit. p. 200 (* Official statistics did not show any evidence of nationalised 
means of production other than land).
With 631,840 ha, such nationalisations represented a mere 11% of the total land of 
the PAS (1965 data).
D. The formation of the agricultural revolution sector (ARS).
The constitution of the ARS and its particular characteristics were determined by the 
mode of distribution of nationalised lands. Co-operation (23) was the dominant form 
under which the new sector was organised. The free distribution of nationalised land 
went to those peasants who were either insufficiently provided with land or who were 
landless. This distribution was also accompanied by the obligation on the beneficiaries 
to work land under whatever co-operative form was decided for them. As beneficiaries 
(the prioritary beneficiaries were the workers who were already employed on the 
nationalised farms), they were to accept the conditions attached to the attribution 
(24). If the form of co-operatives was decided by the reformers, in turn these co­
operatives were in principle autonomous and independent from any outside power. In 
practice, one finds a parallel between the situation of the self-managed estates and that
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%of the co-operative sector. The setting up of the co-operative system was based on the 
central role of the Service Co-operative CAPCS (25) at the level of each commune. All 
beneficiaries of the AR (whatever the mode of land attribution), are de facto members, 
of the CAPCS. In effect the CAPCS represents the backbone of the co-operative sector. It 
provides the new agricultural sector with all the services required (26): fertilisers, 
credit, farm machinery, marketing, etc. Thus, the CAPCS was set up to perform the 
same functions vis-a-vis the ARS in particular and the PAS in general, as those of the 
different specialised state boards vis-a-vis the SMS. In this form, and given such 
specialisation, the CAPCS is very similar in nature to the structure of ONRA: all 
conditions of production and distribution are within the hands of the CAPCS, itself 
"dependent for much of its marketing and technical assistance on state agencies" (27). 
The power of the CAPCS contains therefore the same potential danger of 
bureaucratisation and domination over the new agricultural co-operative sector. 
Moreover, the CAPCS itself is part of an economic environment dominated by the power 
of BNA, OFLA, etc. "During the National Conference for the Development of Agriculture 
in April 1976, representatives of the producers of the SMS, as well as those of the co­
operative sector, formulated requirements and demands, criticised the same system 
and proposed the same recommendations: the same public institutions which 
previously suffocated the SMS (BNA, OFLA, SAP, ONAMA, etc.), were again on the 
carpet" (28). The nature of the difficulties encountered by the co-operative sector, is 
not so much associated therefore with the fact that the ARS was managed under a co­
operative form, but rather the limited economic power of the CAPCSs themselves. One 
ought to add that, in themselves the CAPCSs may well be seen as an ideal form of 
dynamising the co-operative, as well as the private sector. The whole question hangs 
on the overriding influence of the economic system at large. As such an "island of co­
operation" has little chance of surviving in an hostile economic environment for "it is 
extremely doubtful whether a transition to a collective system in agriculture is at all 
feasible so long as the other sectors of the economy remain areas of private enterprise.
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The few experiments of this type seem to have run into considerable problems. The 
cases of Tanzania, Algeria and Mexico provide some relevant illustrations" (29).
a. The co-operative system.
The management of the ARS was based on the following system of co-operatives and 
groupings.
1. The CAPRA (the AR Co-operative of Production) is a form of co-operation whereby 
land and all means of production are collectively owned. It is a form of co-operative 
close to the model of the "self-managed" estate.
2. CAEC (the Common Exploitation of Agricultural Co-operatives) groups the 
beneficiaries who work their land in common. Here, land is privately owned, but the 
means of production are under collective ownership.
3. GMV (the Grouping of Land Development) is a form of grouping used whenever the 
quality of the land distributed is too poor to be exploited other than on an individual 
basis.
4. The GEP is a Grouping of Peasant Mutual Help.
5. The GAI (the Agricultural Grouping of Owners in Joint-possession) a grouping 
whose constitution is accompanied by the commitment of the co-owners not to split 
their holding for a period of at least 5 years. The logic behind such a condition, is that 
the practice of co-operation will eventually impose itself as a necessary and superior 
form of farming compared to the individual private farming of the private sector.
If this wide range of collective forms of agricultural organisation was devised to suit 
the particularity of each situation, their actual distribution showed however an 
emphasis on, and a preference, for the most developed forms of co-operation: the 
CAPRA.
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Table 111.3. 4: Distribution of the different forms of co-operatives in the ARS.
C ategory o f 
c o -o p e ra t iv e s 1 9 7 3 %
Number
1 9 7 5
of co-operatives and
%  1 9 7 7  %
%
1 9 7 8 %
CAPRA 1,349 59% 3,633 70% 4,352 74% 4,800 80%
CAEC 707 31% 763 14% 581 10% 530 9%
GMV 258 11% 831 16% 926 16% 670 11%
Total 2,314 100 5,227 100 5,869 100 6,000 100
CAPCS N.A 610 659 N.A
Grand total - 5 , 8 3 7 6 , 5 1 8 -
Source: Statistiques N91 .0.N.S.
With 80% of co-operatives, the CAPRAs are the dominant form of co-operation. The 
drop in the number of CAECs has been considerable (25% between 1973 and 1978). 
This drop could be explained on the grounds that, whenever the option was left to the 
beneficiaries, the choice of individual plots was opted for, or that there has been a 
transformation of CAECs into CAPRAs. On the whole, it seems that the imbalance in 
favour of the achieved form of CAPRA, is indicative of the attitude of the reformers. As 
such, they seem to have made the economy of "the transitional stages which would have 
implied (as far as the beneficiaries were concerned) the prior learning and 
apprenticeship experience leading to a collective management on the basis of an already 
established experience within the framework of individualised plots" (30). In terms 
of areas, the weight of CAPRAs was also overwhelming.
Table III.3. 5: Distribution of the different forms of co-operatives by area.
Category of Agricultural area of each Average agricultural Number of different
co-operatives form of co-operative area /co-operative or co-operatives and grouping
(1,000 ha) % grouping.(ha/unit) as given by the survey
CAPRA 7 3 6  8 2 %  T75  4 , 2 0 3
CAEC 5 7  .6 %  1 07 5 2 8
GMV 9 2 10%  9 9 9 3 0
GEP 11 1 % 6 4 1 7 0
GAI 8 6 6  0 . 09% 8 6  10
Total 8 9 6  1 00  1 53  5 , 841
Source: Annuaire Statistique de lAlgerie. 1978.
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The CAPRAs controlled 82% of the total area, and their average size was also the 
highest of all forms: 175 ha. If the form CAPRA was dominant by its number and its 
area, it was also dominant in terms of beneficiaries it employed as witnessed by the 
table below.
Table III.3. 6: Distribution of beneficiaries in the co-operative sector in 1975/76.
Category of 
beneficiaries
Number of each category 
of beneficiary %
Number of average 
beneficiaries/ 
co-operative
Ratio of the number 
of ha/beneficiary
Co-operative and pre-coop. 7 8 , 7 9 3
beneficiaries
-CAPRA 5 1 , 8 9 9 58 . 5% 1 2 1 4
-GMV 18,401 21 . 0% 2 0 5
-CAEC 5 , 6 5 4 6.0% 1 1 1 0
-Others 2 , 83 9 3 .0% 16 4
Individual beneficiaries 9 , 8 1 4 11.0% - 4
Total 8 8 , 6 0 7 * 1 0 0 - -
Source: Ibid. (* On December 1978, the number of total beneficiaries was 95,000 but its structure was 
not available.)
CAPRA beneficiaries represented 66% of all co-operative and pre-co-operative 
beneficiaries and 58% of all beneficiaries of the AR. On average, 14 ha were available 
for each beneficiary in each CAPRA. The ratio of the average size of a CAPRA to the 
average number of beneficiaries, i.e. 12, tends to suggest that these co-operatives 
have been devised to experience a certain form of mechanisation which in the case of 
Algeria cannot be divorced from a built-in tendency to rely on the use of temporary 
workers. The necessity to rely on outside labour stems from the difficulty in 
maintaining a constant given level of farm machinery: the procedure of acquisition of 
inputs being of a bureaucratic nature, the CAPRA can neither be certain of the time of 
their acquisition, nor of their nature (particularly for farm machinery). The control 
over a given technological model is not therefore achievable in such a context. In other 
words, the issue of the choice of a technique and its mastery by the direct producers, 
remain unsettled. The problem of defection of the beneficiaries has also to be taken into 
account. As a consequence, most CAPRAs have tended to operate on the basis of a regular
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use of seasonal workers, transforming themselves into assimilated capitalist units.
The preference for the CAPRA (31) form of agricultural organisation, is further 
evidenced if one looks at the ratio of the agricultural area per beneficiary for other 
forms of land exploitation. This ratio tends to average 4 ha without any compensation 
in terms of increased land quality. The form of all pre-co-operative land corresponds 
precisely to a type of land requiring improvements and development. The quality of the 
land under the co-operative form was also comparatively of a higher fertility. On the 
whole however, the concrete conditions under which nationalised land has been 
acquired - nationalised landowners were given to select themselves that part of the 
land (usually the least fertile and/or the most difficult to farm) which was to fall 
under nationalisation (see below) tends to suggest that the fertility of the land of the 
private sector remains superior to that of the co-operative sector. But given the 
technical means at the disposal of the new sector, the nationalised land is very likely to 
produce higher yields than when it was part of the private sector. This is in fact one of 
the main potential achievements of the AR. On the whole, the analysis of the co­
operative system suggests that the real impact of the AR revolves around the sole 
impact of the CAPRA form.
b. The balance sheet of the agricultural revolution sector.
T h e  latest figures, i.e. 1978 , allow us to assess the form of the A R S  so far. 
Table III.3. 7: Structure of the agricultural revolution sector in 1978.
Area ** Number of Dalm trees Number of beneficiaries
CAPCS
Number of co-ooeratives 
CAPRA CAEC GMV GEP
1 , 100 , 000 1,820,000 100 , 000 6 7 4 * 4 , 800 530 6 7 0 170
Source: Ibid.
‘Figure relating to 1974; (** This area relates to land suitable for cultivation and not the total 
area of the co-operative sector).
For a total agricultural area of 7,542,485 ha, the co-operative sector share was 
14.5%, representing the equivalent of an average of 1 out of 7 ha (the quality of the 
land aside). The setting up of this new sector was accompanied with its endowment in
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terms of an important equipment stock. In 1978, about 30% on average, of all farm 
machinery was catering for its needs (32).
In terms of performance, and with the limitations that go with the short period of the 
experience, the relative highest farm equipment of the co-operative sector did not 
result in a substantial production increase as evidenced by the table below.
Table III.3. 8: Selected production performance of the CS (1974/75=100) (33).
1 9 73 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0
Cereals 2 2 1 0 0 5 4 6 4 9 7
Share in total production 4 % 14% 1 5 % 1 2 % 1 2 %
Pulses 2 4 1 0 0 1 1 7 8 5 8 8
Share in total production 4 % 1 0 % 1 4 % 1 2 % 1 3 %
Industrial crops 1 1 1 0 0 7 2 1 4 5 9 7
Share in total production 2% 1 2 % 1 0 % 1 6 % 1 3 %
Citrus fruits N.A 1 0 0 9 4 9 3 9 2
Share in total production - 5 % 4. 5% 5 % 5 %
Market-garden products 2 6 1 0 0 9 9 1 0 4 1 3 4
Share in total production 3% 7% 9 % 8 % 9 %
Source: Ibid. and Annuaire Statistique 1984.
During the last year of reference (1975-1980), the share of the production of the CS 
seems to have stabilised around 13% of the total production for cereals 13% of the 
total production for pulses 14% of the total production for industrial crops, 5% of the 
total production for citrus fruits and 9% of the total production for market-garden 
products. In terms of crop distribution, cereals dominated the sector with 70% of 
cultivated land. Translated in yields, these production performances tend to show the 
lowest figures of all the agricultural sector: 6 quintals of cereals/ha in 1980 against 
9 for the SMS and 7 for the PAS; 4 quintals of pulses/ha against 3 in the SMS and 6 in 
the PAS; 59 quintals of market-garden products/ha against 62 in the SMS and 66 in 
the PAS; and 79 quintals of citrus fruits/ha against 101 in the SMS and 89 in the PAS 
(34) .
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In what follows, an attempt will be made to assess the extent to which the objectives of 
the AR programme have been achieved. Through an assessment of the results produced 
by the implementation of the AR, our focus will be particularly centred upon the 
causes of low performances, as well as on the nature of changes brought about by the 
AR.
E. The impact of the agricultural revolution and its limits.
The most straightforward way of assessing the impact of AR is through its 
achievements in terms of land distribution, employment creation and production (in 
themselves these three objectives have an interrelated effect on each other, their 
separate treatment does not imply that one does not bear in mind the nature of their 
dialectical relation. If land distribution affects the level of employment through its 
beneficiaries, in turn the mode of organisation of production reacts on the level of 
employment via the capitalistic nature of the process of production, etc. A more 
thorough way of assessing this AR remains however with the perspective of the 
dynamic of changes it can generate vis-a-vis the agricultural sector as a whole and 
the economy in particular).
a.The immediate achievement of the agricultural revolution and its 
lim its .
The most paradoxical effect of the programme of AR is that its benefits have not been 
accepted. On the one hand nationalised land has not been fully distributed, and on the 
other there have been considerable withdrawals on the part of the beneficiaries. The 
land not distributed did not result from the defection of beneficiaries, but rather from 
a lack of willing candidates in the first place: about 150,000 ha and 45,901 palm- 
trees (35) have not been distributed. The latest figures, in 1981 (36), showed that 
the number of beneficiaries fell from 100,000 to 80,000 (37). This situation 
whereby the beneficiaries of a land reform give up the benefits of the reform itself is 
certainly unique in the history of land reforms. Many factors are to be accounted for in 
such a situation. The phenomenon of rejection of the AR by the peasants stems from the
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general conditions attached to the whole programme of land reform. As such, the 
programme was not the expression of those concerned. A non-peasant motivated 
agrarian reform cannot therefore produce a solution which will be in accordance with 
the interests of the landless and near-landless. In the context of Algeria, the ruling 
class has produced a solution of compromise: it embarked on a radical project of land 
reform but without its main actors. Thus, the extent of land nationalisations proved 
smaller than expected, and at least a minimum of 13% of landowners escaped such 
measures. What the withdrawals further proved was that access to land as such, was 
not a sufficient condition, especially when this land was of a marginal quality. The 
financial allowances given to the beneficiaries as a form of help for the time necessary 
before any income is derived from the exploitation of the land, were also too low to 
prevent land renunciation. This situation evidences well the fact that the general 
conditions under the terms of which land was acquired (the mode of acquisition of the 
nationalised lands), were not in themselves a sufficient condition. As A. Benachenhou 
put it "there is no longer a non monetary vision of labour or of landed property ... the 
idea to strengthen the link between the peasant and the land must not be conceived 
through the distorting view of private property, but by a careful examination of the 
real relation that links the peasant to the land, and which relates to the search for food 
security and/or to a level of income to be achieved" (38). Clearly, if a process of land 
distribution following a programme of land reform does not take into account the 
economic significance of this land in terms of the food security, or the sufficient 
income it can achieve for its beneficiaries, it only puts into question the very nature of 
the land reform itself.
As far as employment is concerned, the impact of the AR proved marginal. If one 
excludes the number of withdrawals, i.e. if one thinks in terms beyond the contingency 
of the withdrawals, the AR secured land for 100,000 beneficiaries out of a pool of a 
poor rural population estimated at 1.2 Million. The category of beneficiaries was also 
socially differentiated (39). The two main categories were landless peasants and
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agricultural workers composed of sharecroppers, khammass, seasonal and permanent 
workers (some of the latter coming from the SMS), on the one hand, and small and 
average peasant - most of whom being beneficiaries on individual plots or in CAECs - 
on the other (40). As priority was given first to those already working on the 
nationalised lands and then to small peasants, it appears that the impact of land 
distribution on landless peasants has been insignificant. In effect, there has not been 
"an integration of new workers in production, but rather a stabilisation of employment 
granted to workers who were already employed" (41). Vis-a-vis that fraction of the 
peasantry which was displaced from the nationalised public land, AR has in fact 
worsened the fate of the rural poor. The overall impact of the AR is not therefore 
expected to affect the generating mechanisms of rural and agricultural migration. The 
problem of agricultural unemployment remains from that viewpoint unresolved.
b. The implication of the AR for co-operatives and average properties.
The emphasis on the constitution of a modern, and technologically well-endowed, 
sector, has been motivated by the objective of achieving the growth of agricultural 
output realised through the standardisation of private property into average 
properties on the one hand, and the constitution of co-operatives which will end up as a 
model of production efficiency on the other. On this point it is open to question 
whether the reduction in the size of private holdings will automatically lead to an 
intensification in farming methods. For this to take place, two conditions are to be met: 
industrial inputs ought to be in abundant supply (which is not the case), and labour 
for employment off the farm unit, ought to be scarce so that private farmers resort to 
more intensive farming as the only technically possible alternative (the obligation for 
farmers and their families to exploit directly and personally their holding without 
relying on outside labour is only possible if the ratio of capital to labour can be 
increased without constraint). In the absence of these two possibilities, average 
farmers will not engage in intensive farming, and production cannot substantially be
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increased.
The constitution of co-operatives as a form of organisation of the new agricultural 
sector was also motivated by two main considerations: to avoid a parceliising of the 
land and to develop farming units which will prove superior to private holdings.
The technological 'superiority' argument of the CS. If the co-operative form of 
production allows for investment on a scale which otherwise would not have been 
possible by individual farmers, the mode of constitution of such co-operatives 
backfired on their presupposed potential advantages. The constitution of co-operatives 
and their form being imposed onto the beneficiaries, these new forms of agricultural 
organisation were in advance of the experience of their beneficiaries whose working 
background contained no apprenticeship of co-operation: the gap between the superior 
form of production (as represented by the co-operative) and the political 
consciousness of the beneficiaries was too wide. The emphasis on a technologically well 
endowed co-operative epitomises further the uncertainty of their mission in so far as 
the substantial increase of agricultural production is concerned. Indeed the acquisition 
of a given technology raises two important questions: what type of technology to 
choose? and who makes the choice? In view of the co-operative experience, the 
determination of the technological dimension involved no participation on the part of 
the beneficiaries and potential users. As a result, the entire organisation of the process 
of production took place from outside the co-operative structure. As N. Jazrra argues 
in her study on the impact of technology on the CAPRA, "the choice of techniques of 
production and of degrees of mechanisation, are fundamental elements which determine 
the level of control over the process of production. The fact is that the programme of 
crops brought very important modifications in relation to the cultural techniques 
previously used, and certain important elements (use of certain products, handling of 
certain farm machinery) were not under the control of co-operative members" (42). 
As far as this point goes, the ability of the co-operative sector to achieve high yields,
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depends therefore, in the last analysis, on the ability of the co-operative members to 
integrate under their control the technological dimension of the organisation of 
production. The homogeneity, in terms of social background, among -co-operative 
members was also absent. In particular, there was an hostility between those who 
still owned their own plot (small peasants), and those who did not (the landless), co­
operative members were de facto wage workers with a status similar to that of the 
SMS. The overall economic environment of the co-operative sector was dominated by 
the bodies which dominate the SMS: the M.AR.A, the banking system, the SAP, ONAMA, 
etc.
The parcellising argument. As far as this argument is concerned, the formation of co­
operatives was presented as a way of fighting the parcellisation of land which was 
prevalent in the PAS. This argument was however contradicted by the conditions under 
which the nationalised land was acquired in the first place. If the formation of co­
operatives has indeed resulted in the constitution of large units of 175 ha on average 
per CAPRA (43), these large units in turn are no evidence of homogeneous units of one 
lot. As a matter of fact, the formation of co-operatives has been conducted on the same 
principle as that which prevailed in the constitution of the National Fund of AR: the 
nationalised land was integrated as such in the new co-operatives. The relatively large 
size of co-operatives hardly raises the question of their structure. The conditions 
under which the nationalised lands have been conducted is clear evidence of the degree 
of parcellisation of the land of the CS. Indeed the nationalisation of limitable 
landowners was conducted according to their own terms: they had the freedom of choice 
as to the portion of their land which they designated for nationalisation, and in so 
doing, such a procedure gave them the opportunity to get rid of the least fertile 
fraction of their land. In other words, no physical regrouping, under whatever form, 
took place and the problem of parcellisation was not attacked. S. Bedrani a leading 
figure on Algerian agriculture writes: "In the course of a survey in EL-ATTAF during 
May, 1977, we came across one CAPRA which had no less than 160 plots scattered all
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over the commune. Half a day has not been sufficient enough to visit them all by car" 
( 44) .
From whatever argument: the resorption of rural unemployment, the potential it 
offers for intensification, its immediate beneficiaries, or its demonstrating effects 
upon the rest of the private agricultural sector, the impact of the programme of AR 
seems to remain somewhat short of expectations. Such a question raises the whole 
problem of the content and the nature of the agrarian transformations.
F. Agricultural revolution v e r s u s  agricultural reform.
The Algerian reformers used the notion of agricultural revolution to describe the 
nature of agrarian transformations. The difference between an agricultural revolution 
and an agricultural reform, is not simply a case of semantics, it rather involves the 
analysis of the nature of the changes that took place and its extent. For an agricultural 
revolution to take place, two conditions need to be met: a practical or empirical 
condition, and a theoretical condition. The practical condition refers to what has 
actually been achieved by the reform. Thus an agricultural reform can be termed an 
agricultural revolution if the transformations it enabled are being achieved on an 
unprecedented scale. In particular such achievements must include at least one or both 
of the following objectives: the eradication of rural poverty and rural unemployment, 
and/or the increase of agricultural production on an unprecedented scope. In the 
Algerian case, neither rural unemployment, nor agricultural production have 
drastically been affected.
On theoretical grounds, the distinction requires a different perception. Through their 
populist rhetoric, the Algerian reformers claimed to abolish "the exploitation of man 
by man" (45) by means of abolishing the indirect management of land, i.e. through the 
abolition of large property, on the one hand, and by developing and generalising the 
system of co-operatives on the other. If by the suppression of indirect exploitation of 
land one understands the suppression of absolute ground rent, it does not follow that
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the suppression of ground rent achieves the suppression of the capitalist relations of 
production. In fact, and the history of most capitalist countries shows this, a capitalist 
system of production accommodates itself better without the existence of ground rent 
particularly as a result of the "dissociation historically operated between land owners 
... and capitalist farmers" (46). In fact the very existence of ground rent, particularly 
in its absolute form, is nothing but the very expression of such a dissociation. From 
that viewpoint the suppression of absolute ground rent allows only for the more rapid 
penetration of capital into the agricultural sphere of production, and achieves the 
transformation (or the replacement) of landowners into capitalist farmers. As M. 
Gutelman points out, "an agrarian reform which would go as far as to a complete 
nationalisation of the land would nonetheless remains a bourgeois reform" (47). The 
abolition of large landed property does not challenge or question the private ownership 
of land as such but only sets a physical limit to the private property of land. In other 
words the programme of land reform does not set any economic limit to property. The 
Algerian reformers are confused between the notion of a farm unit and that of 
property; in particular they tend to identify an average property with an average 
exploitation (48). In fact it was expected that this natural constraint would act as a 
catalyst and help transform this class of private landowners into a class of dynamic 
capitalist farmers.
The assimilation of AR with the development of the co-operative system is another 
mystification of the Algerian land reformers. The equation of these two terms tends to 
suggest that co-operatives are by nature socialist units, co-operatives are not 
economic units proper to the "socialist mode of production". As a matter of fact, a co­
operative system is far from being incompatible with a capitalist system, and for that 
matter, it does not make much difference that the appropriator of economic surplus is 
a capitalist, a group of capitalists or simply the State and its main institutional bodies. 
If the setting up of a co-operative leads to a new form of production organisation, it
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leads as well to the emergence of a new form of ownership (which, in the ALgerian 
context is predominantly State ownership). If the co-operative members appear as the
owners of the co-operative - as is the case of the cooperators of the AR - this
ownership is purely formal since it is not accompanied by a control at the level of the
relations of production. The rights of the beneficiaries can only be used in so far as
their membership vis-a-vis the co-operative is concerned. Once the status of 
membership was granted, the experience showed that most CAPRAs became integrated 
in the same economic environment as that of state agriculture, and as such, 
experienced similar consequences and underwent a development which displayed 
characteristics which were far removed from the idealised projections of the 
reformers (in the mind of the latter, the constitution of co-operatives would lead to 
radical changes in the organisation of agriculture, and their performance would prove 
so effective that they would become an irresistible model for attracting the private 
sector, as well as for the SMS). Thus the insufficient fertility of the land, low yields, 
the level of financial help etc., all accounted for the defection of the youngest and the 
skilled co-operative members. As a by-product of this situation those who remained 
(on average the oldest) opposed new members, and tended to develop the attitude of 
landowners vis-a-vis temporary workers. The use of seasonal workers tended to 
establish itself as a systematic procedure, up to a point whereby, for most co­
operatives, the majority of manpower costs went to seasonal workers (49).This 
tendency to use a high proportion of seasonal workers became the condition under 
which the co-operative sector tends to operate and therefore reproduces itself. One is 
therefore far from the ideal model of co-operation depicted by the reformers and "the 
CAPRAs function beside the peasantry without generating more demonstrative effects 
than the SMS did before" (50). Under these terms if the CAPRAs could not so far serve 
as an example of success vis-a-vis the peasantry, it is simply because they could not 
accomplish their own in the first place.
From such a perspective, the programme of AR has simply consisted in an extension of
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the model of farming proper to state agriculture combining large estates, i.e. 
necessarily requiring extended mechanisation, and de facto run by government 
agencies, whether for the provision of inputs, the mode of farming, the type of crops 
or the technological option. Thus perceived, the immediate outcome of the Algerian AR 
consists in the fact that the State has now achieved an extension of the agricultural 
sector under its aegis by an extra one million fya, while leaving relatively unaffected 
both the extent of rural poverty and the land assets of most of the middle peasants and 
that of large landowners.
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CONCLUSION.
The massive state intervention which gave the newly farmed sector about 30% of 
available farm machinery was not able to substantially raise labour productivity. Up 
to the 1980s the CS proved unfit to meet the requirements of the reformers in so far 
as production was concerned (51). Two characteristics accounted for such immediate
TU
results: the CS inherited a land which on whole was not among the most fertile land and 
whose scattered lay out must probably have stood in the way of a rationale use of farm 
machinery, de facto also the CS could not possibly emerge as a leading sector given its 
limited size in relation to the agricultural sector as a whole (14%). These qualitative 
and quantitative limitations in turn could not possibly have produced a significant 
impact on rural poverty alleviation.
Even if it is too early to assess the impact of the agricultural transformations, and 
beyond the gap existing between the objectives (52) and the realisation, the question 
of the Algerian land reform raises the problem as to whether it is possible to conceive 
any programme of agrarian transformation (with its expected effects on production 
performance and rural poverty) without focusing on the peasantry (especially the 
poor peasantry) as the main immediate beneficiary and the direct architects of such 
transformation. In the light of the circumstances surrounding the adoption and the 
implementation of the AR, the de facto exclusion of the majority of the potential 
beneficiaries of the reform from its benefits [a more equal distribution of land to make 
room for about 1 million poor rural families, 500,000 landless and 425,000 near 
landless living at sub-minimum subsistence level (53)], defines the nature of an 
Agricultural Revolution which is "revolutionary in name only" (54). Out of a target 
population of over 1 million the number of beneficiaries represented less than 
100,000 families altogether. In the context of such a reform "most small peasants 
believed they were being controlled rather than in control of a revolution ostensibly 
being waged on their behalf" (55). At an overall level the programme of AR neither
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prevented the long process of peasant pauperisation, nor promoted their condition of 
farmer/owner and/or their status of a permanent rural proletariat. As a result of the 
process of social differentiation the economic marginalisation of the peasantry has 
resulted in its steady divorce from an exclusively agricultural activity. Under the 
impact of capitalist relations of production, the sale of their produce is thus 
increasingly replaced and taken over by the sale of the labour power (56).
In itself the by-passing of the peasantry revealed the real motivation of a programme 
of AR essentially attached to the exclusive objective of increasing agricultural 
production - "stagnation has been a keynote of Algeria's agricultural production" (57) 
- to meet the increasing urban demand for wage foods which so far had to be met with 
an increased diversion from oil export proceeds. The emergence of a rapidly growing 
and competing industrial sector imposed new terms of relations with agriculture, 
particularly through relatively higher levels of urban wages and the absorption of the 
majority of investible resources. The emphasis enjoyed by industrialisation, whether 
in its social configuration through the dominant classes and groups which identify 
their interests with it, or in its economic aspect in terms of the share of oil surplus it 
enjoys, is such that Algeria "cannot import more and more food without damaging its 
industrial apparatus, or abandoning some part of its plans for importation of 
machinery" (58).
As part of the whole agricultural sector the weight of the CS remains negligible and the 
changes brought about by the "reform" did not go beyond the exclusive technical 
organisation of the co-operative sector itself. In particular the AR did not bring any 
serious challenge to the pre-eminence of private capital invested in the sphere of 
circulation of agricultural production (according to certain estimates (59) merchant 
capital controlled over 2/3 of the domestic market for agricultural and food products). 
The pre-eminence of merchant capital in the distribution of agricultural production 
bears an important relation to the control over the agricultural surplus and its
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utilisation: The size and extent of merchant capital are such that they indirectly 
determine the overall conditions of valorisation of , a great portion of agricultural 
production and consequently its expansion (merchant capital so far remains on the 
outskirts of production and does not attempt to alter the organisation of its labour 
process). In the past its reaction to the threat of an extension of the state marketing 
network proved efficient enough to hold back any product from the market for several 
months, pushing prices up to unprecedented levels (60) and creating shortages whose 
effects in sensitive, large and overcrowded cities guaranteed undreamable profits, and 
threatened social peace. The control over the agricultural domestic market, which may 
accompany a desirable price policy, goes well beyond the scope of the agricultural 
sector alone. One permanent characteristic of this market being the upward price 
instability, there is therefore a constant disruptive tendency which particularly 
affects the process of capital accumulation as the pressure for urban wage increases 
constantly build up (61). The overall limit of the present land reform programme 
calls for an alternative and general agricultural policy capable of embracing the three 
sectors altogether, as a unique structure. Moreover, such a new policy cannot be 
conceived outside a redefinition of the terms which so far have prevailed between 
agriculture and industry.
In the following conclusion, the implications of the study of the overall agrarian issue 
are taken up in the form of a brief assessment while Part IV discusses the terms under 
which the distribution of food consumption of the different groups is interwoven and 
reconciled with the requirements of industrialisation and capital valorisation.
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NOTES
1-In the mind of the Algerian reformers the programme of land reform was worded as 
an "agricultural revolution" (AR) programme. As reforms are whatever reformers 
have in mind, at this stage, the appropriateness of such a formula does not inter into 
our consideration. At a latter stage we will comment on the meaning to attribute to an 
agricultural revolution.
2-This period of truce has objectively cushioned the socio-economic effects of the land 
reform on the landlords. Moreover this period was long enough to allow big landlords 
their reconversion from agricultural to non-agricultural activities and therefore 
transform their agricultural capital into commercial and industrial capital. Viewed in 
these terms landlords did not undergo a considerable loss of economic power as such. 
The new situation reflected therefore more the development of a different form of a 
class alliance.
3-Khennas, S. Petrochimie et agriculture: le cas de I'Algerie. These 3eme Cycle. 
Grenoble. 1976. p. 173.
4-The determination of the size of such units will depend on variable factors according 
to the quality of the land, the capacity of work of the owner and his family as well as 
the level of income it can generate.This point will be taken up at a later stage.
5-Sutton, Keith. Agrarian Reform in Algeria- Proores in the face of disappointment. 
Dilution and Diversion. Rural Poverty and Agrarian Reform. New Delhi. Allied 
Publishers Private Ltd. 1982. p. 361.
6 - 1 b id .
7-The extent of such a land is not known to us but from the information gathered, it 
does not seem to be very important. Besides the problem of assessment of such 
particular nationalisations, there remains the fact that it was the marginal land which 
was chosen to be part of the land fund of the AR sector. On this point we will come back 
later.
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8-Benachenhou, A. Op., Cit. P. 95.
For an account of the discrepancies in the balance sheet of land nationalisations 
existing between the different sources, see Sutton, Keith. Agricultural Co-operatives 
in Algeria. Year Book of Agricultural Co-operation 1981. Plunkett Foundation. 
Oxford. U.K
9-The side effects of nationalisations of such public lands meant that the communes and 
the Wilayate lost the ground rent which they formerly perceived from the private 
landowners. The state intervention however compensated for such a loss of income out 
of the public budget.
10-Such highly publicised donations which were over exploited up to demagogy were 
advocated as evidence of national solidarity and national unity. In effect such a political 
campaign particularly revealed that some of the donators were important government 
dignitaries. In this respect this operation showed that prominent political figures of 
the Algerian ruling class were in fact important landlords themselves. In the words of 
R. Tlemcani "many FLN-ALN [army and party] cadres rewarded themselves with land 
during the armed revolution and the moment of independence. As a case in point, KaYd 
Ahmed, head of the FLN (1967-77)and member of the Revolutionary Council, owns 
more than 3,000 ha in Tiaret, which he had not, according to some people, owned prior 
to independence. His removal from the FLN was associated, according to people close to 
the pinnacle of power, with his refusal to give part of his property, as did other 
ruling ruling elements did, to the FNRA, the National Fund of the Agrarian Revolution, 
and his opposition to the agrarian revolution in general". Op. Cit. p. 135. Footnote 
N928.
11-A.P.C and A.P.W became extended executive power organs so as to include 
"representatives" of the peasants: the U.P.A (the national union of the peasants).
12-All members of the local executive power are elected members. The regional 
governor (the Wali), is nominated and as such, he represents the government and his 
authority is that of the state itself. His political power is such that, he can dismiss 
any, or all of the elected members of the APC, or the APCE. In the last analysis, his
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power always prevails. In the case of elected members of the APC, their power ought to 
be weighted against the background of the system of representation. Algeria being a one 
party state, any candidate must be godfathered by the sole party (the FLN), if he or she 
is to stand for any election. This procedure guaranties that the elected candidates will 
have to follow the political programme of the party first. As all elected candidates are 
mediated through the party, the selection of political representatives of the executive 
always falls within the official line of the party and the government.
13-Sutton, Keith. Op. Cit. p. 370.
14-M. Almeyra, Guillermo How Real was Algeria's Agrarian Revolution? CERES. FAO. 
March-April. 1979. Footnote N2 1. P. 35.
15-lt is also worth noting that such concealments are possible with the implicit 
collaboration of the local authorities as they are the ones which know best the local 
situation, at both personal and impersonal level
16-The programme of AR was embodied into two major legal texts, The Charter of the 
AR and the Ordinance of AR promoted during November 1971.
17-Revolution Agraire. Presidence du Conseil. R.A.D.P. 1971. P. 23.
18-Whenever the farmer directly and personally exploits his farm with the help of 
his family, he can employ "punctual wage labourers". As no practical provisions were 
made to define the notion of a punctual use of wage labourers, this possibility in fact 
gives de facto an absolute freedom to farmers to employ whatever level of wage 
labourers they feel is necessary.
On the whole there remains the puzzle in which the Algerian reformers put themselves 
in: how to reconcile the abolition of the system of wage earning when, at the same time, 
we maintain the system by the very nature of which, this class is precisely 
reproduced, a system based on the private ownership of the means of production. It is 
therefore a theoretical as well as a historical misconception to want to abolish the use 
of wage labour, without at the same time abolishing the class of capitalists and the 
class of wage earners.
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19-Such provisions maintain the original economic inequality that existed before the 
introduction of the AR. Moreover, if the income of a permanent in the SMS was taken as 
a reference or yardstick, this reference however excluded the size of his family. The 
social differentiation of the peasantry was therefore reproduced in all its 
manifestations.
20-In any case, the promotion of intensive farming always come up against the notion 
of the punctual use of wage labour. This clearly draws one's attention to the 
technological model that the reformers want to promote: the mechanisation of 
agriculture.
21-One cannot exclude the possibility that potential nationalisable landowners 
classified themselves in the category of exceptions. It is also worth noting that the 
comparison between the"exceptions" and the "nationalisable" suggest that in view of 
the proportion of the former, the "nationalisable" were in fact the exception and the 
"exceptions" the general rule. This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that 
the whole programme of AR was after all focused on the category of "nationalisable".
22-MARA/CNRA Balance sheet 1974. Quoted by Benhouria, Tahar Op. Cit. p. 196.
23-lt is worth noting that "agricultural self-management" has not been considered as 
a possible way of organising and managing this new sector. The relative failure of the 
experience, particularly, from the viewpoint of agricultural production, has been 
somehow accepted in a somewhat implicit and indirect manner.
24-Individual attributions occurred only whenever the co-operative form was 
"materially impossible". Beyond the technical argument (which in fact is not clear), 
that justified the preference for the co-operative form, one finds a constancy of the 
Algerian AR: as potential beneficiaries, poor peasants were not part of the mode and 
conditions of utilisation of the land. At all levels decisions were made for them.
25-See chapter I.
26-The creation of CAPCSs allows to highlight in its own way and a contrario, the 
extent of the deficit of the "traditional" sector in terms of modern inputs.
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27-Sutton, K. Agricultural Co-operation in Algeria. Op. Cit. p. 181.
28-Benhouria, Tahar. Op., Cit., P. 207.
29-Ghose, A. K. Agrarian reforms in contemporary developing countries. Croom Helm 
St Martin's. 1983. pp. 19-20.
30-Bessaoud, Omar . Revue Du Tiers Monde Volume XXI N2 83. July-September 
1980. P. 618.
31-The CAEC form is close to the CAPRA system with a ratio of 10 ha/beneficiary.
32-See Appendix III.3.
33-The first years of implementation of the AR have not been purposely choosed as 
reference in order to avoid large and misleading output increases, i.e. until production 
organisation is "routinely" established away from major disrupting external 
influences.
34-See Appendix AIII.4.
35-Bouzidi, Abdelmadjid Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiques & 
Politioues. N2 3 September. 1980. PP. 417-418.
36-Statistiques. Office des Statistiques. Algiers, N2 2, 1984. P. 55.
37-See Appendix AIII.5.
38-lbid., P. 174.
39-See on this point the article by O. Bessaoud and particularly pp. 616-617.
40-Benachenhou, A. L'exode rural en Alaerie. Ibid., P. 97.
The exact distribution of the beneficiaries according to their social background is not 
available to us so far.
41 -Ib id .
42-Jasra, N. Les debuts des CAPRA: difficultes et esooires. Terres et Progres, N2 5,
Mars 1974. Quoted by Raffinot, M and Jacquemot, P. Ibid., P. 344.
43-The structure of CAPRA was as follow: 20% of CAPRAs have an area between 100 
and 200 ha, 46% between 200 and 500 ha and 20% between 500 and 100 ha.
44-Bedrani, Slimane. Op. Cit. p. 78.
45- actual fact there is no such a thing as an "exploitation of man by man".
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Exploitation, as understood in the sense of political economy, i.e. when devoid from any 
moral and subjective interpretation, the private appropriation of the surplus labour 
of the direct producers by the private owners of the means of production. As such, 
surplus appropriation is always mediated by the social relations of production which 
transform part of society into the representatives of capital and the other part as those 
of the labouring class. Moreover, such a surplus does not appropriation involve 
individuals as such, but always individuals as part of a given class.
46-Gutelman, Michel . Reforme et Mystification Aqraires. Maspero. Paris. 1971. 
P-17.
4 7 -lb id .
48- An average property can well be transformed into an economically large farm unit 
provided the investment it carries out is important, regular and intensive in nature.
49-See Appendix AIII.6.
50-Chaulet, Claudine Pavsans et collectifs de producteurs dans la R.A Algerienne. 
Cahiers du CREA N2 1 Juillet-Septembre 1976. P. 132. Quoted by Benhouria, Tahar. 
P. 204.
51-Between 1972 and 1980, the average yield for cereals was 5 quintals/ha.
52-For methodological purposes we left out of the scope of our study part of the 
objective of the programme of the AR, i.e. mainly Phase three and Phase four as well 
as the significance of a package of social measures. Phase three objective was 
concerned with the protection of the balance between the ecological environment and 
the development of livestock breeding. In particular it wanted to provide for the 
protection against overgrazing by setting up animal breeding co-operatives, helping 
the settlement of nomads, initiating a more balanced distribution of flocks via the 
nationalisation of large stock breeders, a greater protection of shepherds, etc. 
Progress concerning this phase is very slow particularly in view of the problems still 
associated with the organisation of the first two phases. Phase four which is still in 
preparation, is essentially focused on problems linked to the use, development and
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control of agricultural water utilisation. Among the series of social measures taxes 
were eliminated for farmer and education was being extended in the countryside. The 
most ambitious programme of all was the plan to build 1,000 "socialist villages" 
by...1980. This project was meant to provide the agricultural population in general 
and the beneficiaries of the AR in particular with dwellings meeting the standard of a 
modern life: running water, electricity, schools, medical centres, etc. The long term 
objective of the project remains that of fixing the agricultural population on the one 
hand and by the same token discouraging rural migration. At the end of 1978, only 201 
villages were build
53-Charte de la Revolution Aoraire. Presidence du Conseil. Algiers. 1971. pp. IT- 
12 .
54-Agricultural Co-operatives in Algeria. Op. Cit. p. 186.
55-Knauss, Peter. Algeria's Agrarian Revolution"'.Peasant Control or ControLoi 
Peasants? African Studies Review. 31/CD.
56-As evidenced from the following table, and a far as the population of poor farmers 
is concerned, agriculture contributed less and less to the formation of their income.
Table III.3. 9: Origin of incomes of independent farmers as a % of total income.
Origin of incomes 1960 1968 1973
Agricultural 87% 69% 4 0 %
Non-agricultural 1 3% 31% 6 0%
Total 100 100 100
Source: A. Amara. Revue Alg6rienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques. 
Volume XVII. N2 4, December 1980. p. 71.
57-Sutton, Keith. Agricultural Co-operatives in Algeria. Op. Cit. p. 185.
58-M. Almeyra, Guillermo. Op. Cit. p. 35
59-Benhouria, Tahar. Ibid, p. 211.
60-Price instability is a characteristic of the Algerian domestic agricultural 
market.Variation of prices for fruits and vegetables can range from 50% to well over 
500% and 800% within periods as short as two months.
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61-When the hardship of life develops through the inability to increase the standard of 
living via a wage increase, industrial workers tend to resort to an indirect form of 
resistance: working less intensively and/or even resorting to sabotaging their 
instruments of work. As far as agricultural workers are concerned, their form of 
resistance is expressed in a loss of incentive for their work accompanied by an 
increased tendency for self-consumption.
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CONCLUSION Part III
The nature of agrarian change which so far dominated the agricultural sphere of 
production has not fundamentally altered the unequal access to land at the level of both 
the private sector (the transformations which took place within this sector have not 
substantially affected the structure of land ownership), and the "public” sector (the 
"SMS" still comparatively enjoys the same advantages as those which were its 
beneficiaries before independence). The first post-independent agrarian measures 
focused mainly on the progressive total state take-over of the colonial sector. As. such 
this policy enabled the achievement of two objectives: the preservation of the colonial 
sector in its essential economic features (size, technical labour process, supporting 
structures, mechanisation, type of crops, etc.), and the integration of the colonial 
farms under the ownership of the state. In short, the substitution of one form of 
property (the individual ownership of the colonists), for another (that of the state) 
was not accompanied by a major alteration in the basic capitalist relations of 
production opposing the means of production (the estates and the technical equipment), 
their owner (the state) and those wage workers who were employed (existing now 
however, under a new ideological reference: managing committees, general assembly, 
workers councils, etc.).
The potential of a peasant land reform following the freeing of the colonial sector from 
its masters was therefore lost to the hegemonic construction of the post-colonial state. 
The contribution of the "self-managed sector" (SMS) therefore left unaltered the 
panorama of overall agriculture. By the 1970s, the dualistic nature of such an 
agriculture was in fact further exacerbated. The constitution of a new sub- 
agricultural sector of AR, constructed on the model of "self-management", with a high 
ratio of ha/worker combining an intensive use of industrial inputs and relying on state 
supporting structures, extended de facto the domain of state agriculture at the expense 
of the traditional/private sector, an extension which corresponds in spirit with the
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development of the colonial sector itself. The marginalisation of the fraction of 
nationalised small peasants from the communal land, combined with the already 
landless and near-landless excluded de facto from the AR, has meant that the 1970s 
programme of land reform was in nature and in essence an anti-peasantry programme, 
i.e. a programme more based on the extension of state agriculture than on the actual 
'de-colonisation' of the ex-colonial sector based on an openly farmer option of 
agricultural development.
Originating from a long and continuous process of confiscation of peasant land, the 
constitution and reproduction of the "modern" sector of "self-management" is, from a 
historical point of view, a reminder of both that confiscation and of its constancy. Just 
as in the not too distant colonial past, the "traditional" agricultural sector, with the 
predominance of the small and middle peasantry, remains far outside the realm of 
progress and development and as such, remains unaffected by AR. In this respect, and 
in so far as the small peasantry is concerned, the great obstacle to agricultural 
expansion and land access remains not only the large property available in the private 
sector, but also and particularly the state property itself. Dominant, this form of 
property has also excluded itself from one of the main objective of land reform, i.e. the 
limitation of large property. As during colonisation, the same agrarian contradiction 
was reproduced in the form of a consolidation of the dominant sector at the expense of 
the traditional sector. But as pointed out earlier, the contradiction does not stem from 
the existence of the private sector as such but from the conditions of existence and the 
conditions of reproduction of the ex-colonial sector itself. The priority given to 
raising agricultural production, on the basis of an extension of the already existing 
capitalist organisation of state agriculture, over the issue of the peasants' access to 
land (an option which in itself represents another conception of capitalist development 
of agriculture), is what characterises the dominant features of the state agricultural 
policy. In other words, agrarian transformations were mainly perceived through the 
immediate goal of market extension obtained on the basis of the reliance upon the upper
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and middle peasantry of the private sector, as well as on an extension of the state 
agricultural sector itself through the creation of the sector of AR. The consolidation of 
agrarian structures along such lines, or simply the homogenisation of the agrarian 
mode of production via an extension of capitalist relations, is one of the main 
achievements of the Algerian programme of land reform. As such, as we will argue, 
such agrarian transformations are ultimately inseparable from the promotion of a 
policy which directly touches upon the mode of determination of the value of labour 
power. More precisely, it is an agrarian reformism bound up with the development of 
capitalism on the basis of cheap labour, for at subsistence levels the price of food is 
also the price of labour power itself.
The combination of a capitalist transformation of agriculture with the determination of 
a policy of management of labour power has not however been possible without the 
overwhelming intervention of the state and the financial means at its disposal. In the 
last part of this thesis it is precisely our aim to assess the forms under which such an 
intervention proceeded as well as the conditions under which the reproduction of 
labour power in relation to the objective of a cheap food policy was achieved. The state 
regulatory policy of the value of labour power will be also considered with respect to 
its main levels of intervention resting on a price policy (and a de facto wage policy), 
and an import policy in relation to a nutritional goal determined on the basis of the 
supply of a given set of wage goods.
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PART IV
THE MODE OF REGULATION OF LABOUR POWER AND
THE STATE OF FOOD NEEDS.
Introduction
The management of food needs in Algeria is the product of a specific context, that of an 
intensive process of capital accumulation in industry resulting in the rapid extension 
of the wage-earning system, and a corresponding important increase in food demand 
that on the evidence available the domestic agricultural sector is unable to meet. As 
such, the mode of management of labour power through the promotion of cheap food 
policies, is an integral part of capital accumulation whose development based on the 
preservation of the formation of a rate of profit below which the process of capital 
diffusion can be in jeopardy, requires the direct management of low wages (as the 
embodiment of capital the state appears as the main social regulator of capitalist 
relations). Along such a line of argument our implicit assumption is that the 
valorisation of capital - and its related conditions of production of surplus produce - in 
the context of peripheral capitalism, by its very nature, requires precisely such a 
condition.
The conditions under which the regulation of food demand emerged were directly 
associated with state management. The weight of state intervention is also such that it 
has become the main regulator of food needs. From the standpoint of realisation of such 
a policy, the insufficient contribution of agricultural surplus to the physiological 
reproduction of labour power appears both directly under the form of a persistent level 
of food imports (25% of the value of total imports are devoted to food imports) and 
indirectly through the structural shrinking of agricultural export proceeds 
contribution to meet food imports (the value of agricultural exports in agricultural 
imports evolved as follows: 408% in 1938, 379% in 1948, 166% in 1958, 86% in
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1968, 6% in 1980, and 2% in 1985).
Beyond initiating the setting up of an industrial system of production (as seen in Part 
II), it was therefore oil rent which still provided the condition of realisation of the 
management of food demand. The chronic stagnation of agricultural production (as seen 
in Part III), meant that the reliance on the international food market acquired de facto 
a prominent weight in the daily diet of the Algerian population. The study of average 
intakes reveals from that standpoint the overall characteristics of food consumption and 
the trend of its structure. As such, this study epitomises at this immediate level the 
nature of the relation between the respective contribution of domestic agriculture and 
international trade.
Translated in nutritional terms, the assessment of food consumption reveals also the 
two main characteristics of food consumption in Algeria: the overwhelming overall 
weight of cereals calories in the average diet of Algerians, and the degree of social 
differentiation between social groups, expressed in terms of both calorie intake and 
particularly animal proteins. The determination of the overall pattern of food 
consumption is also seen as a direct reflection of the conditions under which economic 
surplus in general and agricultural surplus in particular is being distributed between 
the different social groups. The dominant relations of production within the 
agricultural sector (as seen in Part III), and the mode of valorisation of industrial 
capital through the mode of state consumption of oil rent (as seen in Part II), emerge as 
the main mechanisms which govern the circulation and distribution of food products.
The management of food constraint, because of the necessity of allocating a fraction of 
oil rent away from capital accumulation to meeting domestic food demand, has more and 
more acquired the status of a policy a part entiere. Through state intervention the 
reproduction of an increasing fraction of the labour force is thus determined. The 
supply of wage goods at fixed prices constitutes the corner-stone of the state food policy 
of intervention (wage policy being by definition dominated by a rigid form of nominal 
state wage revision). As such this policy's aim is, in the last analysis, the
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determination of the value of the labour force at the lowest possible cost. The rationale 
requirement of a cheap labour force compatible with an intensive policy of capital 
accumulation is however accompanied by the de facto exclusion of products such as red 
meat, fruit and vegetables from the scope of intervention and price control, a category 
of products catered for mainly by the private capitalist sector.
The massive injection of incomes accompanying the industrialisation programme, 
coupled with the drop in agricultural labour productivity, has meant that the above 
category of products underwent the highest price increase while fixed price products 
by definition experienced an over-consumption trend for low income groups. 
Moreover, while the share of food expenditure in the income of households rose, mainly 
under the impact of free determined price products (as well as a result of the 
persistence of a food determination of wages), the development of a capitalist 
agriculture based on the promotion of products with a high added value and a 
comparatively low nutritional value (mainly fruit, vegetables and meat), at the same 
time created the potential for a diversion away from the domestic production of wage 
goods with a high nutritional value (mainly cereals, pulses, milk), but with a low 
added value as a result of the state's policy of price stabilisation. The pressure from 
commercial agriculture therefore contributes to an increase in state intervention in 
order to take account of the parallel increased over-consumption in fixed price 
products. So far only the weight of state agriculture and its authoritarian management 
have been able to prevent the full effects of such a tension between the two markets 
(the de facto diversion away from state marketing networks of a fraction of the 
production - particularly for fruit and vegetables - of the "self-managed" sector in 
favour of the private marketing network is an indication of the mechanisms of 
attraction exercised by high prices).
The constancy of the state food policy based on the supply of wage goods at a fixed price 
was essentially exercised through three main favourable factors: favourable domestic 
producers prices (until the 1980s, domestic producers - particularly those of the
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public sector - were put to the contribution of such a policy of price stabilisation with 
the result that producer prices were literally frozen for over two decades); 
exceptionally favourable international oil prices (particularly from the early 1970s 
to the mid-1980s) and relatively low international food prices as epitomised by the 
existence of American and particularly European food surpluses.
The role of oil rent, by both bridging the gap between production and food demand, 
enabling therefore the supply of wage goods at fixed prices, also contributed to 
specialising agriculture into two main sectors: a fully private capitalist agriculture 
regulated by the demand of high income groups dominated by "luxury" products on the 
one hand, and a fully administered state capitalist agriculture regulated by the demand 
of low income groups dominated by the market of wage goods supplied at fixed prices 
increasingly dependent on food imports - particularly cereals - as a result of a 
persistent stagnant agricultural production on the other.
Let us see more in detail how the configuration of food consumption and its social 
patterns were intimately interrelated with the state food regulatory policy of labour 
power.
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CHAPTER I
FOOD CONSUMPTION IN ALGERIA
In troduction.
Food consumption, as the direct expression of food needs, is based on a social 
determination which dictates the specific historical conditions in which consumers find 
themselves (1). Whether in its content, value or nutritional dimension, food 
consumption always displays such a social - and necessarily transient - character. As a 
result of the specific conditions under which the post colonial capital accumulation of 
Algeria is being operated, the study of food consumption is the study of the spontaneous 
conditions under which the different social groups assume their own reproduction, but 
a reproduction that remains inseparable from capital accumulation itself: the 
determination of the value of labour power, in which the subsistence content is the 
major component, is also indirectly the determination of the economic surplus 
potentially available for investment purposes. In that context "the needs that 
production satisfies are the needs of production itself, the demand of its reproduction" 
(2). It is only under the methodological framework of such a mode of determination that 
the analysis proceeds to the study of the terms of access of the different social groups to 
food consumption. In particular an attempt will be made to highlight the features of the 
main emerging dominant food models as well as their significance in relation to the 
organisation of agricultural production, food imports and nutritional considerations.
I. Preliminary methodological remarks.
The study of food availability is derived from two main sources: Food Balance Sheets 
(FBS) and Household Budgetary Surveys (HBS) or Household Expenditure Surveys 
(HES). FBS are by far the most immediate way of starting an investigation into the food 
situation of any given country. Their construction based on a routinely statistical 
compilation of relevant data makes them a relatively attractive and practical tool of
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food investigation. Beyond considerations pertaining to their degree and scope in data 
collection, which are usually underestimated (3), their use remains rather limited in 
many ways. Indeed the data available from them are related to aggregate averages which 
only provide indications about the relationship between total population and the total 
(or particular) food consumption (in fact food supply) available for consumption. The 
use of food availability does in fact take into account provision for other uses: waste, 
seed, animal feed , etc . What the data available through FBS do not and cannot say is 
how food is being distributed between the different social groups or classes. When one 
relies on average measures to conduct a study on food consumption through food 
availability, one has to assume a homogeneous population with undifferentiated income 
levels, an assumption rather remote from the forces that shape the structure and 
magnitude of the diversity of consumption. As such FBS can only lead to four main uses: 
The determination of the average level of food consumption of a given country as a 
result of the trends of growth of agricultural production, food imports and population. 
The structure of food consumption within its nutritional dimension. An international 
classification of countries according to their per capita food profile. A tool to cross­
check the findings of HES.
The straightforward policy implications of such an approach are mainly of two kinds. 
How to increase the level of food consumption (which is incidentally the level of food 
availability), either through domestic production and/or imports, to meet the 
theoretical food requirements of the population as a whole. In an opposite direction, FBS 
also serve the purpose of establishing the surplus of food availability vis-a-vis the 
theoretical needs of the population. As such their purpose is to determine the extent of 
food exports. Perceived from that angle, this type of policy implication takes for 
granted that the main constraint being food output, an increased food supply 
automatically translates itself into more food for every one, leaving aside the existence 
of the economic mechanisms of income generation and distribution. "Efforts devoted to 
expanding the output of allegedly key commodities, e.g., food, are exposed as being 
inadequate because of the lack of connection between changes in production and changes
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in purchasing power in the hands of the poor" (4). The second major policy implication 
derived from FBS raises the question of how to change the structure of per capita food 
supply in terms of the weight attached to vegetable products and animal products so as 
to assure a richer nutrient diet for the population as a whole.
Given the limits attached to the use of FBS, HES will be our main source of study of food 
consumption (the use of FBS will be used mainly for cross-checking purposes). Since 
the early 1960s five main household surveys were carried out in Algeria. Each one 
carried its own objectives and scope. The 1959 household survey was carried out by 
France before the political independence of Algeria. The 1967 survey of "Grand 
Algiers", was to assess the food situation of Algiers and its communes. The first global 
household expenditure survey of 1968 was carried out before the launching of the 
industrial policy programme of Algeria in 1970 and was conducted by A.A.R.D.E.S 
(Algerian Association for Demographic, Economic and Social Research). A partial 
survey in 1977 was limited to the study of the rural households of the private 
agricultural sector. The 1980 HES concerned the total Algerian population. In our 
present investigation our concern will be restricted to the two main Surveys: that of 
1968 and that of 1980 (5).
II. The major find ings of the 1968 survey.
A. Methodology.
The survey was based on the method of interviews for considerations pertaining to the 
household income level and the amount of food consumed at dinner times. The actual 
weighing method was limited to food consumed at lunch time only. The survey was based 
on the communal (i.e. the smallest administrative subdivision of the territory) 
distribution of the population derived from the 1965 census (6). The presentation of 
the results of the survey in each stratum focuses on 18 socio-professional categories 
(SPC), each with its weight within the population including: Permanent agricultural 
workers (16.8%) (7), Retail traders (0.3%), Handicraftsmen & handicraft workers 
(7.2%), Middle executives (4.1%), Clerks (1.7%), Permanent & temporary workers 
(3.3%), Other permanent unskilled workers (5.3%), Other temporary unskilled
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workers (1%), Self-employed in petty jobs (0.7%), Law & security enforcement 
members (4.7%), Retired (7.1%), Unemployed (3.8%), Rentiers (97.1%), 
Employees & wholesale traders (13%), Liberal professions & top executives (0.4%), 
Employed in services (2.3%). The findings of the HES represent food consumption in 
three manners: In quantitative terms corresponding to the amount of each category of 
food product consumed by each socio-professional category (S.P.C) in each stratum, in 
qualitative terms corresponding to the level of calorie intake, the proportion of 
proteins by type of food origin, the level of fat, etc. and in relation to income level.
B- The quantitative findings of the HES (8). 
a-Distribution of food consumption by stratum and region.
Table IV. 1.1: Structure of food intakes (U=kg/person/year)in 1968.
Grand Algiers Northern Strata Northern Southern Algeria Algeria
1 2+3 4 Algeria Algeria without Grand Algiers
.CEREALS 1 1 0 1 6 0 2 3 3 2 5 2 2 2 5 1 2 8 2 1 7 2 0 8
Hard wheat 4 0 9 5 1 3 8 1 6 5 1 4 3 8 8 1 3 8 1 3 0
Soft wheat 5 9 5 5 4 4 2 3 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 8
Barley 1 1 1 0 51 6 4 4 7 5 4 4 4 0
Bread 9 3 51 2 7 9 2 2 3 8 2 3 2 9
Potatoes 41 3 0 2 0 1 7 21 1 6 2 0 2 2
Pulses 1 4 8 7 6 6 5 6 7.0
-Fresh 12 6 3 2 3 3 3 4.0
-D r y 2 2 4 4 3 2 3 3.0
VEGETABLES 6 6 4 5 3 0 2 1 2 9 5 3 3 1 3 3
E f i U I T S 5 4 2 9 2 7 2 1 2 4 5 6 2 6 2 9
-Fresh 5 0 2 7 2 2 15 19 1 5 1 9 21
-D r y 4 2 5 6 4 41 7 8.0
M E A T 1 6 1 3 9 9 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1
Bovine 1.6 1 1 .5 1 .4 .6 0.7
Ovine 1 1 10 5 6 7 8 7 8.0
Poultry 1.5 .6 .4 .4 .4 .4 .2 4.5
Eggs 1.5 .6 .4 .3 .4 .5 .4 0.5
Other 4 .8 2.2 1.8 1.2 2.9 1.6 1.3
Fish 3 3 1 .6 1 .2 1 1.3
Oil & fat 13 1 1 9 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
of animal origin 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
vegetable oils 1 1 1 0 8 8 9 9 9 9.0
Animal Drod. 
including animal
iat§...(sob. total)
2 1 1 7 1 1 1 0 . 6 1 2 1 3 . 2 1 2 1 2 . 3
Source: Autrey, M. Ibid. P. 98.
From one stratum to another there were significant differences. With a few exceptions,
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the Southern population hold the lowest intakes of Algeria, particularly for cereals, 
pulses, milk and fish. In turn Northern Algeria offers its own contrasts. Patterns of 
food intakes vary considerably between the urban stratum and the rural stratum. Grand 
Algiers, which offers the best profile of an urban food consumption, has the lowest 
cereal intake of all strata (110 kg). At the other end of the social spectrum, the rural 
stratum with 252 kg of cereal intake, holds the highest consumption level. On average, 
a rural consumer consumes twice as much cereals as his urban counterpart. In turn the 
structure of cereal intake tends to be altered under the impact of an emerging urban 
pattern of consumption dominated by soft wheat and bread. The proportion of hard 
wheat, a typically traditional staple, tends to decrease with the degree of urbanisation. 
Thus, if the rural consumer consumes four times as much hard wheat as his 
counterpart in Grand Algiers, conversely the latter consumes nearly three times more 
soft wheat than the former. This trend is best evidenced when we look at the quantity of 
soft wheat-based bread consumed in each category of stratum: 93 kg in Grand Algiers, 
51 kg in the urban stratum, 27 kg in the intermediate stratum and 9 kg in the rural 
stratum. If, on a whole, urban consumers experience the lowest cereal intake, they 
however display the highest intake for ail other food products, i.e. pulses and 
particularly fresh pulses (broad beans, peas, beans..), vegetables, fruits, meat, offal, 
poultry, eggs, fish, sugar and oil & fats.
Southern Algeria is a different case. Though the Southern population displays the lowest 
cereal intakes compared to those of Northern Algeria (without Grand Algiers), it does 
not however experience any increased intake for other products except for vegetables 
(an intake lower than that of Grand Algiers and greater than that of stratum 1), sugar 
(the highest intake (9) of all Algeria), meat (meat consumption in the South bears a 
relation to the nomadic economy based on sheep farming and date farming, the Algerian 
nomadic population being essentially of a Southern origin), and dried fruits (dates). 
The South experiences the lowest intakes for roots & tubers (16 kg against 37 kg for 
stratum 4 and 41 kg for Grand Algiers), pulses (5 kg against 6 kg in the rural North, 
8 kg in the urban stratum and 14 kg in Grand Algiers) and animal products in general
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(32 kg against 44 kg in the rural areas, 50 kg in the urban stratum and 93 kg in Grand 
Algiers).
From the above characteristics, one can distinguish three main models of food 
consumption. Firstly, a southern model with a low intake of cereals and animal 
products, and a high intake of vegetables. As such, this model appears as an hybrid 
model. By certain aspects it is a rural model (low proportion of animal products) and 
by others it is an urban model (low proportion of cereals). Such characteristics depict 
this model as the poorest of all. Secondly a rural model typified by the highest intakes 
of cereals (particularly hard wheat and barley) and low intakes of animal products. 
This model is a grain-based diet par excellence. Thirdly an urban model characterised 
by a low intake of cereals consumption (particularly hard wheat and barley), the 
highest intakes for animal products as well as for fish, vegetables and fruits. This 
model is rich in terms of both the variety of products and of the quality of food in the 
form of animal products. As such it is close to the profile of food diet prevailing in 
developed countries. At an aggregative level, the above patterns of food consumption 
apply to the following populations: 3.5 million persons (or 30% of the total 
population) for the urban model, 7.6 million persons (or 63% of the total population) 
for the rural model, 0.9 million persons (or 7% of the total population) for the 
Southern model. But such a level of aggregation is bound to hide considerable 
differences depending on fractions of the population belonging to given social groups 
according to their economic position and their economic power of command, as 
expressed by the share of the social product accruing to them. The aggregated 
presentation of food intakes by stratum ought to give place to a disaggregated 
presentation by social category in order to judge the terms of access of the different 
fractions of the population to food supply (domestic and international).
b. Food consumption by Socio-economic categories: a quantitative 
approach.
The presentation of daily intakes for each stratum according to the 18 SPCs, and for the 
main food products is heavy and cumbersome at this level. Instead, we will attempt to
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highlight, in a horizontal presentation (the comparison between SPCs), the degree of 
discrepancy existing in each stratum between the SPCs experiencing the lowest and the 
highest intakes. In so doing we enable our horizontal presentation of the SPCs, i.e. 
independently of their respective strata, to be complemented with the extent of the gaps 
existing within each stratum.
1. Horizontal presentation of food intakes between SPC: the case of the 
highest and lowest intakes.
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Table IV. 1.2: Food discrepancies between social groups (U=kg/person/year) in 1968.
Stratum Product SPCs with Highest Lowest SPCs with Gap % extent
Highest intake intake intake lowest intake of the gap
1 Cereals Permanent agr. workers 217 107 Handi..& handi. workers 110 50%
2+3 / / Farmers 294 157 Clerks 137 46%
4 1 1 Season.agr. workers 285 171 / / 114 40%
South 1 I Non-qual. workers 145 101 Seas. agri. workers 44 30%
1 Barley Seas.agri. workers 35 2 Middle exec 33 94%
2+3 / / Farmers 76 8 Services 68 89%
4 / / / / 81 12 Middle exec. 69 85%
South / / Retired 9 1 Non-qual. workers 8 89%
1 Bread Law & sec. members 73 23 Farmers 50 68%
2+3 / / Services 68 4 / / 64 94%
4 / / Clerks 36 4 / / 32 89%
South / / I I 73 6 Seas. agri. workers 67 92%
1 Animal, prod. Employees + whol. sale trad. 119 23 Unemployed 96 80%
2+3 / / Farmers 57 20 Seas.agri. workers 37 65%
4 / / Middle exec. 70 12 Unemployed 58 83%
South / / Clerks 61 11 Seas.agri. workers 50 82%
1 Pulses Employees + wholesale trad. 27 2 Seas. agri. workers 25 92%
2+3 / / Retail traders 11 5 Perm.agri. workers 6 54%
4 / / Law & sec. members 31 2 Temporary employed 29 93%
South / / Clerks 9 2 /  / 7 78%
1 Vege. Employees + wholesale trad. 128 52 Temporary employed 76 59%
2+3 / / Clerks 100 38 Farmers 62 62%
4 / / Law & sec. members 122 16 / / 106 87%
South / / Qual.workers temp. empl. 155 36 Seas. agr. workers 119 77%
1 Fruits Law & sec. members 54 14 Temporary employed 40 74%
2+3 / / Clerks 46 10 Seas. agr. workers 36 78%
4 /  / Middle exec. 38 7 Unemployed 31 81%
South / / Farmers 92 25 Temporary employed 67 73%
1 Milk Employees + wholesale trad. 66 14 Unemployed 52 79%
2+3 / / Farmers 40 11 Temporary employed 29 72%
4 /  / / / 38 7 Unemployed 31 81%
South /  / Clerks 31 3 Qual.workers 28 90%
Source: Computed on the basis of M. Autrey's report.
The above reveals extreme inequalities. The rates of discrepancies range from 30% for 
cereals (the lowest discrepancy of all) to well above 90%. The relatively low rates for 
cereal intakes show the pre-eminence of cereals in the overall diet of the population on 
the one hand, and the type of model of reference on the other ( in that case the extent of 
the discrepancy can better reflect the expression of the model of reference (10) -
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urban or rural - rather than that of a given deficit). As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the terms of discrepancies cannot be assessed without having in mind the 
"status" of the food products involved. Broadly speaking, two main categories of 
products ought to be distinguished: subsidised products, of which cereals are the main 
component, and non-subsidised .
The most significant aspect of discrepancy rates is by no means their ability to identify 
the recurrent SPCs which are to be found at the highest levels and/or at the lowest 
levels of food intakes depending on the underlying model of reference. The SPCs which 
display the lowest food intakes are to be found among those categories whose diet is 
essentially a grain-based diet. They include: agricultural workers (seasonal & 
permanent), the non-agricultural workers who are temporary employed, the 
unemployed, the unskilled workers and the farmers (11). If, however, one is to extend 
this list to the social categories which display similar intakes (12), it would extend to 
the self-employed in petty jobs, the retired and the employed in services. For non­
cereal products the SPCs with the highest intakes are to be found among employees & 
wholesale traders, farmers (the superior income fraction), middle and top executives, 
Law and security enforcement agents, clerks, and qualified workers.
In all, the SPCs with the immediate lowest non-cereal intakes, i.e. excluding those 
approaching such levels, represent about 60% of all Algerian households. In 
comparison, those with the highest intakes represent about 13% of all households. 
Thus, as far as the level of intakes goes, the Algerian diet is very unequal in its social 
distribution. This is an important recurring characteristic of the food situation in 
Algeria. Viewed from a different angle, i.e. independently of their distribution by 
stratum, the overall distribution of SPCs by food intake, reveals another perception of 
the unequal terms of access to food consumption.
2. Vertica l/h ierarchical presentation of food intakes by SPC.
Such a presentation concerns the main food products.
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Table IV. 1. 3: Cereal intakes for Algeria without Grand Algiers (U= kg/person/year) in 1968.
Socio-Professional Categories
Hard wheat
C E R E A L S
Soft wheat Barley Bread
T o ta l
All SPCs (averaae). 1 3 8 3 5 4 4 2 4 2 1  7
Farmers 1 6 8 2 0 7 9 5 2 6 8
Permanent agricultural workers 1 3 8 4 8 31 1 8 2 1 7
Seasonal agricultural workers 1 5 9 2 8 6 8 7 2 5 5
Retail traders 9 8 4 5 1 9 4 3 1 6 2
Handicraft & handicraft workers 2 0 5 3 4 6 6 3 2 2 0 6
Middle cadres 1 0 2 5 9 6 5 6 1 6 8
Clerks 8 4 5 9 7 5 6 1 5 0
Qualified workers 1 1 2 4 7 1 6 4 3 1 7 7
Unskilled workers permanently employed 1 3 3 3 9 2 6 3 8 1 9 8
Unskilled workers temporary employed 1 2 0 4 5 3 3 2 0 1 9 8
Self-employed in petty jobs 1 2 0 3 5 3 2 1 6 1 8 7
Law & security enforcement members 9 9 5 6 1 1 5 4 1 6 6
Retired 1 5 4 2 8 3 8 21 221
Unemployed 111 2 7 3 8 2 2 1 7 6
Rentiers 121 1 6 9 1 8 3 7 1 6 9
Employees & wholesale traders 9 2 6 5 3 5 4 161
Liberal professions & top executives 4 0 1 2 2 0 9 8 1 2 2
Services 1 0 2 1 6 6 9 5 2 1 6 0
Source: Ibid, Table A 3.1. pp. 178-179.
Here again we find the same characteristic of inequality, and on a wider range, existing 
between the different social groups. The inequality in question is a two level inequality: 
an overall inequality which expresses itself in the actual level of intakes for each 
product (this is the quantitative aspect of inequality), and an inequality based on the 
proportion of each category of product in the diet of each social category (this is the 
qualitative aspect of inequality).
For the population as a whole, the weight of cereals is quite high: 217 kg/head/year or 
the equivalent of about 600 g/day/head. The weight of cereals is associated with the 
high level of cereal consumption of farmers, (268 kg), permanent agricultural 
workers (217 kg), seasonal agricultural workers (255 kg), handicraft & handicraft 
workers (206 kg), the retired (221 kg), unskilled workers with permanent 
employment (198 kg), unskilled workers with temporary employment (198 kg) and 
the self-employed in petty jobs (187 kg), all of which represent over 70% of total 
households (13). The lowest cereals intakes are to be found mainly among the 
categories of employees & wholesale traders (161 kg), liberal professions & top
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executives (12 kg), the rentiers 169 kg), clerks (150 kg) and middle cadres 
(168kg).
The imbalance in the consumption of other products is even more pronounced (14). The 
categories with the lowest intakes in pulses are the agricultural workers (between 3 
and 4 kg), the handicraftsmen & the handicraft workers (5 kg), the self-employed in 
petty jobs and the unskilled workers with temporary employment (3 kg). At the other 
extreme, the employees & wholesale traders consume 20 kg (over 6 times the intake of 
the self-employed in petty jobs or the agricultural workers), the liberal profession 
and top executives (13 kg), the clerks and middle cadres (10 kg). The highest 
consumption of fresh pulses is also within these categories. The highest intake of 
fruits, vegetables, animal product and oil & fat are to be found with the same categories 
of liberal professions & top executives, wholesale traders & employees, rentiers, 
middle cadres, law & security enforcement members.
The particular distribution of animal products consumption is worth considering on its 
own. The unemployed with 16 kg, the unskilled workers with temporary employment 
with 18 kg, the retail traders with 29 kg, the self-employed in petty jobs with 27 kg 
and the agricultural workers with an intake between 22 and 29 kg are the categories 
with the lowest intakes of all (such intakes range from 44 to 80 g/day/person). At the 
other end of the social spectrum, liberal professions & top executives have an intake of 
124 kg, the employees and wholesale traders an intake of 95 kg, or the equivalent of 
between 264 to 344 g/person/day. Middle cadres, law and security enforcement agents 
clerks and rentiers consume respectively 78 kg, 64 kg, 60 kg and 56 kg, or the 
equivalent of between 156 and 216 g/person/day.
If one looks at the structure of the diet from the point of view of each category of 
product according to its physical weight alone (a broad measurement of the degree of 
differentiation, and as such an anticipated indication of the nutritional differences 
between intakes), the result can be expressed and typified on the basis of the diet of 
liberal professions and wholesale traders on the one hand and agricultural workers on
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the other (the selection of these two categories is dictated by the extreme distribution 
of their intake).
Table IV. 1. 4: Structure of intakes between two typical social groups in 1968 (% weight).
Commodity Agricultural workers 
intake
Liberal profession & 
wholesale traders intake
Cereals 66 .0% 22 .0 %
Pulses 1.0% 2.0%
Vegetable 13 .0% 29 .0%
Sugar 4.0% 3 .0%
Fruits (dry) 3 .0% 2.0%
Fruits (fresh) 5 .0% 17.0%
Animal products 7.0% 22 .0 %
Vegetable oils 2 .0% 3 .0%
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0
Source: 1968 HES
Similarities emerge for the consumption of three products (15): Pulses: 1% of the 
quantity of food consumed by agricultural workers, 2% of the quantity of food consumed 
by liberal profession and wholesale traders. Sugar: 4% of the quantity of food consumed 
by agricultural workers, 3% of the quantity of food consumed by liberal professions 
and traders. Vegetable oil: 2% of the quantity of food consumed by agricultural 
workers, 3% of the quantity of food consumed by liberal professions and wholesale 
traders. The difference in the structure of both diets is shown by the gap existing 
between the other main products. If the first diet (that of agricultural workers) is 
mainly based on cereals (66%), the second one is however more balanced between 
cereals (22%), vegetables (29%), fruits 17%) and animal products (22%). In the 
second diet cereals and animal products represent the same weight. Outside vegetables 
(13%), the first diet is strictly a grain based diet with the proportion of other 
products averaging between 5 to 7% of total intake. The superior social category 
consumes more in quality and more in quantity. The polarity of these two diets is 
therefore what characterises best the food intake of the Algerian population as a whole 
(the overall social distribution of intakes is therefore not only differentiated but also 
polarised). We now turn to the nutritional significance of such intakes.
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C. The nutritional aspect of food intakes of the Algerian population.
The nutritional measurement of food intake is expressed in terms of calorie or energy 
needs (calorie units per day), protein (number of grams per day), fat needs (number 
of g per day) and Vitamin needs (number of microgram/day). These needs are 
theoretically determined in relation to a man aged between 20 and 39, weighing 65 kg 
and a woman of the same age and weighing 55 kg, both of whom enjoy a good health. Such 
needs are determined on the basis of an economic activity of 8 hours, the remaining 
hours being spent for 8 hours in sleep, and the rest performing a light activity. It goes 
without saying that the gap between the nutritional needs of the man and woman of 
reference, an ideal prototype, and the characteristics of the actual population can be 
quite considerable. This is particularly so when one considers a population of an 
underdeveloped country living in poor sanitary conditions, subject to health hazards, 
performing economic activities of different intensity and requiring different duration, 
and experiencing a high rate of malnutrition and/or undernutrition (16). The 
determination of nutritional needs on such a methodology is bound to convey unavoidable 
limitations and reserves. In other words "... recommended intakes are not an adequate 
yardstick for assessing health....because each figure represents an average 
requirement " [our emphasis] (17).
a- The determination of calorie needs.
It is a determination based on the age and weight of the man and woman of reference 
(18). As such the determination is a minimal determination in order to make provision 
for incidence of malnutrition or illnesses which, as will be shown at a latter stage, are 
prevalent among the Algerian population and particularly the high risk population of 
children and women in general and pregnant and/or lactating women in particular. 
Moreover, such a minimal mode of determination ought also to take into account the 
incidence of the real conditions associated with a given activity: the factor of a 
professional activity with its intensity, the conditions and duration of transport etc.
On average the recommended minimum intake (19) suitable for a healthy population is 
established at 2,206 calories a day but if we are to make provision for the loss of
281
calorie which inevitably takes place between the purchasing phase and the final intake, 
the recommended calorie intake ought to be adjusted. M. Autrey sets this level at about 
2,400 calories. Other estimates set at a much higher level the minimum intake 
compatible with the reproduction and maintenance of health without the danger of 
malnutrition (Dr. Paul Lunven, the current Director of Nutrition at the F.A.O, sets at 
2,500 calories the safer level (corresponding to 1.4 times the level of basal 
metabolism which is the level of requirement of cells at rest), beyond which the danger 
of malnutrition can be avoided) (20).
b- The determination of protein intake.
The function of proteins is mainly for growth and tissue synthesis purposes. Their 
function can also be an energy function but only when calorie intake requirements are 
not adequate. The determination of protein needs is either calculated in terms of protein 
of reference, which is of a higher value, i.e. containing more amino-acids (usually 
milk or the egg protein with a biological value equal to 100%), or in terms of food 
protein , i.e. which possess a lower nutritional value depending on the composition of 
the food diet, or mixed protein of animal and vegetable origin (the biological value of 
the food protein of the Algerian diet has been estimated by M. Autrey at 57%).
The methodology of determination of protein needs is that set by the F.A.O in 1963 
(21). The requirement for an average protein intake ceterus paribus is 31 g in terms 
of the protein of reference, or between 0.57 and 0.52 g/day per kg of body weight 
(F.A.O and W.H.O, 1971), 54 g in terms of food protein (of a biological value equal to 
57%), to take into account the lower content of nutrient elements in terms of amino 
acids, and about 60 g of food protein at purchase level, to make provision for waste 
occurring before and after the actual act of consumption (a 10% rate of waste is 
considered to be a reasonable rate in normal conditions).
It is, however, well established that protein and calorie requirements cannot be 
established independently of each other. In particular, it has been shown that when 
calorie needs are not met, protein intake is diverted to cover calorie needs. In other
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words, it is the calorie requirement that determines the degree of utilisation of 
proteins to meet physiological needs. As such the emphasis ought to be put on calorie 
requirement first and protein second (22). The logic of this proposition is derived 
from the fact that since calorie and protein come together, the emphasis on the former 
can only result in the increase of the latter when the critical level of calorie 
requirements is first met.
c- Profile of the nutritional intake of the population.
The main nutritional findings by stratum can be summarised in the following manner 
using the two main measures: the level of calorie and protein intake.
Stratum 1: average calorie intake: 2,300 calories and 66 g of proteins; Stratum 2 +3: 
average calorie intake: 2,700 calories and 84 g of proteins; Stratum 4: average calorie 
intake: 3,100 calories and 96 g of proteins; South : average calorie intake: 2,100 
calories and 55 g of proteins. In terms of calorie requirement it appears that the 
Southern population is well below the level of 2,400 calories. The urban stratum can 
be considered to be meeting the necessary requirement. Stratum 2+3 and particularly 
the rural stratum have the highest calorie and protein intake.
On the whole the nutritional situation of the Algerian population appears to be better in 
rural areas than in urban centres. But this is only so if looked at from the point of view 
of the energy requirement for, from one stratum to another, the nutritional differences 
of intakes remain important.
Table IV. 1. 5: Nutritional characteristics of intakes in 1968.
Stratum Total
calories
Share of cereal 
calories 
(%)
Total
proteins
9
Share of 
cereals proteins 
g %
Animal 
proteins 
g %
Other veg. 
proteins 
g %
1 2 ,3 0 0 6 8 % 6 6 51 7 7 % 9 1 4 % 6 9 %
2 + 3 2 ,7 0 0 7 6 % 8 5 7 2 8 5 % 7 8 % 6 7 %
4 3 ,1 0 0 8 0 % 9 6 8 5 8 9 % 6 6% 5 5 %
South 2 ,1 0 0 5 5 % 5 5 4 0 7 3 % 7 13% 8 1 4 %
Source: Ibid. pp. 106,109,112 and  113.
The main source of supply of calories and protein is cereals. As such, to a more or 
lesser degree, the diet of all strata is essentially a grain based diet. It is in the rural
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stratum that cereals contribution is the highest as it provides for 80% of total calories 
and nearly 90% of all proteins.
In urban centres, this contribution is less important as it provides 66% of calories and 
77% of proteins. It is in this stratum that the contribution of animal proteins is the 
highest (14%), while that of the rural stratum is the lowest (6%). From the point of 
view of the contribution of cereals and animal products, the diet of stratum 2+3 with 
76% of cereal calories and 72% of cereal proteins, is essentially a rural diet while 
that of the Southern population is typically an urban one. On the whole, the rural diet is 
mainly a high cereals calorie based diet, while the urban diet is mainly a lower cereal 
calorie-animal product based diet. The overall presentation of intakes by social 
category, which allows us to assess the variability of diets and their nutritional 
characteristics is as follows.
d- Nutritional characteristics of the diet of the population.
The overall picture of the diet of the population can be summarised in the following 
manner:
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Table IV. 1. 6: Average per head intakes (Algeria without Grand Algiers) in 1968.
Calories Cereals
calories
Animal
calories
Proteins
(9)
Animal
Proteins
% of animal % of cereals 
Proteins Proteins
All SPCs (averaae) 2 , 7 7 0 75% 6% 8 4 7 8% 85%
Farmers 3 , 2 0 0 80% 5% 1 0 3 8 7% 87%
Permanent agricultural workers 2 , 8 0 0 75% 4% 8 2 6 7% 87%
Seasonal agricultural workers 3 , 0 3 3 8% 33% 9 4 4 5% 92%
Retail traders 2 , 3 0 5 67% 9% 6 8 10 15% 78%
Handicraft & hand, workers 2 , 5 9 0 75% 5% 7 7 6 8% 86%
Middle cadres 2 , 7 0 0 60% 13% 7 7 16 21% 69%
Clerks 2 , 4 0 0 60% 10% 6 5 11 17% 72%
Qualified workers 2 , 5 0 0 68% 7% 7 3 8 11% 78%
Unskilled workers perm, employed 2 , 5 6 0 74% 6% 7 6 7 9% 84%
Unskilled workers temp, employed 2 , 3 0 0 79% 3% 6 9 3 5% 90%
Self-employed in petty jobs 2 , 6 0 0 78% 4% 7 3 5 6% 89%
Law & sec. enforcement members . 2 , 6 0 0 61% 11% 7 4 13 18% 72%
Retired 2 , 9 8 0 74% 8% 8 7 6 7% 86%
Unemployed 2,200 82% 4% 6 4 3 5% 91%
Rentiers 2 , 5 0 0 66% 8% 7 3 9 12% 77%
Employees & wholesale traders 2 , 7 0 0 57% 16% 7 8 19 24% 65%
Liberal professions & top executives 2 , 6 0 0 45% 19% 6 9 23 33% 61%
Services 2 , 2 5 0 70% 7% 6 5 8 12% 80%
Source: Ibid. pp. 90-100.
The above table offers the best illustration of the different nutritional characteristics 
of the two main diets.
1. The high cereal-caiorie diet.
It provides us with two main varieties: the low cereal-intake variety on the one hand 
and the high cereal-intake variety.
The low intake variety is best illustrated with the structure of the diet of the 
unemployed where a low level of calorie intake of 2,200 was achieved with a high 
proportion of cereals (82%). The case of unskilled workers with temporary 
employment is another similar example: with a high cereal contribution (79%), the 
level of calorie intake is as low as 2,300.
The high cereal intake variety provides the highest calorie level of all diets (including 
the low cereal intake/high animal intake). This diet is best exemplified by farmers 
(3,200 calories) and agricultural workers (3,000 calories).
285
2. The low cereal-calorie diet.
It is the diet of the well off urban categories. This type of diet can be subdivided into two 
categories: the low cereal calorie diet with a high animal intake content on the one hand 
and that with a low animal intake content on the other.
The first sub-category is best exemplified by the nature of the diet of the category of 
liberal professions and top executives: 45% of cereal calories (the lowest cereals
i
contribution of all categories) and the highest contribution of animal products for both 
proteins (33%) and calories(19%). Employees and wholesale traders experience an 
identical diet with 57% of cereal calories, 16% of animal calories and 24% of animal 
proteins.
The second sub-category of the low cereal calorie diet is illustrated by the diet of retail 
traders: 67% of cereal calories, 9% of animal calories and 15% of animal proteins. 
The cereal calorie diet is shared as well by middle managers, clerks and to a certain 
degree, by qualified workers and by law and security enforcement agents.
On the whole, if the first type of diet (a) is rich in calories, it is however poor in 
terms of non-cereal products. The second type of diet (b), less based on cereals, is 
more varied and balanced and as such, it is much richer than the rural diet, 
particularly in terms of vitamins and amino-acids. Of all diets the worst off in terms of 
nutritional requirement are the high cereal-calorie diet with a low cereals intake and 
the low cereal calorie diet with a low animal intake, i.e. the two diets which are poor in 
both animal and cereal content.
The broad dichotomy which so far characterised both the quantitative distribution of 
food products as well as their nutritional content, derives from two main sets of 
factors: immediate factors, i.e. those which directly bear a relation to the actual food 
consumption (size and structure), and mediate factors, i.e. those which precisely 
account for the mode of distribution of food products between the different social groups 
as epitomised by the selection of the 18 socio-economic groups. If the first set of
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factors explain the observed patterns of food consumption, the second set of factors 
highlight the social conditions under which such a consumption is operated. In what 
follows, our concern will be mainly with the study of the main determinants pertaining 
to the immediate factors.
D- Food consumption and income.
Food consumption and its pattern is determined by the combination of several variables: 
the family size and its structure by age and sex, the level of income, the level of food 
prices, the existence of alternative sources of food supply (family gardens, etc.) and 
cultural and historical food habits, etc. In what follows our aim is to concentrate 
mainly on the income side.
In an economy based more and more on commodity relations, income emerges as the 
main channel of access to food (23). But it is certainly its level and particularly its 
nature (wage, pension, profit), which are the determinant influences in shaping food 
consumption. The variety of situations can stretch from one extreme to another: from a 
situation where income level is the main constraint which stands in the way of meeting 
the needs of the household unit according to its size and structure, to a situation where 
the level of income is not the constraint standing in the way of meeting the food needs in 
accordance with their cultural and nutritional requirements (24). The weight of food 
expenditures in total income varies from one social category to another. For the social 
categories with little alternative sources of food supply, and for low income levels, the 
proportion of income accruing to food is the highest. When the possibility of self­
consumption exists, the relation between income and food consumption is looser. The 
following table evidences the diversity of such situations.
Table IV. 1. 7: Share of income devoted to food (%) in 1968.
Expendi t ure
l eve l s
AD 0-20 AD 201-400 AD 401-800 AD 801-1,800 AD 1,800 + TOTAL
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) ( D (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
T o t a l 6 5  6 2 6 5  6 0  5 9  6 0 5 6 5 5 5 6 4 8  4 8  4 8 4 2 41 41 5 4 5 0 5 7
Source: Ibid., P. 146.
(1) = Algeria without Grand Algiers. (2) = Urban stratum. (3) = Rural stratum.
287
On the whole the "Algerian population", all social categories combined, allocates 54% 
of its income to food. It is the rural stratum which spends more on food than its urban 
counterpart: 57% against 50%. In accordance with the Engel's law the share of food 
expenditure is highest in the lower income groups: 65% for Algeria without Grand 
Algiers, for the lowest food expenditure (AD 0-20), and lowest for higher income 
groups: 42% for the food expenditure (above AD 1,800) (25).
An international comparison of figures relating to the share of income devoted to food 
offers an illustration of the weight exercised by food expenditure. Independently of an 
income classification of countries, and despite the existence of a policy of wage goods 
subsidies, food expenditure in Algeria absorbs the highest fraction of income.
Table IV. 1.8: Comparative weight of food expenditure in total income (%).
Country Country as a whole Urban stratum Rural stratum Year
Algeria 5 4 % 5 0 % 5 7 % 1 9 6 8
Portugal 4 6 % 4 2 % 5 4 % 1 9 6 8
Sweden 2 6 % - - 1 9 6 9
Tunisia 5 0 % 4 2 % 5 6 % 1 9 6 6
U.SA - 3 1 % 3 1 % 1 9 6 6
Yugoslavia 4 1 % - - 1 9 6 9
Source: Ibid., p. 146.
The above figures reveal in their own way the overwhelming weight of food in the total 
family budget. In such a context, once the minimum physiological needs of the 
population are given, the level of food prices determine the extent of income to be 
devoted to food (26). The distribution of households by income level tends also to 
suggest that the majority of the population being concentrated in the lowest income 
groups, the inflationary pressure of their purchasing power is, in fact, minimal.
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Table IV. 1. 9: Household distribution by income level (in AD) and social category (%) in 1968.
Income levels 0-3.000 3.001-5.000 . JiQOliSOO.., 7.50MiLQOft .10.Q9.flLt Total
Farmers 75 11 7 3 4 100
Permanent agricultural workers 91 7 0.6 0.6 - 100
Seasonal agricultural workers 57 32 7 3 - 100
Retail traders 32 34 15 16 16 100
Handicraft & hand, workers 35 30 13 11 10 100
Middle cadres - - 20 37 42 100
Clerks 7 15 17 35 15 100
Qual.workers 57 28 8 6 - 100
Unskilled worker perm, employed 22 36 28 12 2 100
Unskilled workers temp, employed 83 13 3 0.1 - 100
Self-employed in petty jobs 57 28 8 6 - 100
Law & sec enforcement members .2 6 14 66 12 100
Retired 68 20 7 2 1 100
Unemployed 91 2 2 3 2 100
Rentiers 36 3 40 3 18 100
Employees & wholesale traders 38 - 9 12 75 100
Liberal professions & top executives - - - 3 97 100
Services 64 16 12 7 0.6 100
Total 43 19 15 14 8 100
Cumulative total 43 63 78 92 100 -
Income le ve l/p e rso n  * 0-455 456-758 759-1,138 1,139-1,157 1,518 + -
Source: Ibid., p. 142. * The average size of an Algerian household is 6.59.
The above table throws some light on the economic structure of the population and, as 
such, gives an overall picture of the weight attached to the economic significance of the 
different households. In short, this table is the best illustration of the social pyramid 
prevailing in Algeria. It shows that 43% of the population, i.e. the absolute majority of 
the population by income group, has the lowest income level. For the two lower income 
levels, the proportion increases to 63% of the total population. At the other extreme, 
8% of households have the highest income level. This category is essentially 
represented by liberal professions and top executives, wholesale traders & employees 
and middle managers. It is this category, as well as that of the income group (AD 
7,501-10,000), which is identified with the low cereal calorie diet. In other words, 
the urban diet draws its characteristics mainly from the high income group categories 
(the diet of the other section of the urban population with a low income level is only a 
nutritionally poor version of the dominant urban diet). Those categories within the 
lowest income group, rural in their majority, are best identified by a diet largely
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dominated by cereals (the sole category of farmers and agricultural workers represent 
over 40% of Algerian households). 80% of the former and about 70% of the latter are 
located in the rural stratum. For strata 2 and 3 the proportions are respectively 90 
and 80%.
Table IV. 1.10: Food intake and income level (in AD) in the urban stratum in 1968.
0-200 201-400 401-800 801-1,800 1.801-3,000 3,000 + TOTAL
Total calorie 2,169 2 , 1 6 1 2 , 2 1 9 2,417 2 , 6 7 8 3 , 1 6 2 2 , 3 0 0
Cereal calories (%) 81% 74% 70% 62% 52% 41% 67%
Animal calories(%) 4% 5% 6% 10% 14% 27% 8%
Proteins (g) 6 6 6 3 6 3 6 9 7 5 9 6 6 7
Cereal proteins (%) 89% 4% 81% 1% 59% 42% 67%
Animal proteins (%) 5% 7% 9% 17% 25% 46% 14%
Source: Ibid. p. 139.
To maintain a low level of cereal intake, improvement of the urban diet, once income 
increases, is obtained by decreasing cereal calories and increasing animal calories and 
proteins.
The decreasing contribution of cereals is much more pronounced at higher income 
levels than at lower income levels. In contrast, the same pattern of substitution 
between cereals and animal products can be observed for the rural population, but at a 
much higher cereal intake level.
Table IV. 1.11: Food intake and income level (AD) in the rural stratum in 1968.
0-200 2 0 1 -40 0 4 0 1 -8 0 0 8 0 1 - 1,800 1 . 801 - 3 ,0 00 3,000  + TOTAL
Total calories 2 , 8 8 2 3 , 0 4 0 3 , 4 1 8 3 , 5 7 0 3 , 8 2 8  4 , 2 4 4 3 , 1 0 0
Cereal calories (%) 84% 81% 75% 72% 67% 67% 79%
Animal calories (%) 4% 4% 5% 17% 7% 8% 5%
Proteins (g) 9 1 9 5 100 1 09 1 24 1 2 9 9 6
Cereal proteins (%) 90% 98% 86% 81% 70% 77% 88%
Animal proteins (%) 5% 5% 7% 11% 14% 16% 6%
Source: Ibid. p. 140.
On the whole, for the same levels of expenditure, the rural diet remains 
overwhelmingly dominated by cereals in the form of proteins and calories. The 
decreasing proportions of cereals in total nutrients, when income increases, remains,
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however, a common feature to both the urban and the rural diet. The "urban diet" 
aspect, (i.e. the extent of substitution between cereal products and animal products), in 
the rural diet, only appears at a much higher income level corresponding to the 
expenditure level over AD 1,800 with 67% of cereal calories and 8% of animal 
calories. The influence of income on the structure of the rural diet on the whole 
remains a less straightforward relation. Many reasons explain such a pattern. Unlike 
economic activity in urban areas, the rural economy is still geared towards a market 
economy, or fully regulated by commodity relations. As such, part of the domestic 
agricultural production can be excluded from the market network depending on the 
extent of domestic needs, the proportion of the family labour force employed outside the 
farm unit, and the importance of wages earned in the total income of the farm, etc.
From the point of view of commodity relations, such a portion of agricultural 
production not sold on the market is therefore self-consumed. For all these reasons, the 
importance of self-consumption (27) remains an important characteristic of the rural 
population in general (the above table in fact includes, in the level of expenditure, the 
estimated value of self-consumption). From the viewpoint proper to a peasant 
economy, self-consumption plays a definite social function in the face of increased 
commodity relations as well as a means of preserving a given pattern of consumption. 
In this respect, the rural population can be seen as the depository of the traditional 
Algerian diet. This attitude towards the upholding of certain food practices in accordance 
with the life style proper to the peasantry is not unique to Algeria (28). This is 
particularly the case since the rural population is de facto at the immediate 
intersection of production and consumption (29).
The differentiation between the urban and the rural patterns of consumption is also 
accounted for by the mode of organisation of the food market itself. As a result of the 
urbanisation of an increased fraction of the population, the organisation of the urban 
food market, particularly in its wage goods section, has been increasingly regulated, 
both qualitatively and quantitatively, by a heavy state intervention in the form of an 
increasing supply of wage goods at fixed prices. Despite the general diffusion of
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subsidised goods at national level, state intervention remains a thoroughly urban based 
intervention. The setting up of the state network distribution of fixed price products in 
rural areas is peripheral when compared to its densely organised urban implanting. On 
economic grounds also the organisation of the rural food market is discriminated 
against particularly under the influence exercised by high incomes on the orientation 
and specialisation of agricultural production for high price products (meat, fruits, 
vegetables).
Under the influence of the overall characteristics of urbanisation, the diffusion of the 
urban model has therefore tended towards its generalisation and as such it has imposed 
itself on an increasing fraction of the population, particularly when accompanied by an 
extension of monetisation and commodity relations. After over a decade, the diffusion 
and generalisation of such an urban model is well established.
III. The 1980 Household Expenditure Survey (HES).
The methodology of the survey is similar to that of 1968. The main objective of the 
1980 survey was the study of households expenditures. As such, it was not a survey 
focused on the nutritional aspect of food consumption (as a result of such a 
shortcoming, the analysis of the findings of the 1980 HES will be mainly conducted on 
the basis of a comparative study with the 1968 food situation). The population of 
reference was established on the basis of the 1977 population census. The estimated 
survey population was set at 18,234,191 distributed between an urban population of 
7,642,980 and a rural population of 10,592,211. The survey distinguished between 
two main strata: the urban stratum and the rural stratum (30).
Compared to the situation prevailing in 1968, the size of an average household 
increased from 6.59 to 7.32 for a total number of 2,491,287 households. The 
distribution of households samples (8,208) between the urban stratum (5,508) and 
the rural stratum (2,700) with a high degree of representativeness of 1/190 for the 
former and 1/535 for the latter clearly introduces a large bias against the surveying 
of the rural population. The rural sample ought to have been of the order of 6,655
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households to represent the overall population distribution between the rural and the 
urban strata. This is certainly a serious limitation of the 1980 survey (as such the 
1980 HES was an essentially urban survey).
A- The food intake by stratum.
One of the immediate interests of the 1980 survey is the opportunity it gives to assess 
the food situation of households after well over a decade and particularly after a period 
during which Algeria entered into one of its most important post-colonial changes: the 
initiation of the intense industrial policy of capital accumulation.
Table IV. 1. 12: Level of food intake by stratum (U=kg/head/year) in 1980.
Grand Algiers Large Average
metropolis
Small
towns
Urban
towns
Villages
stratum
Countryside
stratum
Rural Total
C e r e a l s * 1 4 3 1 6 2 1 7 0 1 88 1 65 2 0 4 1 97 1 9 8 1 8 5
Barley. 1.2 2 1.5 3.6 1.3 6 16.5 15 9
Bread 85 70 58 39 63 31 9 12 33
Roots & tuber 43 4 2 3 7 3 6 3 9 3 5 3 1 3 1 3 4
Pulses 20 1 9 1 9 1 3 1 8 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 6
Fresh 12 11 11 7 11 7 7 6 8
Dry 8 8 7 6 7 8 8 8 8
Vegetabl es 6 8 5 6 6 6 5 5 6 3 5 0 3 3 3 5 4 7
Fr u i t s 4 7 3 1 3 9 3 5 3 9 2 5 2 1 2 2 2 9
Fresh 45 30 37 31 37 22 18 19 26
Dry 1.4 1.5 2 4 2 3 3 3 3
Mea t
Sub total excl. bovine meat 20 1816 13 17 12 6 7
I 4
I I
Ovine meat & offal 8 10 9 9 9 8 3 3 4
Poultry 8 5 4 3 5 3 3 3 4
Eggs 3 2 2 1 2 1 0.4 0.5 1
Other
Fish 3 4 3 2 3 2 .5 0 0 .3
0.4
1.6
Mi l k 7 9 5 6 4 3 3 3 5 1 2 9 4 5 4 3 4 7
Animal products inc. 105 81 65 50 74 45 52 51 64
animal fat
Animal & veg. oils N .A N .A N .A N .A N .A N .A N .A N .A 1 5 . 2 9
Butter 3 3 3 2 3 "1.6 1.2 1.2 2
Olive oil & Veg. oil 
Sugar N.A N.A N.A N. A N. A N. A N. A N.A
13.29 
1 5
Source: Ibid.
The overall picture of food intake remained unchanged particularly in view of the 
imbalance between the urban diet and the rural diet with the latter holding the highest 
cereal intakes and the lowest non-cereal intakes. The change which took place concerned 
both the level of intakes and the proportion between cereals and other food products. On
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the whole, and except for cereals, the consumption of most products was much higher in 
1980 (31). From 1968 to 1980, the average intake of cereals per head fell by 30% , 
i.e. from 266 kg to 185 kg. The drop was far greater for the rural stratum (about 
40%) than for for the urban stratum (20%). The exception remained with barley 
(92% drop for the urban population as compared with 82% for the rural population, 
but the rural population still consumes a much higher quantity than that of the urban 
population: 15 kg against 1 kg). The most consumed cereals remained hard wheat (in 
the form of semolina and paste) representing 78% of all grains as opposed to soft wheat 
(consumed mainly in the form of bakery bread) with 17% of total human consumption.
In all sections of the population, the contribution of barley in cereal intake has been 
reduced to a minimum: less than 1% in the urban centres and only 8% in rural areas 
(in 1968 the rural population was consuming 1/4 of its cereals in the form of 
barley). In absolute terms, the fall of cereal contribution in the average diet of the 
rural population was over three times that experienced by the urban population 
(respectively -125 kg and -40 kg). Such a drop is enormous and as such, ought to be 
handled with circumspection.
Though the rural population still consumes more hard wheat than its urban counterpart 
(78% against 63%), the contribution of soft wheat in the rural diet represents an 
increasing weight: 9% in 1968 against 14% in 1980, as such it expresses the result 
of the diffusion of an essentially urban pattern of consumption (until recently, the 
consumption of bakery bread was mainly a thing of urbanity which never penetrated 
the countryside).
On the whole Algeria consumes more bread than a decade ago: 33 kg in 1980 against 29 
kg in 1968. The consumption of this product tends to be generalised, though with some 
considerable differences in intake levels between the two strata. The rural population 
consumed 12 kg of bread in 1980 (against 9 kg in 1968) and the urban population 62 
kg against 51 kg in 1968 (32). In general, the main source of calorie supply (cereals) 
represents a lesser quantitative share in 1980 than in 1968. The question is whether
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this drop has been nutritionally compensated by other products (33). With the 
exception of fruits (zero rate of growth), sugar (14 kg in 1968, 15 kg in 1980), and 
fish (1.3 kg in 1968 against 1.6 kg in 1980), most intakes were substantially 
increased: pulses (over 150% increase), vegetables (50% increase), meat (30% 
increase) and milk (40% increase). Therefore, with the drop of cereal consumption, 
such increases represent most of the alteration of the 1968 food intakes
As far as their distribution goes, such intake increases w ere  not even for all s trata. 
Table IV. 1 . 13:lncremental rate concerning the main food intakes by stratum (%) between 1968 and  1980.
Urban stratum Rural stratum
Potatoes + 3 0 % + 8 2 %
Pulses + 1 2 5 + 1 3 3
Fruits + 3 4 % + 5%
Animal products + 8 5 % + 4 5 %
Vegetables + 4 0 % + 6 6 %
Source: 1968 HES and 1980 HES
With the exception of animal products and fruits, the highest incremental intakes were 
mainly located within the rural stratum. But the significance of such increases, 
however, ought to be interpreted against the background of extremely uneven levels of 
intake between stratum, not to mention the effects of uneven income distribution within 
each stratum. As such, these rates of growth are of uneven significance. Above all, these 
rates fail to capture the evolution of the gap existing between the two populations. The 
following table allows precisely for the measurement of such a situation.
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Table IV. 1 .14 : Food gap trend between the urban population and the rural population:1968-1980
(U= kg/head/year).
1
Urban intake- 
Rural intake 
1 9 68
II
Urban intake- 
Rural intake 
1 98 0
[ ( l l - l ) / l ] . 1 0 0
Degree of reduction 
of the gap 
1 9 6 8 / 8 0
[(IM)/I]. 100
Degree of extension 
of the gap 
1 9 6 8 / 8 0
Cereals -92 kg -33 kg + 6 4 % -
Bread +42 kg +51 kg - + 2 1 %
Barley -54 kg -14 kg + 1 1 4 % -
Potatoes +13 kg +8 kg + 3 8 % -
Pulses +2 kg +4 kg - + 1 0 0 %
Vegetables +24 kg +28 kg - + 1 6 %
Fruit +9 kg +17 kg - + 9 0 %
Meat +4 kg +10 kg - + 1 5 0 %
Ovine meat +4 kg +6 kg - + 5 0 %
Poultry +0.2 kg +22 kg + 9 0 0 %
Eggs +0.3 kg +1.5 kg -  ■ + 4 0 0 %
Fish +2 kg +2.7 kg - + 3 5 %
Milk +8 kg +8 kg 0 0
Source: Ibid.
In relation to the urban population, and contrary to the previous figures, there has 
been a worsening of the terms of food intakes of the rural population for the majority of 
its products and particularly for animal products, pulses, vegetables and fruits.
The only reduction of food gap concerns barley (this reduction in nature is an artificial 
one since the urban population has literally given up the consumption of such a 
product; unless compensated by other products it is the reduction of cereals which is 
more worrying), cereals and potatoes , i.e. the cheapest food products of all.
What seems likely is that the impact of the industrial policy of development, if it 
allowed for a certain growth of incomes, has also provided the economic basis for an 
increased inequality between the two populations (34). What is more important, is 
that such a policy has tended to induce a structure of food intake more and more based on 
animal products but with a far smaller weight of cereals.
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TablelV.1.15: Structure of food intakes by stratum between 1968 and 1980. (kg/year/head & %).
Urban population Rural population
1968 % 1980 % 1968 % 1980 %
Cereals 196 56% 165 41% 323 78% 198 56%
Roots & tuber 30 8% 39 10% 17 4% 31 9%
Vegetables 45 13% 63 16% 21 5% 35 10%
Fruits 29 8% 39 10% 21 5% 22 6%
Animal 39 11% 74 18% 27 6% 51 14%
Total 347 100 398 100 395 100 351 100
Source: Ibid.
With the exception of pulses, there is a striking similarity between the rural diet in 
1980 and the urban diet of 1968. From both the quantitative and the qualitative point 
of view there is an identity, with a 10 year lag period, between the two models. Over a 
period of time the urban model consumption has tended to impose itself on the rural 
population (35), i.e. there has been a tendency of homogenisation of patterns of 
consumption. If, between 1968 and 1980, the urban model consolidated both its 
structure and its intake, the rural population, however, consolidated its diet at the 
expense of a regressive intake level. The urban population consumes more and better 
while the rural population consumes better but less.
Between 1968 and 1980 the urban population improved its diet by 51 kg of food 
products (all categories combined), while the rural population experience^! a fall of 41 
kg off its diet. One of the main factors explaining the gap between the level of intake 
between the urban population and the rural population remains the income aspect.
B- Income level and household distribution by stratum.
The following table shows, on the basis of a classification of households by level of 
expenditures, how income distribution (in itself a class produced distribution), 
produces social differentiation between groups according to their stratum distribution 
( 36) .
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Table IV. 1 .1 6 : Distribution of households by their level of expenditure in 1980.
Level of Grand The Metropolis Average Small Villages Countryside Total Cumulative
expenditure (AD) Algiers to w n s to w n s to t a l
<1,500 4.4 4.0 7.4 10.2 12.60 24.9 1 6 . 4 1 6 . 4
1,500/2,000. 7.5 9.9 10.2 14.6 18.30 21.1 1 6 . 4 3 2 . 8
2,000/2500. 9.2 11.6 9.7 15.0 14.20 14.6 1 3 4 5 . 8
2,500/3 ,000 11.2 14.3 9.8 12.0 13.70 9.0 1 0 . 3 56 . 1
3,000/3,500. 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.5 10.40 3.1 19. 3 6 5 . 4
3,500/4,000. 10.0 8.3 9.1 6.9 6.70 5.6 7 .0 7 2 . 4
4,000/4,500. 7.7 8.2 7.6 5.5 6.14 8.3 5 .6 7 8 . 0
4,500/5,000. 7.6 6.8 7.1 5.5 5.00 3.4 5 .0 8 3 . 0
5,000/5,500. 5.6 5.0 4.9 3.7 2.70 2.8 3 .7 8 6 . 7
5,500/6,000. 4.5 4.5 5.0 2.0 2.00 1.0 2 .4 8 9 . 0
6,000/6,500. 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.5 1.00 1.0 2.0 9 1 . 0
6,500/7,000. 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.00 1.0 2.0 9 3 . 0
7,000 /7 ,500 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.02 2.00 2.0 1.0 9 4 . 2
>7,500 13 10.0 11.0 7.0 4.70 2.0 6.0 100
To t a l 1 00 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: 1980 Survey. Annex A. 4. Table 1.
The unequal aspect of income distribution prevails both within and between strata but 
the degree of inequality is by far the highest between strata (as seen in Part II, the 
terms of income distribution between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural 
sector has tended to widen at the expense of the agricultural population). Thus if 1/4 of 
households in the three main metropolis are to be found within the three lowest income 
levels, I.e. below AD 2,500, the corresponding proportion in the countryside is to be 
found in the lowest income level below AD 1,500. Extended to the three lowest income 
levels, the proportion of households rises to 60%. Conversely, for the three highest 
income levels, the share of the three large metropolis is 15% of households while that 
for the countryside is only 4%. On the whole, the absolute majority of the population 
is concentrated within the lowest income scale. Around 50% of the population is living 
within the lowest income groups (37). The unequal distribution of households 
expenditures shows that per capita expenditure varies greatly from one stratum to 
another.
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Table IV. 1 .1 7 : Distribution of households expenditures by stratum in 1980.
To t a l Population Per head
pxpen d iiy re d i s t r i bu t i on expend i t u r e
AD.million % % AD
Algiers 7,151 13% 9% 4,261
The 3 metropolis 4,568 8% 6% 3,863
Average 13,847 24% 19% 3,986
Small 4,452 8% 7% 3,442
Urban stratum 3 0 , 0 0 0 5 3 % 4 2 % 3 , 9 2 8
Villages 4,128 7.2% 7% 3,038
Countryside 22,803 40% 51% 2,464
Rural stratum 2 7 , 0 0 0 4 7 % 5 8 % 2 , 5 4 3
A l g e r i a 5 7 , 0 0 0 100 1 00 3 , 1 2 3
Source: Ibid., p. 68.
On average the urban population spends nearly twice as much on consumption than the 
rural population. Even when the intra-stratum distribution of income is not taken in to 
account, it is the countryside with 51% of the population (the majority of the 
population) which is by far the worse off with a 40% share of total expenditure. From 
the point of view of social categories, the gaps between per head expenditure with their 
own incidence on the weight of food spending are even w ider.
TableIV.1.18: Distribution of social categories by level of per head total spending and food spending. 1980.
Food
AD
expenditures
%
Total
AD
expenditures
%
Employees & liberal professions 2,288 52% 4,380 100
Self-employed 1,575 4% 2,912 100
Managers 2,463 51% 4,829 100
Clerks &qualified workers 1,986 55% 3,610 100
Skilled & unskilled workers 1,649 59% 2,798 100
Agricultural workers 1,426 70% 2,043 100
Other categories 1,781 57% 3,134 100
Total 1,758 56% 3,123 100
Source:lbid.
For the lowest expenditure per head (AD 2,043), the food budget is the highest: 70%. 
Conversely, managers with the highest expenditure level (AD 4,829), allocate only 
51% of their resources to the food budget. For all social categories, representing the
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total population (38), the weight of food represents 56% in the total budget (39). 
Between 1968 and 1980 the weight of food has not decreased in the total household 
budget. On average food is costing more for all social groups (in 1968 food budgets 
represented 54%). If the drop in the food budget was to be used as an indicator of 
economic progress and development, then, from that standpoint, the Algerian, situation 
is far from conforming to such a qualitative change.
IV. The comparative results of HESs and the FAO food balance sheets 
( FB C) .
FBS represent a second source of knowledge about the food situation of Algeria. Although 
HESs are by far the most privileged tool of food investigation, it is, nonetheless, worth 
attempting a comparative study of the two findings. The contrast between the two main 
sources is best assessed as follows.
Table IV. 1.19: Comparative findings of FBSs and HESs (U=kg/head/year).
FBS
19667
HES
1968
FBS
1978
HES
1980
FBS
1984
Cereals 106.0 208.0 150.0 185/ 157* 199/163
Barley 13.0 41.0 18.0 9 15.0
Roots &tuber 12.0 22.0 27.0 34 29.0
Pulses (dry) 2.0 3.0 5.0 8 5.0
Vegetables 21.0 37.0 22.0 55 38.0
Fruits 47.0 29.0 56.0 29 52.0
M eat 9 .0 11.0 9 .0 1 4 11.0
M ilk 5 6 . 0 3 4 . 0 4 4 . 0 4 7 8 0 . 0
Fish 1.6 1 .3 2.2 1.6 2.1
Veg. o ils & fa ts 8.0 10.0 11.0 1 5 1 5 . 0
- Oi l 7 . 0 9 . 0 ' 8 . 0 1 3 12.0
-F a t, b u tte r 1.0 1.0 3 .0 2 3 .0
Source: FBS 1966/70: FAO/UNPD. P. 132. FBS 1978: Food Balance Sheets. FAO. Rome 1980. p .79. 
FBS 1984 Document personally provided by the FAO.
* 185 in terms of grains; 157 in terms of fiour/semolina. The value of cereals for 1966, 1968 
and 1978 are all expressed in the form of flour/semoiina equivalent (40).
Discrepancies exist and they are particularly important for cereals. The 1967 FBS and 
the 1968 survey display a gap of the order of 100 kg/person/year. This gap is in fact 
the highest of all. Its existence makes us realise that our source of knowledge about the 
food situation of Algeria is relative. With the exception of fruit and vegetables, the 
1968 figures are far superior to those of FBSs. From 1978 onwards, however, the 
gaps between FBSs and HESs are definitely smaller with the sole exception of fruits for
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which both surveys display a constant intake (29 kg). As with the 1968 survey, the 
1980 survey also shows greater levels of intakes than FBSs. For animal fats and 
vegetables, a convergence of intake similarities emerges. This similarity exists as well 
for fish but with a constant overestimation on the side of FBSs figures. For barley the 
contrast between the level of intakes is constantly important, but both sources give a 
downward intake trend. The 1968 figure seems however to be exaggerated. Given other 
findings (41), the figure of 41 kg/person/year could well include animal feed.
For other categories of cereals (mainly wheat), the levels of intakes show a definite 
convergence. On the whole and with the exception of fruit, HESs tend to display higher 
intakes than FBSs. There are two reasons for such a situation: the question of self- 
consumption on the one hand and the overestimation of HESs themselves on the other. 
Generally speaking FBSs fail to assess the non-marketable production and as such their 
intakes always fall short of the share of production which is self-consumed. In an 
economy which is not fully dominated by commodity relations, and such was the 
Algerian situation in 1968 (42), part of the production is retained from the market.
Table IV. 1. 20: Rates of self-consumption (% share of intake/person/year).
HES 1968 F.E.S 1980
Cereals 19% 4%
Roots & tuber 11 % 8%
Vegetables 11% 13%
Fruits 12% N.A
Milk 44% 40%
Meat & offal 14% 8%
Pulses 40% 5%
Source: 1968 and 1980 HES
If FBSs were to be adjusted using the above rates of self-consumption, the extent of the 
gap will become as follows.
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Table IV. 1. 21: Adjusted FBSs (kg/person/year).
Ad j us t ed HES Gap Adjusted 1980 HES Gap
FBS (1966/70) 1 9 6 8 1978 FBS
(D (2) (2) - (1) (3) (4) (4) - (3)
Cereals 146 208 +62 156 157 + 1
Roots & tuber 15 22 +7 30 34 +4
Pulses (dry) 4 3 -1 5.4 8 +2.6
Vegetables 25 37 + 12 29 55 +26
Fruits 50 29 -21 56 29 -27
Meat 11 11 10 10 14 +4
Milk 71 34 -37 63 47 -16
Source: Ibid.
The introduction of self-consumption has considerably reduced the gap between FBSs 
and HESs but on the whole FBSs remain constantly overestimated for milk and fruit, 
while HESs are for all other products and particularly vegetables. These discrepancies 
are obvious inadequacies pertaining to both sources concerning the magnitude of food 
intakes. But whatever the differences between the two sources, no analysis of the food 
situation is complete and satisfactory if, and this applies more for developing 
countries, it is not accompanied by the testing of the findings. This reserve is dictated 
by the following consideration: the degree of accuracy of either HES and/or FBS cannot 
be taken for granted. The qualitative appreciation from the nutritional and medical 
standpoint of the level of intake and its structure is lacking. In fact, for Algeria this 
area is still relatively untouched by research in general. The absence of less global and 
more specific surveys about socially identifiable groups particularly agricultural 
workers, industrial workers, households living in shanty towns which make up a very 
important fraction of the urban population, and the unemployed, etc.
The elements of ponderation about both surveys can be weighted by the findings of a 
W.H.O expert (43) and a group of researchers (44) on the state of malnutrition 
particularly among children. The findings are briefly summarised by M.Autrey (45) 
in six points: " lags of growth (up to 3 kg) among children of the age group 4 and 5, 
relative frequency of calorie and protein malnutrition among children, frequency of 
rickets, high frequency of avitaminois (A and B2), existence of zones of goitrous 
endemic disease, and frequency of anemia with both mother and child
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Generally speaking it is only under the condition of a regular observation of 
malnutrition and its effects on child development, on the rate of child mortality, on the 
health of women and particularly child bearing women, etc., that it becomes possible to 
complete the findings related to HESs and therefore assess with relative accuracy and 
significance the sense of evolution of the food situation of the population in its concrete 
meaning: the improvement of basic conditions of existence.
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CONCLUSION.
The analysis of the two main HESs revealed the essential characteristics of the Algerian 
food situation both in its structure and in its intake level. If in 1968 it appeared rich 
in calories because of the weight of cereals and poor in proteins (particularly animal 
proteins), in the 1980s it emerged as a more balanced diet with relatively less cereals 
(particularly hard wheat for the rural population) and more non-cereal products 
especially pulses and animal products.
This qualitative and quantitative food shift was made possible by the new economic 
conditions created by the industrial Algerian policy of development: a massive injection 
of incomes (unequal in their distribution) which took the form of an overall increased 
purchasing power for the population unmatched by any corresponding increase in 
agricultural production and agricultural productivity. More specifically the 
homogenisation of food consumption was achieved through two main factors: the 
doubling of the urban population in a relatively short period (in 1966 30% of the total 
population - 3.6 million - was living in urban areas while in 1980 the rate of 
urbanisation of the population went up to 42% with 7.6 million), and the increasing 
availability of food products of imported origin (46). The generalisation of the food 
model of consumption that accompanied the development and extension of wage earning 
relations has not however resulted in a reduction in the gap between the diet of the 
urban population and that of the rural population (the management of the food content 
directly associated with the generalisation of capitalist relations of production, was 
more evident in urban areas which are the locus of capital accumulation than in rural 
areas where the diffusion of capitalist relations of production is relatively attenuated 
by the survival of simple commodity production and lower wage levels). The imbalance 
between the two populations, in terms of food intakes, has been a constancy of the 
Algerian food situation. As a matter of fact this imbalance has been steadily increasing. 
In the late 1960s the imbalance was expressed in the form of a rural diet heavily based 
on cereals on the one hand and an urban diet relatively balanced in its composition on
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the other. By the 1980s, if the composition of the two diets showed similarities in 
their structure, the rural diet, unlike the urban diet, underwent a reduction in the 
total food consumed. The distribution of expenditure per head showed in turn the origin 
of the unequal food distribution, both between the urban and the rural population, as 
well as between social groups.
In the last analysis, it is at the level of these economic conditions that the question of 
the conditions of access to food rises. As such, the food question is directly linked to the 
nature of the policy of development. In this respect it is the oil rent based industrial 
policy of Algeria which is at the root of all changes that affected the conditions of 
reproduction of the labour force particularly in its food aspect. The significance of the 
increasing food deficit of Algeria as well as the increasing cost of food acquisition by 
]  those social groups where dominate wage earners, and low income groups in general, 
are only the correlate of such a strategy of accumulation.
It is therefore in the light of such a strategy that we fully devote our attention to the 
study of the regulatory aspect of state food policy proper.
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NOTES
1-"The use of products is determined by social conditions in which consumers find 
themselves" Marx, Karl Mis ere de la ohilosophie. Editions Sociales. Paris. 1972. p. 
72.
2-Jean Pierre Terail. The historical and social nature of needs in Capitalism. 
consumption and needs. Preticeil and Terail. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1985. p. 39.
3-A good account of a critique of FBS limitations is to be found in Food and poverty. 
Appendix 1 by Sinha, Radha. Croom Helm London. 1976.
4-K. Griffin and Khan, A. R Poverty in. the Third World: Ualv facts and Fancy models. 
World Development, 1978. Volume. 6, p. 303. Pergamon Press.
The channeling of food goods and for that matter of any type of commodity is determined 
in the last analysis by the places occupied by the different social groups in the relations 
of production, relations which determine the way the social product is primarily 
distributed between the representatives of labour and capital. It is this social 
structural relation between capital and labour which determines the degree of 
skewdness of income distribution and therefore that of food production or food supply.
5-The justification of such a choice is commanded by two important considerations. 
Both surveys are concerned with the study of food of the total population, and they are 
based on a similar methodology.
6-See Appendix AIV.1, AIV2, and AIV 3.
7-The percentages represent corresponding households proportions.
8-The survey excluded from its scope the nomadic population (particularly important 
in the Southern part of Algeria), foreign households temporarily living Algeria at the 
time of the survey, persons living on their own and all collective households in general 
(hospitals, boarding schools and the army). Most of our references on the 1968 survey 
are based on the work of M. Autrey ex-Director of the Nutritional Division of the F.A.O 
and a leading expert on nutritional and food issues for the Maghreb countries. Aloerie: 
Evaluation de la Situation Alimentaire (Analyse Nutritionnelle de I'Enauete Nationale
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sur la Consommation et les Budgets des Menaaesl. FAO. Rome. 1978.
9-Due to the climatic heat of the Sahara desert, the Southern population like many 
populations living in excessive heat, rely on a great consumption of tea and 
particularly sweet tea, in order to fight the thirst of a dried climate. Apart from being 
the product of a climatic constraint, the consumption of tea is above all associated with 
a social ritual regarded as the cultural expression proper to the Southern population.
10-The determinants of the model of reference are both social and cultural in their 
expression as well as economic in their basis (level of income, nature of the income, 
etc. ).
11-See Appendix AIV.4, AIV.5, and AIV.6.
12-lt goes without saying that the notion of farmers being too vague and general since 
as it can include a capitalist farmers using the most sophisticated industrial inputs as 
well as a marginal peasant working his marginal plot of land with rudimentary tools, 
the above notion of "farmers" can only refer to the pauperised fraction of farmers. The 
survey show that 75% of farmers households were to be found in the lowest income 
group (Ibid., P. 142).
13-The evaluation of intakes discrepancies is based on the UNPD/FAO document pp 179 
- 189  (tables A3.1, AS.2, A3.3, A3.4, A3.5 and A3.6). The discrepancy rates have 
been computed on a stratum basis. As such this method does not always incorporate 
certain SPCs in certain strata. The overall presentation for Algeria as a whole does 
however contain all categories. When the presentation of intakes by stratum fail to 
incorporate certain SPCs for lack of sufficient number (below 25 households), we 
refer therefore to the overall table. This is particularly the case for the category of top 
executives, liberal professions, self-employed, etc. The method of presentation by 
stratum has been preferred in order to avoid computing the discrepancy rates on the 
basis of average values at national level.
14-All cereals figures relate to the value of cereals expressed in flour/semolina. As 
such they are lower than figures expressed in terms of grains.
15-lf one brings in the nutritional aspect of food products, it appears here again that 
for both pulses and vegetable oil, the high social category derives more nutrients from
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these two products than the low category. The case of sugar is different as it represents 
the best sample of an empty calorie product.
16-In actual fact the reference to the ideal prototype goes well beyond the simple 
nutritional reference as it implies a reference to an ideal environment devoid of those 
elements, such as ineffective demand, lack of access to food, poor sanitation, etc., 
which in the real world stand in the way of human achievement. What the man and the 
woman of reference are about is that the notion of development can hardly be restricted 
to one or another aspect of improvement but rather to its full dimension , i.e. 
embracing all its essential aspects.
17-R. Passmore, B.M. Nicol and M. Nararayana Rao Handbook on human nutritional 
requirement. FAO and WHO Rome 1984. P. 2
18-But tacking into effect the structure of the Algerian population.
19-See Appendix AIV.7.
20-Le monde. 22nd, April, 1987, article by C. B. P. 20.
21-See Appendix AIV.8.
22-On this point cf. the interesting article by Professor Leonard Joy Food and 
nutritional planning Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 24. 1973 pp 165-192. 
This point has far reaching implications depending on the type of priority and the type 
of development that the policy makers are to privilege: a priority to increase the 
calorie requirement of the population or the protein requirement ?
23-lf income is the intermediate variable between needs and food production, one 
clearly sees that a situation whereby there is an equilibrium between food supply and 
food demand does not necessarily imply that food needs are being met by food 
consumption. Or as put by D.Badillo "the neo-classical principle of a confrontation 
between supply and demand on a market fails to explain the mechanisms which led to 
situation of malnutrition or even suggest alternatives ". Ibid. cit. P. 146.
24-lncidentally it is among the well off social groups that we find most the 
preservation of 'traditional' food habits, but only those associated with the food habits 
of the dominant social groups themselves.
25-lt is worth mentioning that it is only at a higher level of income that the same
308
proportions of food expenditure are to be observed for both strata. Two elements on our 
mind seem to explain such a phenomenon. At a higher level of income there is a 
homogenisation of the food model precisely because the income constraint doe not any 
more represent a barrier. The situation is different for the lower income group. Here 
our assumption is that incomes being lower in the rural areas, it is very likely that, 
for the same level of food spending, the rural population "spends" more on food because 
of the integration of self-consumption, a well generalised practice.
26-Food price system will be discussed in the next chapter.
27-The 1968 survey estimated the following percentages of self-consumption in the 
average intake: 19.5% for cereals, 11% fir roots and tuber, 40% for pulses, 11% for 
vegetables and 14% for meat.
28-Cf. C. and Ch. Grignon. Op. Cit., for the case of modern French peasantry.
29-Conversely, the urban population, because geographically located at the heart of the 
food market, develops a different attitude towards food consumption which in this case 
is largely determined by the food model of reference on the one hand and the level of 
income on the other. This goes mainly for those categories, i.e. mainly the low income 
category, who rely heavily on the subsidised food market. Cf next chapter.
30-See Appendix AIV.9.
31-The increment in food intake was the direct result of the overall increase in the 
purchasing power of the population as a result of the initiated global industrial policy.
32-See Appendix AIV.10.
33-This question is particularly acute for the rural population which in 1980 
experienced a cereal intake (198 kg) close to the cereal intake of the urban population 
in 1968. (206 kg). This question is also relevant for the urban population with the 
lowest income level.
34-This inequality could not have been achieved without an inequality between all 
other groups.
35-The consequences of the generalisation of such a model will be studied in a separate 
chapter at a later stage.
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36-The unequal distribution of income of the urban population clearly confirms that 
the industrial Algerian policy has been mainly an urban based industrialisation.
37-lt is very likely that it is this fraction of the population that poverty is to be found. 
It is in this category that we find 70% of agricultural workers, 50% of self-employed 
and 47% of qualified and unqualified workers (the regrouping of these last two 
categories has been made unavoidable by the presentation adopted by the survey).
38-The percentage weight of all social categories is as follows: employees and liberal 
professions: 2.4%, self-employed: 25.3%, managers:5.5%, clerks and qualified 
workers:19.4%, specialised workers and unskilled workers: 18%, agricultural 
workers: 10%, other categories:19.4%.
39-For the social categories with the lowest income levels, wages can be assimilated to 
subsistence wages.
40-The 1984 FBS figure are however expressed in grains. The 1968 figure 
expressing the level of cereals in flour/semolina is obtained using the same extraction 
factor used in the HES of 1980 (85%). The use of an identical extraction obeys 
considerations pertaining to the practical possibility of comparing the flour/semolina 
content of cereal intake expressed in grains and referring very probably to two 
different structures of cereals consumption patterns.
41-The 1967 survey conducted by M.A.R.A to assess the food situation of farmers in 
the private agricultural sector showed a level of barley intake of 21 kg. Even if this 
intake reflects a situation 8 years after the 1968 survey, it tend however to support 
the fact that the 1968 survey over-estimated the human consumption of barley and as a 
consequence the level of cereals consumption in general.
42-The gap between the finding of the 1978 FBS and the HES being smaller than those 
of the 1960s tend to suggest a fortiori that Algeria was more dominated by commodity 
relation in 1980 than at the time of the 1968 survey. In other words the share of self­
consumption is very likely to have fallen since 1968.
But self-consumption as a part of a food model of consumption can also be the 
expression of the resistence of a style of life, in its food aspect, against an emerging 
dominant urban food model conveyed by the market. This point has been studied for the
310
French peasantry by C. & Ch. Grignon Styles d'alimentation et gouts ooDulaire. Revue 
Frangaise de Sociologie. V21, 1980.
43-A. Raoult Enauete sur I' etat de nutrition des enfants Alaeriens. Paris, Medecine et 
Dietetique. N2 3, 1974. Quoted by Autrey, M. P. 55
44-Grangaud & collaborateurs. Eoiddemoioaie de la malnutrition de i'enfant Aiaerien 
d'aae orescoiaire. Rapport sur la malnutrition de I'enfant Alaerien. 5eme Congres 
Medical Maghrebin. Alger, Mai 1975. Quoted by Autrey, M.
45-lbid. P. 80.
46-The combined effects of these factors bear a direct relation to the reduction of self­
consumption which is particularly dominant in the rural areas.
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CHAPTER II
THE ALGERIAN FOOD POLICY AND ITS MANAGEMENT:
THE REGULATION OF THE VALUE OF LABOUR POWER.
Introduction.
The state of the Algerian food situation is structurally dominated by food imports. 
Throughout the years and particularly since the late 1960s, the management of this 
constraint has become de facto the expression and the embodiment of the state food 
policy proper. Far from being a mere management of the constraint resulting from an 
inelastic agricultural production, the state food policy is also and above all a policy of 
management of capitalist development itself. As such this policy is impregnated with 
the implications imposed by the adoption of an overall urban based industrial policy of 
development: to meet at the lowest possible cost the reproduction of the labour force 
accompanying the industrialisation process in particular and capital accumulation at 
large (perceived from that viewpoint, the state food policy can be regarded as the policy 
whose objective is the management of the wage-earning constraint). If the state food 
policy in question is in essence a policy which "resolves" the food constraint through an 
increasing reliance on the international market, from the evidence this should be seen 
as the case only as a result of the inability of the domestic agricultural sector to meet 
the wage constraint in the first place. The development of agriculture on the basis of the 
penetration of capital has not yet resulted in raising a level of agricultural surplus 
large enough to meet the reproduction of labour power in a form that will not compete 
with the formation of the stock of capital exclusively financed from oil resources raised 
on the international market. What however characterises the state food policy - which is 
above all a policy of management of the value of labour power - is not only a mere 
equalisation of food demand and food supply obtained by food imports that oil rent is able
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to finance, but also the provision of a quantum of wage goods which can guarantee the 
reproduction of labour power at a level of subsistence nutritionally defined.
In what follows it is intended to examine more closely the state food policy in its 
manifestation and how it is operated on both markets (national and international), in 
order to assess on the one hand its mode of contribution to the relief of the internal food 
constraint and on the other to determine its impact on the regulation of the value of 
labour power.
I. The characteristics of the state food policy.
The scope of intervention of the state is a two level intervention. Firstly, an 
intervention on the world food market. At this level the state is the exclusive operator 
and as such its command over the modalities of imports is absolute. The overt objective 
of state board operators is the bridging of the gap between food demand and domestic 
supply. Secondly, an intervention on the domestic market. Here the state monopoly is 
counterbalanced by a relatively autonomous private sector in terms of crop selection 
and choice, the existence of a parallel and independent distribution network, a free 
price system, etc. The logic of intervention of the state on the domestic market is 
dictated by the necessity of meeting, out of imports and the state controlled domestic 
agricultural surplus, food demand at fix price.
A-The international intervention of the state.
The immediate objective of state intervention on the international market conforms to 
the necessity of meeting the gap existing between domestic food demand and supply. This 
gap concerns all basic food products: cereals, sugar, vegetable oil and milk, i.e. the 
main sources of calorie and protein intake. As a percentage of apparent food 
consumption, imports have represented an increasing proportion.
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Table IV. 2.1:% contribution of food imports to apparent food consumption,. 
[imports/(domestic supply +imports)].
1 9 6 6 1 9 7 0 ^  19 7 4 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1
Cereals 41% /  14%., ' 56% 65% 61%
Sugar 94% 93% 85% 78% 76%
Vegetable oil 64% 64% 54% 63% 61%
Milk - 30% - - -
Source: Series Statistiques and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.
The increase of food imports over the years has not taken place without a certain 
diversification of products. The diversification concerns mainly two products: cereals 
and animal products. From the 1960s onwards both the quantity and the quality of 
imported cereals increased. The diversification went from wheat (in 1958), to wheat, 
flour and cereal preparation (in 1968), and to wheat, barley, maize, wheat flour, 
meal, wheat groats, meal or groats (other than wheat), etc. (in 1978). In the category 
"animal products" the most significant qualitative change concerns meat. If up to the 
mid 1970s imports consisted exclusively of "live animals", in 1974 for the first time 
meat was directly imported for immediate consumption. Under the pressure of an 
increasing domestic demand and the generalisation of animal products consumption, 
eggs became an import product in 1974 for the first time. Given the inaccessible price 
of red meat for average and particularly low income groups (at present prevailing 
prices, around AD 130/kg, the purchasing power of the minimum nominal wage rate 
represents the equivalent of less than 10 kg per month), imports also provided for the 
production of poultry in the form of a supply of feed (1). Poultry farming is one of the 
instances where imports provided for the provision of all required inputs, feed and 
machinery. Between 1964 and 1981 the volume of imports of animal products 
(including animal oil and fat and excluding poultry production catered for by feed 
imports) increased on average by more than 25%. This was by far the most important 
increase of all categories of food products.
B-The state intervention on the domestic market.
Based on the requirement of supplying the domestic market at the lowest price possible,
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the state policy of intervention relied on four direct methods. At the level of imports, 
the use of an overvalued currency, and the suppression of custom duties on imports 
(particularly since 1974), provided for the de facto conditions of cheap food imports. 
At the domestic level, the generalisation of subsidies and producer price control 
further completed the policy of food price control. The incorporation of such measures 
into specific policy goals finds its embodiment in the mode of management of the 
essential components of the daily diet of the population.
a. The cereal policy.
Given the overwhelming weight of cereals in the daily diet of the Algerian population, 
the cereal policy represents one of the main focuses of the state food policy of 
intervention. Broadly speaking this policy involves three main stages of price control: 
a producer price at the collecting stage or simply an import price where imports are 
concerned, a "retrocession" price  (i.e. the price at which the processing industry 
catering for final demand pays the state supplying board, or the internal price between 
the importing board and the processing industry) at the processing stage, and a 
subsidised price at the consumer level.
The collecting stage function is devoted to the state cereal board OAIC (a colonial 
creation of the 1930s). The role of OAIC is to "guarantee the producers an outlet for 
their products at a remunerative price" (2). The state board acts therefore as a 
collector on the domestic market, but also as the exclusive importer on the 
international market. The downward stream function of OAIC is to supply the state 
owned enterprise SN-SEMPAC (National Enterprise for Semolina, Milling, Pasta and 
Couscous) with the necessary cereal inputs required to meet domestic final demand for 
cereal products at a fixed price throughout all Algeria. The following diagram 
summarises the working of the cereal network from imports to the final demand.
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Figure 1: Overall marketing network for cereals.
Domestic
market
Imports
P P Producer price 
P m Import price
Ps Subsidised price 
Pr Retrocession price
The share of domestic production collected by OAIC has always fluctuated according to 
the fluctuation of total production. During the last two decades this share has tended to 
be stabilised at about 1/2 the domestic production.
Table IV. 2. 2: Domestic cereal production accruing to the cereal board (U=million tons).
1951-55 1957-61 1961-64 1965-67 1968-71 1972- 74 1975- 77
Domestic wheat production 1.10 1.30 1.40 1.10 1.40 1.30 1.40
Share acquired by OAIC 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.49 0.74 0.70 0.79
% share of domestic production 59% 56% 48% 43% 52% 51% 55%
sold to the board
Source: I. Molina, Ibid, p. 206.to the board
Over three decades the cereal board captured around an average of 700,000 tons per 
year (the magnitude of OAIC collection bears a direct relation to the level of cereal
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imports). A number of objective factors explain the inability of OAIC to capture a 
greater share of domestic cereal production. On the issue of remunerative prices, 
production prices did not provide any form of incentive: from well before 1960 and 
until 1974, the price at which the cereal board paid cereal producers (3) did not 
undergo any significant increase (it is worth mentioning that the significance of the 
cereal price freeze during colonisation - especially when domestic subsistence farming 
is concerned - did not proceed from the same rationale as that of the post colonial 
period: while the policy of cereal prices before 1962 obeyed the objective of the 
maximum extraction of surplus produce from peasant producers through a price 
squeeze operated at the advantage of the colonist export marketing boards, the function 
of fixed cereal prices in post colonial Algeria was - in addition to the price squeeze 
born by peasant producers - more directly geared towards the domestic valorisation of 
capital accumulation through the regulation of its subjective condition)
Though in principle producers are organised in cooperatives which are in charge of the 
marketing side of production, SAP or CCRA (the cooperatives de commercialisation de 
la revolution agraire: marketing cooperative of the agricultural revolution), acts as a 
mere appendix to the central board OAIC and as such they operate as simple collecting 
bodies. Moreover the determination of prices is fixed outside the intervention of the 
producers and the management of the marketing function is entirely within the hands of 
the Ministry of Agriculture MARA (as far as the cereal policy is concerned, and though 
the degree of freedom offered to private producers is much greater than that of the 
SMS, it is the entire agricultural sector of cereals which falls under the state policy of 
administered prices).
The possibility for most producers to increase their income only occurred after 1974. 
Such a decision was also accompanied by a temporary freeze in the prices of certain 
farm machinery and fertilisers. But as S. Bedrani, the expert on Algerian agriculture, 
rightly pointed out, "such measures [concerning the price freeze of certain industrial 
intermediate goods] came late as the prices of such inputs were frozen at an already
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high level on the one hand, and were partial since they did not apply to many other 
agricultural intermediate consumption [seeds, lorries, trailers, irrigation equipment, 
green-houses, pesticides, fungicides, herbicides, etc.]" (4). This passive policy which 
has been systematically pursued by the cereal board, which acted more as a simple 
centres of collection at disincentive production prices, explains to a certain extent the 
relative stagnation of the share of domestic production supplied to the processing 
industry.
The policy of OAIC vis-a-vis domestic producers contrasts a great deal with its import 
strategy. De facto, imports offer many direct advantages to the cereal board. Firstly 
there is a practical advantage. Here, the possibility of acquiring whatever quantity of 
cereals was needed on the international market contrasts with the uncertainty linked 
with domestic crop fluctuations as well as with the limited quantities collected in 
relation to the needs of the processing industry, and the existence of stocking facilities 
at harbour points located in urban areas endowed with the necessary infrastructure 
contrasts with the scattered collecting points in rural areas (5), the proximity of 
cereal processing industries in the urban areas also stimulated the dependence of the 
board on cereal imports, etc. On the financial side OAIC gains more from the 
international market. If one looks at the cereal network from the supply side of the 
processing industry, import prices (as translated by an overvalued rate of exchange) 
are systematically lower than both producers' prices and particularly retrocession 
prices. With the exception of a few years, OAIC was paying domestic producers at a 
much higher level than that of world prices (6). Except when international prices 
rocketed during the years 1974-76, the cereal board tended to benefit on a whole from 
its import policy as is evidenced by the following table:
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Table IV. 2. 3: Trend in cereal prices: 1964-1977. (AD/ton).
Y ear Import price R e t r o c e s s i o n  price Production price
1964 342 N.A 470
1965 398 N.A 470
1966 381 N.A 470
1967 378 N.A 470
1968 348 N.A 470
1969 430 475 500
1970 380 475 500
1971 356 475 500
1972 254 575 500
1973 420 580 500
1974 475 N.A 500
1975 970 N.A 625
1976 960 N.A 725
1977 730 N.A 875
Source: U.N Yearbook of International Trade Statistics for import prices(average prices are import 
C.I.F).H. Delorme, op., cit., p. 12 for retrocession prices and production prices (production 
prices for the period 1964-68 are our own estimate).
Between 1969 and 1971 import prices were decreasing while internal processing 
prices (retrocession prices) remained constant. Between 1971-72, while import 
prices underwent a further drop, retrocession prices were increased. The sudden 
increase in import prices between 1972 and 1973 was not enough to alter the positive 
gap with retrocession prices. Up to that date, and as far as OAIC was concerned, "the 
stabilisation of domestic prices did not cost anything and even allowed for substantial 
profits" (7). The subsequent sharp rise in international prices substantially altered 
the balance between relative prices. Conceived in a favourable context of low 
international prices, the state food policy based on price control, soon became more and 
more dependent on increased subsidies (on average, AD 935 million/year for the 
period 1974-81).
At the processing stage too, the use of subsidies becomes an unavoidable consequence. As 
the main processing board SN-SEMPAC is under obligation to meet at fixed prices the 
demand for all finished cereal products (8) throughout the Algerian territory (in 
1982, SN-SEMPAC owned 764 warehouses distributed throughout the territory and as 
such was literally present in excess of 1 warehouse per commune; during that year 
Algeria was administratively subdivided into 704 communes. The effect of such an
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intervention is significant in many ways. Above all it reflects the ability of the state to 
affect and influence the profile of the food diet of the population through a complete 
control of the market for cereal by products. The distribution of subsidies for the three 
major output components was as follows.
Table IV. 2. 4: Price subsidies at consumer level (U= AD Millions).
Subsidised products 1 9 7 4  1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7  7 19 7 8 19 7 9 1 9 8  0 1 981
Flour 67 115 37 19 - 113}
Semolina 166 66 143 132 309} 4 3 5 *
Pate 17 -  ■ - - - }
Total 250 181 180 151 422 435
Source: H. Haddouche "Situation des produits a prix fixes (1968-1981)" in Debats et Critiques. N2 7. 
INEAP. Algiers. 1983. p. 81 (* refers to the value of the tree items).
From 1974 to 1978, price subsidies tended to be constant with an average of AD 150 
million/year, and between 1979 and 1980 they doubled with about AD 300 
million/year. The distribution of overall cereal subsidies revealed a high concentration 
at the pre-processing level (OAIC absorbed on average well over 3/4 of subsidies).
Table IV. 2. 5: Distribution of total cereal subsidies: 1974-81 (U= AD million).
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1
At OAIC level 1,356 1,188 684 661 650 460 1,077 1,410
At SN-SEMPAC - 250 181 180 151 - 422 435
Total 1,356 1,438 865 841 801 460 1,499 1,845
Source: Ibid.
The comparative relative constancy of subsidies at the processing stage tends to suggest 
a lesser variability of retrocession prices (9), compared to the cumulative increase of 
import prices and producer prices after 1973. In other words OAIC serves as a price 
absorbing screen so that the retrocession price mechanism resulting from the 
fluctuation of producer and import prices, does not operate on the downward processing 
industries which therefore tend to enjoy relatively stable input prices (10). But 
independently of the distribution of subsidies between the different bodies involved, and
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the magnitude of subsidies at different levels of intervention, any policy of price 
subsidy is based on the absorption of the effects of price fluctuations at input level 
(11). In terms of results, the state policy of subsidies has been able to meet, at 
relatively low prices, the requirement of the final demand for cereal products.
Table IV. 2. 6: Retail price index for cereal products: 1969-83. (1971=100).
19 69 1 97 1 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 Average yearly increase 1969-83
Bread 95 100 100 122 185 182 6%
Paste 127 100 106 119 144 141 3%
Semolina N.A 100 104 128 162 176 5%
Couscous 99 100 106 119 154 142 3%
Source:"L'Algerie en quelques chiffres". Direction des statistiques. Alger. 1970-1984.
The above prices, which are retail prices (including in principal the profit margin of 
sellers), i.e. prices higher than those of the processing industry itself, did not changed 
significantly until 1978. The post-1978 period opened up an era of comparatively 
important increases (12) affecting the majority of products. The occurrence of such 
increases, far from calling into question the existence of the price subsidy policy, can 
only be seen as the unavoidable revision of consumer price fixing policy. Such an 
upward price revision took place against the background of an overall increase in the 
purchasing power of the population. As a result of a massive income injection (13) 
following the launching of the Algerian industrialisation programme, the demand for 
cereal products underwent an increase which by far exceeded that of population growth 
itself (between 1969 and 1981 the demand for semolina increased by 8.7%/year, that 
of flour by 5% and that of pasta by 7% (14). Such a demand increase bears the scars of 
the peculiarities of the Algerian food market. In many instances, it expresses a de facto 
forced demand (15) by low income groups for a relatively abundant and cheap product. 
The transfer of such a demand on alternative products is not materially possible 
because of the combined effects of a regular scarcity (as is the case of pulses) and the 
prohibitive level of prices at which certain products are available (as is the case of 
vegetables, fruit and meat). This clearly shows that unless the supply of other food 
products increases at moderate prices, the restrictive use of a price subsidy policy, in
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terms of the scope of the range of products concerned by the policy of intervention (in 
the case of Algeria, mainly cereals and its by-products), is bound to increase cost 
subsidies by over-concentrating the demand on the cheapest subsidised products. The 
scope of consumer price subsidies is not however restricted to cereal products alone. To 
a lesser extent and with great variability, animal products, vegetable oil, sugar and 
coffee represent the second category of subsidised products.
b. The scope of non-cereal subsidised products.
1. Animal products.
The main import is powdered milk which represents between 60 and 70% of the total 
animal imports. In the category of meat imports, red meat import for direct 
consumption, initiated since 1974, still does not represent more than 6% of total 
animal imports. The diversification of animal imports centres mainly on butter and 
eggs both of which represent over 30% of total animal imports (16).
2. Vegetable products.
In the category of vegetable products, and up to the late 1960s, tubers represented the 
main vegetable imports. A major diversification was introduced in the early 1970s in 
the form of a drastic increase in dry pulse imports: 6,000 tons in 1971 (6% of total 
vegetable imports), 112,000 tons in 1979 (36% of total vegetable imports), giving 
an average rate of increase of 220%/annum. This major shift in the structure of 
vegetable imports corresponds with requirement of meeting the demand of low income 
groups for protein products (17). The increased reliance on imports denotes the extent 
of the deficit of domestic production itself but also the sign that the consumption of a 
product for which there is clearly a tendency for over-consumption as a result of the 
permanent imbalance introduced between the price of vegetables and animal proteins 
or, in other words, the imbalance between the formation of fixed/subsidised products 
prices on the state controlled market and free determined prices for animal products on 
the private market.
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3. Vegetable oil and fat.
Up to 1974, the imports of vegetable oil and fat remained constant at around 100,000 
tons/year. From 1975 onwards the level rocketed to an average of 300,000 tons/year. 
Such an increase was the expression of the contradictory result of a shift in the oil 
industry based on the decision to substitute seed imports with domestic production 
based mainly on sunflower and soya beans. The initiation of such a policy, because it 
was not based on the maturation of the main objective (the increased domestic 
production of seeds), eventually led to an increase in seed imports as well as in total 
vegetable oil. With the early implementation of the new policy, the import of seeds fell 
from 71% (66,000 tons) in 1964, to 46% (58,000 tons) in 1974 and to 19% 
(76,000 tons) in 1981. While the induced domestic production was not forthcoming, 
fixed vegetable oil imports increased: 27,000 tons in 1964 (29% of total imports of 
vegetable oil and fat), 84,000 tons in 1974 (59% of total imports of vegetable oil and 
fat), and 390,000 tons in 1984 or the equivalent of 80% of the total imports of 
vegetable oil and fat (the systematisation of the overall food policy of import 
substitution will be dealt with more thoroughly in the conclusive part of this chapter).
4. Sugar and coffee.
The case of coffee is special since one of the conditions of production, i.e. a tropical 
climate, is not to be met in a mediterranean context. However the production of sugar, 
particularly under the form of beet sugar, is possible on irrigated land. In order to cut 
imports, which averaged well over 200,000 tons during the 1960s, an organisation 
for the domestic production of beet sugar and sugar processing industries were set 
during the mid 1960s. If the production of beet sugar went up from 11,400 tons in 
1964 to 35,000 tons in 1981 (a 12% net increase per year), the trend of imports for 
the same period went up from 212,000 tons to 575,000 tons or the equivalent of a net 
increase of 10% per annum. Related to the quantities imported, domestic production in 
1981 was only 1% above what it had been in 1964 (i.e. 5%). In view of the trend of
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imports, such a percentage only translates the relatively insignificant increase of 
domestic production over a period of 17 years. Here again the option of an import 
substitution policy did not produced any significant result in bringing down the level of 
imports. As for cereals, all the above categories of products were managed with 
different degrees under a policy of price control. Unlike cereals however, the scope of 
state intervention was limited. In the domain of price control and quantities supplied, 
the degree of state intervention was counter-balanced by the existence of an 
independent private sector controlling most of the meat, vegetable and fruit products. 
This duality between two fundamentally different modes of regulation of the food 
market, is seen clearly through the comparative study of the structure of retail prices.
Table IV. 2.7: Retail price index of non-cereal products between 1969-83 (1969=100 except for dry 
beans 1971=100) (18).
1 9 6 9 ( 1969)  1 971 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 Average yearly increase
Animal products
Butter 100 (7.87) 107 152 152 2 03 2 06 7 .5 %
Milk 100 (0.86) 106 146 153 153 153 4 .0 %
Ovine meat 100 (10) 117 3 1 2 431 660 640 3 9 .0 %
Bovine meat 100 (11.8) 110 2 6 7 3 5 7 6 27 662 4 0 .0 %
Poultry 100 (7.2) 108 153 184 2 7 6 2 6 2 1 2 .0 %
Eggs 100 (0.25) 124 2 16 2 4 4 2 8 0 248 1 0 .0 %
Vegetable products
Pulses 100 (0.16) 105 2 05 3 4 2 5 19 5 34 3 1 .0 %
Dry beans N.A 100 (1.9) 145 173 2 0 4 2 02 7 .0 %
Vegetable oil 100 (2.19) 100 107 129 131 136 4 .0 %
Sugar 100 (1.7) 100 103 159 161 162 4 .0 %
Coffee 100 (7 .6 )  105 105 3 6 6 3 68 3 6 8 1 9 .0 %
Source: Ibid. (Figures between brackets refer to the actual price).
From the above table there clearly emerge two distinct groups of products: a high price 
increase group and a low price increase group (19). The first group, with an average 
of 40% yearly price increase represents the category of red meat products (with 31% 
increase, pulses are the only vegetable product which belongs to this group). The 
second group of products includes white meat products, eggs, dairy products and 
vegetable products in general. The distinctive characteristics between these two major 
categories of products is directly related to the degree of state intervention in 
production, prices and imports. Meat products (red meat particularly) are by far the
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products over which state intervention is most restricted (the meat market is entirely 
dominated by the private sector). Poultry and eggs are subsidised products which cater 
mainly for the urban market entirely dependent on imports (it is worth mentioning 
that the state price regulation of such products takes an essentially indirect form 
through the provision of state owned enterprises and of private units, of all necessary 
inputs entering into the production of poultry farming such as improved seeds, 
equipment, genetically selected breeds, etc. As a result of the weight of private 
producers in production, the distribution of poultry production is operated mainly 
through private channels).
Generally speaking, these two products experience on average higher consumer prices 
than the other category of subsidised products (with the exception however of coffee). 
Such a price differential is mainly due to the specific conditions prevailing in the 
overall meat market itself (20). This domestic market like any other food market in 
Algeria, is characterised, as a result of an insufficient production level, by a very 
unstable supply which affects, because of their close substituability, botft categories of 
meats as well as eggs. The above retail prices hide a considerable instability. Whenever 
this is the case, which is very frequent, the increase in the price of red meat on the 
private sector leads to a shift in the demand for poultry and eggs, while such tensions 
last, the increase in the price of these products become unavoidable thus preparing for 
the stabilisation of the price of red meat at a level below which it will not fall, or 
rather a level from which it will instead increase in the future. Such instability exists 
in an intense atmosphere of speculation characterised by the prospect of short term 
high financial returns. The intervention of the profit maximising speculators takes the 
usual form of temporary withdrawals from the market of important quantities of either 
product in order to promote the required depression of the supply necessary for the 
price increase (21). Conversely, if for one reason or another (and these reasons can be 
several) delays in imports of eggs and/or feed occur, the immediate build up of the 
demand for these products unavoidably leads to their price increase, immediately
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followed by a rise in the price of meat on the private market. Given the much higher 
price of red meat, the pressure on the price of poultry and eggs is nearly permanent. In 
recent years the gap between the price of red meat and white meat has tended to narrow 
thus showing the close link between the two products in a situation of very unstable 
market fluctuations. If one excludes subsidies going to animal products in general 
(22), the level of subsidies going to vegetable products can be presented as follows.
Table IV. 2. 8:Price subsidies accruing to vegetable products: 1974-81. (23). (U= AD million.)
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 981
Sugar 861 1,066 334 161 - - - -
Fixed veg.oil (1) 221 159 45 158 190 251 208}
Oleaginous seeds (2) 64 115 34 62 50 35 51} 2 5 6 *
Coffee - 49 234 991 - - ' }
Refined veg.oil(3) - -  . - - - 73 90 90
Total 1,146 1,389 647 1,372 240 359 349 346
Source: H. Haddouche, ibid, p. 81.
(1) Subsidies at import level; (2) Subsidies at import level and domestic level; (3) Subsidies at 
consumer level (* refers to the value of the three items).
The first category of subsidy are those at ONACO level (the national board for 
marketing), i.e. the importing body in charge of all food imports (except for cereals 
the prerogative of which belongs to OAIC). These subsidies occur as a result of the 
difference between retrocession prices and import prices. The second category of subsidy 
operates at the processing stage itself to allow for the control of fixed consumer prices. 
They apply at the level of SOGEDIA (the national enterprise for the management and 
development of food industries). On the whole the level of subsidies, unlike those of 
cereals, has been steadily decreasing between 1974 and 1981. The amount and the 
distribution of these subsidies remain highly unstable depending mainly on the level of 
world prices. The case of sugar is illustrative of the situation. Between 1974 and 1975 
its import price which increased by 75% (from AD 2,046 to AD 3.593/ton), was 
followed by a parallel increase in subsidies. During the following year the drop in the 
level of subsidies was the result of a subsequent fall in the import price (from AD 
3,593 to AD 1,844/ton). The further decline in import prices for this product has led
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to a parallel reduction in its subsidies. From 1977 onwards the combination of a higher 
domestic consumer price level and a decreasing import price, has led to the 
suppression of subsidies for sugar altogether.
The fluctuation of international prices for fixed oil and oleaginous seeds produced the 
same effects on the movement of subsidies: each increase in subsidies corresponded to 
an increase in import prices. The same scenario of correlation between subsidies and 
the differential between domestic and international prices can be observed for all 
products under the regime of controlled prices. Structurally, the overall subsidies can 
be presented as follow.
Table IV. 2. 9: Overall distribution of food subsidies: 1974/81 (AD million).
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 19 8 2 Average structure 
of subsidies
Cereals 1,356 1,438 865 841 801 460 1,499 1,845 1,138 (61%)
Veg.oil and fat 285 274 79 220 240 359 349 346 269 (14%)
Sugar 861 1,066 334 161 - - - - 303 (16%)
Coffee - 49 234 991 - - - 159 (8%)
Total 2,505 1,512 2,213 1,041 819 1,848 2,191 1,866 1,869 (100)
Source: Ibid. P. 81.
Depending on the years, cereal products appropriated between 50 and 80% of all direct 
subsidies. Until 1976 sugar subsidies came second with a share of subsidies fluctuating 
between 22% and 34%. From 1978 onwards all subsidies have been allocated between 
mainly three categories of product: cereals, sugar, coffee and oleaginous products. As a 
privileged tool of price control the manipulation of subsidies have not however 
presented the policy makers with much financial constraints. Subsidies have tended to 
be essentially self-financing as a result of the financial ease conferred by oil rent.
C-The role of subsidies in the state food policy.
As paradoxically as it may appear the use of subsidies is not central to the state food 
policy of intervention as such. Its role is restricted to a mere means of achieving the 
objective of food price control. The price manipulation by the different state bodies has
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not produced a chronic situation of cumulative subsidies. Food subsidies only appeared 
during peak import prices, i.e. when they increased above domestic prices (24). The 
case of coffee and sugar, two products for which subsidies have dropped, illustrates this 
quite well (25). For the period 1969/81 the net positive gross margin integrating the 
effects of the fluctuations of import prices and the constant upward increase of 
consumer prices was around AD 17,000 million. The margin for these two products 
alone was more than enough to cover all food subsidies for the entire period between 
1974-1981, i.e. the period which underwent the highest import price increase, 
AD14,000 million (26). From this example one sees the conditions upon which the 
state policy of food price control is based: the use of import proceeds to finance the 
equalisation of food prices at production, processing and consumer levels. Subsidies are 
only indicators of the temporary state of imbalance between domestic and international 
prices. As such, they always inaugurate the upward revision of consumer prices. The 
policy of subsidies is in essence self-financing (at least, only in so far as the 
counterpart represented by the sheer increase of the foreign exchange value of imports 
is not taken into account).
Generally speaking, the achievement of the policy of price fixing is based on three main 
mechanisms: direct subsidies, transfer pricing and self-financing. If the first form of 
price control is visible, and therefore its assessment is relatively straightforward, the 
other forms are more difficult to assess as they involve the use of a panoply of goods, 
and levels of prices not easily identifiable. Broadly speaking the use of cross-price 
subsidies occurs whenever the price of a given product (or a group of products) is used 
to support the price of another product or group of products. The use of self-financing 
corresponds to those products whose prices do not require any form of financial 
support (the case of coffee and sugar are the ideal example of products which are both 
self-financing and cross-price subsidising (27). The question of price control 
however raises issues of a different sort. In what follows attention will centre on two 
main issues: the rationale behind the policy of food price control and the effects
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produced by such a policy.
II. The impact of the state food policy.
A. The strategy of importing boards.
The impact of state intervention depends in the first place on the strategy adopted by the 
importing boards. During the period when import prices were low the importing 
boards benefited from the gap between those prices and the processing prices. This 
situation prevailed until the mid 1970s. Up to this date the level of domestic producer 
prices acted as a disincentive for importing boards for the simple reason that such a 
level did not allow for higher returns compared to the much lower import prices 
(domestic producers were paid at a level of prices well above world prices). In this 
context the strategy of OAIC was more geared towards imports since they find it more 
expensive to buy at home. Domestic production became attractive only when import 
prices were above domestic prices. However the degree of responsiveness to higher 
prices on the part of domestic producers is not linear due to the other structural 
factors which determine the level of output. The positive price elasticity of supply can 
only be conceived in a state whereby only farm gate price being exogenous, all other 
conditions of production - price of inputs, level of inputs, etc - are within the control 
of producers; neither in the private nor in the public sector are or can such conditions 
be met given the present state of agricultural organisation. In such a context the board 
attempts to increase the collected share of domestic production are therefore limited in 
themselves, thus making the reliance on the world market (even when prices are 
higher), an unavoidable issue. It is the occurrence of such a situation and the absence of 
flexibility between domestic and international products, which generate the highest 
levels of subsidy particularly since the upward adjustment of retrocession prices not 
only goes well beyond the capabilities of the board (28), but also because such an 
adjustment would have to be transmitted to consumer prices.
The position of the processing industry is of a different nature. Faced with the
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obligation to supply final consumers at fixed prices, its room for manoeuvre in price 
manipulation is the least of all. In terms of alternatives, its strategy is bound to focus 
on the minimisation of retrocession prices and/or the revision of consumer prices 
proper. In practice the growing financial debt of such industries puts pressure on the 
revision of consumer prices. The feasibility of such measures has increased 
particularly when looked at from the viewpoint of the overall purchasing power 
increase of the population as a result of the massive injection of incomes following the 
industrialisation plans. The political decision to maintain a certain freeze on consumer 
prices has also meant that the processing industry has benefited from relatively 
constant retrocession prices even when import prices rocketed well above consumer 
prices (the concentration of subsidies on importing bodies has so far been the 
practice). Naturally the management of the importing boards, like that of the 
processing industries had one exclusive objective: the regulation of the domestic food 
market with the necessary level of imports. The implication of such a situation is that 
the functioning of such bodies has become de facto disconnected from any real incentive 
to promoting domestic production. OAIC has become in effect a board specialising in 
imports, or at least acting as a reinforcing mechanism of the domestic food industry on 
the international market (in 1980, the contribution of cereal imports constituted 87% 
of the total cereal requirement for the processing industry SN-SEMPAC). In this 
respect one can say that the state food policy, by exclusively focusing on the 
achievement of fixed consumer prices, has created a relative isolation of domestic 
producers.
B. The price effects of the state food policy.
Broadly speaking the state food policy has induced two major types of effects depending 
on the nature of the agricultural sector.
a. The immediate effect of the state food policy.
The use of fixed prices applies entirely to the production of the public agricultural
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sector at both production and distribution levels. The lowest agricultural prices are to 
be found in this sector (the price increase after 1974 did not alter this fact that, even 
after revision, the prices of this sector remained the lowest in relation to the private 
sector). The major products involved were cereals, oleaginous, sugar beet, milk, 
vegetable oil, fruit and vegetables, wine, eggs, etc.
b. The effects of the state policy on the private sector.
The extent of the cereal production of the private sector which is commercialised 
through the state market is subject to the same price system as that of the state 
agricultural sector. The rest of the private sector production is governed by free 
market mechanisms. The price differential of food products between the two sectors 
however creates a whole range of situations. The effects of low prices in the public 
sector depends in the first place on the weight of the state boards in the total supply of 
those goods subject to a price regulation. The type of fixed price goods for which the 
state monopoly is exclusive concerns vegetable oil, sugar, coffee and powdered milk. As 
far as fresh milk is concerned, in principle, the SMS is entitled to sell its product on 
the private market. In actual fact, 75% of the quantities of milk collected by ONALAIT 
(the national board for milk and dairy products) which come from the SMS are in fact 
still collected on the basis of state controlled prices, i.e. lower than private prices.
In the case of poultry and eggs, state boards control neither their marketing network, 
nor the quantities available at a particular moment. For the bulk of other products, i.e. 
fruit, vegetables and meat, the pre-eminence of the private sector is absolute and this 
monopoly even extends to the marketing of a fraction of the production of the "self­
managed" sector despite the supposed state monopoly. During 1964/65 "the self­
managed sector which was supposed to realise 80% of the total exports of fruit and 
vegetables only commercialised through the state sector 53.6% of vegetables and 73% 
of fruit" (29). It is within this market that prices are highest and their increase 
permanent.
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Table IV. 2.10: Consumer price trend for few products available through the private market(1969= 100, 
except for 1971=100). AD/kg.
1 9 6 9 ( 1 9 6 9 ) 1971 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 Average yearly 
in c re a se
Me a t
Ovine 100 (10 *) 117 312 373 557 640 38.5%
Bovine 100 (118) 110 267 304 485 662 40%
Fr u i t s
Oranges 100 (.67) 110 231 355 485 1,343 90%
Grapes 100 (1.57) N.A N.A N.A 525 N.A 38%
Dates N.A 100 (2.58) 165 258 610 N.A 56%
V egetab les
Carrots 10 (.63) N.A N.A N.A 480 N.A 31%
Onions 100 (.54) 150 315 385 577 1,030 66%
Potatoes 10 (.61) 105 20 5310 362 534 31%
Tomatoes 100 (1.07) 131 252 388 476 747 46%
Source: L'Algerie en quelques chiffres and Annuaire Statistique de I'Algerie 1981.
For the period under investigation average price increases have not fallen below a 30% 
yearly increase. On the whole it can be said that between 1969 and 1983 prices have 
been increasing at an average rate of about 50% per annum. Such increments stand in 
total contrast to state price controlled products: 7.5% for butter, 4% for milk, 2.6% 
for vegetable oil, 4% for sugar, 19% for coffee, 10% for eggs, 12% for poultry, 6% 
for bread, 5% for semolina and 3% for couscous for the same period. The parallel 
movement of prices in the two markets introduces an alteration in the relative prices 
of agricultural products which in turn react on the structure of agricultural output 
itself. One must also point out that the price factor is however more economically 
significant, i.e. as a stimulant, for private agricultural producers - particularly in the 
capitalist section of the sector - than for the producers of the "self-managed" sector. 
Comparatively speaking, the former have a relatively greater freedom over the 
organisation of the conditions of production, the mode of distribution and above all the 
type of crops.
In contrast, the bureaucratic rigidity under which the workers of the SMS operate in 
terms of pre-set norms involving the nature of the crop to be farmed and its mode of 
farming, the terms under which to sell production, and the channel of its distribution 
etc., arbitrarily excludes the entire sector from the mechanisms of market
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determination. If one excludes permanent crops (citrus fruit, dates, etc.) characterised 
by a short and middle term structurally rigid supply because of the biological cycle of 
production (30), the high prices of vegetables and meat products have certainly had a 
determinant effect in the shift of agricultural resources towards the development of 
such products particularly since the 1970s. The first industrial programme of Algeria 
having been initiated in 1970, the pressure on food supply from increased demand 
must have taken place during the subsequent years. In this respect, the realisation of 
industrial investments was closely linked not only to an important increase in demand 
but also to a new type of demand based on high incomes and catering especially for fruit, 
vegetables, and meat. The policy of development based on "investments in heavy 
industry tends to reinforce the concentration of incomes at the benefit of social strata 
which control public capital or hold private capital, or belong to the minority of 
qualified workers" (31). The following table evidences this sense of causality.
Table IV. 2 .11 : Production trends for certain products marketed in the private sector(U= 1,000 tons).
1 9 6 7 / 6 9  
Period I
1 9 7 0 / 7 3  
Period II
1 9 7 4 / 8 1  
Period III
Rate o f increase  betw een: 
Period I & II Period II & III
Average production of market-garden 
products
700 800 1,200 14% 50%
Average production of citrus fruit 720 800 800 14% 0%
Average production of red meat 76 105 110 38% 5%
-bovine and ovine meat 54 95 95 68% 4%
-poultry 24 27 118 12% 337%
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I’Algerie" and "Series Statistiques". Direction Generate des Statistiques. 
MPAT. 1984. and K. Hadjiat in "Evolution de la consommation en Afrique: le cas de I'Algerie". Ibid. 
p. 104 .
The most important increases concern vegetables and above all meat products. In terms 
of land use, overall increase of land devoted to market-garden products in both 
agricultural sectors is among the highest of all crops: index 100 in 1964/65, 268 in 
1979/80. For other crops the indices in 1979/80 were: 113 for cereals, 217 for 
pulses, 188 for industrial crops, 115 for natural fodder, 70 for olive tree and 148 
for dates. Only land increment for artificial fodder holds the highest record of increase
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with an index of 578 in 1980 (the exact sectoral distribution of this land is not known 
to us but its contribution to the private sector is a well established fact). If in general 
the growth of market-garden products is linked to a commercialised agricultural sector 
based in the intensive use of irrigated land, the conditions prevailing in the growth of 
meat products are of a different sort. The main sources of meat increase are derived 
from bovine and ovine meat on the one hand and poultry on the other. The overall 
characteristics of animal husbandry in Algeria is based on the extensive use of large 
areas of pasture land (90% of herds are produced on the basis of itinerary husbandry 
(32). Under the influence of high income generated demand, a more capitalist form of 
intensive livestock rearing emerged, combining the size of the immensity of the ground 
rent free public pasture land (35 million ha), the development of artificial fodder 
(1.8 million quintals on average during 1963/69, 2.8 million quintals during 
1970/73, 5.3 million during 1974/79, and 7 million during 1980/82), the 
extension of veterinary controls (33) and the intensive use of modern equipment in 
general. To counteract difficulties experienced on the Algerian Steppe and prevent the 
disadvantage associated with traditional extensive breeding (the pursuit of grazing 
space over a wide area meant a drop in the actual animal weight), the practice of 
modern means of transportation, to move herds from one point of grazing to a richer 
one in order to prevent the loss of animal weight and maximise therefore the financial 
returns/kg weight, has been one of the achievements of this new form of modern 
livestock breeding.
The most important increase however remains that of intensive poultry farming. The 
achievements attained were based on the integration of an industrial process combining 
genetically high breeds fed on a balanced nutritional diet based on high calorie cereals 
(mainly maize) and high protein oleaginous (mainly soybeans) and complemented with 
the necessary vitamin and mineral requirements.
On the whole, the development of the meat market guided by high income demand, 
resulted in an alteration between the price of meat and that of cereals, which in turn
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transmitted its effects to the balance between vegetable production, especially that 
section of vegetable production catering for human consumption, and animal production. 
In view of the ratio between the price of meat and cereals (7.5 in 1970 and 22.1 in 
1980 (34), it is therefore becoming more and more remunerative to engage in meat 
rather than in cereal production. It is however worth mentioning that the import of 
cereals for animal feed has a cushioning effect on the degree of reconversion away from 
cereal production for human consumption. Over the past decade (1969/80), the 
structure of cultivated land allocated to cereal crops underwent changes in two opposite 
directions: a decrease in the land under wheat cultivation, and an increase in the land 
under barley, oats as well as artificial fodder cultivation (35). In the private sector 
land devoted to oats and artificial fodder doubled. At the level of the entire sector, the 
proportion of cereal land devoted to barley and oats increased from 32.5% to 44.5% 
over the decade. The increase in the total acreage of barley, oat and artificial fodder, is 
significant as it corresponds to a shift in production from human to animal 
consumption. Between 1968 and 1980, the study of the major household surveys 
revealed that the amount of barley in the diet of the population, particularly rural, had 
been reduced to a minimum. The parallel movement of the drop of barley in the diet of 
the population on the one hand and the increase of its acreage on the other is the 
evidence of the shift that is occurring from subsistence cereals to animal cereals). The 
alteration in the balance between animal production and vegetable production directly 
geared to human consumption, remains however a potential alteration, due to the 
existence of counter-tendencies. The shift in cereal production thus remains limited in 
terms of the overall needs of feed requirements. In so far as the total requirement of 
animal production is concerned, the contribution of the private sector during the last 
years fluctuated around 1/2 of the needs (36). In itself the shift from subsistence 
cereals to animal cereals is counteracted by the weight of the public agricultural sector 
and particularly the pre-eminence of public pasture land which still offers to livestock 
breeders free access to grazing (de facto also, part of the grazing of private livestock 
breeders is takes place on the land of the SMS). The capitalist model of intensive
livestock farming, based on cereals feed and the production of artificial fodder, though 
limited to a section of livestock breeders, tends to be substituted by extensive animal 
husbandry particularly in times of drought when pasture land cannot sustain the size of 
livestock herds (37). Sustained by permanent meat price increases, the diffusion of 
the model of intensive meat production received its backing from state intervention and 
imported cereal feed progressively complemented domestic production (38). Feed is 
imported in processed form (fish, flour, oil-cakes) as well as in the form of maize and 
barley. The following table gives the structure and origin of animal feed during the past 
decade.
Table IV. 2 .12 : Animal feed (imports + domestic production) between 1970/81 (U= 1,000 tons).
Per i od 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1
Total supply ( Im p o r ts 429 960 507 1,324 1,487 1,015
♦d o m e stic  p roduction )
I mp o r t s
Animal feed 14 27.8 34.4 82.7 72.3 90.9
Barley - 87.3 66.6 519.6 342.2 103.8
Maize - 16.8 95.2 187.2 167.9 276.2
Total imports 14 132 196 790 582 471
% share in total supply 3% 14% 39% 60% 39% 47%
Domestic production
Barley 372 742 260 456 794 483
Oat 38 79 49 80 110 60
Maize 35 6 2 860 1,500 1,400
Total domestic p ro d u c tio n 415 828 311 534 905 544
% share in total supply 97% 86% 61% 40% 61% 53%
Source: U.N Yearbook of International Trade Statistics and Series Statistiques.
The pre-eminence of domestic cereal feed production has been drastically challenged by 
imports since 1974. In recent years imports contributed to nearly 1/2 the cereal 
needs of the growing domestic animal feed market.
As far as the calorie and protein requirements of animal feed are concerned, the 
contribution of domestic production remains uneven. If domestically produced barley 
accounts for up to 3/4 to 2/3 of total barley supply, oleaginous (the main protein 
source of animal feed), and more particularly maize products (the calorie source)
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however requires a heavy reliance on the international market (39). As a result of the 
spread of the new model of meat production, the size of animal feed requirement was 
considerably increased in relation to the capabilities of domestic cereal production: In 
1970, 1/4 of the domestic cereal production was necessary to meet the requirement of 
meat production against well over 1/3 in 1981 (40).
Table IV. 2 .13: Animal feed requirements and domestic cereal production (U= 1,000 tons).
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 198 1
I.Feed requirement
II.Domestic cereal production
% share of feed in domestic production
415
1,735
24%3
828
2,680
1%
311
1,142
27%
534
1,619
33%
905
2,417
37%
544
1,525
36%
Source: Ibid.
In the market for fruit and vegetables the impact of high prices produced the highest 
effects in the organisation of the production of market-garden products. Between 1969 
and 1980, the land devoted to their production was more than doubled from 108,000 
ha to 225,000 ha. The contrast between the two major sectors however remained 
significant (41). The impact of price increases was highest for the private sector 
which increased its land cultivation by over 100% (its share in the land of the sector 
increased from 56% to 60%), and its output from 53% to 58% of total supply. A 
similar situation characterised the sector of "agricultural revolution" in terms of 
output and land. But this sector remains insignificant because of its size. The "self­
managed" sector was the sector which displayed the poorest performance: with only 
50% net increase in land under cultivation, its share in total output fell from 47% in 
1969 to 33% in 1980.
On the whole the responsiveness to higher market prices was much more obvious in the 
private than in the public sector. Needless to say the two sectors cater for entirely 
different demands and therefore for entirely different social groups. The imbalance 
between the two sets of prices becomes de facto the dividing line between the low 
income groups, de facto excluded from a rich and balanced diet (42), and whose 
physiological reproduction is entirely dependent upon fixed price products (cereals,
337
vegetable oil, sugar and coffee), and the highest income groups whose reproduction is 
essentially met by domestic production in the form of a balanced diet (accessible at 
much higher prices), based on a high proportion of meat products, fresh fruit and 
vegetables (43). The combining effects of low incomes and the increasing cost of food 
in the budgets of households have in actual fact transformed food imports (with the 
contribution of public agricultural production), as the dominant channel through which 
the food demand of low income groups is being met while domestic production 
(particularly private), became, because of its high prices, the prerogative of high 
income groups. This social polarisation expresses the conditions under which the 
formation of the different social classes accompanies the social mode distribution of 
agricultural production. In such a context, "the formation of classes becomes 
inseparable from the conditions under which control over the agricultural surplus is 
organised"(44), and the emergence of an agricultural surplus is by definition 
inseparable from the emergence of a dominating class able to set a limit to the level of 
consumption of the agricultural direct producers.
After assessing the implication of the state food policy with regard to the structure of 
agricultural production and its corresponding social distribution, we now turn to the 
more specific study of the implications associated with the adoption of the food model of 
import substitution as a means of increasing agricultural output with a view to 
minimising the level of food imports.
C. Food policy of import substitution.
Unlike its industrial strategy import substitution in agriculture corresponds to the 
line of policy which has been most systematically followed by Algeria. Such a policy 
was pursued for three main products: animal products (industrial poultry farming), 
sugar (sugar beet) and vegetable oil (oleaginous products). In itself the aims of such a 
policy can only praised since it mainly aimed at substituting imports by domestic 
production. But given the nature of the problem facing the Algerian agriculture, the 
question is not so much one of substitution as one of domestic production. In other words
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an import substitution is only possible when the management of domestic production 
does not represent a constraint in itself, a situation which is precisely that being 
experienced by Algeria. In the absence of such a condition, an import substitution 
policy is not different from a re-play of the scenario which so far has been that of 
domestic production itself.
Looked at from a different angle, the assessment of the issue reads as follows: if in the 
first place there was a need for imports this has only been so because of the 
inefficiency of domestic production. To promote a food policy of import substitution 
(IS) presupposes therefore that there is no constraint on the supply side. To try to 
operate such a policy in the face of an already structurally rigid supply (see the rise of 
imports and the stagnation of production over the past two decades) will lead to two 
main situations: an increased dependency on the international market for the provision 
of the inputs necessary to operate such an IS policy (as in the case of oleaginous and 
sugar), and increased inefficiency in the domestic organisation of production itself (as 
a result of the introduction of new crops such as beet sugar and oleaginous). Let us 
examine these two points in turn.
a. Import substitution and dependency.
With the exception of the industrial activity of poultry farming, this policy of IS has 
been exclusively located within the state sector. The diffusion of poultry farming, 
initiated within the public sector has been intensively extended to private 
entrepreneurs with a package of concessional measures: the supply of subsidised feed, 
easy terms of access to the necessary investment credit, etc. If the success of this line 
of production is in no doubt (output increased from 24,000 tons in 1968 to 118,000 
tons in 1977), its performance however ought to be questioned upon the very 
conditions which made it possible, i.e. the increased reliance on imports. In this 
respect, if there was a case for IS in meat production, there was also a case for the 
substitution of one category of imports (poultry production) by another (the entire
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technological package of poultry farming). If the domestic production of meat is 
desirable, the question which ought to be asked is: under what specific mode or on which 
technological basis should operate? The consequence of this policy is its 
shortsightedness with regards to the consequences associated with the adoption of a 
model which originated, and was developed in a different socio-economic context 
altogether: that of the USA in the 1930s, endowed with important cereal surpluses 
(whose transformation into animal feed was at least in conformity with American 
resources), and enjoying the benefits of an advanced industrial development of its 
economy and particularly of its agriculture (45). In terms of alternatives, the 
technical option of the Algerian choice of poultry farming is not the only available one. 
Animal production is compatible with more than one technique. Rather than the 
conception based on animal production that competes with the same resources as those 
used by man (as in the case of most types of "modern" West European animal farming), 
there is the conception of animal production and organisation of agriculture whereby 
animal husbandry "can be organically linked to agriculture, but on a particular 
pattern, made of domestic animal resources not used by man himself (common land, 
follow and stubble, natural meadows not suitable for cultivation etc." (46). Close to the 
former conception is the example of Chinese pork breeding based on the agricultural 
by-products such as "vegetable scraps products, rice husk, maize cobs, soya stalks and 
leaves, waste from sweet potatoes and other vegetable, cattlecakes, etc., nutrients not 
used by man such as certain sea plants [the narcissus or water hyacinth can be 
produced at the rate of well over 1,000 tons/ha], or unusable elements such as certain 
types of spontaneous vegetation" (47). In his comparative study of the two polarised 
Chinese and Danish models of pork breeding, B. Rosier concludes that "as an adult 
Danish pig consumes a little more than a human's ration of cereal-based diet ration, if 
each Chinese pig were replaced by a Danish one (at a rate of one pig per person), China 
would be reduced to famine" (48). In the context of a country like Algeria which is not 
even able to control its cereal production, the adoption of such a mode of production 
represents by no means a "heavy tendency" of its food policy (the very necessity of the
presence of animal proteins in the daily human diet is even widely question when 
calories requirements are not taken into account: see the article by Professor Leonard 
Joy "Food and nutrition planning", Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume XXIV, N9 
1, January 1973: 165-192).
b. Import substitution and economic inefficiency.
During the mid 1960s Algeria engaged in the domestic production of sugar beet and 
oleaginous products in order to cut their respective imports. The experience of sugar 
beet was based on the objective of substituting imports of refined sugar by the 
promotion of the domestic production of sugar beet and the parallel setting up of a sugar 
mill industry. The development of domestic production was not without difficulties and 
set backs due to attempts of crop farming methods on both dry and irrigated land.
In 1966 the persistence of low yields lead to a complete suppression of the crop in the 
west of Algeria (Sicfi Belabes) due to a shortage of water (49). The availability of 
irrigated land was further to represent the main constraint as the method of dry 
farming proved unsuccessful. The limited supply of irrigated land on the estates (90% 
of the total land under sugar beet were located in the "self-managed" sector) 
represented the actual physical limit (less than 4,000 ha) beyond which the crop was 
to be extended. Yields on the whole, remained unstable at constantly low levels: 20 
quintals/ha in 1970, 18 in 1976, and 15 in 1980.
The overall conditions under which production was operated (the dryness of the air and 
the southern heat tended to reduce the sugar content of the crop, lack of water 
irrigation proper, and the uneconomic viability of dry cultivation, etc.) greatly 
hampered the development of a crop which in many aspects represented a rich source of 
calorie supply, feed in the form of pulp, stalks and leaves, and employment 
opportunities, etc. After well over a decade of experience, the crop is still at the 
experimental stage (50).
The case of oleaginous products is another example of the short-lived experience of
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industrial crop promotion. In the early 1960s the industrial activity focused mainly on 
a few processing units geared towards the processing of oleaginous imports (mainly 
rape seeds), and mixed vegetable oil. Sunflower seeds were the first oleaginous crop to 
be initiated during the mid 1960s. The choice of the crop was based on the grounds of 
high yields under dry farming conditions, as well as on a high oil extraction factor 
(between 40 and 50%). The results however proved well below expected objectives. 
Yields/ha remained low: 4 quintals in 1970, 1 quintal in 1978, 6 quintals in 1980 
(51). Also the early development of the crop could not find an outlet as the existing oil 
industry was mainly equipped for the processing of rape seeds (the multi-seed 
processing industry was set up only after 1974). In the face of the different setbacks 
associated with the production of sunflowers, new oleaginous varieties were introduced: 
soy beans under irrigated farming and particularly safflower (the relevance of the 
later crop was that it offered the possibility of being cultivated under dry farming 
conditions using fallow land). But such potentialities could not be materialised. The 
combination of cumulative inefficiencies produced "insignificant" yields in the terms of 
the IDCI (52), the official institution in charge of the development and promotion of 
industrial crops.
The end result of the experience of IS concerning industrial crops is best summarised 
by I. Molina who closely studied this industry: "the results of 15 years of 
experimentation [the author wrote in 1982] and of promotion of yearly industrial 
crops are thus very disappointing: during all this long period, neither the technical 
problem of the crop, nor the problem of marketing linked to the processing industry, 
have been solved. An official document of MARA states without astonishment that 
"oleaginous crops, which could be of considerable interest, are still at the experimental 
stage" (53).
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CONCLUSION
The notion of food policy in the Algerian context does not assume a deliberate aspect in 
the sense of a planned nutritional target that the agricultural activity is to achieve. As 
no nutritional objective exists as such to serve as a guide for a coherent agricultural 
policy, the state food policy is in essence divorced from nutritional considerations. In 
the present context/the food policy of Algeria ought to be distinguished from its 
agricultural policy. As such these policies are conceived in terms of their relative 
reciprocal autonomy. If the agricultural policy can be reduced to an extension of the 
state control over the ex-colonial agricultural sector and the relative neglect of the 
private sector in terms of access to basic inputs through their simple availability on 
the market, the food policy can be assessed through the set of measures which have a 
bearing on the content, the level and the structure of food needs, i.e. the level and the 
structure of imports, the level and structure of food prices, and the proportion of fixed 
food products prices, etc.
Thus conceived, the state food policy is in effect reduced to: the management of the 
external food constraint which takes the form of an increasing supply of a range of 
products secured on the international market - in their listing such products 
correspond very closely to the barest definition of a diet "not so much determined on the 
basis of a balanced diet (meat imports are recent and limited), but rather as to what is 
necessary and sufficient for the poor" (54) - and the distribution of basic food stuffs 
at a fixed price.
In its implicit assumption, the state food policy is based on low income groups, and its 
scope for intervention is limited to the most elementary range of food products to meet 
such a demand. Partial in scope, it tends to operate in a context of a structurally 
stagnant domestic production. In itself, this context of intervention is contradictory in 
nature as it maintains a permanent instability between and within the two categories of 
food market. The characterisation of food demand, and as such that of the food market
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itself, is also entirely dependent on volatile conditions: permanent short term cyclical 
shortages of food products (subsidised and non-subsidised alike), extreme price 
variations on the private market, constant tensions as a result of speculations on food 
availabilities, and permanent price increases, etc. In short food expectations do not 
coincide with the state of the market in terms of availabilities. Rather than the supply 
adjusting itself to the demand, it is the latter which adapts itself to the former under 
whatever conditions prevail (level of prices and of availability). Such conditions 
operate de facto a clearing of the market on a clear-cut class distinction whereby high 
income groups meet their demand through high prices, and low income groups meet 
their respective demand on the basis of fixed price products which in principle 
guarantee minimum subsistence.
The level of intervention of the state has led to a form of food policy which tends 
progressively to disconnect the increasing domestic food needs from the development of 
agricultural production itself (domestic demand is indeed met on an increasing scale 
from imports and/or from a structure of agricultural production which operates on an 
increasing use of imported input^. Such a result remains however inseparable from the 
very conditions upon which the new patterns of consumption are being met. The 
international market has become the main provider of food products necessary to the 
reproduction of the labour force’ of the majority of the population, while the free 
market, dominated by the production of meat, fruit and vegetables has become de facto 
earmarked for the needs of high income groups. Such a social polarisation, in terms of 
incomes and patterns of consumption, in turn reacts on the mode of consumption of oil 
rent. The necessity of meeting the conditions of reproduction of the labour force at a 
given nutritional level and at fixed prices on the basis of an increasing reliance on food 
imports, limits de facto the extent of oil rent which would have strictly been used for 
investment purposes (by their nature and as a result of their wage-goods form, food 
imports have progressively acquired, ceteris paribus, the characteristics of an 
irreducible and incompressible import constraint). The procurement of imported basic
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wage-goods supplied at a low price has however a positive effect on the general 
conditions necessary for the promotion of capital accumulation: the supply of a labour 
force available at a minimal cost remains, all thing beings equal, a powerful pre­
requisite in the maximisation of capital valorisation that feeds on the highest rate of 
profit possible.
As such this policy appears as a contribution by the state - the institutional 
embodiment of capital - to the reinforcement and the development of a domestic 
capitalist class at large. It is indeed through the use and allocation of oil rent that the 
state most contributes to the preservation of social classes by reproducing the economic 
conditions of their existence. Through its industrial project, the state guarantees both 
fundamental conditions of capital valorisation: the reproduction of the objective and 
subjective conditions of capital accumulation.
The state management of these two types of constraint (so far expressed in the inability 
to domestically reproduce both constant and variable capital) constitutes in itself a 
form of state subsidy for the promotion and development of capitalism. This assisted 
form of capitalist development, whereby the state acts as its depository, becomes 
necessary only in so far as it still bears the stamp of the historical conditions under 
which European capitalism intruded on the pre-colonial agro-pastoral Algerian social 
formation.
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NOTES
1- The increase in feed imports is no more no less than the manifestation of cereal 
consumption diversification the proportion of animal consumption growth implying in 
itself a reduction in the direct cereal consumption. According to H. Delorme Deficite 
alimentaire et development: I'Alaerie in Revue Du Tiers Monde, cereal feed doubled 
between 1970 (100,000 tons) and 1976 (210,000 tons). On the basis of available 
data, the share of feed in total cereal imports increased from 14% in 1970 to 16% in 
19 . In other words a greater proportion of domestic cereal production served the 
purpose of feeding animals.
2- Bouzidi, Abdelmadjid Productivite du travail dans I'aariculture Alaerienne et 
problems de la commercialisation des oroduits aaricoles. CREA 1977, quoted by 
Molina, Ignasso Les industries en aval de raariculture in L' evolution de la 
consommation alimentaire en Afriaue: le cas de I'Aloene" CREA. Alger & IIES Geneva. 
1982. P. 235.
3-See Appendix AIV.11. ^
4-Bedrani, ^edrani. Ibid, p. 123. It is also worth mentioning that the legal decision to 
"freezing" the prices of the main inputs such as fertilizers, tractors, combine 
harvesters and ploughs, was not totally exempt from exceptions. Thus between 1974 
and 1977, the following increments were observed: 9% for pneumatic tractors (the 65 
Horse power category), 17% for caterpillar tractors, 9% for ploughs, etc.
5-Such facilities for the reception of imports of cereals are also comparatively less 
costly for OAIC than the heavy domestic collection of cereals which involves a complex 
network involving the mobilisation of cereals from the countryside and its 
transportation to the Northern urban based cereal processing industries. The bulk of 
the activities of the board and of the processing industry are also mainly focused on the 
concentrated urban market.
6- The interpretation of the difference between domestic and international prices ought 
to be interpreted with great care as this difference conveys an extreme difference in
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yields between Algeria and cereals exporting countries. For the comparison between the 
level of prices to be significant, it is required that Algeria operates its cereals 
production in the same overall condition as the cereal surplus countries.
7-Delorme, H. Ibid, p. 11.
According to Bouzidi, Abdelmadjid the gross profit of the cereal board was AD 24.8 
million in 1969/70, AD 19.4 million in 1970.71, AD 116.3 million in 1971/72 and 
AD 30.9 million in 1972/73.
8- Apart from retail traders and direct consumers, the processing cereal industry 
supplies the bakery industry with the necessary quantity of wheat flour for the 
production of bread, an item which is increasingly dominant in the daily diet of the 
population, particularly urban. The supply of such a product is increasingly becoming 
a sensitive issue whenever its price undergoes periodical increases (as most of the 
bakery business is entirely within the hands of the private sector, the official price is 
hardly respected) or whenever its availability proper is tending to be more and more 
erratic as is the case during the past years. The mode of consumption of this product is 
essentially dictated by the mode of urban dwelling which prohibits de facto the 
traditional cooking of home made bread. The urban mode of life also favors the 
consumption of a product whose industrial production is at the same time time saving 
for the housewife.
9- The relative constant level of subsidies at SN-SEMPAC level is in itself a yardstick 
measure of the extent to which the retrocession price was allowed to increase.
10- Such mechanism may tend to represent a self-financing process based on 
compensation: low import and production prices serving to finance future subsidies. 
OAIC acts therefore as a form of compensatory fund subsidy. The logic attached to such 
an economic mechanism is that OAIC will tend to keep producer prices as low as 
possible since import prices are beyond its control by definition. The cereal board 
obeys therefore by its very nature as any commercial enterprise.
11- In the case of Algeria which conducts a voluntarist policy of food consumer price 
control, the question of subsidies implication raise the whole issue of management of
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food crisis through the effects of the present state food policy intervention. This aspect 
of the question will be taken up in the second part of this chapter.
12- The importance of this increase is only contrasted to the previous period which did 
not experience any increase at all. However important the increase may be for the 
subsequent period, it remains that no price was doubled by 1983.
13- The volume of incomes underwent an annual rate of increase of 8% during 
1967/69, 11% during 1970/73 and 17% during 1974/77. cf. S. Bedrani. Ibid, p. 
115.
14-Tou, A. L' evolution de la consommation alimentaire en Afrioue: le cas de i'Aiaerie. 
Ibid.
It is also worth mentioning that the 1978 price revision of SN-SEMPAC was the first of 
its kind since 1959.
15- It is worth mentioning that the rates of cereal demand increase are by far in excess 
of the rate of demographic increase evaluated at 3.2%.
16- For the non-cereal subsidised products the role of imports is overwhelming. As 
such they provide for the entire field of state intervention.
17- Dry pulses are rightly termed the meat of the poor. During the last decade the 
proportion of roots and tuber and pulses in total vegetable imports (on average 90%) 
represented respectively on average 60% and 30%.
18- The price index is based on the use of the unit of AD/liter for vegetable oil, 
AD/unit for eggs and AD/kg for the rest of the products.
19- If generally speaking retail prices are urban prices, it ought to be noted that the 
permanent state of scarcity affecting food availability is such that, whenever there is a 
price differential between the urban and the non-urban market, the attraction effect of 
high prices on the urban market is such that the phenomenon of equalisation of food 
prices between the two markets tends to operate on a permanent basis. But if prices 
tend to be the same between the two markets, the concentration of high incomes in 
urban areas tends also to deprive the non-urban market from the commercialisation of 
an important fraction of the agricultural products.
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20- It ought to be pointed out that the market for poultry and eggs cater mainly for the 
category of low and middle income groups. In normal conditions, the ratio between the 
price of red meat and white meat is 1 to 4. Red meat available through imports and 
distributed through state controlled shops is sold at about 2/3 the value of the meat 
available though the private market. The insignificance of such imports for the 
ordinary market is further worsened by the fact that such imports are appropriated in 
priority by the different pressure groups (military, high ranked civil servants, etc..).
21- The network distribution for poultry and eggs tends to be concentrated in the 
private market.
22- The disturbances on these markets are not devoid directly or indirectly of the 
collaboration and the responsibility of high ranking officials at one point or another 
along the complex network of public boards and enterprises existing from the 
importing stage to the distribution end of the chain. Cases of cargos of subsidised meat 
being sold at full price on the private market, the prioritary terms at which 
speculators acquired cargos of eggs at the peak of intensive speculation accompanying 
scarcity are not uncommon practices but rather well established practices along which 
a fraction of the commercial bourgeoisie established its economic power.
23- No data are in our possession but it is very likely that no animal product as such is 
benefitting from any form of subsidy. The trend in import prices (particularly for 
meat and butter) tends rather to suggest that the impact of such products is more more 
of a source of gross positive profit for the state. The price control of these products on 
the domestic market has been steadily kept at a level higher than the import prices.
24- Such situations are only momentary not only because of imports prices fall but 
because at domestic level any import price increase has always been systematically 
followed (if not anticipated) by larger increases in consumer prices. On a whole, if one 
excludes the exceptional period of high international prices during the mid 1970s, the 
domestic food market has always been characterised by a market whereby consumer 
prices were higher than international prices, a situation leaving room for gross 
positive margins.
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25-See Appendix A1V.12.
26- If however one is to take into account the same period, the net positive gross 
margin derived from coffee and sugar between 1974 and 1981 (AD 15,500 million) 
was more than enough to finance all food subsidies.
27- The absence of subsidies for animal products tended to suggest that the price 
control policy relied on such mechanisms. The following trend in the gap between the 
domestic price of bovine meat and the price of meat imports will give an idea of the 
extent of the positive gross margin: AD 13 /kg in 1975, 21/kg in 1976, 29 /kg in 
1977, 28/kg in 1978, 33/kg in 1979, 48/kg in 1980 and 63/kg in 1981. The case 
of butter is also significant. Between 1970 and 1981 the positive gross margin allowed 
by the level of its domestic and international price, amounted to a total of about AD 
6,000 million.
28- Retrocession price fixing depends on the intervention of the ministry of trade, the 
Ministry of light industries and the arbitration of the Ministry of finance.
29-Bouzidi, A. Productivity du travail dans I’agriculture Aloerienne et oroblemes de 
commercialisation des produits aaricoles RASJEP, N9 4, December 1977, p. 514. 
Quoted by Bedrani, Slimane. Ibid, p. 140.
30- It is not surprising that the highest price increase concerns citrus fruit such as 
oranges.
31- Delorme, H. Ibid, pp. 10-11.
32- Over 90% of Algeria ovine and bovine livestock belong to the private agricultural 
sector.
33- Unlike poultry farming, livestock rearing remains basically based on local breeds.
34-Amara, Ait. Effets des importations aiimentaires sur la structure de la production 
aoricoie  in "L' evolution de la consommation alimentaire en Afrique: le cas de 
I'Algerie", ibid, p. 122.
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35-See Appendix AIV.13.
36-This constancy is largely due to the increase in the acreage of the "self-managed" 
sector and the sector of "agricultural revolution"(from 0.3 million ha to over 0.4 
million ha from 1969 to 1980). This incremental acreage which corresponds more to 
an authoritarian decision by the Ministry of agriculture than as a result of the choice of 
the producers themselves, stems from the rationale to possibly substitute soft wheat 
import by domestic production.
37- Official estimates gave 6 million units of heads (1974), other estimates (El Kenz,
H. Marche/elevape bovin in Debats et Critiques" AARDES. Alger, 1978, p. 90.) gives 
between 12 and 13 million for the same year.
38- It goes without saying that such imports were not solely restricted to fed. The role 
of imports acted as an integrated vector of diffusion of the model of intensive poultry 
farming. As such these imports were the embodiment of the entire process of 
production from the genetically high breeds to the necessary equipment.
39- It is open to question whether the adoption of such farming system establishes a 
sense of balance between production and domestic resources.
40- The contribution of imports and their domestic social determinants played the 
decisive role in stimulating, establishing and consolidating the mode of intensive meat 
production from which is derived the above tendency of agricultural organisation.
41-See Appendix AIV.14.
42- Cf chapter on the patterns of food consumption (the model of food consumption of 
this social category is mainly based on the overwhelming weight of cereal products. 
Deficiency is that of meat, fruit and vegetables)
43- Such overall characteristics contain in themselves a clear cut class specialisation 
particularly as the terms of access to the conditions of reproduction of the different 
sections and groups of society are concerned.
44- " The conditions of the setting up of a relation of power established by one social 
group capable of imposing a limit to the consumption of the producer and to set itself 
therefore in a position of a dominating class" is the condition of emergence of an
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agricultural surplus. Rosier, Bernard. Types de development et rapports sociaux: pour 
une nouvelle strateoie du development aaricole et aaro-industriel. Monde en 
Developpement N2 29/30. 1980
45- The transplant of the American model of farming in the context of the "backward" 
Algerian agriculture, requires for its technical reproduction a permanent dependency 
on the imports of all aspects of the production process and above all the socio-economic 
conditions capable of producing the necessary cereal surplus. The adoption of the 
American model of farming remains in itself an important indicator of the finality of 
agricultural development in itself.
46-Rosier, Bernard Cles pour une strateoie nouvelle du developpement. Les Editions 
Ouvrieres. UNESCO. 1984. p. 151
47- Ibid, p. 151.
48- Ibid, p. 152.
A study on the livestock situation in developing countries conducted from the case of 
dairy development in kenya raises the same concern. The question that the authors 
raises is most fundamental in designing a livestock strategy: "to avoid 'prescribed' 
yields and production targets based on animal breeders conceptions of what 'ought' to be 
achievable from a cow - given all ideal input requirements. It is essential to start at 
the other end - with the resources that people have available - and try to design 
improvements which are possible within these limits [...] start by studying the 
farmers and their resources, and only then look at the cows". Howard Wagstaff, Grace 
Gachacha, Henry Mbogoh. The Livestock Situation in Developing Countries Science, 
Technology & Development Volume 4 N93 & 4, August 1986-January 1987
49-Molina, I. Ibid.
50- "Trial of seed varieties and sowing are still listed in the 1980 programme of 
experimentation of the IDCI (Institute for the Development of Industrial Crops). 
Molina, I. Ibid, pp. 216-217.
51 - Part of the crop was wasted because of predators attacks.
According to an official document quoted by I. Molina, AD 8 million of crops was lost
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that year.
52- Less than 1 quintal/ha against an expected minimum of 5 quintals/ha. According to
I. Molina, during 1977/78, 20% of the 18,000 ha of the safflower were harvested.
53- Ibid, p. 220.
54-Chaulet, Claudine L' eloge du couscous in ”L' evolution de la consommation en 
Afrique: le cas de I'Algerie". Ibid, p. 407.
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OVERALL CONCLUSION OF THESIS
In retrospect this work is a measure of the particularism that characterised the 
capitalist development of Algeria since the early years of its colonisation in 1832. As 
such capital accumulation emerged within the context of two distinct historical phases. 
The colonial period (Part I) saw the emergence of an essentially export sector operated 
in accordance with the interests of settlers and organically dependent on the French 
economy either as a market outlet or as a provider for the settlers' demand for 
consumer and capital goods. Based on massive peasant expropriations and land 
confiscations, the colonial economy brought about the deepest transformations in the 
domestic agro-pastoral economy. The 'corrosive' impact of the diffusion of capitalist 
relations of production and the weight of the extra economic factors in the shrinking of 
tribal land only magnified the fragility of a social formation whose reproduction 
excessively depended on nature as a result of a poor labour productivity. The 
transformations of the domestic economy acquired the features of an economy 
increasingly integrated into the cycle of valorisation of capital. While confronting 
capital within the capitalist mode of production, peasant households remained as before 
small commodity producers (here capital did not directly attempt to organise peasant 
production). At the same time the initiation of such a formal mode of subsumption of 
peasants by capital bore a powerful relation to the pattern and conditions of their 
progressive class differentiation into those incapable" of maintaining simple commodity 
production (the case of poor peasants), those capable maintaining it longer (in the case 
of middle peasantry), and those rich farmers capable of transforming themselves into a 
class of capitalist farmers.
As a result of the technological methods proper to colonial farming (the systematic use 
of labour-saving technology in cereal farming and the development of vine growing 
farming based on seasonal labour), the peasant economy functioned essentially as the 
main provider and reproducer of free labour, as well as the main regulator of cheap
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labour (the peasant economy guaranteed its own autonomy as a result of the exclusion of 
the majority of the population from the permanent status of wage earners). The 
emergence of increased peasant pauperisation which preluded their proletarianisation 
(directly for landless peasants, and indirectly for the category of household peasants 
unable to reproduce themselves though the solely direct expenditure of their labour on 
their small plots of land), was not however accompanied by their economic 
transformation into a permanent rural proletariat, which could find the condition of its 
employment 4n the capitalist agrarian sector, and/or a permanent industrial 
proletariat. The absence of a local industry magnified the limits of a colonial mode of 
accumulation which remained agrarian throughout. The inability of the colonial mode of 
capital accumulation to provide - beyond the exclusive sphere of settlers alone and 
particularly their agrarian interests - for a fuller development of capitalist relations 
of production through industrialisation also marked the end of the colonial hegemony. 
The independence of Algeria opened radically new perspectives for domestic classes and 
for capital accumulation.
Oil and the form of rent associated with it soon conferred upon the post colonial state the 
means of an hegemonic entrepreneurship translated in a massive and intense 
accumulation of fixed capital located in the 'public' sector (Part II). This new form of 
capital accumulation, which inaugurated an era of rapid extension of wage relations was 
also the correlate of an extension of commodity relations through the development of a 
state induced private/capitalist industrial sector. Under the requirement of capital 
valorisation, and as a result of the historical particularism of the capitalist 
development of the Algerian social formation, the direct management of the value of 
labour power began to be operated as a policy a part entiere. Bound to the development 
of industrialisation the agrarian question (Part III) was essentially thought in terms of 
its functional contribution to meeting the new food demand. The passage from the 
colonial mode of accumulation, which de facto resorted to the contribution of the 
peasant economy for the production and reproduction of cheap labour, to the post­
colonial mode of capital accumulation was effected on the basis of an extension of the
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reproductive food function to state farms which progressively abandoned their colonial 
specialisation based on export promotion (in an attempt to increase Algeria's self- 
sufficiency the reduction of agricultural exports affected food and no-food alike), and 
new cooperative farms issued from the post independence programme of land reform. 
Bound by a stagnant agricultural production in the estates and a programme of land 
reform which on the evidence available neither improved the economic status of the 
peasants nor prevented their increased pauperisation, overall state intervention which 
included more systematic measures comprising price controls, marketing monopolies 
etc. (Part IV), maintained the subsistence level of reproduction of the value of labour 
power while at the same time increased the extent of domestic food deficit as a result of 
the increased diffusion of wage earning relations related to its industrial policy. The 
management of the price of wage goods became thus inseparable from both the 
reproduction of the determinants of the prevailing agrarian crisis (in itself a hidden 
aspect of the prevailing mode of accumulation), and the necessary regulation of the 
value of labour power.
Conceived in a favourable context of increasing international oil prices, the conception 
of a policy of regulation of labour power based on the supply of cheap wage foods - 
restricted in its scope to the barest definition of what is nutritionally sufficient for 
subsistence - is however more and more faced with a new constraint. With the drop in 
the value of Algeria's main export receipts and the disillusionment with the post­
independence land reform, the increased persistence of the deficit in the production of 
wage foods confronts policymakers with the dilemma of continually diverting away 
from capital accumulation scarce foreign earnings to meet necessary food imports. The 
contribution of oil rent to the domestic valorisation of capital proceeding from its 
ability to command increasing food imports and to manage a sustained policy of 
subsidised wage goods, seems to have reached its full potential.
As a result of the bureaucratic management of the supply of subsidised wage goods, the 
permanent recurrence of scarcities unavoidably results in the rocketing of supposedly
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fixed prices. The increased cost of food expenditure in household budgets - a reflection 
of the persistence of the determination of wages by the cost of foodstuffs - is 
increasingly highlighting the 'limits' of the state food policy itself. The definition of the 
value of labour power determined by its subsistence content is de facto also 
increasingly contradicted by the weight of other food items - such as meat, vegetable
and fruits - whose market price determination "exhausts” by definition the subsistence
f 0  ~conception of labour power and as such militates ^ar an elevation of the price of labour 
power. The superimposition of these two situations and their duration create not only 
the conditions for higher nominal wage demands (and therefore a redefinition of the 
distribution between wages and profits), but also the resurgence of social unrests. The 
bloody events of October 1988 - the continuation of several other past violent mass 
movements - are in themselves a clear demonstration of the extent to which such a 
contradiction can manifest itself.
Wile the abandonment of the policy of regulation of the value of labour power cannot be
A
socially conceived in the present context of Algeria's capitalist development (this 
strategy, which de facto operates the preservation of low wages, remains geared 
essentially towards the maximisation of capital valorisation), the preservation of food 
imports in the context of falling international oil prices compounded by the weight 
attached to the servicing of the debt, highlights the need to increase the domestic 
production of wage goods, the elevation of agricultural surplus, and the diminution of 
food imports themselves.
So far two possibilities can be considered as alternative policies: a redefinition of the 
state/junker capitalist path of agricultural development, and the elaboration of a rural 
project of development aimed at the peasantry. In itself a redefinition of the capitalist 
development of agriculture away from the bureaucratic style of-state management can 
be undertaken on the basis of a farmer-path of development. The extent of the estate 
disintegration, the terms under which land is to be acquired, the freedom with which 
producers can operate their farms, and the social category which is to benefit from
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such a reform etc., are important issues - which if they cannot be dealt ex-ante -can 
ultimately serve to measure the extent of the reform. The whole question depending on 
such an issue remains emminently political: how can the disintegration of the estates be 
accomplished in complete independence of the interests of the social classes and groups 
which are present in the state apparatus? The initiation of this new line of agricultural 
policy for the creation of more autonomous farms has not yet acquired the features of a 
systematic policy of transition away from the bureaucratically centralised 
state/junker management of estates. So far the timid creation of new farms has been 
mainly achieved in favour of two main categories: the already employed permanent 
workforce and some high ranking officials close to the pinnacle of power.
The elaboration of a new strategy of rural development integrating peasants however 
deserves also some attention. Indeed, if so far the whole state agricultural policy has 
been conceived as completely divorced from the peasantry (the by-passing of the 
peasantry resulted in a stagnant production and an acceleration of rural migration), the 
integration of the peasantry in a rural development project can find its justification 
from two main considerations: the creation of rural employment and the elevation of 
agricultural production. The extent to which the reformed state capitalist sector can 
itself serve to realise such a policy, and the conditions under which the capitalist 
transformations of the private sector will be systematically operated, still remain 
open issues regarding the success of an agricultural policy whose full formulation is 
only a matter of time.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Prevalent theses on the agrarian crisis: a brief methodological note.
The approach taken throughout this work is essentially Marxist. Though no particular 
attempt is made towards a comparative study of existing theories, however, a brief 
survey of some of the current conventional ones concerning the Third World agrarian 
crisis is provided with mainly the aim of defining the contours of an approach which is 
essentially non-historical, linear, partial as well as normative in its methodology.
A Malthusian-inspired approach identifies the problem of "overpopulation" as the main 
cause of poverty prevailing in Third World countries. This school of thought (see P. 
Ehrlich, D. Meadows, et al., G. Borgstrom, L. Brow etc.) clearly establishes a causal 
relation whereby the biological determinism of "overpopulation" transcends the entire 
social issue of poverty. It not only ignores the unequal aspects of food distribution 
within "poor" (i.e. populated) countries, this theory continues to contradict itself: by 
its own logic, this approach contains the implicit assumption that Third World 
countries, because of their demographic weight in world population, also appropriate 
through consumption the absolute majority of available global food production. In 1973 
the USA population alone (6% of world population) consumed 35% of the world's total 
resources.
Taking a different approach, other proponents of liberalism, such as T. W. Schultz, 
Harry G. Johnson, M. Lipton etc., equate the stagnation of agricultural production with 
"market distortions" and "policy mistakes" produced by state intervention which leads 
to decreased opportunities for agrarian investment. Accordingly, if the "rules of the 
competitive game" are restored, this would guarantee agricultural growth and promote 
agricultural investment. Assessing "market distortions" and "lack of agricultural 
investment" exclusively from the ideologically distorted view of "policy mistakes", 
does not take account of the social context which gives them both their own rationality 
and their proper theoretical status. Ignoring the interplay of social classes and the role 
of the state in peripheral capitalist formations, this approach does not grasp the
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specific laws of motion of capital accumulation; rather, the perception of Third World 
reality is perceived from within linearly transposed norms proper to developed 
capitalist social formations. By failing to carry out an investigation proper to 
peripheral countries, such an approach does not distinguish between two structurally 
different economies.
The absence of modern technology capable of substantially increasing agricultural 
production is seen by many authors (Everet Rogers, Y. Hayami & V. Rutt^ni S. 
Wortman & R. Cumming etc.) as a pre-requisite for the resolution of the agrarian 
crisis prevailing in Third World countries. While the Green Revolution option in itself 
contains the potential for increasing agricultural production, the adoption and 
transposition of a technology produced in developed capitalist countries raises the 
question of its social status. A technology devised on the basis of ideal conditions in 
terms of available water, fertiliser use, research centres, skilled manpower etc., 
considerably contrasts with social formations with insufficiently irrigated land, a 
deficiency or absent fertiliser industry, a predominance of subsistence farming and 
peasant agriculture, and a lack of skilled manpower etc. According to the theory, 
transposition of a technology identical to that prevailing in developed capitalist 
countries is seen as the ultimate solution towards the eradication of the agrarian crisis. 
That technology is not seen as a social product born out of the class mode of organisation 
of material production is the main shortcoming of this form of technological 
determinism. Technology cannot be neutral and be seen as a mere technical solution: it 
is functionally determined within its own social context.
The persistence of archaic land tenure systems is also seen as a major obstacle to an 
elevation of agricultural production (see the resolutions adopted by the Punta Del Este 
Conference of 1961 and the country survey of 7 Latin American countries undertaken 
by the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development). According to the 
advocates of such an approach (S. Barraclough ed.) the survival of the minifundia- 
latifundia complex accounts for most contemporary rural backwardness. However
361
unavoidable a land reform may be, it does not necessarily follow that the suppression of 
large estates is going to guarantee higher agricultural performance. While higher 
performance on small plots is often obtained through increased self-exploitation and a 
lower level of consumption, the reproduction of the latifundia-minifundia complex can 
still be operated under a strictly capitalist mode of production. A reform of agrarian 
structures divorced from reforms in the rest of the economy, on all the evidence, is the 
best guarantor for the failure of a strictly agrarian policy (of all approaches mentioned 
this one is probably the most radical as it addresses agricultural backwardness through 
the institutional basis of power relations based on land use and ownership).
A conception of solidarity based on food aid, advocating a change in the food habit of the 
consumers in developed countries, assumes that such policy measures will operate an 
adequate international food redistribution beneficial to Third World countries. While a 
change of food habits in developed countries based on a lower level of animal protein 
intake is more likely to lead to a decrease in production proper, the development of food 
aid (other than in the case of emergency) can only lead to a further reduction of 
domestic food prices and the chronic deterioration of domestic food production itself. 
The advocates whether of one part of the argument or another of this thesis, can be 
found among a variety of authors who do not always belong to the same ideological 
stream (R. Dumont, W. Paddock & P. Paddock etc.).
Whether wishful in their thinking, or partial in their analysis, most of the above 
approaches suffer from the same methodological shortcoming in that they do not 
undertake an historical analysis capable of fully embracing reality and all its 
contradictions. Whatever the chosen approach (saving of course that peripheral 
countries are by definition irrational societies only lacking good advice) the same 
fundamental question remains: "in the name of which group(s) standing above society 
(and by extension outside history), and with no class interest involved, are such policy 
recommendations to be implemented ? " .
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Appendix AI.1: Algeria and its North African context.
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Tchad
TableAl J: Example of certain Regional and communal budgetary resources in 1901 -1905.
(U: Fr million).
Tax specification Amount % share
Regional resources.
Arab taxes 4.9 67%
Ordinary centimes 1.1 12%
Extraordinary centimes 0.9 15%
Tax on vineyards 0.4 5%
Total 100 % share
Communal resources.
Centimes on Arab taxes 1.3 3%
Other centimes 1.4 4%
Fines 0.2 0.5%
Taxes on: rents 2.2 6%
sweeping 0.5 1.3%
dogs 0.2 0.5%
Corv6e* 9.7 26%
Tax on market places 9.1 24%
Indirect taxes 6.7 18%
Income from communal property 4.1 11%
Administrative & notarial services 2.3 6%
Total 100
Source: Henni, A. ibid. p. 104.
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Table All. 1: Structure of borrowing (Structure of debt outstanding disbursed ).
1970 1974 1977 1980 1982 1984 1985
Official creditors 51.3% 30% 17% 15% 18.5% 21% 20%
- I.B.R.D ( 3%) (2%) (10%) (10%) (11%) (18%) (18%)
-Bilateral (97%) (98%) (90%) (90%) (89%) (82%) (82%)
Private creditors 48.6% 70% 83% 85% 81.5% 79% 80%
-Suppliers (93%) (44%) (35%) (29%) (28%) (26%) (23%)
-Financial markets (7%) (56%) (65%) (71%) (72%) (74%) (77%)
Share of interests in 27% 31% 44% 38% 38% 43% 35% 38%
the debt service
Source: World Debt Tables, ibid.
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TableAII.2: The evolution and structure of the population from 1966 onwards are given 
below.
1966 1967/69 1970 /73 1974 /77 1978/82
Population Population Population Population Population
Total male Total Male Total Male Total Male Total Male
(18-59) (18-59) (18-59) (18-59) (18-59)
1.Total population 
(average). 12,142 12,955 14,400 16,282 18,699
2 .Incremental 
population.
-- 813 1,445 1,882 2,417
3.Theoratical 
labour force
4,700 1,760 5,000 ,960 5.650 2,200 6,500 >,586 7,760 :1,058
4 .Incremental 
labour force
- - 300 200 650 240 850 386 1,120 472
5 .Employment 
creations 1,725 1,893 2,182 2,859 3,422
6 .Incremental 
labour force - 168 289 677 563
7.Net
incremental
requirement
( 4 - 6 )
- 132 32 361 -49 173 -291 557 -91
8.Total
employment
requirement
( 3 - 5 )
2,975 35 3,107 67 3,468 18 3,641 -273 4,198 -364
For the entire period 1966/1982 the scenario of total requirements, depending on the 
two main methods of computing the rate of employment of the population (the official 
method being both restrictive and discriminatory: the employed population referred to 
being mainly a male population), compare as follows.
HYPOTHESIS I:
The theoretical total active labour force is the population of the age group 18 to 59.
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Total increment of the labour force: 2,920,000 
Total increment of labour creations: 1,697,000 
Employment requirements:! ,223,000 
Rate of labour requirement:42%.
HYPOTHESIS II: The active population is the male population aged between 18 and 59. 
Total increments of the labour force: 1,298,000 
Total increments of labour creation: 1,697,000 
Labour surplus: 399,000
Increments of the female population effectively employed:70,000 
Labour surplus: 329,000
Depending on the population reference and, as far as the method of increments (71) is 
concerned, the upper limit of labour requirements is set at a level of 1.2 million 
unemployed, while the lower limit leaves an excess labour creation of 329,000 jobs. If 
however one integrates the initial levels of the labour force which served to calculate 
the total increments between 1966 and 1982, the above picture of labour 
requirements is altered in the following manner.
HYPOTHESIS I
Total employment is the level of employment in 1966 (1,725,000) plus incremental 
labour creation between 1966 and 1982 (1,697,000) or 3,422,000.
Total labour requirement is labour requirement in 1966 (4,700,000) plus 
incremental labour requirements between 1966 & 1982 (2,920,000) or
7 ,620,000.
Overall rate of employment: 45%
HYPOTHESIS II
Total employment = 1,725,000 + 1,697,000 = 3,422,000 
Total labour requirement = 1,760,000 + 1,298,000=3,058,000 
Excess labour creation =364,000
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Table AII.3: Distribution of oil surface area between national and international oil companies. 
(U: km2)
1 96 6  196 7  1 968 1969 1 970 1971
Association with foreign 
interests(SONATRACH 
+ foreign companies).
175,000 1 9 5 ,0 0 0  2 0 5 , 0 0 0  1 7 0 , 0 0 0 1 5 5 , 0 0 0 1 5 , 0 0 0 *
Surface area under the 
complete control of 
SONATRACH
N.A 25,000 4 0 , 0 0 0 4 0 , 0 0 0 6 6 0 , 0 0 0 8 0 0 , 0 0 0
Source: K. Ammour, L.Leucate & J.J. Moulin. Op.Cit. p. 50.
p
*This figure represents the mixed interests between Getty Petroleum (11,500kmfc) 
and Elf-Alg6rie (3,500km2), an American and French company respectively.
Table AII.4: Structure of oil production (U: million tons).
1966 1 967 1 968 1 97 9 1970 24/2/1 971 1 972
Foreign interests 30 34 .4 37.1 3 7 3 3 21 12
SONATRACH 3 .9 4 .6 5 .9 8 14.8 2 7 4 2
Total 33 .9 3 9 4 3 4 5 4 7 .8 4 8 5 4
Algerian control 11% 12% 14% 18% 3 1 % 5 6 % 7 7%
(% of total production)
Source: Ibid. p. 51.
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Figure 111.1: The marketing network of self-managed estates.
S.M.E CAP.C.S
Surplus
Local marketa
CO.F.E.L
Surplus
Regional
surplus
O.F.L.A Regional
deficits
Imports Exports
Regional movement of surplus and supply 
Inter-regional movement of surplus and deficit
Domestic
market
International
market
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Figure 111.2: Overall pattern of growth of the average number of days worked.
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Table AIII.1 :OveralI distribution of GDP by main sectors.
% in agriculture % in industry % in services
1960* 1 9 7 9 ** 1 960* 1 9 7 9 * * 19 6 0 * 1 9 7 9 * *
21 7 33 58 46 35
Source: World Development Report.(* Some figures are for 1961, not 1960; ** Some figures are for 1978, not 
1979).
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Table AIII.2: Structure of employment in the total agricultural sector (Number).
In the SMS In the PAS In the two sectors
Permanent workers 132,950 35,392 168,342
Temporary workers 123,510 493,390 616,900.
Undetermined/ Family helpers 13,390 627,475 627,475
Total 269,850 (51) 1,156,257 1,426,107
Source: Manpower Survey. Op., Cit., and D. Benamrane. Agriculture et d6veloppement en AlgSrie. S.N.E.D 1980. 
Algiers. P. 226.
Table Alll.3: Farm machinery of the A.R.S in 1978 (Number & %).
Category of CS (excluding the Equipment CAPCS ‘Proportion of the CS in the
equipment held by the CAPCS) overall agricultural sector(%)
held by
Traction equipment 6,289 5,827 28.5%
Harvesting equipment 3,849 5,604 32%
ploughing equipment 11,491 9,238 22.5%
transportation 4,144 4,400 39.4%
other equipment 2,771 2,095 21%
Source: Annuaire Statistiques de I'Algerie. 1984.
As seen in chapter III, CAPCSs are cooperatives which primarily cater for the needs of 
the cooperative sector but their services extend to private farmers. The question of the 
financial capabilities of the small holders (who remain unaffected by the benefit of 
land nationalisations) to hire the CAPCS services remains unsolved.
Table AIII.4: Comparative yields in the different agricultural sectors (quintal/ha).
CS
Cereals 
SMS PAS CS
Pulses
SMS PAS
market-qarden 
CS SMS
Droducts
PAS CS
Citrus fruits 
SMS PAS
1973 3 7 4 - 4 6 - 6 1 6 9 - 112 91
1975 7 1 0 8 7 7 8 6 3 7 7 6 1 98 113 9 9
1977 4 5 3 6 6 8 4 6 5 6 6 2 90 115 110
1979 4 7 5 4 3 6 4 9 5 8 6 3 83 105 94
1980 6 9 7 4 3 6 5 9 6 2 6 6 79 101 89
Source: Ibid.
The exception is for industrial crops given the weight of industrial tomatoes.The 
weight of tomatoes production has also evolved as follow. 1973: 75%, 1974: 99%, 
1975: 98.5%, 1976: 92%, 1977: 99%, 1977: 71%.
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Table AIII.5: Balance sheet of withdrawal by the beneficiaries of the A.R measures (1979).
Wilaya Number of 
beneficiaries
Withdrawals 
Number %
Replaced withdrawals 
Number %
Tiaret 9,087 2,171 24% 536 25%
Sidi belabes 9,036 1,718 19% NA NA
Blida 2,021 1,271 63% 509 40%
Constantine 3,275 1,089 33% 600 55%
Skikda 2,116 927 44% 0 0%
Mostaganem 4,322 515 12% 0 0%
Batna 4,241 783 18.5% NA NA
Setif 4,598 625 13.6% NA NA
Biskra 5,310 520 10% NA NA
Oum El Bouaghi 6,214 487 8% 487 100%
Alger 457 301 66% 0 0%
Source: M.A.R.A quoted by Benachenhou, A. Planification et 
P. 175.
Developpement en Algeria. 1980. Algiers.
TableAIII. 6: Share of the cost of seasonal workers for 5 cooperatives in the Wilaya of 
Algiers (1974/75) U =A.D 1,000.
Cooperatives Total cost of Cost of seasonal % of seasonal workers cost
cost manpower workers in total manpower
El harrach 69 50 72%
Zeralda 649 404 62%
Boudouaou 156 104 66%
Thenia 321 136 42%
Cheraga 714 430 60%
Source: Benhouria, Tahar. Op., Cit. P. 203.
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The randomly selected samples of households was carried out in two steps: A first draw 
of 520 districts (each communal population was subdivided into district and in turn 
each district includes about 100 households) distributed according to the weight of the 
geographical distribution of the population between North and South. The result was the 
distribution of the 480 districts in Northern Algeria (total population 10,234,974) 
and 40 districts in Southern Algeria (total population: 874,752). Each district was to 
provide 20 households or a total of 10,400 households. I turn the households were 
distributed by stratum depending on the proportion of its agricultural active 
population. 4 types of stratum were derived: The rural communes with an agricultural 
active population greater or equal to 75 % of total active population (STRATUM 4). The 
semi-rural communes wit a proportion of agricultural active population included 
between 50 and 25% (STRATUM 3). The semi-urban communes with a proportion of 
active agricultural population included between 50 and 25% (STRATUM 2). The urban 
communes with less than 25% of an active agricultural population (STRATUM 1). The 
distribution of the population by stratum and district is given in the following table.
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Table AIV. 1: Population distribution by stratum and by district in 1968.
Northern Algeria 
without Grand Algiers
Population Districts Drawn 
districts
Rate of sample 
survey
1/Urban communes 
2/Semi-urban commune 
3/Semi-rural commune 
4/Rural communes
2 , 6 4 5 , 5 8 5
6 1 4 , 5 3 9
5 7 2 , 6 0 5
6 , 4 0 2 , 2 4 5
4 , 3 0 4  124  
1 , 0 9 0  2 9  
1 ,0 6  27 
1 2 ,0 2 9  3 0 0
1 / 3 5  
1 / 3 9  
1 / 3 9  
1 / 4 0
Total 1 1 0 , 2 3 4 , 9 7 4 1 8 , 4 8 7  4 8 0 1 / 3 8
Southern Algeria 
5/U rban
6/Semi urban + semi rural 
7/Rural communes
339,215
4 9 , 9 7 3
4 8 5 , 5 6 4
7 4 0  15  
9 3  2 
1 , 0 5 5  23
1 / 4 9  
1 / 4 9  
1 / 4 5
Total II 8 7 4 , 7 5 2 1 , 8 8 8  4 0 1 / 4 7
Grand total 1 1 , 1 0 9 , 7 3 0 2 0 , 2 7 5  5 2 0 1 / 3 9
Source: Autrey, M. "AlgSrie: Evolution de 
1878. P. 5.
la situation alimentaire ".UNPD/F.A.O Rome,
A second draw of about 10,000 households. Here the number of households ii
determined according to a size distinction: less than 5 persons and above 5 persons.
Table AIV. 2: Household distribution in 1968.
Communes < 5 persons > 5 persons Total
Urban
Semi-urban
Sem i-rura l
Rural
5 , 2 8 2
776
9 4 8
8,176
9 , 2 2 4
1 , 6 6 4
1 , 5 0 5
16,729
14,506
2 , 4 4 0
2 , 4 5 3
2 4 , 9 0 5
Total 15,173 2 9 , 1 9 2 44 ,365
Source: Ibid. p. 6.
The distribution of drawn households by types of communes gave 10,360 households 
distributed in the following manner.
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TableAIV. 3: Survey sample in 1968.
Number of households Surveyed population Represented population
North
Urban 3,013 19,343 2 ,615 ,585
Semi-urban 555 -
Sem i-rura l 585
}1 ,1 401,541 1 ,187 ,144
South
Urban +semi urban 376 .
}7 ,104,618 874,752
Rural + semi-rural 334 -
Total 10,360 62,136 11,109,730 *
Source: Ibid. p. 7. ‘ For Grand Algiers the number of households was of the order of 750 for a 
population of 943,555. The total population amounted therefore to about 12,053,281.
The final adjusted sample gave a total of 18,596 households (In order to arrive at a 
levelling of the rates of representativeness, the following rates were used. In the North 
1.59 for the urban stratum, 1.78 for the semi-urban/semi-rural, 1.92 for the rural 
stratum. In the South 1.64 was applied to the urban stratum, 3.5 to the semi- 
urban/semi-rural stratum and 3.03 to the rural stratum).
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Table AIV.4: Pulses, vegetables & sugar intakes for Algeria without Grand Algiers
(U= kg/person/year) in 1968.
S.E.Cs (Pulses ) Total Fresh pulses drv pulses V ege tab les Sugar
All S.E.Cs (averaaef 6 3 3 5 8 1 4
Farmers 8 2 6 38 13
Perm.agr.workers 3 1 2 62 19
Seas. agr. workers 4 2 2 35 1 2
Retail traders 7 5 2 73 15
Handicraft &hand. workers 5 3 2 63 13
Middle cadres 10 8 2 110 1 7
Clerks 10 7 3 100 1 6
Qual. workers 6 3 3 84 15
Unskilled workers perm, employed 6 4 2 66 15
Unskilled workers tempor. employed 3 2 1 38 1 0
Self-employed in petty jobs 3 2 1 42 1 2
law & sec. enforcement members 1 4 1 0 4 123 1 6
Retired 10 6 4 64 13
Unemployed 3 1 2 38 9
Rentiers 9 5 4 87 1 4
Employees & whole sale traders 20 1 6 4 108 15
Liberal professions & 1 3 9 4 169 18
Services 6 4 2 74 15
top executives
Source: Ibid.
Table AIV. 5: Fruits, meat and dairy products intakes for Algeria without Grand Algiers 
(U=kg/person/year) in 1968.
S.ECs Fresh Fruits dry fruits Total Meat Fish Milk
All S.E.Cs (averaae) 2 6 1 9 7 1 1 0.4 2 7
Farmers 26 13 13 9 0.2 37
Perm.agr.workers 18 1 5 3 6 0.2 20
Seas, agr.workers 1 7 1 1 6 7 0.4 1 4
Retail traders 33 26 7 1 7 0.5 29
Handicraft & hand, workers 31 22 9 7 1.1 27
Middle cadres 54 43 1 1 29 3.2 43
Clerks 42 38 4 16 3.5 38
Qual. workers 34 28 6 1 1 2.5 26
Unskilled workers perm, employed 23 1 8 5 7 2.0 25
Unskilled workers tempor. employed 19 9 1 0 3 0.6 1 6
Self-employed in petty jobs 27 1 2 15 6 1.0 1 9
Law & sec. enforcement members 50 4 2 8 1 9 4.0 38
Retired 29 1 9 7 7 3.5 38
Unemployed 1 1 9 2 5 2.5 20
Rentiers 48 33 1 5 1 7 2.0 25
Employees & whole sale traders 41 30 1 1 31 1.0 1 9
Liberal professions & top executives 94 92 2 36 4.0 38
Services 26 21 5 1 0 1.0 22
Source: Ibid.
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Table AIV. 6:Oil, fats and animal products for Algeria without Grand Algiers
(U=kg/person/year) in 1968.
S.E.C Oil and fat Total Animal products
Animal fat Veg.oil (sub-total )
All S.E.Cs faveraae) 1 0 1 9 4 0
Farmers 7 1 6 47
Perm.agr.workers 1 0 1 9 29
Seas. agr. workers 8 1 7 22
Retail traders 10 1 9 29
Handicraft and hand, workers 8 1 7 36
Middle cadres 14 2 12 78
Clerks 15 1 14 60
Qual.workers 1 1 1 10 41
Unskilled workers perm, employed 1 0 1 9 3 4
Unskilled workers tempor. employed 7 1 6 18
Self-employed in petty jobs 7 1 6 27
law and sec. enforcement members 15 3 1 2 64
Retired 15 6 9 36
Unemployed 6 1 5 1 6
Rentiers 10 1 9 56
Employees and whole sale traders 1 6 4 1 2 95
Liberal professions and top executive 18 3 15 124
Services. 9 1 8 41
Source: Ibid.
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Table AIV. 7: Calorie needs of the Algerian population in 1968.
Age group Calorie needs in relation
to age* (U = Calories)
Population
structure
Needs for 100 persons. 
(U = Calories)
C h ild ren
< 1 year 1,030 4.40 4,791
1-3 1,360 11.03 14,994
4 -6  1,930 10.71 19,606
7 -9  2,190 
Adolescents + Males
3.32 20,414
10-12 2,60 3.97 10,332
13-15 2,900 3.65 10,586
16-19 3,070 4.19 12,877
20-39 3,000 10.55 31,657
40-49 2,850 3.24 9,244
50-59 2,700 
60-69 2,400
2.47 6,665
7 0 +  2,100 
Adolescents + Females
}3.07 }6,916
10-12 2,350 3.81 8,955
13-15 2,480 3.40 8,423
16-19 2,310 4.01 9,415
20-39 2,200 12.48 27,312
40-49 1,090 3.58 7,476
50-59 1,980 
60-69 1,760
2.77 5,492
70 + 1,540
}3.34 }5,509
T o ta l 220,664
Total per head 2,206
Source: Ibid. p. 119. * The ca lo rie  requ irem ent is based on the  1973 F. A .O /W .H .O  calculation,
Table AIV. 8: P rote in  needs o f the  A lgerian  popu la tion .
Age group Body weight Protein needs /kg 
of body weight
Proteins/person 
/day (g)
Structure of the 
population
Needs for 
100 persons
<1 - - 15.00 4.40 66.00
1-3 12 1.06 12.72 4.03 140.30
4 -6 17 0.97 16.49 10.71 176.61
7-9 24 0.92 22.08 9.32 205.73
Male Female M F M F M F M F
10-12 33 35 0.86 0.86 28.3 30.1 3.9 3.8 112.6 114.6
13-15 43 45 0.84 0.84 36.1 37.8 3.6 3.4 131.8 128.5
16-19 60 52 0.77 0.77 46.2 40.2 4.1 4.0 193.5 163.3
20+ 65 55 0.70 0.70 42.6 38.3 19.0 22.0 822.1 847.3
Total for 100 persons 3,103 g
Total per head 31 g
Source: Autrey, M., ibid. P. 121.
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Table AIV. 9: Population distribution by stratum in 1980.
Urban stratum Rural stratum
(d is tribu tion  o f the  urban popu la tion) (d is tr ibu tion  o f the  rura l popu la tion
as a %  to ta l population) as a %  to ta l popula tion)
Grand Algiers 9.2% Villages (agglomerated rural) 7.4%
The 3 big metropolis Countryside (scattered rural) 50.6%
(Annaba, Oran, Constantine) 6.5%
Middle towns 19.0%
Small towns 7.0%
Total Urban stratum 42% Total rural stratum 58%
Source: Algerian Households consumption expenditure. Algiers. 1981.
Table AIV.10: Structure of cereal consumption (kg/head/year and %)between 1968 & 1980.
U rban 
1968 %
S tra tum  
1980 %
R ura l 
1968 %
s tra tu m  
1980 % 1968
T o ta l
% 1980 %
Hard wheat 122 59% 103 62% 210 65% 155 78% 160 60% 145 78%
Soft wheat 71 34% 61 37% 30 9% 28 14% 49 18% 31 17%
Barley 13 6% 1 1% 83 26% 15 8% 51 19% 9 5%
Total cereals 206 100 165 100 323 100 198 100 266 100 185 100
Source: Ibid.
TableAIV. 11: Index trend  o f ce re a l p ro d u c tio n  p rices* (1965= 100).
1 9 6 3 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1975 1 9 76 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8
Hard wheat 100 100 108 118 118 144 192 221 270
Soft wheat 100 100 106 108 108 128 172 200 240
Barley 100 100 105 105 105 135 165 199 265
Source: S.Bedrani in "L'agriculture Algerienne depuis 1966". OPU. Algiers, 1981. p. 148.* If one is to take into account 
the effects of inflation on such prices; up to 1974, OAIC was actually paying domestic producers at decreasing 
real prices.
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TableAIV. 12: Movement of consumer prices and import prices (AD/ kg) and its effect on the 
level of gross margin * (U= AD million).
Consumer Price Import price Margin Total gross margin
1 9 6 9 Coffee
Sugar
7.6
1.7
3
0 .5
+ 93  
+ 1 2 3 + 2 1 6
1970 Coffee 8 3 + 7 6
Sugar 1.7 0.5 + 2 5 8 + 3 3 4
1971 Coffee 8 2 + 4 8
Sugar 1.7 0.6 + 2 8 2 + 3 3 0
1 9 7 2 Coffee 8 2 + 63
Sugar 1.7 0 .8 + 2 3 9 + 3 0 2
1973 Coffee 8 3 + 60
Sugar 1.7 1 + 1 8 0 + 2 4 0
1 9 7 4 Coffee 8 5 + 8 7
Sugar 1.7 2 - 8 8 - 1
1975 Coffee 8 5 + 101 - 5 2 1
Sugar 1.7 8 - 6 2 2
1 9 7 6 Coffee 8 9 - 3 9
Sugar 1 .75 1.8 -1 7 - 5 6
1 9 7 7 Coffee 1 3 1 9 - 2 7
Sugar 1 .87 1.6 + 1 1 4 - 1 5 7
1 9 7 8 Coffee 2 6 1 5 + 7 6 5
Sugar 2 .7 0.9 1 1 ,2 3 5 + 1 2 , 0 0 0
1 9 7 9 Coffee 2 8 131 + 8 0 9
Sugar 2 .7 1 + 8 5 6 + 1 , 6 6 8
1980 Coffee 28 1 5 + 8 4 7
Sugar 2 .7 2 + 4 0 3 + 1 , 2 5 0
1981 Coffee 2 8 1 1 + 1 ,431
Sugar 2 .7 2.9 - 1 1 5 + 1 , 3 1 6
Source: U.N Yearbook of International Trade Statistics and L'AlgSrie en quelques chiffres.
[Gross margin = (consumer price x imports) - (import price x imports)]
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Table AIV. 13: Structure of cereal land.
1 9 6 9 / 7 0  1 9 7 9 / 8 0
Total agr. sector
Hard wheat 47% (1.5 M ha) 38% (1.30 M ha)
Soft wheat 22% (0.7 M ha) 20% (0.70 M ha)
Barley 25% (0.8 M ha)] 26% (0.90 M ha]
]41 .5% ]3 1 %
Oat 2% (0.06 M ha)] 5% (0,16 M ha)]
Artificial fodder 4% (0.10 M ha)] 10% (0.30 M ha)]
Private agr. sector
Hard wheat 50% (1.20 M ha) 44% (0.80 M ha)
Soft wheat 16% (0.40 M ha) 11% (0.20 M ha)
Barley 29% (0.70 M ha)] 36% (.06 0 M ha)]
]32.5% ]44.5%%
Oat 1% (.03 M ha)] 3% (0.06 M ha)]
Artificial fodder 2% (0.04 M ha)] 5% (0.09 M ha)]
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I'AlgSrie.
TableAIV.14:Structure of the market-garden product sector (U = 1,000 HA and %).
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1 9 8 0
S.M .S
Area under cultivation 46 46 69
% share in total production 47% 37% 33%
C.S
Area under cultivation - 10 21
% share in total production - 6% 9%
P.S (50)
Area under cultivation 61 73 134
% share in total production 53% 57% 58%
Total land under cultivation 108 130 225
Source: Annuaire Statistique de I'AlgSrie.
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